TRI-STATE ROOFING AND SHEET METAL v. STEVEN HENSLEY; HONORABLE ROGER D. RIGGS, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD and STEPHEN HENSLEY v. TRI-STATE ROOFING AND SHEET METAL; HON. ROGER D. RIGGS, ALJ; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATON BOARD
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RENDERED: October 31, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001067-WC
TRI-STATE ROOFING AND SHEET METAL
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO.02-WC-00402
v.
STEVEN HENSLEY;
HONORABLE ROGER D. RIGGS,
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
AND:
APPELLEES
NO. 2003-CA-001216-WC
STEPHEN HENSLEY
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 02-WC-00402
TRI-STATE ROOFING AND SHEET METAL;
HON. ROGER D. RIGGS, ALJ; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATON BOARD
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, KNOPF AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Tri-State Roofing and Sheet Metal (Tri-State)
petitions for review of a decision of the Workers’ Compensation
Board (the Board), entered April 23, 2003, that affirmed an
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) determination that Steven
Hensley (Hensley) sustained work-related cumulative trauma
injuries to his left shoulder, hips and back while employed by
Tri-State.
The Board also held that the ALJ correctly found
that Hensley’s disability manifested on March 29, 2000.
Hensley
has cross-petitioned, arguing that the ALJ and the Board erred
by failing to strike Tri-State’s special answer asserting a
statute of limitations defense as untimely.
We affirm.
Hensley was employed by Tri-State from 1986 until 1991
and from 1998 until March 28, 2000, as a sheet metal roofer1.
The roofs that Hensley installed were made primarily from copper
panels that weighed between 40 to 50 pounds.
Hensley’s job as a
roofer entailed climbing a scaffold or a ladder to access a
building’s roof, pulling the panels onto the roof, laying and
seaming the panels together and screwing cleats into the panels.
The cleats were screwed in every eighteen inches, requiring
Hensley to bend and stoop frequently.
Hensley testified during
his deposition that Tri-State installed roofs on large
commercial contract jobs, such as Lexington area shopping malls,
the Lexington Green Shopping Center and a Pier One store.
During the summer of 1998, Hensley began experiencing
back pain.
Hensley sought medical treatment from his family
1
From 1991 until his return to Tri-State in 1998, Hensley worked for an
auction company that oversaw the closure and liquidation of businesses.
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physician, Dr. Joseph Gerhardstein, for his back pain, which he
assumed to be “normal work pain.”
Dr. Gerhardstein’s medical
records from January 8, 1999, indicated that Hensley complained
of lower back and bilateral hip pain, with the left hip hurting
for a year, as well as numbness in the legs.
Dr. Gerhardstein
ordered x-rays of the lumbar spine and pelvis, which revealed
some degenerative disc disease at L3-4, and prescribed Motrin.
During a follow-up visit on January 29, 1999, Dr. Gerhardstein
noted that the Motrin had helped Hensley’s shoulder but not his
hips.
Moreover, Hensley was still experiencing pain while
walking.
On February 19, 1999, an MRI of the lumbar spine
showed desiccation of the disc at L5-S1 and bulging from L3 to
S1.
Thereafter, on March 5, 1999, Dr. Gerhardstein prescribed
Ibuprofen and back exercises.
The record shows no further
treatment of Hensley until January 2000.
On January 18, 2000, Hensley suffered an acute episode
of back pain that required emergency room treatment.
The next
day, Hensley saw Dr. Gerhardstein and complained that his back
pain had been increasing for over a month.
Dr. Gerhardstein
examined Hensley and noted that Hensley had a bent stance,
antalgic gait, and was walking with the aid of crutches.
Hensley was unable to engage in range of motion testing.
Based
upon his examination, Dr. Gerhardstein diagnosed Hensley with
right-sided sciatica and referred Hensley to physical therapy.
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During an office visit on February 7, 2000, Dr.
Gerhardstein noted that the physical therapy improved Hensley’s
physical impairments.
Dr. Gerhardstein recommended that Hensley
continue attending physical therapy sessions.
Hensley indicated
to his physician that he had been able to rest and attend
physical therapy because he had been temporarily laid off by
Tri-State.2
However, Hensley informed Dr. Gerhardstein that he
was concerned about being ready to return to work once the
layoff was over.
Hensley, assuming that his pain was related to
the physical demands of his employment, also expressed his
desire that his medical condition and treatment be covered under
workers’ compensation.
At this point, Dr. Gerhardstein asked
Hensley if he had been involved in an accident at work, to which
Hensley responded negatively.
Dr. Gerhardstein noted that
“[S]ince we have no definite injury that [a workers’
compensation claim] is hard to do.”
At this point, Dr.
Gerhardstein excused Hensley from work for one month to continue
physical therapy.
Even with physical therapy, Hensley continued
to experience pain while walking.
Dr. Gerhardstein referred
Hensley to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. John Allen.
Hensley first saw Dr. Allen on March 15, 2000.
Dr.
Allen diagnosed greater trochanteric bursitis, with the left
side being worse than the right side, and injected Hensley’s hip
2
At this time, Tri-State had laid-off Hensley and several other employees due
to a lack of work.
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with pain medication.
On March 29, 2000, Dr. Allen noted that
the shots had temporarily relieved Hensley’s pain, but provided
no dramatic improvement.
During this visit, Dr. Allen noted
that Hensley was employed in a physically demanding job that was
likely contributing to his persistent back and hip pain.
Dr.
Allen advised Hensley not to work for a couple of weeks to see
if rest would improve his medical condition.
Moreover, Dr.
Allen’s treatment note from this office visit reads:
“He is working rather hard and I think
between his back and the hip problem and his
work related strain he is not getting any
better. . . .I hope he can be off without
too much difficulty as I do think that his
problems are work related at this point.”
Hensley immediately took his medical excuse to his
supervisor.
In response to Dr. Allen’s off-work slip, Tri-State
terminated Hensley’s employment.
Hensley has not worked in any
capacity since having his employment terminated by Tri-State.
Following the termination of his employment, Hensley
applied for Social Security disability benefits.
In the course
of being evaluated for that claim, Hensley was diagnosed with
severe peripheral vascular disease, which severely reduced the
circulation of blood in his legs.
pulse in either leg.
Sometimes, Hensley felt no
The pain and numbness Hensley felt in his
legs, as well as the difficulties he had walking, were
attributed to the vascular disease.
-5-
Meanwhile, an MRI ordered by Dr. Gerhardstein revealed
tendonitis, arthritis, and degeneration of Hensley’s left
shoulder.
On July 31, 2001, Dr. Allen read the MRI to show
chronic rotator cuff tendonitis and some arthritis in that area
as well as in the acromioclavicular joint.
Hensley eventually
underwent surgery on his left shoulder to repair an underlying
chronic rotator cuff tear.
On March 26, 2002, Hensley filed an Application for
Resolution of Injury Claim against Tri-State, alleging March 29,
2000, as the manifestation date of his back and hip injuries.3
In support of Hensley’s claim, Dr. Allen diagnosed Hensley with,
degenerative osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine, hips, and left
AC joint, trochanteric bursitis of the hips and rotator cuff
tendonitis/partial tear.
Dr. Allen opined that these medical
conditions were caused by “chronic overuse from heavy labor” and
assigned a 5% impairment rating Hensley’s lumbar spine
condition4.
According to Dr. Allen, Hensley would be restricted
in lifting, bending, walking, standing, sitting and climbing.
Accordingly, Hensley was unable to work as a roofer.
At Tri-State’s request, Dr. Daniel Primm evaluated
Hensley on July 27, 2002.
As a result of his examination, Dr.
3
Hensley later amended his workers’ compensation claim to include injuries
sustained to his left shoulder. Hensley’s peripheral vascular disease was
not included in his claim.
4
Dr. Allen also noted, however, that the AMA Guides did not adequately deal
with the condition found in the left shoulder.
-6-
Primm diagnosed Hensley with advanced peripheral vascular
disease with chronic claudication, which affected Hensley’s legs
and lower back.
Dr. Primm found that Hensley’s employment in
manual labor aggravated the degenerative disc disease in the
lumbar spine and produced one-half of the 5% permanent
impairment rating.
Further, Dr. Primm opined that Hensley’s
peripheral vascular disease was totally occupationally
disabling, but in the absence of that condition, Hensley’s back
injury would only limit him from lifting no more than 20 to 25
pounds with occasional lifting of up to 75 pounds.
Dr. Primm
also advised Hensley to avoid repetitive bending and regular or
frequent climbing.
While acknowledging Hensley’s shoulder
injury and operation, Dr. Primm offered no opinion as to
causation, impairments or restrictions relative to that injury.
The ALJ reviewed the lay and medical testimony
contained within the record and concluded that Hensley was
permanently and totally disabled as a result of the back, leg
and shoulder conditions caused by the cumulative trauma from
Hensley’s employment.
The ALJ further determined that Hensley’s
disability became manifest on March 29, 2000, noting that this
date represented the first indication from a medical
professional that Hensley’s physical conditions were workrelated.
On appeal, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings and
award of benefits.
This petition and cross-petition followed.
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At this point, we must first address the threshold
issue Hensley presents in his cross-petition.
In his cross-
petition, Hensley argues that the Board and the ALJ erred in not
striking Tri-State’s special answer, in which Tri-State argued
that Hensley’s claim was not filed with the Department of
Workers’ Claims within two years of the date of his injury as
required by KRS 342.185, as untimely.
We find this argument to
be without merit.
803 KAR 25:010E § 5(d)(2) provides as follows:
A “special answer shall be filed within:
a.
Forty-five (45) days of the scheduling
order; or
b.
Ten (10) days after discovery of facts
supporting the defense if discovery
could not have been had earlier in the
exercise of due diligence.
Here, Tri-State filed its special answer on June 18,
2002, approximately four days after Hensley testified at his
deposition.
During the deposition, Hensley testified that he
assumed as early as 1999 that his physical impairments were
related to his employment.
Review of the record indicates that
Tri-State acted with due diligence in filing its special answer
because it first discovered the possibility of a statute of
limitations defense during this deposition.
The initial
description of Hensley’s injury in his application for benefits
did not make this defense obvious to Tri-State.
-8-
Moreover, Tri-
State had no prior notice of Hensley’s injury, nor did it
possess the opportunity to investigate Hensley’s alleged injury,
nor did it pay Hensley any temporary total disability payments
or medical expenses.
The medical records contained in the
record also failed to indicate the viability of a statute of
limitations defense.
Under these circumstances, it is clear
that 803 KAR 25:010E § 5(d)(2) did not require Tri-State to file
its special answer until it discovered that a statute of
limitations defense was viable.
Because Tri-State filed its
special answer four days after taking Hensley’s deposition, we
find this employer timely filed its special answer and properly
preserved this issue for review.
We now turn our attention to the merits of Tri-State’s
petition for review.
Tri-State asserts that the ALJ and the
Board incorrectly applied the standard for determining when the
statute of limitations begins to run in a cumulative trauma
claim.
Specifically, Tri-State argues that in cumulative trauma
cases, the claimant’s obligation to file a timely claim is not
diminished even if the treating physician fails to specifically
diagnose the claimant’s medical condition as being work-related.
Hence, according to Tri-State, even though Hensley was not given
specific notice of a cumulative trauma injury until seeing Dr.
Allen on March 29, 2000, the statute of limitations on Hensley’s
workers’ compensation claim commenced when Hensley, prior to
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seeking treatment from his family physician, believed that his
back, leg, and shoulder pain was related to his employment.
Simply put, Tri-State’s position is without merit.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has clearly defined our
function in reviewing matters from the Workers’ Compensation
Board.
In Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d
685, 687-88 (1992), the Court stated:
The function of further review of the WCB in
the Court of Appeals is to correct the Board
only where the the Court perceives the Board
has overlooked or misconstrued controlling
statute or precedent, or committed an error
in assessing evidence so flagrant as to
cause great injustice.
A claimant in a workers’ compensation action bears the
burden of proving every essential element of his cause of
action.
Snawder v. Stice, Ky. App., 576 S.W.2d 276 (1979).
Since Hensley was successful before the ALJ, the question on
review is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
conclusion.
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky. App., 673 S.W.2d
735 (1984).
Substantial evidence is evidence which, when taken
alone or in light of all the evidence, has probative value to
induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.
Bowling
v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, Ky.
App., 891 S.W.2d 406, 409 (1994), citing Kentucky State Racing
Comm’n v. Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (1972).
-10-
As the finder of fact, the ALJ has the sole authority
to assess and to evaluate the quality, character, and substance
of the evidence.
(1993).
Square D Co. v. Tipton, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 308
The ALJ may reject any testimony and believe or
disbelieve various parts of the evidence, regardless of whether
it comes from the same witness or the same adversary party’s
total proof.
Hall’s Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, Ky. App.,
16 S.W.3d 327 (2000).
Mere evidence contrary to the ALJ’s
decision is not adequate to require reversal on appeal.
Whittaker v. Rowland, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1999).
To
reverse the ALJ’s decision, it must be shown that no substantial
evidence supports that decision.
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky.,
708 S.W.2d 641 (1986).
KRS 342.0011(1) defines a compensable injury as being
a traumatic event or series of events, including cumulative
trauma, that proximately causes a harmful change in the human
organism.
When a cumulative trauma injury is alleged, the claim
must be filed within two years of the date the disability
becomes manifest.
S.W.2d 487 (1999).
KRS 342.185; Special Fund v. Clark, Ky., 998
In Alcan Foil Products v. Huff, Ky., 2
S.W.3d 96 (1999), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that an injury
or disability manifests when the claimant discovers that a
physically disabling injury has been sustained and becomes aware
that the cause of this injury was work-related.
-11-
The entitlement
to workers’ compensation benefits arises with that work-related
injury, even if that injury does not result in a permanent
functional impairment or permanent disability.
Holbrook v.
Lexmark International Group, Inc., Ky., 65 S.W.3d 908, 911
(2002).
Clearly, the notice and limitations provisions of
Kentucky’s workers’ compensation law are triggered when the
claimant becomes aware of an injury and knows that the injury
was caused by work, regardless of whether the symptoms that led
to the discovery of the injury later subside.
Id.
The worker,
however, must reasonably be apprised of the work-relatedness of
his condition.
See Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.,
v. Czarnecki, Ky. App., 41 S.W.3d 868 (2001).
It is
unreasonable for a claimant to self-diagnose the cause of the
harmful changes to his body since medical causation is a matter
for the medical experts.
Hill v. Sextet Mining Corporation,
Ky., 65 S.W.3d 503, 507 (2001).
As such, Kentucky law mandates
that a claimant cannot be required to give an employer notice
that he has sustained a work-related gradual injury until
actually becoming informed of that fact.
See Alcan Foil, supra;
Clark, supra.
In the case sub judice, the record clearly reveals
that Hensley was aware of his physical impairments and
associated these impairments with his employment long before
being evaluated by Dr. Gerhardstein or Dr. Allen.
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Furthermore,
the record shows that, while seeking treatment from Dr.
Gerhardstein from January 1999 to March 15, 2000, Hensley was
led to believe that his condition was not an appropriate subject
of a workers’ compensation claim.
The medical records from
Hensley’s first visit with Dr. Allen on March 15, 2000 provide
no indication that Dr. Allen diagnosed Hensley’s medical
condition as being work-related.
Under these circumstances, we
are not persuaded that Hensley’s personal assumption that his
aches and pains were attributable to his work rise to the level
of knowledge contemplated by Alcan Foil, Clark or Hill.
Moreover, medical records dated March 29, 2000, conclusively
demonstrate that Dr. Allen became the first physician to
determine that Hensley’s employment with Tri-State had
accelerated the development of the degenerative condition in
Hensley’s back, hips and legs.
On March 26, 2002, Hensley filed
his workers’ compensation claim based upon Dr. Allen’s medical
diagnosis and conclusions of March 29, 2000.
Since Hensley
provided the employer with notice of his medical condition
within two years of Dr. Allen’s diagnosis, we conclude that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Hensley
timely filed his claim for workers’ compensation benefits.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
Workers’ Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE:
Thomas L. Ferreri
Curtis S. Sutton
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/
CROSS-APPELLANT STEVEN
HENSLEY:
J. Follace Fields, II
Lexington, Kentucky
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