SHERRY DENISE VANN (NOW JORJANI) v. BILLY RAY VANN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
JANUARY 16, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000511-MR
NO. 2002-CA-000584-MR
NO. 2002-CA-000611-MR
SHERRY DENISE VANN (NOW JORJANI)
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEALS AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL E. BRADEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00632
BILLY RAY VANN
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KNOPF, TACKETT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Sherry Denise Vann (now Jorjani) appeals, and
Billy Ray Vann (Bill) cross-appeals, from an order of the
Whitley Circuit Court which, among other things, denied their
respective motions to modify the existing joint custody
agreement concerning their only child, Billy Ray Vann, Jr.
(B.J.).
Sherry sought sole custody of B.J., while Bill sought
to continue joint custody with himself designated as the primary
residential custodian.
Sherry also appeals the granting of
additional parenting time to Bill, and various evidentiary and
procedural issues which arose in the custody litigation.
For
the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Sherry and Bill were married on November 22, 1989.
During their marriage they had one child, Billy Ray Vann, Jr.,
born June 10, 1990.
On October 28, 1996, Sherry filed a
petition for dissolution of marriage.
On March 18, 1997, a
final decree was entered dissolving the marriage.
The decree
incorporated a separation agreement the parties had previously
executed which, among other things, provided for joint custody
of B.J., with Sherry designated as the primary residential
custodian.
Following entry of the final decree, Sherry married
David Jorjani.
In the years following the decree, relations
between Bill and Sherry, and between Bill and David, have been
extremely bitter and acrimonious.
Extensive post-decree
litigation, mostly by way of motions for contempt, has resulted.
The parties have repeatedly accused one another of violating
parenting time orders, not sharing information concerning B.J.,
engaging in improper conduct in front of B.J., saying improper
things in front of B.J., making threats, and of filing frivolous
motions regarding these matters.
-2-
On June 29, 1998, and on July 1, 1999, Bill filed
motions for a change of custody, but it appears that these
motions were never ruled upon.
On May 30, 2000, Bill filed a
motion requesting that he be designated as the primary
residential custodian, or, in the alternative, that he be
awarded sole custody of B.J.
On May 14, 2001, Sherry filed a
motion to modify custody to grant her sole custody of B.J.
The
trial court referred the motions to the DRC.1
On June 6, June 7, and August 11, 2001, hearings were
held on the custody motions.
On November 6, 2001, the DRC
entered her proposed custody and visitation order.
The order
recommended that Sherry remain B.J.’s primary residential
custodian, but also recommended substantial additional parenting
time for Bill.
On November 8 and November 14, 2001, respectively,
Bill and Sherry filed their notices of exceptions objecting to
the DRC’s recommended order.
On December 3, 2001, Sherry filed
supplemental exceptions to the DRC report.
On December 14,
2001, the trial court entered an order striking Sherry’s
supplemental exceptions as untimely.
On February 14, 2002, the trial court entered an order
overruling the exceptions of the parties and adopting the DRC’s
proposed order.
1
On February 23, 2002, Sherry filed a motion for
Domestic Relations Commissioner.
-3-
additional findings of fact pursuant to CR2 52.02; a motion for
the trial court to interview B.J. on the basis that the DRC’s
interview with the child was either erased or had not been
recorded; and a motion for the trial court to reopen the
judgment, take additional testimony, and to make new findings of
fact and conclusions of law since her testimonial evidence from
the DRC hearings was inaudible on the cassette recordings of the
hearing.
On March 15, 2002, the trial court entered an order
denying Sherry’s post-judgment motions.
DIRECT APPEAL – CASE NO. 2002-CA-000511-MR
CUSTODY
First, Sherry contends that the trial court erred by
failing to award her sole custody of B.J.
In Scheer v. Zeigler3 this Court held that the same
criteria apply for a modification of joint custody as apply to a
modification of sole custody.
Thus, in order for there to be a
modification of joint custody, as in all custody cases, the
party seeking modification must first meet the threshold
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
3
Ky. App., 21 S.W.3d 807 (2000);
Ky. 114 S.W.3d 767 (2003).
-4-
See also Fenwick v. Fenwick,
requirements for modification contained in KRS4 403.340 and KRS
403.350.
For a proposed modification occurring more than two
years after the initial custody award, KRS 403.340(3) sets forth
the threshold circumstances which must be met in order for the
circuit court to reconsider its initial custody award:
[T]he court shall not modify a prior custody
decree unless after hearing it finds, upon
the basis of facts that have arisen since
the prior decree or that were unknown to the
court at the time of entry of the prior
decree, that a change has occurred in the
circumstances of the child or his custodian,
and that the modification is necessary to
serve the best interests of the child. When
determining if a change has occurred and
whether a modification of custody is in the
best interests of the child, the court shall
consider the following:
(a) Whether the custodian agrees to the
modification;
(b) Whether the child has been integrated
into the family of the petitioner with
consent of the custodian;
(c) The factors set forth in KRS 403.270(2)
to determine the best interests of the
child;
(d) Whether the child's present environment
endangers seriously his physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health;
(e) Whether the harm likely to be caused by
a change of environment is outweighed by its
advantages to him; and
(f) Whether the custodian has placed the
child with a de facto custodian.
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-5-
KRS 403.350 provides that a party seeking modification
of a custody decree submit an affidavit setting forth facts
supporting the requested modification, which would include the
presence of circumstances contained in KRS 403.340, and that the
court must deny the motion unless it finds that adequate cause
for hearing the motion is established by the affidavits, in
which case it must set a date for hearing to show cause why the
requested order or modification should not be granted.
While it appears that the circuit court did not enter
an order explicitly holding that Sherry’s motion had met the
threshold requirements of KRS 403.340 and KRS 403.350, Bill does
not allege that the threshold for the trial court to consider a
modification of custody was not met, and his own motion to
modify custody carries with it the implicit contention that the
threshold conditions for a change of custody are met.
However, in considering whether there should be a
change in the existing custody decree, KRS 403.340 also requires
that the change be in the best interest of the child.
In fact,
the overriding consideration in any custody determination is the
best interests of the child.5
In this case, unfortunately, the trial court provided
minimal findings of fact addressing the best interest factors as
5
Squires v. Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 765, 768 (1993); KRS
403.270.
-6-
set forth in KRS 403.340(3) and KRS 403.270(2).
Rather, the
trial court’s order was limited to the following findings and
conclusions:
The Court finds that B.J. has finally begun
to adjust to his parents’ divorce, and
everything that followed from it, including
a new school, new friends, and a new home.
. . . .
The Court finds and concludes that it is in
B.J.’s best interest not to interrupt his
life again, and Sherry should remain primary
residential custodian. However, it is also
in B.J.’s best interest that Billy should
have more parenting time with him.
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."6
A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is
supported by substantial evidence.7
"Substantial evidence" is
evidence of substance and relevant consequence sufficient to
induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people.8
After a trial court makes the required findings of
fact, it must then apply the law to those facts.
The resulting
custody award as determined by the trial court will not be
6
Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, Ky. App., 6 S.W.3d 843, 852
(1999); CR 52.01.
7
Janakakis-Kostun at 852.
8
Id.
-7-
disturbed unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion.9
The
trial court possesses broad discretion in determining the
child's best interests.10
"'Abuse of discretion in relation to
the exercise of judicial power implies arbitrary action or
capricious disposition under the circumstances, at least an
unreasonable and unfair decision.' . . . The exercise of
discretion must be legally sound."11
The trial court’s finding that B.J. was finally
becoming adjusted to the acrimonious divorce of his mother and
father, and that his life should not be interrupted again, was
not clearly erroneous.
While these findings appear more
concerned with the issue of whether there should be a change in
the primary residential custodian, they apply equally to the
issue of whether there should be a change in the existing joint
custody decree.
The trial court’s finding that a change in
custody status could be disruptive to B.J.’s acceptance of his
parents’ divorce, and that it was in the child’s best interest
that his life not be so disrupted was not clearly erroneous.
9
Bickel v. Bickel, Ky., 442 S.W.2d 575, 577 (1969); Carnes v.
Carnes, Ky., 704 S.W.2d 207, 208 (1986).
10
Squires, supra, at 770; Dull v. George, Ky. App., 982 S.W.2d
227, 230 (1998).
11
Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, Ky., 888 S.W.2d 679, 684
(1994)(citations omitted); See also, Sherfey v. Sherfey, Ky.
App., 74 S.W.3d 777, 782 – 783 (2002).
-8-
The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion by denying
Sherry’s motion for sole custody.
SHARED PARENTING TIME
Next, Sherry contends that the shared parenting time
schedule awards excessive time to Bill.
Previously Bill had
parenting time with B.J. substantially consistent with the
standard schedule for Whitley County.
This consisted of shared
parenting time every other weekend, one evening per week,
alternate holidays, and four weeks during the summer.
Under the
February 14, 2001, order Bill was awarded parenting time with
B.J. three weekends per month from 6:00 Friday until Monday
morning; overnight parenting time one night per week; alternate
holidays; and summer parenting time from the Sunday following
the last day of school until Sunday the week before school
starts, with Sherry having parenting time every other weekend
during the summer.
The additional parenting time schedule
provided Bill with approximately 79 additional days of parenting
time per year.
Sherry alleges that shared parenting time with Bill
produces emotional and mental harm to B.J. and that, if
anything, the shared parenting time should be reduced, not
increased.
KRS 403.32 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
-9-
(1) A parent not granted custody of the
child is entitled to reasonable visitation
rights unless the court finds, after a
hearing, that visitation would endanger
seriously the child's physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health. Upon request of
either party, the court shall issue orders
which are specific as to the frequency,
timing, duration, conditions, and method of
scheduling visitation and which reflect the
development age of the child.
. . . .
(3) The court may modify an order granting
or denying visitation rights whenever
modification would serve the best interests
of the child; but the court shall not
restrict a parent's visitation rights unless
it finds that the visitation would endanger
seriously the child's physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health.
What constitutes "reasonable visitation" is a matter
which must be decided based upon the circumstances of each
parent and the children, rather than any set formula.12
When the
trial court decides to award joint custody, an individualized
determination of reasonable shared parenting time is even more
important.
A joint custody award envisions shared decision-
making and extensive parental involvement in the child's
upbringing, and in general serves the child's best interest.13
parenting time schedule should be crafted to allow both parents
as much involvement in their children's lives as is possible
12
Drury v. Drury, Ky. App., 32 S.W.3d 521, 524 (2000).
13
Squires v. Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 765, 769 (1993).
-10-
A
under the circumstances.14
Moreover, trial courts should not
give undue weight to the terms of a "standard" visitation
order.15
In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the
trial court has considerable discretion to determine the living
arrangements which will best serve the interests of the
children.16
This Court will only reverse a trial court's
determinations as to visitation if they constitute a manifest
abuse of discretion, or were clearly erroneous in light of the
facts and circumstances of the case.17
In contrast with the standard parenting time schedule,
the trial court awarded one extra weekend per month, with
visitation ending Monday morning rather than on Sunday evening.
During the summer months, Bill becomes, in effect, the primary
residential custodian with Sherry receiving alternate weekend
parenting time.
This results in Bill receiving approximately 79
additional days of parenting time per year above the former
schedule.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot
conclude that the trial court’s determinations as to parenting
14
Drury at 524.
15
Drury at 524 - 525.
16
Drury at 525.
17
Id.
-11-
time constitute a manifest abuse of discretion or were clearly
erroneous.
The trial court made a specific finding that it was
in B.J.’s best interest that Bill have more parenting time with
him.
Bill’s testimony in this regard supports the trial court’s
finding.
Accordingly, we will not disturb the parenting time
schedule established by the trial court.
THOMAS CONNERS TESTIMONY
Next, Sherry contends that the trial court erred by
permitting Billy’s counselor, Thomas Conners, director for the
Christian Appalachian Project, to be qualified as an expert and
to present opinion testimony.
Specifically, Sherry contends
that Conners is not licensed by the Kentucky Board of Licensed
Professional Counselors and was therefore not qualified to
testify concerning the Taylor-Johnson Temperament Analysis test,
the primary subject of his testimony.
KRE 702 vests the trial court with broad discretion to
determine whether a witness is qualified to express an opinion
in a matter which requires expert knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education.
Likewise, the rule requires the trial
court to determine if such expert testimony will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue.18
18
KRE 702 provides as follows:
R.C. v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 101 S.W.3d 897, 901 (2002).
-12-
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Application of KRE 702 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.19
An abuse of discretion occurs
when a "trial judge's decision [is] arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles."20
A trial
court's ruling on the qualifications of an expert should not be
overturned unless the ruling is clearly erroneous.21
Mr. Conners has a B.A. and a masters in psychology and
is certified by a national board as a counselor.
Conners is the
director of the Christian Appalachian Project and supervises
twenty-eight managers and four assistant directors of that
program.
Conners manages several types of programs, including
education programs and school programs.
He also manages elderly
programs, prescription assistance programs, and shelters.
However, Conner admitted that he is not licensed as a counselor
in Kentucky and that he has had limited case experience.
19
Ford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 665 S.W.2d 304, 309 (1983).
20
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575,
581 (2000).
21
Farmland Mutual Insurance Company v. Johnson, Ky., 36 S.W.3d
368, 378 (2000).
-13-
Despite any shortcomings in Conners’ credentials, we
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in
qualifying him as an expert.
Conners holds a masters degree in
psychology and is nationally certified as a counselor.
Further,
Conner’s testimony, rather than being presented to a jury, was
presented to an experienced DRC who, we are persuaded, had a
full appreciation of Conners’ experience and limitations and who
was able to give proper weight to the testimony.
Hence, to the
extent there may have been shortcomings in Conner’s credentials,
under the circumstances, we are persuaded that the admission of
any testimony outside the scope of his expertise was harmless
error.
“No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence and no error or defect in any ruling . . . or in
anything done or omitted by the court . . . is ground for . . .
disturbing a judgment . . . unless refusal to take such action
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.
The
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.”22
Accordingly, there was
not reversible error associated with the testimony of Mr.
Conners.
22
CR 61.01.
-14-
AVOWAL TESTIMONY OF SUE REED
Next, Sherry contends that the trial court erred by
denying her the opportunity to present the avowal testimony of
the child’s treating psychologist, Sue Reed.
In January 1997, upon the initiative of Sherry, B.J.
began counseling treatment with Sue Reed.
In June 1999,
following a visitation with Bill, B.J. appeared to Sherry to be
extremely upset.
As a result, Sherry contacted Reed, who asked
that B.J. be brought in to her office.
As a result of her
evaluation of B.J. and his reaction to the recent shared
parenting time, Reed concluded that B.J. should not have
parenting time with his father.
Reed advised Sherry of this,
and, as a result, B.J. missed parenting time with his father as
scheduled under the order.
In response, Bill filed a motion to
hold Sherry in contempt for violation of the trial court’s
parenting time order.
parenting time.
Sherry responded with a motion to suspend
At the hearing on the contempt motion, it came
to light that Reed had influenced Sherry’s decision to violate
the trial court’s parenting time order.
The trial court held
Sherry in contempt and expressed annoyance that Reed had
recommended violating the trial court’s order.
As the June and August 2001 custody hearings
approached, Bill filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Reed
on the basis of her qualifications.
-15-
The trial court granted
Bill’s motion and stated to the effect that he would not allow a
witness who had recommended that his orders be violated to
testify in his court.23
Reed thus did not testify at the custody
hearings.
As a result of the trial court’s ruling, Sherry sought
to enter into the record the avowal testimony of Reed.
As this
could not be done during the time allotted for the hearings, the
DRC allowed Sherry thirty days24 in which to take the avowal
testimony, which, in effect, established a window for taking
Reed’s avowal deposition to end on September 10, 2001, thirty
days after August 11.
It appears uncontested that Bill’s
attorney waived notice of the avowal deposition and did not
intend to attend if the deposition was held during the thirtyday window.
As it turned out, Sherry failed to take the deposition
within the window established at the hearing.
her proposed order on November 6, 2001.
The DRC issued
On December 3, 2001,
after the entry of the proposed order and the parties’
exceptions thereto, Sherry served Bill with notice that she
would be taking the deposition of Reed the next day, December 4.
23
Sherry sought to appeal this ruling to this Court; however, by
order dated October 8, 2001, the appeal was dismissed as
interlocutory. See Case 2001-CA-001736-MR.
24
Because of the poor quality of the cassette tape recording, it
is unclear whether the DRC granted a window of 30 days or 14
days to take the deposition.
-16-
Bill then objected to inadequacy of notice and moved to exclude
the avowal testimony from the record.
The trial court granted
Bill’s motion and Sue Reed’s avowal testimony is not in the
appellate record.
Excluded testimony must be placed in the record by
avowal to be preserved for our review.25
Obviously Sherry was
attempting to comply with this requirement, but since the avowal
testimony is not in the record for us to review, we cannot
address the merits of whether the trial court erred by granting
Bill’s motion to exclude her from testifying, but, rather, we
will limit our review to whether the trial court erred by
granting Bill’s motion to exclude Reed’s avowal deposition.
It appears undisputed that (1) the DRC granted
Sherry’s motion to take Reed’s avowal deposition within thirty
days following the conclusion of the custody hearing; (2) Bill’s
attorney waived notice if the deposition was taken during this
window; (3) Sherry did not take the deposition within the
window; (4) when Sherry took Reed’s testimony substantially
after the thirty day period she served Bill’s attorney; and (5)
the notice was not timely.
25
Transit Authority of River City [TARC] v. Vinson, Ky. App.,
703 S.W.2d 482, 487 (1985).
-17-
"[A]buse of discretion is the proper standard of
review of a trial court's evidentiary rulings."26
Sherry was given a generous amount of time, thirty
days following the custody hearing, to take Reed’s avowal
deposition.
Further, had she taken the deposition within the
allotted time, notice would not have been an issue because Bill
waived notice.
However, Sherry waited until almost four months
after the conclusion of the custody hearing, and almost a month
after the DRC had entered her recommended order, and after the
parties had entered their exceptions to the DRC’s order, to take
the avowal deposition.
With all that had transpired since
Bill’s original waiver of notice – most notably the expiration
of the window and the entry of the DRC’s recommended order – we
are persuaded that the waiver was no longer effective.
In light of Sherry’s failure to conduct Reed’s avowal
deposition within the thirty days allotted by the DRC, and her
failure to timely give notice of her belated taking of Reed’s
avowal testimony, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s granting of Bill’s motion to exclude Reed’s avowal
testimony.
REDUCTION OF PARENTING TIME AS PUNISHMENT
26
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575,
577 (2000).
-18-
Next, Sherry contends that the trial court erred by
reducing her parenting time to punish her.
CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv) mandates that a party indicate how
an issue is properly preserved for review by an appellate court.
Sherry’s brief does not cite to where in the record this issue
is preserved, and we will not search the record on appeal to
make that determination.27
Moreover, CR 76.03(8) provides that a party shall be
limited on appeal to the issues in the prehearing statement
before the Court of Appeals.
Sherry did not list this as an
issue on her prehearing statement, so the issue is unpreserved
on two grounds.
It is only to avert a manifest injustice that this
court will entertain an argument not presented to the trial
court.28
We have reviewed Sherry’s argument applying this
standard and conclude that no manifest injustice occurred.
To
the contrary, the record does not reflect that the trial court
increased Bill’s visitation time with B.J. for the purpose of
punishing Sherry.
TRIAL COURT’S REFUSAL TO RULE ON MOTIONS
27
Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., Ky., 103 S.W.3d 46, 53 (2003).
28
Charash v. Johnson, Ky. App., 43 S.W.3d 274, 281 (2000).
-19-
Finally, Sherry contends that the trial court erred by
refusing to hear and rule on various motions.
Specifically,
Sherry contends that the trial court failed to rule on her
motion to require Bill to undergo anger management counseling
and her motion to increase child support.
On November 6, 2000, Sherry filed a motion to require
Bill to undergo anger counseling.
On November 20, 2000, the
trial court entered an order directing the DRC to “conduct a
change of custody hearing and a hearing on all substantive
Motions now pending . . . .”
On June 1, 2001, Sherry filed a
motion for an increase in child support.
The hearings were held on June 6, June 7, and August
11, 2001.
2001.
The DRC entered her recommended order on November 6,
In her exceptions filed November 14, 2001, Sherry stated,
among other things, that she excepted to the Commissioner’s
order because “it did not address all pending motions of the
petitioner . . .”
On December 3, 2001, Sherry filed a
“supplement to exceptions” in which she stated that she excepted
from the recommended DRC order because “[t]he Commissioner
failed to rule on motions, including child support and to have
Mr. Vann attend anger management.”
Again, Sherry has failed to direct us to where in the
record this issue was preserved.
The hearings before the DRC
were held on June 6, June 7, and August 11, 2001.
-20-
The record of
those hearings consists of sixteen cassette tapes.
It was
incumbent upon Sherry to direct us to where she requested the
DRC to rule on the issues of child support and the anger
management motion, if indeed she did.
We note, further, that the motion for an increase in
child support was filed only five days prior to the commencement
of the child custody hearings.
It appears that Bill had not
even filed his response to Sherry’s motion prior to the
commencement of the hearings on June 6.
We are not persuaded
that it was the intent of the trial court that the DRC even
address that issue at the custody hearings.
Moreover, the anger management motion had been filed
some six months earlier, and while this motion apparently would
have been included in the trial court’s November 20, 2000,
referral to the DRC; nevertheless, much had transpired since
that time.
The parties were engaged in almost constant
litigation during this time, and there was a constant stream of
contempt motions flowing into the record.
Given the status of
the case, and considering that the hearings were addressed
primarily to the issue of custody, absent the issue being
brought to her attention by the parties, the DRC could not
reasonably have been expected to rule on the motion of anger
management.
As Sherry has not directed us to where she
-21-
requested that the DRC rule on the anger management motion, this
issue is not preserved.
CROSS-APPEAL - CASE NO. 2002-CA-000611-MR
The only issue raised by Bill in his cross-appeal is
that the trial court erred by failing to award him primary
custody of the child.
Bill contends that according to the overwhelming
evidence in the case, he should have been awarded primary
custody of B.J.
In particular, Bill argues that he can be a
full-time parent whereas Sherry cannot; Bill does not have any
domestic violence in his home whereas Sherry does; that Bill has
a healthy relationship with B.J. whereas the child has periods
of extreme emotional distress while living with Sherry and David
Jorjani; and that Bill’s overall credibility in this case is
substantially greater than Sherry’s.
We discussed the general principles of a modification
of a joint custody decree and the standards of appellate review
in our discussion of Sherry’s appeal of the trial court’s child
custody decision.
We also addressed the trial court’s provided minimal
findings of fact addressing the best interest factors as set
forth in KRS 403.340(3) and KRS 403.270.
-22-
As previously noted, the trial court found that B.J.
was finally adjusting to the divorce of his mother and father
and his life should not be interrupted again.
were not clearly erroneous.
These findings
These findings appear specifically
addressed to the issue that B.J. should not be subjected to a
change of residence, as he has finally, after a long period of
difficulty, become adjusted to his new home.
In light of the trial court’s finding that a change in
custody status could be disruptive to B.J.’s acceptance of his
parents’ divorce, and that it was not in the child’s best
interest that his life be so disrupted, it did not abuse its
discretion by denying Bill’s motion to modify custody.
Accordingly, we affirm the February 14, 2002, order of
the Whitley Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sherry Jorjani, pro se
Corbin, Kentucky
Marcia A. Smith
Corbin, Kentucky
-23-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.