JAMES MARK DUNN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 11, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000742-MR
JAMES MARK DUNN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00036
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS; CHIEF JUDGE; KNOPF AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE. Appellant, James Mark Dunn, appeals from an
order of the Garrard Circuit Court summarily denying his RCr
11.42 motion.
In 1995, Appellant and Eric Gill were indicted for
murder and first-degree robbery for the death of Bradley
Johnson.
At trial both were convicted of the charges and
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for a
minimum of 25 years for murder and 20 years for robbery in the
first degree.
The trial court ordered said sentences to run
concurrently.
Appellant’s convictions were affirmed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in an unpublished memorandum opinion
rendered on August 26, 1999.
(96-SC-406-MR)
Appellant argues in his RCr 11.42 motion that his
trial counsel was ineffective due to incorrect, incongruous, and
conflicting arguments before the trial court at the January 26,
1996 hearing on the defense’s motion for a continuance.
Further, Appellant asserts that he is entitled to appointment of
counsel and an evidentiary hearing in that the record is
insufficient to resolve whether the alleged acts or omissions
were outside the wide range of prevailing professional norms1 and
whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.2
In Appellant’s brief he asserts that his trial
attorneys argued inconsistent reasons for a continuance for a
mental health expert to complete an evaluation of appellant.
The trial court had previously granted appellant funds to hire a
mental health “consulting expert” to examine appellant’s records
and develop mental health defenses for both the guilt phase
1
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984).
2
Id. at 694.
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(competency and insanity) and penalty phase of the trial.
trial was set for February 19, 1996.
The
In the motion for a
continuance filed January 22, 1996, defense counsel stated that
an expert had personally evaluated appellant and two other
experts had reviewed the materials, but additional evaluation
from a qualified forensic expert was needed to prepare a defense
for both the guilt phase of trial and the sentencing phase.
The
trial court held a hearing on the motion for continuance.
At the hearing, defense counsel Susanne McCollough
asserted that appellant was entitled to more time for completion
of the mental examination under Hunter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 869
S.W.2d 719 (1994).
McCollough stated that appellant’s request
of a three month continuance was not an excessive amount of time
to adequately investigate and prepare a defense, “in particular
a penalty phase mitigation defense to the state’s attempt to
execute James Dunn.”
The Commonwealth responded by citing Kordenbrock v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 384 (1985), and Jackson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 703 S.W.2d 883 (1986), for the proposition
that appellant was not entitled to additional time, experts, or
funding since he was not raising insanity or another mental
health defense to the charges.
The Commonwealth opined that the
defense wanted more time to put together mitigation evidence for
the penalty phase, not to develop a defense to the charges.
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The
Commonwealth further asserted that the facts of the case did not
point to a defense such as a mental defect or extreme emotional
disturbance, and therefore questioned the necessity of the
experts and the relevance of their inquiry.
McCollough
responded:
I would like to point out that he is so
concerned – this is nothing to do with the
guilt phase. This is a death penalty case
and we are entitled to put on mitigation
evidence. If he doesn’t want us to spend
the time working that up, all Mr. Lockridge
has to do is drop the death penalty and we
can proceed on to trial.
We don’t have to
fiddle around working up the mitigation
evidence. But it is a death penalty case.
It is different. There is an entirely
different phase to it, and we are entitled
to funds and the time to work it up.
The court denied the motion for continuance.
Defense
counsel Joseph Myers then asked to clarify the defense position.
He stated that the defense had asserted in the motion for
continuance all the defenses they wished to explore on
appellant’s behalf.
He stated the fact that an insanity defense
had not yet been asserted by filing a notice of intention to
raise the defense did not mean that the defense did not intend
to or was never going to assert it.
The court declared that it
would look at the issue again if appellant pled insanity.
On January 29, 1996, appellant filed notice of
intention to introduce evidence of mental illness or insanity at
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the time of the offense
The motion asserted that the defense
was “in jeopardy” due to time constraints and concluded:
Finally, defense counsel cannot say at this
time that the defendant’s mental health
status rises to the level of mental disease
or defect, insanity at the time of the
offense or mental illness as the defendant’s
mental health expert evaluation is
incomplete as of this date.
The court entered a written order overruling appellant’s motion
for continuance on January 30, 1996.
On February 5, 1996, appellant filed a motion for an
ex parte hearing to present evidence as to the prejudice he
would suffer if not granted a continuance.
The trial court
granted the motion for a hearing, which was conducted ex parte
on February 8, 1996.
At the hearing, appellant submitted
affidavits and called to the stand its consulting expert, Eric
Drogin, a licensed clinical psychologist and licensed attorney.
Dr. Drogin submitted an affidavit3 and summarized the work he had
performed on the case, which included consulting a
neuropsychologist who performed an evaluation of appellant.
Dr. Drogin declared that appellant still needed to
retain a psychiatrist to deliver a competent forensic
examination.
He testified that a physician was needed to
explore questions of brain injuries suffered by appellant due to
multiple drug overdoses, sustained drug use, a near drowning as
3
We do not find any of the affidavits in the record.
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a young child, and numerous blows to the head, one of which
occurred a few days before the killing with which appellant was
charged.
Counsel Myers asked Dr. Drogin whether in his
affidavit he had identified potential factors which might
pertain to mitigation.
Dr. Drogin responded that there were
several factors a doctor could assess which would pertain to
mitigation, but they would also be highly relevant in working up
the case for the guilt phase.
After this testimony, counsel
renewed the motion for continuance.
The court stated that
defense counsel had shown more than competent trial preparation,
and the court would decide whether it would be error not to let
the defense explore further.
Nevertheless, the trial court
subsequently affirmed its denial of the motion for continuance.
On February 3, 1996, the Commonwealth asked the court
to quash the notice of intention to introduce evidence of a
mental illness defense.
The Commonwealth asserted both that it
was not timely and that the defense confirmed in the notice
there was no determination that appellant’s mental health status
rose to the level of mental disease or defect, insanity at the
time of the offense or mental illness.
The trial court granted
the motion to quash the notice of intent, but reserved the
question whether such evidence could be used in the penalty
phase.
At trial, Appellant presented evidence of his mental
condition only during the penalty phase.
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Appellant now claims that he was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel because his attorneys argued
inconsistently in pretrial hearings and motions whether the
evaluation was for a possible guilt phase defense or only the
penalty phase.
Appellant alleges these inconsistent arguments
resulted in the trial court’s denial of his motion for
continuance and grant of the Commonwealth’s motion to quash the
notice of intention to introduce evidence of mental illness.
He
believes he was prejudiced by “fractured defenses,” as in the
Georgia case of Ross v. Kemp, 393 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 1990).
In
Ross, the Georgia Supreme Court found ineffective assistance of
counsel in a capital case in which a defendant’s two attorneys
presented mutually exclusive defenses and also disagreed as to
whether the defendant should take the stand in his defense.
The
defendant had retained counsel as well as appointed counsel who
both actively represented him at trial, yet had never had a
substantive discussion before trial about the theory of the
case.
In reversing, the Georgia Supreme Court found the
defenses were “at odds,” and there was a practical inability to
advise the defendant on his decision to testify.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must first show that counsel's
performance was deficient relative to current professional
standards, and second, that but for counsel's deficient
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performance there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome
would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
A court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's actions fall within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and thus
constitute sound trial strategy.
Id. at 689-90, 104 S. Ct. at
2065-66, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, the trial court concluded in its
order below that counsel had conducted a reasonable
investigation and made a tactical choice to use the expert for
mitigation evidence alone.
The trial court reasoned that if the
defense had any evidence that appellant lacked the capacity to
appreciate the nature and consequences of the charges, or that
he could not participate rationally in his defense, Dr. Drogin
would have testified as such at the hearing.
Appellant,
however, maintains that Myers’ and McCollough’s conflicting
arguments show no such tactical decision was made.
We believe from the record that it is not clear that
counsel had elected to pursue one or the other course as a
tactical matter.
On the one hand counsel stated that the
experts were needed only for mitigation evidence, but counsel
also asserted that needed investigation into mental health
defenses at trial was ongoing.
We note, however, that the
arguments of counsel were not “at odds” to the same degree as in
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Ross, since both worked toward the goal of obtaining a mental
health evaluation by a psychiatrist prior to trial.
We believe
it was not possible to conclude from this record that the
decision to argue inconsistently to the trial court was a
tactical decision.
While we are obligated to be highly
deferential to an attorney’s performance and indulge in a strong
presumption that the attorney’s performance was reasonable, we
cannot determine from this record which decision of trial
counsel formed the basis for the trial strategy.
We now turn to the other prong of Strickland, supra,
that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense, and
but for said errors, the result would have been different.
Appellant argues that his chance to explore guilt phase mental
defenses was cut off by the performance of counsel, in
particular McCollough, before trial.
However, we believe
appellant has not shown that the result would have been
different if counsel’s arguments had been unvarying.
Even if
the attorneys had been unified in arguing for a guilt phase
mental health expert, the trial judge was not inclined under
Kordenbrock or Jackson to grant any more time to explore mental
health defenses.
This was based on the fact that appellant had
not identified any mental defect, but only the possibility of
one.
In this sense the case is distinguished from Hunter,
wherein the defense had raised issues of extreme emotional
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disturbance and inability to assist in the defense in a request
for a continuance.
Hunter, 869 S.W.2d at 721.
Indeed, the
court below in its order denying the RCr 11.42 stated that
defense counsel’s expert had not established any basis for a
guilt phase defense which needed to be explored further.
On
appeal, appellant does not show that there was any actual basis
for pursuing guilt phase defenses at trial.
Thus, we find no
indication that appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s
performance.
A hearing on a RCr 11.42 motion is unnecessary where
the allegations, even if true, would not be sufficient to
invalidate the conviction.
S.W.2d 311, 314 (1998).
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978
In this case, even if we assume that a
hearing would show that the attorneys made conflicting arguments
in their requests for a mental health expert, their actions did
not prejudice the defense in that they affected the outcome of
the case.
Thus, the trial court properly denied the motion
without a hearing.
Therefore, the Garrard Circuit Court’s order denying
Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Shelly R. Fears
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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