MATTHEW MUSARD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 12, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000910-MR
MATTHEW MUSARD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00003
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, DYCHE AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Matthew Musard has appealed from the final
judgment and sentence of imprisonment entered by the Kenton
Circuit Court on April 17, 2002, which convicted him of assault
in the second degree1 and wanton endangerment in the first
degree.2
Having concluded that the sole claim of error raised by
Musard on appeal was not properly preserved for appellate
review, we affirm.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.020.
2
KRS 508.060.
During the early morning hours of October 13, 2001,
Musard was involved in an altercation with Keon Smith in the
parking lot of a Family Dollar Store in Kenton County, Kentucky.
As a result of the altercation, Smith suffered several stab
wounds to his chest and back.
On January 4, 2002, Musard was
indicted by a Kenton County grand jury and charged with assault
in the second degree and wanton endangerment in the first
degree.
Musard entered a plea of not guilty and the case
proceeded to trial.
Several witnesses testified on behalf of the
Commonwealth at trial.
Smith testified that after he and Musard
exchanged words in the parking lot of the Family Dollar Store,
Musard came after him with a knife.
Smith stated that he then
swung a stick at Musard in self-defense.
Smith explained that
he was not aware that he had been stabbed until he took his
shirt off and noticed that he was bleeding.
Smith further
testified that after the altercation Musard tried to chase him
down in his truck.
Jodi Thompson testified that she observed
the altercation between Smith and Musard, who was her exboyfriend.3
Thompson indicated that she was positioned between
the two men when the fight broke out and she stated that Musard
threw the first punch.
Thompson explained that she never saw
Musard stab Smith but that she heard Smith say that he had been
3
Apparently, there was jealousy between Musard and Smith regarding Thompson.
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stabbed during the altercation.
Thompson further stated that
shortly after the fight broke out she noticed that her right arm
was covered in Smith’s blood.
Thompson testified that shortly
before the police arrived Musard and another person fled the
scene in Musard’s truck.4
Jackie Haskins also testified that she
witnessed the altercation between Musard and Smith.
Haskins
stated that she never actually saw Musard stab Smith but that
she heard Smith say that he had been stabbed during the
altercation.
Haskins further testified that shortly before the
police arrived Musard and another person fled the scene in a
truck.5
Detective Ted Edgington of the Covington Police
Department also testified on behalf of the Commonwealth.
Det.
Edgington stated that he interviewed Thompson and Haskins as
well as several other witnesses who were in the parking lot when
the altercation between Musard and Smith took place.
In
addition, Det. Edgington testified that he obtained a statement
from Smith on November 1, 2001.
During cross-examination,
defense counsel asked Det. Edgington if he remembered coming
across any statements made by Smith during the course of his
investigation indicating that the stabbing was gang-related.
4
Thompson stated that Musard “did donuts” around Smith in the parking lot
before fleeing the scene.
5
Haskins stated that Musard chased Smith around the parking lot in the truck
before fleeing the scene.
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Det. Edgington stated “that was the first [he had] heard about
it being gang-related.”
Defense counsel then presented Det.
Edgington with an investigative report prepared by Officer Eric
Higgins of the Covington Police Department and asked him to read
certain statements contained in the report.
The Commonwealth
objected, arguing that the proffered testimony was inadmissable
hearsay.
After a brief discussion at the bench, the trial court
sustained the Commonwealth’s objection.
Defense counsel never
asked for permission to proceed with this line of questioning by
way of an avowal outside of the presence of the jury and he
failed to have the investigative report admitted into evidence
as an avowal exhibit.6
Musard did not present any witnesses for
his defense.
The jury found Musard guilty of assault in the second
degree and wanton endangerment in the first degree as charged in
the indictment.
On April 17, 2002, the trial court entered its
final judgment and sentence of imprisonment.
The trial court
sentenced Musard to prison for a term of five years on the
conviction for assault in the second degree and one year on the
6
At one point, defense counsel did attempt to have an offense report prepared
by Officer Higgins admitted into evidence. We are unable to discern,
however, whether the offense report defense counsel attempted to have
admitted into evidence is the same report that was presented to Det.
Edgington during cross-examination as the discovery inventory contained in
the record indicates that the defense was provided with an investigative
report and an offense report, both of which were prepared by Officer Higgins.
Regardless, we are not required to resolve this issue as defense counsel
withdrew his request to have the offense report admitted into evidence before
the judge issued a ruling.
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conviction for wanton endangerment in the first degree.
As
recommended by the jury, the trial court ordered the sentences
to be served concurrently for a total of five years.
This
appeal followed.
Musard contends that the trial court erred by not
allowing Det. Edgington to testify as to the statements
contained in Officer Higgins’s report.
We are unable to address
the merits of Musard’s argument as he has failed to preserve
this issue for appellate review by way of an avowal.
KRE7 103 outlines the procedures for preserving issues
regarding rulings made at trial as to the admissibility of
evidence for appellate review.
The rule provides, in relevant
part, as follows:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected; and
. . .
(2) Offer of proof. In case the
ruling is one excluding evidence,
upon request of the examining
attorney, the witness may make a
specific offer of his answer to
the question.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court
may add any other or further statement which
shows the character of the evidence, the
form in which it was offered, the objection
made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct
7
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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the making of an offer in question and
answer form.
RCr8 9.52 describes the procedures for preserving evidentiary
issues for appellate review in a criminal trial when the trial
court sustains an objection to certain testimony.
The rule
provides:
In an action tried by a jury, if an
objection to a question propounded to a
witness is sustained by the court, upon
request of the examining attorney the
witness may make a specific offer of his or
her answer to the question. The court shall
require the offer to be made out of the
hearing of the jury. The court may add such
other or further statement as clearly shows
the character of the evidence, the form in
which it was offered, the objection made,
and the ruling thereon. In actions tried
without a jury the same procedure may be
followed, except that the court upon request
shall take and report the evidence in full,
unless it clearly appears that the evidence
is not admissible on any ground or that the
witness is privileged.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has consistently read
KRE 103 and RCr 9.52 as requiring an offer of avowal testimony
in order to preserve a ruling made at trial as to the
admissibility of evidence for appellate review.9
In Cain v.
Commonwealth,10 the Supreme Court explained that “without an
8
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
9
See Hart v. Commonwealth, Ky., 116 S.W.3d 481, 482-84 (2003); Garrett v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 48 S.W.3d 6, 15 (2001); Commonwealth v. Ferrell, Ky., 17
S.W.3d 520, 523-24 (2000); and Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219,
223 (1996).
10
Ky., 554 S.W.2d 369 (1977).
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avowal to show what a witness would have said an appellate court
has no basis for determining whether an error in excluding his
proffered testimony was prejudicial.”11
Nevertheless, Musard
contends that there was no need for an avowal in the case sub
judice since the contents of the statements he sought to
introduce “w[ere] contained in a written report that was
available for the trial court to consider[.]”
This argument is
disingenuous at best as one of the primary reasons for requiring
an avowal is to provide appellate courts with a meaningful basis
for reviewing decisions made at trial concerning the
admissibility of evidence.12
As previously discussed, Officer
Higgins’s investigative report was not admitted into evidence as
an avowal exhibit and counsel failed to elicit the statements
contained in the report from Det. Edgington by way of an avowal.
Thus, we have no way of conducting any meaningful form of review
of the trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of the
statements contained in the report.
As the Supreme Court stated
in Partin, supra, “[c]ounsel’s version of the evidence is not
enough.
A reviewing court must have the words of the witness.”13
11
Id. at 375.
12
See Hart, 116 S.W.3d at 483 (quoting the 1992 commentary to KRE 103).
13
918 S.W.2d at 223. See also Garrett, 48 S.W.3d at 15 (“[w]hile KRE
103(a)(2) and RCr 9.52 are both couched in terms of preserving oral testimony
as opposed to real evidence, a fair reading of those rules requires avowal
testimony to authenticate the document or object, then a tender of the
document or object to the court as an avowal exhibit” [emphasis added]).
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That is to say, “[a] reviewing court requires more than the
general substance of excluded evidence in order to determine
whether a defendant has suffered prejudice.”14
Simply put,
“[w]ithout an avowal, or a crystal ball, reviewing courts can
never know with any certainty what a given witness’s response to
a question would have been if the trial court had allowed them
to answer.”15
Musard urges us to review this issue pursuant to RCr
10.26, which “provides that an alleged error improperly
preserved for appellate review may be revisited upon a
demonstration that it resulted in manifest injustice.”16
Musard’s contention that we should review the trial court’s
evidentiary ruling in the case sub judice for palpable error
simply underscores the problem caused by his failure to properly
preserve this issue.
In sum, Musard has asked this Court to
determine, without knowing the substance of the statements he
sought to have introduced through the testimony of Det.
Edgington, that a manifest injustice resulted from the trial
court’s ruling with respect to the admissibility of those
statements.
We are not permitted or inclined to engage in such
guesswork.
14
Hart, 116 S.W.3d at 483.
15
Ferrell, 17 S.W.3d at 525, n.10.
16
Butcher v. Commonwealth, Ky., 96 S.W.3d 3, 11 (2002).
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Based on the foregoing reasons, the final judgment and
sentence of the Kenton Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bruce A. Brightwell
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Brian T. Judy
Frankfort, Kentucky
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