RONNIE COOK v. UNICORN MINING, SPECIAL FUND, HON. R. SCOTT BORDERS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: August 1, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED:
August 29, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000519-WC
RONNIE COOK
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-93-33721
v.
UNICORN MINING, SPECIAL FUND,
HON. R. SCOTT BORDERS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
PAISLEY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Ronnie Cook (hereinafter Cook) appeals from the
February 19, 2003 opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board
(hereinafter the Board), which affirmed the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) to deny his motion to
reopen.
1
We affirm.
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
On June 16, 1995, Cook was awarded benefits
representing a 20% occupational disability following a work
related back injury in 1993.
On March 26, 1998, Cook, with the
assistance of an ombudsman, filed a motion to reopen, alleging a
worsening of his condition.
The Arbitrator later found that
Cook’s physical condition had not changed since the time of his
original award.
Cook filed the present motion on July 19, 2002
alleging that, as a result of a worsened condition, he was
totally disabled and unable to perform any type of employment.
These allegations were supported by his affidavit and a medical
report.
The ALJ denied this motion, noting that it was barred
by the four-year limitation upon reopening pursuant to Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 342.125(8) and the Board affirmed.
This
appeal followed.
Cook argues that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in
denying his motion to reopen because the 1996 and 2000
amendments to the workers’ compensation law violated his
Constitutional rights.
His arguments are based on his belief
that he had a vested right to reopen his claim and that further
the Appellee and the Department of Workers’ Claims (hereinafter
Department) had a duty to give him notice of the effect of the
amended laws.
-2-
Cook’s argument is not persuasive.
In Nygaard v.
Goodin Bros., Inc., Ky., -- S.W.3d –-, -- (2003 WL 21355415 at
*2)(2003), the Kentucky Supreme Court found that KRS 342.125(8)
is
both a statute of limitation and repose
because, by limiting the time for taking
action, it may extinguish a cause of action
before it arises. In enacting a statute of
repose, the legislature may not abolish or
diminish the legal remedies for common-law
causes of action for personal injuries or
death that existed prior to the adoption of
the 1891 Kentucky Constitution. But no such
constraint exists with regard to a statutory
cause of action such as workers'
compensation.
KRS 342.125(8) does not violate the Constitution by denying a
vested property right because “the right to be compensated for a
post-award increase in disability was inchoate until such time
as the increase occurred.”
Id. at *1; McCool v. Martin Nursery
& Landscaping, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 256, 258 (2001).
Whenever the
employee sustains a post-award increase in occupational
disability, the right becomes vested at that point.
S.W.3d at 258.
McCool, 43
When, as in McCool, “the alleged increase in
disability occurred after the effective date of the amendment,
applying the amendment and dismissing the motion to reopen did
not affect a right that vested before the amendment's effective
date.”
Id.
Therefore, KRS 342.125(8) is constitutional.
Nygaard, -- S.W.3d at -- (2003 WL 21355415 at *1).
Cook’s
alleged increase in disability occurred after the amendment took
-3-
effect; thus, his right to reopen did not vest until that time.
The amended provision did not affect a vested right.
We also find Cook’s contention to be unfounded that
Appellee and the Department were duty-bound to notify him of the
statutory amendments.
Cook failes to cite any statutory or case
law supporting his position.
That which he does cite is
irrelevant to the issue of reopening.
Likewise, we are unable
to find any authority in support of his asserted duty to give
notice.
There is no statutory obligation to give notice of an
alteration of the statute of limitations under KRS 342.125.
It
is Cook’s personal duty to keep abreast of changes in the law.
His constitutional rights have not been violated.
Cook concedes that “a party seeking to have a statute
declared unconstitutional is faced with the burden of
demonstrating that there is no conceivable basis to justify the
legislation.”
Brief of Appellant, p. 8 (citing Buford v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 942 S.W.2d 909 (1997)); see also
Holbrook v. Lexmark International Group, Inc., Ky., 65 S.W.3d
908, 915 (2001).
However, he utterly fails to meet this burden,
inasmuch as he simply concludes that there is “no legitimate
legislative purpose” for the workers’ compensation amendments
and that they are “not logical.”
This is insufficient.
KRS
342.125(8) is constitutional and Cook has suffered no other
violation of his constitutional rights.
-4-
Cook’s final argument is that he, in fact, complied
with the amended version of KRS 342.125.
He argues that he
filed his motion to reopen within four years of the date of the
last decision on his claim in 1998.
The plain language of KRS
342.125(3), however, only provides for a four-year limit
following the date of the original award.
The statute does not
provide for a later decision to have any effect on this period.
This argument is also without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Ronald C. Cox
Atkins Law Office
Harlan, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, UNICORN
MINING:
Francesca L. Maggard
W. Barry Lewis
Hazard, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION FUNDS:
David W. Barr
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.