DALE W. RATLIFF v. HUSKY COAL COMPANY; KEVIN KING, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND KENTUCKY WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 26, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001301-WC
DALE W. RATLIFF
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-02-01091
v.
HUSKY COAL COMPANY;
KEVIN KING, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND KENTUCKY
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE:
BAKER, KNOPF AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BAKER, JUDGE.
Dale W. Ratliff petitions us to review an Opinion
of the Workers’ Compensation Board entered June 4, 2003.
We
reverse and remand.
Ratliff began working for Husky Coal Company (Husky)
in 1995 and his last day of employment was in January 2002.
Ratliff apparently began experiencing carpal tunnel symptoms
sometime in 1996.
In September 2001, Dr. Sonya Webb diagnosed
Ratliff with carpal tunnel syndrome and informed Ratliff that
the condition was work-related.
Radcliff filed an Application for Resolution of Injury
Claim with the Department of Workers’ Claims on July 24, 2002.
Husky argued that the claim should be dismissed as it was not
brought within two years of “injury” as required by Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 342.185.
Husky believed that the date of
injury was some time in 1996 when Radcliff first began
experiencing symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome and when a Dr.
Samuel King specifically diagnosed Radcliff as suffering from
carpal tunnel syndrome.
Conversely, Radcliff argued that his
date of injury was in September 2001 when Dr. Webb informed him
that the condition was indeed work-related.
The Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) agreed with Husky and concluded that Radcliff’s
claim was time-barred by KRS 342.185.
In so concluding, the ALJ
reasoned:
This claim boils down to the question
of when Ratliff knew he had suffered a workrelated injury. Ratliff argues that
occurred, at the earliest, when Dr. Webb
made the diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome
and informed Ratliff that the condition was
work related in September of 2001. On the
other hand, Husky argues that occurred in
1996 when Ratliff began to experience
symptoms and when, at least according to Dr.
Templin, Dr. King made a diagnosis of
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
Unfortunately for Ratliff, the
Administrative Law Judge believes that the
date of injury was sometime in 1996. In
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doing so, the Administrative Law Judge notes
that, although Ratliff denied receiving a
diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome from Dr.
King, Dr. Templin’s history reflects such a
diagnosis. If Dr. Templin did not obtain
that information from Ratliff, where did he
get it? Furthermore, the Administrative law
Judge notes that Ratliff testified that he
began to experience symptoms while working
in 1996 and that those symptoms
progressively worsened. Clearly, this should
have lead Ratliff to conclude that his
condition was related to work activity.
While the Administrative Law Judge
recognizes that Ratliff is not a physician
and that Ratliff is not required to selfdiagnose, Ratliff has some responsibility to
be aware of his physical condition.
Brief for Appellant at 6-7.
Ratliff sought review of the ALJ’s
opinion in the Workers’ Compensation Board.
The Board
ultimately affirmed the ALJ’s opinion, thus precipitating this
review.
Ratliff’s sole contention of error is that the ALJ
erroneously concluded that his claim was time-barred under KRS
342.185.
For the reasons hereinafter enunciated, we must agree.
Under KRS 342.185, a claim for workers’ compensation
benefits must be filed within two years from the date of injury.
See Alcan Foil Products v. Huff, Ky., 2 S.W.3d 96 (1999).
As to
injuries which occur gradually from a series of traumatic events
or from multi-traumas, our Supreme Court has held that the date
of injury under KRS 342.185 occurs when the worker knows that he
has suffered an injury and he knows that the injury was work-
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related.
See Id; Special Fund v. Clark, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 487
(1999).
In the case at hand, the ALJ found that Ratliff had
received a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome in 1996 from Dr.
King.
The ALJ further found that Radcliff testified that he
first experienced symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome while
working in 1996 and that these symptoms progressively worsened.
From these facts, the ALJ found that, “[c]learly this would have
led Radcliff to conclude that his condition was related to work
activity.”
In Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp., Ky., 65 S.W.3d 503
(2001), the Supreme Court stated that:
[m]edical causation is a matter for the
medical experts and, therefore, the claimant
cannot be expected to have self-diagnosed
the cause of the harmful change to his
cervical spine as being a gradual injury
versus a specific traumatic event. He was
not required to give notice that he had
sustained a work-related gradual injury to
his spine until he was informed of that
fact.
Id. at 507.
We view Hill as adopting the rule that a claimant
suffering from a gradual injury is not required to self-diagnose
that injury as being work-related; rather, the work-relatedness
of a gradual injury is a question for medical experts.
It is
undisputed that Radcliff was not informed by a medical expert
that his carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related until September
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2001 when Dr. Webb so informed him.
Thus, we believe that the
statute of limitations contained in KRS 341.185 was triggered in
September 2001.
Even if Hill does not adopt such a bright line rule
requiring expert opinion as to the work-relatedness of a gradual
injury, we are of the opinion that the ALJ was clearly erroneous
in finding that Radcliff knew that his carpal tunnel syndrome
was work-related in 1996.
The ALJ bases this finding upon the
fact that Radcliff experienced carpal tunnel symptoms while
working and that these symptoms progressively worsened.
As a
matter of law, we are simply unable to conclude that the mere
onset of symptoms while working, and the progressive worsening
of those symptoms over time is sufficient to impute knowledge
that the underlying condition was work-related.
Indeed, several
chronic medical conditions are progressive and worsen over time.
Additionally, most claimants who suffer from a gradual workrelated injury experience symptoms not only at work but outside
of work in their daily activities.
Viewed in the light of
everyday experiences, it would be clearly unreasonable and
unfair to require a claimant to know that his injury is workrelated simply because he experiences symptoms at work and those
symptoms progressively worsen.
Upon the whole, we hold that
Ratliff’s claim was timely filed under KRS 341.185.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board is reversed and this cause is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert J. Greene
Kelsey E. Friend Law Firm
Pikeville, Kentucky
Kamp T. Purdy
Ferreri & Fogle
Lexington, Kentucky
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