JACK RANDALL KIRK v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 9, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-001843-MR
AND
NO. 2001-CA-002611-MR
JACK RANDALL KIRK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00033
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE. On September 8, 1978, Appellant was initially
indicted by the Boyd County Grand Jury and charged with murder.
That indictment was dismissed in 1979 due to Appellant’s
incompetence to stand trial.
The present appeals, 2001-CA-
001843-MR, to be heard with 2001-CA-002611-MR, are predicated
upon a reindictment for the same offense on April 14, 1997.
After a two day jury trial, Appellant was convicted and
sentenced to serve a life sentence.
On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment.1
Appellant filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 to
vacate the judgment of the Boyd Circuit Court.
He also sought
appointed counsel and an evidentiary hearing.
The Commonwealth
filed its response to the motion on August 15, 2001.
On August
16, 2001, the trial court issued its order denying Appellant’s
motion to vacate judgment concluding that the issues raised in
the motion were “defeated in the record as a matter of law.”
Appeal no. 2001-CA-001843-MR followed.
A few months after his reindictment, Appellant filed
notice of intent to introduce evidence of mental illness or
insanity at the time of the offense.
Just before trial, on July
22, 1998, Appellant filed a notice that he was withdrawing his
notice of an insanity defense.
The notice was signed by both
Appellant and his attorney, Mr. Curtis.
At a hearing on that
date regarding various pretrial matters, the following exchange
occurred:
BY THE COURT: Now also, let me ask this of
Mr. Kirk. During the break, Mr. Kirk, Mr.
Curtis gave me a document which is signed by
both you and him, that he asked me to file
in the court file. And, it says that you’re
1
See Kirk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 6 S.W.3d 823 (1999).
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withdrawing your notice of an insanity
defense, and you’re not going to rely on
that. And Mr. Curtis says that you and him,
in your all’s private meetings, have
discussed that, and that’s what you want to
do?
APPELLANT: Yes, sir.
BY THE COURT: All right, we’ll file that of
record. And, that – there’ll be no proof
necessary on no disease or defect.
On appeal Appellant argues that it was error for the trial court
not to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
Appellant intelligently and voluntarily waived the insanity
defense.
Appellant asserts this issue could not be resolved by
the bare record of proceedings below.
He states that in the
present case, the trial court’s findings as to competence only
addressed the broader issue of competence to stand trial.
Appellant concedes that the issue of competency to conduct his
defense at the time of his trial was not raised on direct
appeal.
Appellant advises this Court that although a defendant
generally has the right to direct the nature of the defense to
be presented, the right is limited by the requirement that the
defendant be competent to direct such defense.
Appellant cites
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d 412 (1994), a case in
which the Kentucky Supreme Court dealt with the issue of a
defendant who objected to his counsel’s decision to present an
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insanity defense.
The Court recognized that neither counsel nor
the court has the power to contravene a defendant’s voluntary
and intelligent decision to forego an insanity defense.
418.
Id. at
To guarantee a defendant’s right to a defense, counsel
should bring to the attention of the trial court any conflict
which exists after counsel has informed the defendant of the
relevant considerations bearing on the decision to forego the
insanity defense and seek a determination of whether the accused
is capable of voluntarily and intelligently waiving the defense.
Id.
Even if a defendant is found competent to stand trial, he
may not be capable of making an intelligent decision about his
defense.
Id.
Where there is a conflict concerning the
assertion of the defense of insanity or should there be a
question of the defendant’s mental capacity even though the
defendant was found competent to stand trial, the trial court
shall hold a hearing on the record on the ability of the
defendant to voluntarily and intelligently understand and waive
such a defense.
Id.
Appellant points out that the record in the case at
bar does not reveal whether there was pretrial disagreement
between Appellant and defense counsel over raising an insanity
defense at trial.
Appellant also offers that he may not have
been competent to waive the defense because of the drugs
administered to him at the time of trial, because he may have
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been suffering from a “delusional fixation,” and because his
trial counsel used “undue duress” on him.
Appellant believes
the absence of information in the record establishes that it was
error for the trial court to rely solely on the written record
in denying the RCr 11.42.
We conclude that Appellant is not entitled to postconviction relief because this is an issue which had to have
been raised on direct appeal.
RCr 11.42 was intended to provide
post-conviction relief to persons under sentence, on probation
or parole who felt aggrieved by errors which led to their
conviction that could not be reached by direct appeal.
Commonwealth v. Stamps, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 336, 338 (1984).
Constitutional grounds must form the basis for relief granted by
collateral attack.
Commonwealth v. Basnight, Ky. App., 770
S.W.2d 231, 237 (1989).
Issues which could have been raised on
direct appeal are not appropriate for RCr 11.42, Hoskins v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 420 S.W.2d 560 (1967); Thacker v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 476 S.W.2d 838 (1972).
This is a claim appropriate for direct appeal.
Appellant’s principal allegation is that the court erred in
failing to determine whether he had the mental competency to
direct his defense.
Jacobs makes clear that it is the
obligation of the court to investigate the defendant’s
competence once counsel informs the court of the decision to
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forego a mental illness defense.
In this case, counsel filed a
notice with the court and brought up the decision to forego the
defense during a pretrial hearing.
The trial court should have
done a more extensive colloquy to explore Appellant’s competence
and whether counsel agreed with Appellant’s decision to forego
the defense.
Appellant raises no issue of ineffectiveness of
counsel, which could have been raised by way of RCr 11.42, but
uncovers a failing of the court.
This should have been raised
prior to Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion, and so we decline to
review it.
We affirm the order of the court denying Appellant’s
motion for relief.
Under appeal no. 2001-CA-002611-MR; Appellant is
appealing, pro se, the Court’s denial of his Motion for a copy
of his Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), which he waived
in writing.
the PSI.
Appellant argues that he was not competent to waive
We conclude that the trial court correctly denied the
motion because Appellant is not entitled to a copy of his PSI in
any event.
Bush v. Commonwealth, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 943 (1987).
Furthermore, his claims that he was not competent or was too
medicated to waive the report should have been raised in his
direct appeal, and we find such matters unpreserved for review.
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the orders of the
Boyd Circuit Court in this case.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
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COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTING:
dissent.
I respectfully
While the majority opinion characterizes this claim as
one that is appropriate only for direct appeal, I believe that
it is equally appropriate for redress by way of RCr 11.42.
The
majority acknowledges the error of the failure of the trial
court to conduct a competency hearing, stating as follows:
Appellant raises no issue of ineffectiveness
of counsel, which could have been raised by
way of RCr 11.42, but uncovers a failing of
the court. This should have been raised
prior to Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion, and
so we decline to review it. (Emphasis
added.)
I submit that the alleged failure of trial counsel to follow the
dictates of Jacob, supra, clearly presents an issue of deficient
performance resulting in serious prejudice to the defendant –
thus satisfying both prongs of Strickland, supra.
Perhaps the claim pursuant to RCr 11.42 could have
been more carefully crafted.
However, the egregiousness of this
error compels that it be addressed.
Trial counsel’s failure to
apprise the court of its erroneous ruling on this serious issue
calls for the very remedy that RCr 11.42 is designed to provide.
Simply to deny this appeal because appellant has belatedly
revealed an error of the court misses the point and compounds
the error.
Counsel had a duty to serve as adequate advocate in
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urging the court to comply with its obligation to conduct a
competency hearing.
Since the court failed to comply with
Jacobs in conducting a competency hearing, it should now provide
an evidentiary hearing on the RCr 11.42 motion as the only
remedy available for this due process violation.
Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment on this point
and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the RCr 11.42 motion.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher F. Polk
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jack Randall Kirk, Pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Carlton S. Shier, IV
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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