THE HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK AND HUNTINGTON ACCEPTANCE COMPANY v. HENRY H. PORTER; BURTON J. SMITH; JOHN A BRENZEL; AND DDR RENTAL AND LEASING, INC., D/B/A DOLLAR RENT-A-CAR OF KENTUCKY and DDR RENTAL LEASING, INC.; HENRY H. PORTER; AND B.J. SMITH v. THE HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK; THE HUNTINGTON ACCEPTANCE COMPANY; AND THE ESTATE OF ROBERT E. CLINE
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RENDERED: AUGUST 27, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-000505-MR
THE HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK
AND HUNTINGTON ACCEPTANCE COMPANY
(COLLECTIVELY, THE HUNTINGTON)
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-005804
HENRY H. PORTER; BURTON J. SMITH;
JOHN A BRENZEL; AND DDR RENTAL
AND LEASING, INC., D/B/A DOLLAR
RENT-A-CAR OF KENTUCKY
AND:
NO. 2001-CA-000509-MR
DDR RENTAL LEASING, INC.; HENRY H. PORTER;
AND B.J. SMITH
v.
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-005804
THE HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK;
THE HUNTINGTON ACCEPTANCE COMPANY;
AND THE ESTATE OF ROBERT E. CLINE
CROSS-APPELLEES
AND:
NO. 2003-CA-001022-MR
DDR RENTAL LEASING, INC.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-005804
v.
THE HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK;
THE HUNTINGTON ACCEPTANCE COMPANY;
AND THE ESTATE OF ROBERT E. CLINE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, GUIDUGLI, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
These consolidated appeals arise out of various
orders of the Jefferson Circuit Court that adjudged DDR Rental
and Leasing, Inc., d/b/a Dollar Rent-A-Car of Kentucky (DDR)
liable to Huntington National Bank and Huntington Acceptance
Company (collectively Huntington) for a debt owing by DDR under
a loan agreement referred to as “floorplan” financing by the
parties.
The circuit court also determined that certain claims
were subject to a directed verdict and that Huntington was
entitled to attorney fees.
We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for further proceedings.
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DDR was in the rental car business in Louisville,
Kentucky.
The stockholders of DDR were Henry H. Porter, Burton
J. Smith, and John A. Brenzel (the stockholders).
DDR
originally obtained its financing from First National Bank in
Louisville.
However, the loan officer at that bank, Robert E.
Cline, took employment with Huntington and DDR switched its
affiliation to that entity.
It is undisputed that DDR received floorplan financing
from Huntington for $8.6 million.
The parties are in
disagreement about whether Huntington was also obligated to
extend another $5 million in “overline” financing to DDR.
DDR’s
rental car business operated on the premise that the floorplan
financing was used to pay for all aspects of the enterprise
including its fleet of rental cars.
Under the accepted business
practice DDR would purchase cars from local dealers that were
then subject to a repurchase agreement with those dealers.
That
is, after a certain time DDR would resell the cars to the
dealers for an agreed upon amount of money and purchase new cars
for its fleet.
In this way DDR kept its inventory fresh.
Huntington had a security interest in the cars
purchased from the dealers, and when DDR received monies from
resale to the dealers, it was designated to be paid to
Huntington toward DDR’s outstanding debt on the floorplan.
Before the dealer would repurchase the cars it required
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Huntington to release its lien on them.
Since the monies from
the repurchase of cars were paid directly to DDR, Huntington was
left unsecured as to the vehicles turned in, and determined that
it wished to have further security for its extension of credit.
Thus, Huntington asked the stockholders of DDR to sign an
agreement whereby they promised to reimburse Huntington for any
losses Huntington might suffer from DDR’s failure to abide by
its repurchase agreements with the dealers.
DDR, Henry H. Porter, and Burton J. Smith claim that
Huntington, through its representative, Robert E. Cline (Cline),
promised to extend overline financing of $5 million to DDR in
order for DDR to purchase new cars before receiving payment for
the cars turned in under the repurchase agreements.
They claim
that DDR received this financing at its former banking
institution and Cline promised this financing in order to induce
DDR to switch its banking to Huntington.
Huntington denies that
it ever promised such financing to DDR or the stockholders.
Prior to the trial in this case the circuit court
decided various motions.
As to these appeals, the court
determined that the agreement between the stockholders of DDR
and Huntington that purported to indemnify Huntington for its
losses was actually a guaranty agreement.
As such, the circuit
court decided that KRS 371.065 barred its enforcement for
failure to comply with the terms of the statute.
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The remaining claims in the case were tried before a
jury from October 10, through November 17, 2000.
The jury
determined that DDR was liable to Huntington under the floorplan
note in the amount of $3,804,480.00, but did not award DDR and
the stockholders anything on counterclaims not relevant here.
The circuit court also ruled that Henry H. Porter’s claims
against Huntington for fraud should not be submitted to the jury
and directed a verdict in Huntington’s favor.
In appeal No. 2001-CA-000505-MR, Huntington appeals
from the circuit court’s ruling finding the agreement executed
between the stockholders of DDR and Huntington was a guaranty
agreement, and as such, subject to KRS 371.065.
It also brings
a protective appeal contending that it was entitled to summary
judgment on one of DDR’s counterclaims.
In appeal No. 2001-CA-000509-MR, DDR, Henry H. Porter,
and Burton J. Smith cross-appeal claiming that the circuit court
erred in its jury instructions; by denying the company the right
to open and close the proof on its claims; by admitting certain
hearsay testimony; and by dismissing Henry H. Porter’s fraud
claim against Huntington.
Subsequent to the trial, the circuit court found that
Huntington and the Estate of Robert E. Cline were entitled to
attorney fees and costs, and awarded them $745,454.68 and
-5-
$29,120.93, respectively.
DDR appeals the award of attorney
fees in appeal No. 2003-CA-001022-MR.
All three cases have been consolidated for our review.
Any further factual circumstances necessary to a decision of the
various appeals will be considered along with the parties’
arguments below.
Huntington’s first argument in its direct appeal,
(Appeal No. 2001-CA-000505-MR) is that the trial court erred
when it determined that the instrument signed by the
stockholders of DDR and styled “Indemnity Agreement” was
actually a guaranty agreement that did not comply with KRS
371.065, and, therefore, was unenforceable.
The interpretation and construction of contracts is a
matter of law for the court to decide and our review of the
circuit court’s findings is undertaken de novo. Frear v. P.T.A.
Industries, Inc., Ky., 103 S.W.3d 99, 105 (2003); First
Commonwealth Bank of Prestonsburg v. West, Ky. App., 55 S.W.3d
829, 835 (2000); Fay E. Sams Money Purchase Pension Plan v.
Jansen, Ky. App., 3 S.W.3d 753, 757 (1999); Cinelli v. Ward, Ky.
App., 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (1999).
It is true that a court cannot create ambiguity in a
contract where none exists, First Commonwealth Bank of
Prestonsburg v. West, 55 S.W.3d 829, 836 (2000); and that a
contract must be interpreted in accordance with the parties’
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intent gathered from the instrument itself if possible.
Monroe’s Adm’r v. Federal Union Life Ins. Co., 251 Ky. 570, 65
S.W.2d 680, 681 (1933).
However, simply concluding that the
contract at issue is an indemnity contract because it is labeled
as such and because of the wording used in the body of the
contract is incorrect.
It is the effect of an instrument that
determines its character, not the style afforded it by the
parties.
Terrill v. Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co., 290 Ky. 35,
160 S.W.2d 326, 328 (1942); Duncan v. Mason, 239 Ky. 570, 39
S.W.2d 1006, 1008 (1931); Kentucky Rock Asphalt Co. v. Milliner,
234 Ky. 217, 27 S.W.2d 937, 939 (1930).
Huntington complains that the circuit court
impermissibly considered a prior draft agreement that was not
signed by the parties in interpreting the contract at issue
here.
We have determined that this is irrelevant since it is
not necessary to consider the prior unexecuted contract in order
to determine the nature of the one that was executed.
The contract at issue here is an agreement for the
stockholders to “unconditionally agree to indemnify The
Huntington Acceptance Company” until it receives “payment in
full of all liabilities owing by Borrower [DDR] to Huntington.”
The liabilities were conditioned on the performance of DDR
pursuant to the various repurchase agreements that it had with
dealers.
-7-
An indemnity contract is defined as one in which the
obligation requires the promisor (the stockholders) “to make
good any loss or damage which another [(Huntington)] has
incurred while acting at the request or for the benefit of the
promisor [(the stockholders)].”
Intercargo Ins. Co. v. B.W.
Farrell, Inc., Ky. App., 89 S.W.3d 422, 426 (2002).
In the
indemnity contract, the promisor (the stockholders) promised to
protect Huntington from loss or damage as a result of DDR’s
liability to Huntington.
A guaranty, on the other hand, is an agreement where
the promisor (the stockholder) promises to protect Huntington
“from liability for a debt resulting from the failure of a third
party [DDR] to honor an obligation to that promisee
[Huntington].”
Id.
A guaranty contract is characterized by the
promise to protect the promisee (Huntington) against loss or
damage through the failure of DDR to fulfill its obligations to
Huntington.
Id.
See also, Thomasson v. Pineco, Inc., 173 Ga.
App., 794, 794-795, 328 S.E.2d 410, 411-412 (Ga. App., 1985) for
a clear discussion of the differences between indemnity and
guaranty contracts.
Clearly the contract in this case seeks to hold the
stockholders liable for a debt owed by DDR to Huntington.
This
is a straightforward guaranty contract regardless of the label
and wording used.
-8-
Since we have determined that the trial court was
correct in finding that the contract was one of guaranty rather
than indemnity, then KRS 371.065 applies.
Under the plain
meaning of KRS 371.065, guaranty contracts must state “the
amount of the maximum aggregate liability of the guarantor
thereunder, and the date on which the guaranty terminates,”
unless the guaranty is contained within the instrument being
guaranteed, or expressly refers to the instrument being
guaranteed.
KRS 371.065(1); Wheeler & Clevenger Oil Co., Inc.
v. Washburn, Ky., 127 S.W.3d 609, 614-615 (2004).
applies to all guaranty contracts.
KRS 371.065
APL, Inc. v. Ohio Valley
Aluminum, Inc., Ky. App., 839 S.W.2d 571, 575 (1992).
In this case the guaranty contract between the
stockholders and Huntington is not contained within an
instrument being guaranteed, nor does it expressly refer to an
instrument being guaranteed.
Thus, its failure to comply with
the other requirements of KRS 371.065 is fatal to its
enforcement.
Huntington’s second argument on appeal is that the
circuit court should have granted it summary judgment with
respect to claims by DDR regarding the $5 million overline
credit extension.
Since the jury did not award DDR any damages
for this claim, the appeal by Huntington is a protective appeal
-9-
and given that we are affirming the trial court’s judgment as to
Huntington and DDR, there is no need to decide this issue.
On cross-appeal, DDR, Porter, and Smith have alleged
various grounds for reversal of the jury’s verdict.
Their first
argument is that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury
on DDR’s breach of contract claim against Huntington concerning
the $5 million overline financing.
The jury was instructed with
respect to this claim as follows:
You will find for DDR if you are satisfied from the
evidence:
a)
b)
c)
d)
that DDR and HAC understood and orally agreed to
a temporary $5,000,000.00 overline financing;
that HAC failed to comply with the material terms
of the agreement;
that DDR was damaged as a result of HAC’s
failure;
that DDR complied with all material terms of the
agreement.
Otherwise you will find for HAC and HNB [Huntington].
DDR complains that the circuit court erred by including subpart
(d) in the instructions to the jury.
We disagree.
The contract claim that DDR made against Huntington
alleged that Huntington failed to provide $5 million in overline
financing, and this resulted in the failure of the business.
To
find for DDR on this claim, the jury was required to find that a
contract existed; the terms of that contract obligated
Huntington to extend up to $5 million in financing to DDR; that
Huntington failed to do so; and that the breach of the contract
-10-
caused harm to DDR.
It further had to find that DDR complied
with all material terms of the contract.
It is unknown whether the jury believed that none of
the elements were satisfied or just the fourth element requiring
it to find that DDR complied with all material terms of the
contract.
DDR only complains as to the fourth element, but this
is a defense to the enforcement of a contract and was clearly an
issue tried before the jury.
Thus, whether or not contained in
the parties’ pleadings, if it is tried to the jury, then the
court is authorized to instruct the jury according to those
issues actually tried.
Shanklin v. Townsend, 467 S.W.2d 779,
781 (1971).
DDR’s contention that Huntington’s failure to perform
excuses its failure to comply with material terms of the
contract is unpersuasive.
This contention is a question of fact
that was apparently never presented to the jury, DDR never
requested an instruction on this issue nor raised an objection
as to the court’s failure to submit such an instruction.
DDR, Henry H. Porter, and Burton J. Smith’s second
argument is that the circuit court erred by refusing to realign
the parties so that they would have opened and closed the proof
and also made closing arguments to the jury last.
CR 43.01(2) allocates the burden of proof to “the
party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either
-11-
side.”
CR 43.02(c) requires that party to produce its evidence
first.
Clearly Huntington would be defeated on its claim
against DDR and the stockholders if it presented no proof. It is
also clear that DDR and the stockholders would be defeated on
their various counterclaims if no proof were presented.
The
trial court has broad discretion in determining the course and
proceeding of trial, including the allocation of the burden of
proof.
Where, as here, there are multiple parties and multiple
issues to be decided, the circuit court’s ruling will not be
disturbed absent a showing that it abused its discretion. Dayoc
v. Johnson, Ky., 427 S.W.2d 569, 571 (1968); Connecticut
Indemnity Co. v. A.K. Kelley, Ky., 301 S.W.2d 584, 586 (1957);
Blackburn v. Beverly, 272 Ky. 346, 114 S.W.2d 98, 102 (1938).
DDR has failed to show that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying its motions to realign the parties.
DDR, Henry H. Porter, and Burton J. Smith also contend
that the court allowed prejudicial hearsay testimony from John
Cline’s widow to be admitted, and that this constituted
reversible error, or that their motion for a mistrial should
have been granted.
John Cline’s widow was allowed to testify in rebuttal
to testimony from the general manager of DDR that he had met
John Cline at Churchill Downs in 1991, and had a discussion
-12-
regarding the financing of DDR in which calculations were made
on a tablecloth.
The widow was allowed to testify that there
were no tablecloths in use in this particular room of Churchill
Downs.
She was also permitted to testify regarding John Cline’s
character.
DDR, Henry H. Porter, and Burton J. Smith contend that
this testimony was hearsay, irrelevant, and prejudicial.
Even
if this contention were true, the nature of the testimony and
its overall importance in a six-week trial is so slight that it
did not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
CR 61.01.
Further, granting a motion for mistrial should only be done when
it appears to be a manifest necessity.
Gould v. Charlton Co.,
Inc., Ky., 929 S.W.2d 734, 738 (1996).
The error, if any, in
admitting the testimony and refusing to grant a mistrial is not
reversible.
Henry H. Porter has appealed the trial court’s
directed verdict in favor of Huntington on his claim of fraud.
When granting a directed verdict the trial court is
required to draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
On appellate review the evidence must be considered in the same
light.
Baylis v. Lourdes Hosp., Inc., Ky., 805 S.W.2d 122, 125
(1991); Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co., Ky. App., 37 S.W.3d
770, 775 (2000).
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To sustain a claim of fraud, Henry H. Porter was
required to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Huntington made a material misrepresentation; that it was false;
that it was known to be false or made with reckless regard for
whether or not it was false; that Huntington made the material
misrepresentation with an inducement that it be acted upon; that
Henry H. Porter acted in reliance on the material
misrepresentation; and that Henry H. Porter suffered injury as a
result.
United Parcel Serv. Co. v. Rickert, Ky., 996 S.W.2d
464, 468 (1999).
The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to
Henry H. Porter, is that Huntington, through its representative,
John Cline, made representations that he had more authority at
Huntington than at his previous employment, and that he
represented to DDR that Huntington would provide the floorplan
financing and the overline financing.
These representations
were made in order to induce DDR to move its banking to
Huntington, and that was done.
Henry H. Porter, in reliance on
these promises, executed notes on behalf of DDR on which he
eventually had to personally pay $173,749.28 to Huntington.
The circuit court directed a verdict on this claim
because it did not believe that Henry H. Porter had introduced
any evidence that material misrepresentations were directed at
him rather than DDR.
However, the law is clear that indirect
-14-
influence may be a basis for liability if the one making those
misrepresentations should reasonably anticipate the reliance of
the third party.
Here it seems reasonable that Henry H. Porter
would rely on representations made by Huntington and that his
reliance should be anticipated.
Taking the evidence in the
light most favorable to Henry H. Porter, we believe that the
circuit court should not have directed a verdict on this issue.
The final appeal is by DDR alone and is from the trial
court’s order awarding attorney fees to Huntington. The award of
attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court.
v. Grecco, Ky. App., 111 S.W.3d 877, 883 (2002).
argued that the court abused its discretion.
King
DDR has not
Therefore, the
award of fees is affirmed.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed in part, and reversed as to the directed verdict
entered in favor of Huntington against the fraud claim of Henry
H. Porter.
The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
-15-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS/CROSS
APPELLEES:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSS
APPELLANTS:
Victor B. Maddox
Mary E. Eade
Louisville, Kentucky
Charles D. Greenwell
Augustus S. Herbert
Michael V. Brodarick
Laurence J. Zielke
John H. Dwyer, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
-16-
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