DICKIE HOLBROOK v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: August 6, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-000240-MR
DICKIE HOLBROOK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS C. COMBS, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00005
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
McANULTY, AND MINTON, JUDGES; AND EMBERTON, SENIOR
McANULTY, JUDGE.
A Perry County Circuit jury found Appellant,
Dickie Holbrook (Holbrook), guilty of flagrant nonsupport and
fixed his punishment at a prison sentence of 3 ½ years.
At
final sentencing, the trial court imposed judgment in accordance
with the jury’s verdict.
1
This is a matter-of-right appeal in
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
which Holbrook raises a number of issues for our review.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Holbrook married Joanne Holbrook (Joanne) in June of
1986.
The couple divorced in 1989.
(3) sons.
Together, they have three
The oldest two (2) sons were born during the
marriage, and the youngest son was born after the couple
divorced.
Pursuant to the divorce decree, Joanne was awarded
sole custody of all three (3) children.
Initially, the court ordered Holbrook to pay Joanne
forty-five dollars ($45.00) per week in child support.
Holbrook
failed to fulfill his child support obligation, and, eventually,
Joanne had to rely on AFDC, Food Stamps and Medical Insurance to
support the boys.
Because she was receiving AFDC and medical
benefits, the Perry County Child Support Agency (the Agency)
became involved in Joanne’s case.
Joanne assigned her right to
child support to the Agency for collection.
Consequently, in
1991, the Agency then stepped in her shoes to attempt to recoup
money from Holbrook for the state benefits Joanne had been
receiving.
Holbrook.
Since 1991, the Agency had collected $210 from
As of the date of trial, November 14, 2000, Holbrook
owed $36,616.00 in child support.
follows:
This number is broken down as
Holbrook owes $28,510.16 to the state for AFDC
arrearage, $7,961.84 to Joanne for child support arrearage and
$144 to the state for genetic testing of the last child.
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On February 10, 2000, the Perry County Grand Jury
returned an indictment charging Holbrook with one count of
flagrant nonsupport, a class D felony pursuant to KRS 530.050.
Holbrook entered a plea of “not guilty,” and was released on
bond.
During the course of the proceedings, the trial court
scheduled his jury trial for October 9, 2000.
On September 29,
2000, Holbrook’s counsel made a motion for a continuance on the
grounds that Holbrook had a pending social security disability
claim filed, the outcome of which would be evidence a jury could
hear in determining whether Holbrook was in a position to work
and provide support for his children.
The trial court granted
the motion for continuance and rescheduled the trial for
November 13, 2000.
On November 13, 2000, Holbrook’s counsel made another
motion for a continuance on the grounds that on November 12,
2000, Holbrook voluntarily admitted himself into the ARH
Psychiatric Center (ARH).
Holbrook’s counsel stated that a
continuance was necessary because he could not communicate with
his client, review the defense to be presented at trial, nor
subpoena witnesses in a timely manner.
Upon learning of
Holbrook’s whereabouts, the trial court issued an order to
transport Holbrook to the Perry Circuit Courtroom on the
following day, November 14, 2000, and to further release all
records of admissions and treatment.
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On November 14, 2000, the trial court heard Holbrook’s
motion to continue.
Obviously, Holbrook’s competency to stand
trial became an issue at the hearing due to his voluntary
admission to a psychiatric hospital just two days prior.
The
Commonwealth opposed the continuance and argued that the defense
sought it the day of trial.
Further, the Commonwealth contended
that Holbrook purposefully absented himself from the proceedings
by voluntarily checking himself in.
Counsel for Holbrook
responded that that argument might carry more weight if Holbrook
had not voluntarily admitted himself to this same facility in
July of 2000.
Finally, Holbrook’s counsel argued that he did
not feel that Holbrook could contribute to his defense after
being recently hospitalized.
The trial court read into the record pertinent
portions of Holbrook’s records from his November 12, 2000,
admission.
The medical records indicated that Holbrook reported
that the reason for his admission was that his ex-wife was
trying to take away his kids.
Holbrook commented that “they’re
going to send me to prison and I’d rather be dead.”
Prior to
his transfer to police custody, after his two-day stay in the
hospital, Holbrook was diagnosed with poly-substance dependence
and substance-induced mood disorder.
After reviewing Holbrook’s medical records, the court
directed its attention to Holbrook and asked him a number of
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questions.
The court asked him if he knew why he was there that
day, to which Holbrook responded “yeah.”
The court then
specifically asked Holbrook why he thought he was there, and
Holbrook replied, “To send me to jail.”
The court responded
that he was there for a trial, not necessarily to be sent to
jail.
When asked if Holbrook knew the charges against him,
Holbrook stated “non-support.
Child support.”
The court
further asked about Holbrook’s attorney and whether Holbrook had
had a chance to speak with his attorney about the case, and
Holbrook replied that he had.
The court than proceeded to
inquire about a witness named Beulah Turner, who was Holbrook’s
girlfriend at the time and who was prepared to testify on
Holbrook’s behalf as to money Holbrook had spent on his children
during various visits.
Beulah Turner was present to testify
because Holbrook requested that she do so.
Ultimately, the
trial court denied Holbrook’s motion to continue, and the trial
commenced.
On appeal, Holbrook raises four arguments for our
review.
First, Holbrook argues that the trial court’s ruling to
exclude testimony as to Holbrook’s mental condition
substantially prejudiced his right to present an adequate
defense.
Second, Holbrook argues that the trial court erred in
failing to adequately instruct the jury on the charged offense
and further erred in failing to instruct on the lesser-included
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offense of non-support as set out in KRS 530.050(1)(a), (b).
Third, Holbrook contends that the trial court’s failure to
admonish the jury after the Commonwealth violated the “Golden
Rule” substantially prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
Finally, Holbrook argues that the trial court erred in failing
to hold a competency hearing pursuant to KRS 504.100 after being
confronted with reasonable grounds to question Holbrook’s
competency to stand trial.
Taking Holbrook’s arguments in order, we begin with
the argument that the trial court prevented him from introducing
evidence of his inability to pay child support due to a mental
condition.
Holbrook asserts that this argument is properly
preserved in pre-trial motions.
Having reviewed the record, we
are not convinced that: (1) Holbrook’s counsel made this
argument, nor that (2) the trial court prevented Holbrook from
presenting testimony that a car accident in 1989 left Holbrook
physically incapable of performing work.
The pertinent pre-trial discussions are as follows.
After the court heard the issue of the continuance and one other
matter pertaining to privileged marital communications,
Holbrook’s attorney stated:
There is one other matter I would like to
address that we enter the records from the
psychiatric hospital. Those are protected
in the [transcript indicates inaudible] you
see afar. Unless we talked [transcript
-6-
indicates inaudible] we didn’t subpoena the
records [transcript indicates inaudible]
requested the records…
The trial court responded:
records be introduced?”
Yes.”
“You request that those
Holbrook’s counsel answered, “Yeah.
The Commonwealth’s Attorney then interjected:
Commonwealth does not intend to introduce
those. While we are on the subject the
Commonwealth now moves for a Motion in
Liminine [sic] to prohibit the Defendant
from offering into evidence any testimony
from the Defendant or any other person
regarding the defendant’s mental condition.
No notice has been given. He is also
wanting to exclude the records and I have
absolutely no intention to sit there, your
Honor, and allow this man to get up and
testify that he hasn’t supported his
children because he has been crazy.
Holbrook’s counsel replied, “You [sic] Honor, we have no expert
witness to the affect [sic] to support that.”
The trial court
then asked “Alright anything else?” to which counsel for both
sides answered, “No.”
In this appeal, Holbrook asserts that his trial
counsel interpreted the court’s ruling “as precluding any and
all testimony as to Mr. Holbrook’s physical and psychological
disabilities.”
We do not believe that the discussion above
supports Holbrook’s argument that he was prepared at trial to
counter the Commonwealth’s proof that Holbrook could “reasonably
provide” child support and the trial court prevented him from
doing so.
See Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d
-7-
830, 832 (2003).
(In a prosecution for flagrant nonsupport
under KRS 530.050, the Commonwealth is required “to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant can reasonably
provide the support ordered.”)
The primary flaw in Holbrook’s argument is that the
trial court did not rule on anything.
The more accurate
characterization is that the parties agreed that Holbrook would
not be presenting a mental health expert to testify regarding
Holbrook’s mental condition.
Although Holbrook may have made a
motion to admit the psychiatric records, the trial court did not
rule on the matter, therefore it is not properly preserved for
our review.
See Luttrell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 952 S.W.2d 216,
218 (1997).
Moreover, Holbrook testified in his own defense
about the 1989 motor vehicle accident that allegedly left him
incapable of holding a job.
The first substantive questions
asked of him pertained to his employment history.
Holbrook’s
testimony was as follows:
Q:
Have you had a steady job since 1999?
A:
No. No I have not had a steady job.
Q:
Would you tell the jury what’s happened
in your employment?
A:
I got in a car wreck about eleven (11)
years ago and my head went through the
windshield, and I got two (2) ruptured
disks, slipped disk in my back. When I
work, I get migraine headaches, and I go in
for short periods of time and therefor I
cannot hold a job down but I do love my kids
and I do pay. I do give them money. I have
bought them clothes. No matter what was
-8-
said here today here in Court I have done
that and that’s the honest to God’s truth.
Thus, the record refutes Holbrook’s assertion that the
trial court prevented him from presenting evidence regarding his
automobile accident and its impact on his employability.
The
Commonwealth presented evidence that Holbrook had obtained jobs,
however, he did not hold them very long.
Holbrook’s brother, a
defense witness, testified that every time Holbrook would get a
job, Holbrook would end up in jail for “drinking and not paying
child support.”
In short, there was conflicting testimony among
the defense witnesses as to why Holbrook could not maintain
steady employment.
The one constant was the fact that Holbrook
had been employed at various times.
Finally, the issue of
Holbrook’s ability to pay is a jury question, and, from the
jury’s verdict, in light of all the evidence, it is clear that
they did not believe that Holbrook was unable to reasonably
provide for his three children the sum of $45 per week.
We turn to Holbrook’s second argument -- the trial
court erred in failing to adequately instruct the jury on the
charged offense and further erred in failing to instruct on the
lesser-included offense of non-support as set out in KRS
530.050(1)(a), (b).
No party may assign as error the giving or the
failure to give an instruction unless the party’s
position has been fairly and adequately presented
to the trial judge by an offered instruction or
-9-
by motion, or unless the party makes
before the court instructs the jury,
specifically the matter to which the
objects and the ground or grounds of
objection.
objection
stating
party
the
RCr 9.54(2).
In this case, there is no record of Holbrook’s counsel
either objecting to the jury instructions or requesting a
lesser-included offense instruction.
To that end, because the
record is void of any indication that Holbrook ever requested a
lesser-included instruction or raised any objection before the
court instructed the jury, this error is unpreserved and does
not warrant consideration upon review.
See Blades v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 246, 248-49 (1997).
We move to Holbrook’s argument that the Commonwealth’s
Attorney violated the “Golden Rule” in his opening statement.
In a criminal case a golden rule type of
argument is one that urges the jurors
collectively or singularly to place
themselves or members of their families or
friends in the place of the person who has
been offended and to render a verdict as if
they or either of them or a member of their
families or friends was similarly situated.
Lycans v. Commonwealth, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 303, 305 (1978) (The
statement at issue in this armed robbery case was, “Suppose that
you run a store and somebody comes in on you and does that to
you.
What's it worth?”).
The prohibition stems from the idea
-10-
that such arguments cajole or prejudicially coerce a jury to
reach a verdict.
See id. at 306.
In his opening statement to the jury, the record
reflects that the Commonwealth’s Attorney said,
We are here because he will not pay his
child support. That is the only reason we
are here today. You will hear testimony and
evidence that he will not pay his ex-wife.
He will not pay [transcript indicates
inaudible] will not pay Division of Child
Support Enforcement for the welfare that
Mrs. Holbrook collected which comes out of
your and my pocket as taxpayers.
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s opening statement,
Holbrook’s counsel made a motion for a mistrial on the grounds
that the reference to the state benefits coming out of the
juror’s pockets violated the “Golden Rule.”
The trial court
agreed that the statement was inappropriate, but denied the
motion for a mistrial.
Instead, the court informed the
attorneys that he would admonish the jury that it was not to
take that statement into consideration in making a decision on
the case.
The record does not reflect that the trial court ever
gave the admonition, which would have been the appropriate
remedy in this case.
See id. at 305.
In light of the
overwhelming evidence against Holbrook, however, we conclude the
statement was not of such significance as to prejudice the jury.
While we acknowledge that the statement did violate the “Golden
-11-
Rule,” we believe the error in allowing the statement without
admonishing the jury was harmless under RCr 9.24.
See id. at
306.
Finally, we address Holbrook’s argument that the trial
court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing after being
confronted with reasonable grounds to question Holbrook’s
competency to stand trial.
KRS 504.100(1) requires the trial
court to order a mental health examination or report when the
trial court has “reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial[.]”
Moreover, it is well accepted
that “criminal prosecution of a defendant who is incompetent to
stand trial is a violation of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”
Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d
473, 487 (1999).
RCr 8.06 goes further than KRS 504.100 in identifying
those factors that indicate a defendant is incompetent to stand
trial.
RCr 8.06 is as follows:
If upon arraignment or during the
proceedings there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the defendant lacks the
capacity to appreciate the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him
or her, or to participate rationally in his
or her defense, all proceedings shall be
postponed until the issue of incapacity is
determined as provided by KRS 504.100.
KRS 504.100 and RCr 8.06 allow the trial judge “a wide
latitude in determining in the first instance whether or not to
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require that the accused be examined.”
Conley v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 569 S.W.2d 682, 685 (1978); see Dye v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 477 S.W.2d 805, 806 (1972).
In this case, the trial judge
elicited responses from Holbrook that indicated he had the
capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him and to participate rationally in his
defense.
The trial judge had the opportunity to observe
Holbrook and review the records from his recent psychiatric
admission.
The entry that apparently stood out above all others
was that Holbrook stated his reason for admission was that his
ex-wife was trying to take away his kids and they were going to
send him to prison and he’d rather be dead.
Holbrook had voluntarily admitted himself to the same
facility on July 14, 2000, after the death of his mother in May
of 2000.
Holbrook stated that he had increased his use of
cocaine and alcohol and wanted help to quit.
He was diagnosed
with poly-substance dependence and discharged on August 4, 2000.
During his two-day visit in November, the
psychological screening noted that Holbrook was a former patient
of ARH and the reason for his relapse or readmission was
substance abuse.
The facility monitored him because it
considered him a suicide risk.
Holbrook admitted to hearing
voices, although, the care provider noted that his speech was
coherent and his conversation was relevant.
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The day after his
admission, he reported that he felt better, but he just had a
lot going on his life.
The physician diagnosed him with poly-
substance dependence and substance-induced mood disorder and
prescribed Depakote (a mood stabilizer taken twice daily) and
Zoloft (an anti-depressant taken once daily).
On the day the
psychiatric center discharged Holbrook, he was interviewed and
denied suicide ideation, homicidal/aggressive ideation,
hallucinations, and delusions.
Further, the staff assessment
noted that his mood and affect seemed within normal limits.
When we look at the entire situation in this case, we
cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in
determining that Holbrook was competent to stand trial.
Instead
of having reasonable grounds to believe Holbrook was
incompetent, it seems the trial judge had reasonable grounds to
believe that Holbrook voluntarily admitted himself to a
psychiatric hospital to delay his trial.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Perry
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Stutsman
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Janine Coy Bowden
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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