CLIFFORD EUGENE JEFFREY v. NAOMI GAIL BIRLEY JEFFREY
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RENDERED:
APRIL 9, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000336-MR
CLIFFORD EUGENE JEFFREY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING JR, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00383
NAOMI GAIL BIRLEY JEFFREY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
Clifford Jeffrey appeals from a default
judgment of the Bell Circuit Court, granted in a divorce action
to his former wife, Naomi Gail Birley Jeffrey.
Clifford’s
primary claim is that the circuit court lacked personal and
subject matter jurisdiction to grant the divorce and divide the
marital property.
Having concluded that the circuit court had
jurisdiction over this divorce action pursuant to Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 454.220, we affirm.
Naomi and Clifford Jeffrey were married in West
Virginia in 1956.
They resided in Kentucky throughout the
marriage, although for the last several years, Clifford worked
in West Virginia.
He returned to Kentucky on weekends and
during vacations.
Naomi and Clifford separated on September 26,
2001, after Naomi learned that Clifford had been having a longterm relationship with a woman who lived in West Virginia.
After the separation, Clifford moved permanently to West
Virginia.
On October 10, 2001, Naomi filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Marriage and an affidavit for the appointment of
a warning order attorney in the Bell Circuit Court.
A warning
order was issued on the same day.
On November 6, 2001, Clifford petitioned for divorce
in the Family Court of Cabell County, West Virginia.
Although
Clifford claims that he filed his petition in West Virginia
prior to the commencement of the Bell County action, the report
of the warning order attorney indicates that Clifford received
notice of Naomi’s divorce petition on October 18, 2001, well
before the date he filed his action in West Virginia.
The warning order attorney advised Naomi’s counsel
that Clifford did not intend to enter an appearance or to
contest the action in Kentucky.
Naomi thereafter filed an
amended petition stating that she and Clifford were both
residents of Kentucky before their separation.
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The petition
also stated that “the respondent [Clifford] is within the
personal jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to KRS 454.220 and
under that statute, the Kentucky Secretary of State is deemed
the statutory agent for service of process.”
Accordingly, on
November 23, 2001, Clifford was served with a copy of the
summons by the Secretary of State of Kentucky.
Clifford made no response to the summons, nor did he
make a personal appearance in the Bell Circuit Court. On January
2, 2002, Naomi and Teresa Justice (Naomi and Clifford’s
daughter) gave their depositions; they were filed in the circuit
court on the same day.
default judgment.
Naomi thereafter filed a motion for
On January 8, 2002, the Bell Circuit Court
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Dissolution of Marriage.
The circuit court divided Naomi and
Clifford’s marital assets, awarding Naomi the marital residence,
furniture, an automobile, a lump sum of $25,000 in maintenance,
and a share of Clifford’s retirement fund.
Clifford appealed
the order on February 7, 2002.
Meanwhile, the West Virginia action, which had been
stayed on September 18, 2001, pending the outcome of the
Kentucky case, proceeded with a hearing on April 1, 2002, to
determine Clifford’s residency.
On January 9, 2003, the West
Virginia Family Court entered an order holding that the Kentucky
court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate spousal support
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and marital assets located in West Virginia, and that Clifford
could pursue those issues in West Virginia pursuant to the
“divisible divorce” doctrine.
Naomi appealed this order.
Clifford meanwhile had filed a motion pursuant to
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 in Bell Circuit Court,
seeking relief from the default judgment.
this motion in the record.
There is no copy of
The motion was denied in an order
entered on February 11, 2003.
That order indicates that
Clifford raised two issues in the CR 60.02 motion: he challenged
the jurisdiction of the Bell Circuit Court and argued that
inadequate notice was given of Naomi and Teresa’s depositions.
Clifford then filed a “Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Alter, Amend, or Vacate the Court’s Order of February 11, 2002.”
These motions were also denied by the circuit court on May 6,
2003, on the grounds that such reconsideration was not permitted
under the Civil Rules, and that Clifford’s proper avenue of
redress was an appeal.
Clifford failed to file a timely appeal
of the denial of his CR 60.02 motion, however, and this Court
denied his motion to add the latter two orders of the Bell
Circuit Court to this appeal.
Finally, on April 28, 2003, the Circuit Court of
Cabell County, West Virginia, reversed the order of the family
court on the grounds that it had misapplied KRS 403.140 and the
divisible divorce doctrine in its ruling.
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Clifford raises four arguments on appeal.
First, that
the Bell Circuit Court lacked personal and subject matter
jurisdiction to enter the default judgment; second, that default
judgments are disfavored in Kentucky and that he should be
afforded the right to present his case before the circuit court;
third, that Naomi deceived the circuit court as to Clifford’s
residency in Kentucky, thus leading it to base its jurisdiction
on the mistaken belief that Clifford had resided in Kentucky for
180 days immediately prior to the filing of the initial divorce
petition; and finally, that notice of the depositions of Naomi
and their daughter was insufficient under CR 30.01.
In Kentucky, it is permissible to appeal directly from
a default judgment.
“However, the issue in such an appeal [is]
limited to determining whether the pleadings were sufficient to
uphold the judgment, or whether the appellant was actually in
default.”
Mingey v. Cline Leasing Service, Inc., Ky. App., 707
S.W.2d 794, 796 (1986) citing Rouse v. Craig Realty Co., 203 Ky.
697, 262 S.W. 1083 (1924).
The exception to this rule is that subject matter
jurisdiction is “open for the consideration of the reviewing
court whenever it is raised by any party[.]”
Commonwealth,
Dept. of Highways v. Berryman, Ky., 363 S.W.2d 525, 526-27
(1962).
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Our review of the pleadings in this case shows them to
be sufficient to uphold the default judgment.
Moreover,
Clifford has not challenged their sufficiency, except in his
prehearing statement, where he listed as one of the issues to be
addressed on appeal the “[v]agueness of pleadings making grant
of relief in KY divorce inequitable and illegal.”
however, pursue this issue in his appellate brief.
He did not,
Nor is there
any question that Clifford was in default, nor does he contest
that fact, except insofar as it relates to the circuit court’s
jurisdiction.
The only issue that may be properly addressed in this
appeal, therefore, is whether the Bell Circuit Court had
jurisdiction over this divorce action.
Clifford argues that the Bell Circuit Court was
without personal or subject matter jurisdiction to issue the
default judgment because he is a resident of West Virginia.
He
claims that West Virginia, where he filed his action, has sole
jurisdiction over the issues of equitable distribution and
alimony.
He accuses Naomi of fraud and perjury for stating that
Clifford had been a resident of Kentucky for 180 days
immediately prior to the filing of her divorce petition, arguing
that this led the Circuit Court mistakenly to conclude in its
judgment that “[t]he record establishes and this Court finds
that both the petitioner and respondent were citizens and
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residents of Pineville, Bell County, Kentucky for at least 180
days prior to the filing of this action.”
Clifford does not indicate where in the record we may
find evidence of Naomi’s alleged fraud and perjury.
In fact, he
admits that on at least two occasions she testified that
Clifford ceased to be a resident of Kentucky on September 26,
2001, several days prior to the filing of her divorce petition.
Regardless, Clifford’s claim that the Bell Circuit
Court was without jurisdiction because he had not resided in
Kentucky for 180 days immediately prior to the filing of Naomi’s
divorce petition is without merit, and rests on a
misunderstanding of the requirements set out in KRS 403.140.
Only one party to a divorce action is required to be a resident
of Kentucky for the court to exercise jurisdiction to grant a
dissolution of the marriage.
KRS 403.140 states in relevant
part:
(1) The Circuit Court shall enter a decree
of dissolution of marriage if:
(a) The court finds that one (1) of the
parties, at the time the action was
commenced, resided in this state, or was
stationed in this state while a member of
the armed services, and that the residence
or military presence has been maintained for
180 days next preceding the filing of the
petition . . . [.]
KRS 403.140(1)(a).
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Clifford does not dispute the fact that Naomi was a
resident of Kentucky for 180 days prior to the filing of her
divorce petition.
Under the statute, that is sufficient to give
the circuit court jurisdiction to grant the dissolution.
Even
if Clifford’s allegations of fraud and perjury against Naomi
were substantiated, it is unclear why she would have needed to
deceive the circuit court on this point.
Similarly, therefore,
the circuit court’s finding that both parties had resided in
Kentucky for 180 days prior to the filing of the petition was
harmless error.
Clifford claims that his case is directly
parallel to that of Karahalios v. Karahalios, Ky. App., 848
S.W.2d 457, 459 (1993), in which the appellant asserted that the
appellee had fraudulently procured the circuit court's
jurisdiction under KRS 403.140 by misrepresenting the duration
of her residency in Kentucky.
In Karahalios, however, one
party did not reside in the state, and there was a controversy
about the residency of the other party.
about Naomi’s residency.
There is no controversy
This Court clearly stated in
Karahalios that “KRS 403.140(1)(a) requires that at least one
party to a dissolution of marriage action must have been
residing in Kentucky for 180 days before filing a petition for
divorce.”
Karahalios, 848 S.W.2d at 459 (emphasis supplied).
That requirement has been met by Naomi in this case.
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In regard to the distribution of the marital property,
Clifford relies on Gaines v. Gaines, Ky. App., 566 S.W.2d 814
(1978), to argue that the Bell Circuit Court was without
jurisdiction to award maintenance or to distribute property
located outside the state of Kentucky, such as his retirement
account which is held by an insurance company in New York.
Gaines stands for the proposition that a court does not have the
authority to order the disposition of property outside the state
if that court does not have in personam jurisdiction over the
absent spouse.
“[T]he court cannot enter an in personam order
directed to an absent litigant to do some act with reference to
personalty which is either within or without the state.”
Gaines, 566 S.W.2d at 819.
The holding in Gaines has been
superseded, however, by the passage in 1992 of KRS 454.220, the
marital long-arm statute.
A divorce court in Kentucky may
assert long-arm jurisdiction to distribute marital property,
whether that property is located in Kentucky or elsewhere, if
the nonresident respondent committed one of the predicate acts
establishing grounds for personal jurisdiction in Kentucky
within the statutory time limits set out in KRS 454.220.
See L.
Graham & J. Keller, 15 Kentucky Practice, Domestic Relations Law
§ 14.20, p. 407 (2nd ed. 1997 & 2004 supp.).
Kentucky’s long arm
statute reflects the holding in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
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186, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977), and sets out four
grounds for jurisdiction over non-residents:
A court in any matrimonial action or family
court proceeding involving a demand for
support, alimony, maintenance, distributive
awards, or special relief in matrimonial
actions may exercise personal jurisdiction
over the respondent or defendant
notwithstanding the fact that he or she no
longer is a resident or domiciliary of this
state, or over his or her executor or
administrator, if the party seeking support
is a resident of or domiciled in this state
at the time the demand is made, if this
state was the matrimonial domicile of the
parties before their separation; the
defendant abandoned the plaintiff in this
state; or the claim for support, alimony,
maintenance, distributive awards, or special
relief in matrimonial actions accrued under
the laws of this state. The action shall be
filed within one (1) year of the date the
respondent or defendant became a nonresident
of, or moved his domicile from, this state.
Service of process may be made by personal
service if the defendant or respondent is
found within the state or by service through
the use of KRS 454.210(3).
KRS 454.220.
The requirements of the statute were clearly met in this case.
Kentucky was Clifford and Naomi’s matrimonial domicile, Clifford
abandoned Naomi in Kentucky, and Naomi’s claim for relief
accrued under the laws of Kentucky.
The action was filed well
within one year of the date Clifford moved his domicile from
Kentucky to West Virginia.
The Bell Circuit Court therefore had
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personal jurisdiction over Clifford and hence subject matter
jurisdiction over the entire action.
Clifford has also argued that although service through
the warning order attorney may have sufficed to create
jurisdiction to grant the divorce, it was insufficient to permit
the distribution of any marital property.
The record clearly
indicates, however, that Clifford also received notice from the
Kentucky Secretary of State, fully in accordance with the
procedure outlined in KRS 454.210(3).
Clifford had ample notice
of the Kentucky action, but simply chose not to participate.
Clifford’s remaining arguments, that the default
judgment contravenes Kentucky’s policy of treating such
judgments with disfavor, and that the notice requirements of CR
30.01 were not observed in providing notice of the depositions,
are precluded from our consideration because, as we have already
discussed, a default judgment may only be challenged on the
sufficiency of the pleadings.
We also note that Clifford
previously raised the issue of deposition notice in his CR 60.02
motion and never appealed the denial of that motion by the
circuit court.
This Court has already denied his motion to join
that petition and the circuit court’s order to this appeal.
Clifford will not be permitted to circumvent our prior order.
The judgment of the Bell Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Otis Doan Jr.
Doan Law Office
Harlan, Kentucky
Gerald L. Greene
Greene & Lewis
Pineville, Kentucky
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