DAMON McCORMICK v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 12, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000582-MR
DAMON McCORMICK
APPELLANT
ON REMAND FROM SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY
APPEAL NO. 2003-SC-0222-D
v.
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN A. HAYDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00103
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Damon McCormick (hereinafter “McCormick”)
appeals the trial order and jury verdict entered by the
Henderson Circuit Court on February 7, 2002, adjudicating him
guilty of the offense of failure to register as a sex offender
(KRS 17.510) and enhancing his sentence of one year to fifteen
years based upon a finding that he is a persistent felony
offender, first degree (KRS 532.070).
In an opinion rendered on
March 7, 2003, this Court affirmed the trial court’s order.
The
Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review, vacated
our prior opinion and remanded the case for reconsideration in
light of its opinion in Peterson v. Shake, Ky., 120 S.W.3d 707
(2003).
In accordance with the principles set forth in
Peterson, we reverse and remand.
On May 3, 2001, McCormick was indicted by the
Henderson County Grand Jury for failure to register as a sex
offender and second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO).
Subsequently, the PFO charge was amended to PFO first degree,
based upon his extensive criminal history.
The original
indictment was based upon information received by Jennifer
Keiser, a Department of Probation and Parole Officer, indicating
that McCormick was a sex offender required by law to register,
that upon release from prison he registered that he would be
residing at 14 Center Circle, Henderson, Kentucky, and that on
February 14, 2001, McCormick moved into the Henderson Hotel,
resided there for at least three (3) weeks and failed to report
the change in his physical address as required by KRS 17.510.
Following a trial by jury, McCormick was convicted of both
charges.
His one year sentence for failure to register as a sex
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offender was enhanced to fifteen years due to the PFO first
degree finding.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, McCormick contends that he should have been
subject to misdemeanor penalties only and not a felony
conviction.
He bases his argument on the fact that at the time
he was released from prison (January 8, 1997), the maximum
penalty for violation of KRS 17.510 was twelve (12) months as a
Class A misdemeanor offense.
He further contends that the
amendment to the statute effective April 11, 2000, increasing
the penalty to a Class D felony does not apply to him.
Upon his
release from prison, McCormick signed a sex offender register
entry form which listed his address as 14 Center Circle,
Henderson, KY 42420.
That form stated, in relevant part, the
following:
I have been notified that the above
information is being sent to the Kentucky
State Police in order to place me on the sex
offender register. I also understand that
if I should have a change of address, I am
required to notify the local probation and
parole officer within 14 days. I further
understand that my failure to comply with
this law is a Class A misdemeanor.
Subsequent to his release on January 8, 1997, KRS
17.520 was amended, effective April 11, 2000, to reflect that
“any person required to register under this section who violates
any of the provisions of this section is guilty of a Class D
felony.”
McCormick argues “that the Legislature did not intend
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to bind persons in his position with this amendment” or in the
alternative, that the Rule of Lenity should apply in that “the
language of the 2000 amendment is ambiguous.”
In Peterson, supra, a case factually similar to the
one before us, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held:
Appellant challenged the application of
the 2000 version of the statute in the
Jefferson Circuit Court. Judge James Shake
determined that the 2000 version of RKS
17.510 was applicable to Appellant, and
thus, Appellant was subject to prosecution
for a Class D felony instead of a Class A
misdemeanor.
Appellant petitioned the Court of
Appeals for a writ prohibiting further
prosecution of the indictment. In an order
entered on August 15, 2002, the Court of
Appeals denied Appellant’s petition. He
appeals as a matter right. CR 76.36(7)(a).
It is clear that Appellant is subject
to the 1998 version of the Kentucky Sex
Offender Registration Act, as he was
released from confinement following its
enactment. However, the Commonwealth wishes
to prosecute Appellant under the 2000
version. As a result, the primary question
with which we are concerned is whether
Appellant is subject to prosecution for a
Class D felony, under the current version of
KRS 17.510, for failing to provide a valid
home address to the sex offender registry.
After considering all of the pertinent
facts, we conclude that Appellant is not.
* * * *
It is quite apparent that the 2000
amendments were only intended to apply to
persons who were required to become
registrants following April 11, 2000.
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Merriam-Webster defines the word “become” as
“to come to exist or occur” or “to emerge as
an entity.” Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary of the English
Language, Unabridged 195 (1993).
Here Appellant was released from state
custody and registered with the sex offender
registry in June of 1999. It necessarily
follows that Appellant could not have been
required to “become” a registrant after
April 11, 2000, since he was included in the
database of registered sex offenders before
that date. In other words, Appellant could
not have “become” a registrant, as he
already was one. In [Gateway Construction
Co. v. Wallbaum, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 247
(1962)], our predecessor Court stated that
“legislative intent is at best a nebulous
will-o’-the-wisp. Far better it is to be
guided by the old adage, ‘Plain words are
easiest understood.’” Id. at 249. If it
was the intent of the General Assembly to
include individuals such as Appellant under
the amended 2000 version of KRS 17.510, then
it could have exactly said just that.
However, such was not expressed. We will
not add words to language we deem to be
unambiguous. Thus, we hold that Appellant
was not among the individuals the General
Assembly intended to be subject to the 2000
version of KRS 17.510.
* * * *
We observe that Appellant has no other
adequate remedy available at his disposal.
If a writ were not issued, Appellant would
experience great injustice in that he would
have to endure a trial and possibly face
conviction of a Class D felony, when the
maximum charge he should face is a Class A
misdemeanor. Considering we have determined
that Appellant could not be indicted under
the 2000 version of KRS 17.510, the felony
indictment charged against him must be
dismissed. If Appellant is to be prosecuted
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regarding an alleged violation of KRS
17.510, then he may be prosecuted under the
1998 version. If the Commonwealth continues
to pursue this matter, the proper court of
jurisdiction would be the Jefferson District
Court.
Peterson, supra, at 708-10.
For the foregoing reasons and in accordance with the
mandate set forth by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Peterson,
supra, we reverse the judgment and order of the Henderson
Circuit Court and remand this matter for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas D. Collins
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, KY
A. B. Chandler
Attorney General
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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