KIMBERLY L. ZAMBOS v. PHILIP N. ZAMBOS
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RENDERED: March 26, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000462-MR
KIMBERLY L. ZAMBOS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00245
PHILIP N. ZAMBOS
AND
APPELLEE
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2002-CA-000598-MR
PHILIP N. ZAMBOS
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00245
KIMBERLY L. ZAMBOS
AND
PHILIP N. ZAMBOS
CROSS-APPELLEE
NO. 2002-CA-001295-MR
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00245
v.
KIMBERLY L. ZAMBOS
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING IN PART
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS
APPEAL NO. 2002-CA-000462-MR
AFFIRMING CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2002-CA-000598-MR
DISMISSING APPEAL NO. 2002-CA-001295-MR
* ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, TACKETT AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Kimberly Zambos brings this appeal from an
“Amended Decree Of Dissolution Of Marriage” entered on February
20, 2002, by the Greenup Circuit Court.
cross-appeal from the same order.
Phillip Zambos brings a
We affirm in part, reverse in
part and remand Appeal No. 2002-CA-000462-MR; affirm Appeal No.
2002-CA-000598-MR and dismiss Appeal No. 2002-CA-001295-MR.
Kimberly and Phillip Zambos were married at Wheeling,
West Virginia, in June of 1988.
Their marriage was dissolved by
interlocutory decree entered by the Greenup Circuit Court on
October 6, 2000.
The matter was then referred to the Domestic
Relations Commissioner (“Commissioner”) pursuant to Ky. R. Civ.
P. (CR) 53.03.
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At the time the parties married, Phillip was a recent
medical school graduate completing his residency in radiology
and Kimberly was employed full-time as a radiology technician.
Shortly after the parties married, they moved to Greenup County
where Phillip began practicing with Northeast Kentucky Imaging,
PSC.
Kimberly continued to work as a radiology technician until
the parties’ son, Nicholas, was born in October of 1991.
Nicholas was born with Down’s Syndrome.
It is undisputed that
upon Nicholas’s birth, the parties agreed Kimberly would not
work outside the home.
Thereafter, her only employment has been
teaching an aerobics class.
The parties’ second son, Andreas,
was born in 1994.
During the course of the marriage, Phillip fathered
two illegitimate children.
Pursuant to an order of the Greenup
District Court, Phillip pays $2,000.00 per month in child
support for one of these children.
He also pays all medical and
dental insurance expenses, including insurance premiums.
The
second illegitimate child resides with Phillip and his
girlfriend, the child’s mother.
The parties stipulated to virtually all valuations of
the marital property.
They could not agree, however, to the
value of Phillip’s medical practice, Northeast Kentucky Imaging,
PSC.
Phillip owned fifty percent (50%) of the practice, a
corporation holding an exclusive contract to provide radiology
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services to a local hospital.
Phillip’s adjusted gross income
for the year 2000 was $952,000.00.
He testified that he
expected to earn approximately the same in 2001.
Despite the
large amount of income generated by Phillip during the marriage,
the parties accumulated a significant amount of debt.
Pursuant to the Commissioner’s report, Kimberly was
awarded the following:
1.
Household furnishings in her possession.
2.
Checking account containing $983.00.
3.
Investment account containing $2,000.00.
4.
One-half of the pension plan or $340,627.00.
5.
Bellefonte Country Club Membership valued at
$7,500.00.
6.
Cash equalization payment of $105,340.00.
Kimberly was also awarded maintenance of $4,000.00 per
month and will receive $3,000.00 per month in child support.
She was also assigned debt totaling $22,611.00.
The Commissioner’s report, containing the above
recommendations, was entered on January 28, 2002.
filed exceptions thereto.
Both parties
The circuit court subsequently
entered the Amended Decree of Dissolution of Marriage on
February 20, 2002.
The Court made two modifications to the
report of the Commissioner, but otherwise incorporated the
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findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein.
This
appeal and cross-appeal follow.
Appeal No. 2002-CA-000462-MR
On appeal, Kimberly initially contends the circuit
court erred in awarding her only $4,000.00 per month in
maintenance.
Specifically, she contends the amount of
maintenance was improper because the circuit court failed to
make the necessary findings of fact under Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 403.200(2).
She further contends that such an
award was an abuse of discretion.
When determining whether a party is entitled to
maintenance, the circuit court must make the following findings:
the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including
marital property apportioned to him, to
provide for his reasonable needs; and
(b) Is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment or is the
custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that
the custodian not be required to seek
employment outside the home.
KRS 403.200(1).
Upon review of the record, we are of the opinion that
the circuit court’s findings of fact were sufficient to support
the conclusion that Kimberly was indeed entitled to maintenance
pursuant to KRS 403.200(1).
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Once a circuit court finds that a party is entitled to
maintenance, it must then engage in an analysis of the relevant
factors under KRS 403.200(2) to determine the amount and
duration of the award.1
A review of the record reveals, as
Kimberly contends, that the circuit court did not set forth
specific findings on each of these factors.
However, the
circuit court did consider the financial resources of Kimberly,
including the marital property apportioned to her, as well as
the high standard of living established during the marriage.
The circuit court’s analysis was sufficient to allow this Court
to review and determine the appropriateness of the maintenance
award.
See Hollon v. Hollon, Ky., 623 S.W.2d 898 (1981).
The
determination of maintenance is within the sound discretion of
the trial court.
In Clark v. Clark, Ky. App., 782 S.W.2d 56, 60
(1990), this Court held that “unless absolute abuse is shown,
the appellate court must maintain confidence in the trial court
and not disturb the findings of the trial judge.”
This Court is of the opinion that the circuit court
made sufficient findings to support the amount of maintenance
awarded.
An award of maintenance that is sufficiently supported
1
The circuit court awarded maintenance of “$4,000.00 per month pending
further Orders of the Court.” This Court construes this as a permanent award
of maintenance and conducts its analysis accordingly. See Combs v. Combs,
Ky. App., 622 S.W.2d 679, 680 (1981).
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by the record cannot be an abuse of discretion.
This Court,
therefore, will not disturb the circuit court’s determination.
Kimberly next contends the circuit court erred by
failing to award prejudgment interest on the cash equalization
payment of $105,340.00.
Specifically, she contends entitlement
to prejudgment interest from October 6, 2000, the date the
interlocutory decree was entered, until February 20, 2002, the
date the Amended Decree was entered.
Each party was assigned marital property having a
total value of $433,839.00.
Of that amount, $340,627.00 was
attributed to each party for a pension plan that would not be
available for distribution until age fifty-nine and one-half
(59½) years.
The only other significant asset, Northeast
Kentucky Imaging, was valued at $617,617.00.
In an attempt to
divide the marital property in just proportions, Phillip was
ordered to pay Kimberly an equalization payment of $105,340.00.
He was permitted to pay that amount in three equal annual
installments with interest at the rate of twelve (12) percent.
No prejudgment interest was ordered.
Kimberly argues that pursuant to Fields v. Fields,
Ky., 58 S.W.3d 464 (2001), she is entitled to prejudgment
interest on the amount of the equalization payment. She asserts
that during the fifteen (15) months between entry of the
interlocutory decree and the Amended Decree, Phillip had
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complete control over the parties’ primary asset, Northeast
Kentucky Imaging.
She contends Phillip was able to utilize the
asset to accumulate additional wealth and that she was precluded
from sharing in that wealth.
During this fifteen (15) month
period, Phillip purchased a home and a second Mercedes sports
utility vehicle.
He also reduced outstanding debt by
approximately $300,000.00.
As noted by the Court in Fields, “[i]t is self-evident
that equity and justice demand that one who uses the money or
property of another for his own benefit, particularly in a
business enterprise, should at least pay interest for its use in
the absence of some agreement to the contrary.”
Id. at 466-67,
citing Curtis v. Campbell, Ky., 336 S.W.2d 355, 361 (1960).
In
the case sub judice, as in Fields, a significant amount of time
lapsed between entry of the interlocutory decree and division of
the marital property.
During this time, Phillip had control
over the primary marital asset and was able to utilize it to
accumulate additional wealth.
This Court is of the opinion the circuit court abused
its discretion in not awarding prejudgment interest to Kimberly.
However, prejudgment interest in this case is limited to the
legal rate, eight percent (8%), as set forth in KRS 360.010.
Upon remand, we direct the circuit court to award prejudgment
interest on the cash equalization payment of $105,340.00, at the
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rate of eight percent (8%) per annum from October 6, 2000 until
February 20, 2002, with interest thereafter at the judgment rate
as ordered by the circuit court.
Kimberly next contends the circuit court erred in the
amount of child support awarded. Specifically, she asserts that
$1,500.00 per month in child support, per child, is not
sufficient.
She further contends the circuit court made no
findings regarding the actual needs of the children.
KRS 403.212(5) provides that the court may “use its
judicial discretion in determining child support in
circumstances where combined adjusted parental gross income
exceeds the uppermost levels of the guideline table.”
Obviously, Phillip’s income of $952,000.00 per year exceeded the
guideline table.
Thus, the circuit court utilized its
discretion in setting the amount of child support.
The circuit court obviously did not consider the
factor that Nicholas suffers from Down’s Syndrome.
2
This is
apparent from the fact that Phillip was ordered to pay an equal
amount of support for both children of this marriage.
He also
pays $2,000.00 per month in support for an illegitimate child he
fathered during the marriage; a child that does not have any
special needs.
This Court is of the opinion that $1,500.00 per
2
We observe that if the child support guidelines were applicable,
consideration could be given to Nicholas’s diagnosis of Down’s Syndrome.
403.211(3)(g).
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KRS
month in child support is insufficient given Nicholas’s
condition.
The two children of this marriage clearly have
different needs and an equal award is clearly erroneous on its
face. We, therefore, remand to the circuit court with directions
that it reconsider the amount of child support awarded to
Nicholas and to specifically consider Nicholas’s unique medical
condition when setting an appropriate amount of child support.
We are of the opinion that the $1,500.00 award of child support
as to Andreas was within the circuit court’s discretion.
Having
found no abuse of discretion, the award of child support as to
Andreas will not be disturbed.
Kimberly next contends the circuit court erred in its
valuation of Northeast Kentucky Imaging and that its valuation
was clearly erroneous as a matter of law.
The parties could not
agree to the value of Phillip’s medical practice; therefore,
each presented extensive expert testimony on the issue.
Phillip’s expert utilized a capitalization of excess
earnings analysis and arrived at a value of $1,960,689.00.
The
expert then applied a sixty percent (60%) discount for lack of
marketability and a twenty percent (20%) discount for a minority
interest.
The expert arrived at a final value of $240,000.00.
He claimed the discounts were justified because the stock is not
publicly traded, any prospective purchaser would be required to
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hold a license to practice the profession and the contract held
by the corporation with the hospital was pending renegotiation.
Kimberly’s expert, on the other hand, utilized an
income approach to value the practice and applied a
capitalization rate, as well as other pre-tax adjustments.
arrived at a value of $1,343,000.00.
He
Kimberly asserts the
Commissioner merely cut the expert’s figure in half with no
explanation.
She further asserts that the determination was
subjective and not supported by the evidence.
“[I]t has been the general principle in both Kentucky
and other jurisdictions that the trial court’s judgment and
valuations in an action for divorce will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it was clearly contrary to the weight of the
evidence.”
Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d at 58 (1990) (internal
citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, a review of the
record does not reveal that the circuit court’s valuation of
Phillip’s medical practice was clearly contrary to the weight of
the evidence.
The court accepted the capitalization of excess
earnings valuation set forth by Phillip’s expert, but applied
lesser discounts.
The court reasoned that a thirty percent
(30%) discount for lack of marketability would be more
reasonable, based upon a lack of evidence the contract with the
hospital would not be renewed.
The court then applied a ten
percent (10%) discount for the minority interest.
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The court
reasoned that although a fifty percent (50%) ownership interest
is a minority interest, a gridlock is highly unlikely in a
lucrative corporation such as this.
Kimberly has not convinced this Court that the
valuation of the medical practice is clearly contrary to the
weight of the evidence.
Id.
The circuit court made sufficient
findings to support its valuation; therefore, this Court will
not disturb the valuation on appeal.
Kimberly’s final contention is that the circuit court
erred when dividing the marital property.
Specifically, she
contends the court erred by not making specific findings of fact
pursuant to KRS 403.190.
She further contends it abused its
discretion by ordering an equal division.
She argues KRS
403.190 directs the Court to divide the marital estate in “just
proportions” and that the statute does not create a presumption
for an equal division.
Kimberly also argues the facts of the
case do not support an equal division given the “vast income
during the recent years of their marriage which has been largely
wasted. . . .”
She asserts that if adequate consideration were
given to the factors set forth in KRS 403.190(1), an equal
division would not be justified.
KRS 403.190(1) requires the court to divide marital
property in “just proportions” with consideration given to all
relevant factors including:
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Contribution of each spouse to
acquisition of the marital property,
including contributions of a spouse as
homemaker;
Value of the property set apart to each
spouse;
Duration of the marriage; and
Economic circumstances of each spouse
when the division of property is to
become effective, including the
desirability of awarding the family
home or the right to live therein for
reasonable periods to the spouse having
custody of any children.
The record reflects the circuit court considered the
value of the property set apart to each party and the economic
circumstances of each spouse.
This Court is of the opinion that
consideration of these factors is sufficient to support the
circuit court’s division of the marital property.
The circuit
court satisfied the requirements of KRS 403.190(1) and divided
the marital property in just proportions.
Cross-Appeal No. 2002-CA-000598-MR
On cross-appeal, Phillip contends the circuit court
erred in its division of the pension plan.
Specifically, he
contends the court erred by valuing the plan as of the date of
dissolution of marriage, October 6, 2000.
He further alleges
the court erred by awarding a specific dollar amount, rather
than assigning a percentage of the plan.
He complains that
between October of 2000 and February of 2002 the stock market
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went into a downward spiral and that Kimberly was insulated from
the loss.
His contention focuses on the fact that the pension
plan’s value dramatically decreased after the valuation date.
He further contends that rather than a dollar amount being
assigned to Kimberly’s portion, a qualified domestic relations
order (“QDRO”) should have been entered.
The record reflects the parties agreed that October 6,
2000, would serve as the valuation date for the marital assets.
Phillip does not contend the dollar amount assigned is
mathematically incorrect if the October valuation date is
applied.
Phillip’s contention that Kimberly should share in the
loss suffered by the pension plan is misplaced.
The correct
date for valuing a pension plan is the date of the dissolution
decree.
KRS 403.190; Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d at 62 (1990),
citing Stallings v. Stallings, Ky., 606 S.W.2d 163 (1980).
Given that the parties agreed to October 6, 2000, as the
valuation date for all marital assets, and given the supporting
case law, this Court will not disturb the circuit court’s
division of the pension plan.
Appeal No. 2002-CA-001295-MR
Phillip N. Zambos brings the above appeal from an order
directing payment of Kimberly’s costs and attorney’s fees.
review of Phillip’s appellate brief, it appears that Phillip
Upon
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failed to raise any issues in the above appeal.
Under CR
76.12(8)(b), we believe the appropriate remedy is to dismiss the
appeal.
The Court hereby, sua sponte, ORDERS Appeal No. 2002-
CA-001295-MR, DISMISSED.
For the foregoing reasons, Appeal No. 2002-CA-000462MR, is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with
directions (1) to award prejudgment interest on the cash
equalization payment ($105,340.00) at the rate of 8% per annum
from October 6, 2000 to February 20, 2002 and (2) to reconsider
the amount of child support awarded to Nicholas and to
specifically consider Nicholas’s medical condition when making
such award; Appeal No. 2002-CA-000598-MR is affirmed, and Appeal
No. 2002-CA-001295-MR is dismissed.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART AND
FILES SEPERATE OPINION.
ENTERED:
March 26, 2004
_/s/
Jeff S. Taylor_____
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART:
I fully concur with the majority opinion except the
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portion which reverses the trial court’s child support order.
The majority correctly notes that the trial court ordered Phillip
to pay child support in the amount of $1,500.00 per month per
child.
The majority states that this equal amount of support for
each child demonstrates that the circuit court did not consider
that Nicholas suffers from Down’s Syndrome and obviously has
exceptional special needs.
Although I agree that Nicholas
clearly has exceptional special needs, I disagree with the
majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not adequately
consider them.
As noted by the domestic relations commissioner, when
the combined gross income of divorced parents exceed the highest
level set out in the child support guidelines, the court may not
simply extrapolate the guidelines upward to calculate the amount
of support owed.
457 (2001).
Downing v. Downing, Ky. App., 45 S.W.3d 449,
Rather, the court must look at the actual and
reasonable needs of the children.
Clearly, Nicholas’s condition
is a valid factor to consider in setting the amount of his
support.
KRS 403.211(3)(g).
In addition, Phillip’s income may
be considered to determine whether any claimed expenses are
reasonable under the circumstances.
Downing, 45 S.W.3d at 457.
But in setting child support above the guidelines, the
focus of the proof must be on a showing of what the children’s
reasonable needs and expenses are.
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In this case, Kimberly
introduced an exhibit concerning her expenses and the expenses of
the children.
The commissioner based his child support
recommendation on those claimed expenses.
Kimberly does not
argue that the commissioner improperly disregarded any of the
expenses which she claimed for Nicholas.
Furthermore, the trial
court also ordered Phillip to be responsible for the children’s
health insurance and unreimbursed medical expenses in addition to
his child support obligation.
Under these circumstances, I
cannot agree with the majority that the trial court abused its
discretion in setting the child support for Nicholas.
Accordingly, I would affirm this aspect of the trial court’s
judgment.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gordon J. Dill, Jr.
Ashland, Kentucky
Phillip Bruce Leslie
Greenup, Kentucky
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