JANICE LAWSON v. WAL-MART STORES, INC.; HON. R. SCOTT BORDERS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD; AND SPECIAL FUNDS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 12, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000344-WC
JANICE LAWSON
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-69523
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC.; HON. R. SCOTT
BORDERS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD;
AND SPECIAL FUNDS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
PAISLEY AND TACKETT, JUDGES; AND HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Janice Lawson appeals from an opinion and order
of the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) affirming the
findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) limiting her
recovery to thirty percent of her permanent total disability
award.
The ALJ previously found that seventy percent of
Lawson’s permanent total disability was attributable to the
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
first of three work-related injuries.
In a previous opinion,
this Court determined that recovery for Lawson’s first injury
was time barred.
We affirm the Board, finding that its decision
is supported by our previous opinion in this case.
Lawson was employed by Wal-Mart from September 21,
1980, through July 2, 1998.
At various times during her
employment, she worked as a cashier, sales clerk, service desk
clerk, layaway clerk, and manager of the layaway department.
Lawson injured her lower back in August 1994 while turning to
place a cd player on a stack of boxes.
Initially, she sought
chiropractic care which lessened her pain.
However, her pain
continued to worsen and, in 1997, her doctor restricted her from
lifting more than twenty pounds occasionally and recommended
epidural steroid blocks.
On July 14, 1997, Lawson suffered a second injury,
this time to her right arm, while taping a box closed in the
layaway department.
She sought medical attention, was removed
from work three months later, and finally diagnosed with carpal
tunnel syndrome.
She returned to work in September, after her
treating physician concluded that she was capable of doing jobs
which did not require the use of her right arm, and suffered an
additional injury on September 26, 1997.
In January 1998, Lawson was restricted from lifting
more than five pounds or using her right arm in a repetitive
-2-
fashion.
Wal-Mart assigned her to the position of customer
service manager in an effort to accommodate her medical work
restrictions.
Lawson’s new duties required some heavy lifting
in that she was required to carry bags and trays of change.
Her
pain continued to worsen throughout the remainder of her
employment.
She last worked on July 2, 1998, when, due to
physical exertion, she suffered severe pain in her lower back
and legs at the end of her shift.
Lawson stayed in bed
throughout her vacation, which began the next day, and never
returned to work.
Lawson filed an Application for Resolution of Injury
Claim on March 18, 1999.
Initially, she listed injuries to her
lower back and right wrist, arm, and shoulder and gave injury
dates of July 14, 1997, and September 26, 1997.
Lawson later
amended her application to include a claim for the 1994 back
injury.
Wal-Mart filed an affirmative defense arguing that the
1994 claim was time barred.
On August 16, 1999, Lawson moved to
join the Special Fund as a party and the Special Fund filed a
notice denying her claim.
The presiding ALJ, in an opinion entered February 28,
2000, found Lawson to be totally and permanently occupationally
disabled as the combined result of her 1994 and 1997 injuries.
The ALJ found that seventy percent of the disability was
attributable to the 1994 injury and apportioned this amount
-3-
equally between the Special Fund and Wal-Mart.
In March 1998,
which was after the two-year statute of limitations had expired,
Wal-Mart had voluntarily paid Lawson temporary disability
benefits for the 1994 injury.
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
342.185 states as follows:
No proceeding under this chapter for
compensation for an injury or death shall be
maintained unless a notice of the accident
shall have been given to the employer as
soon as practicable after the happening
thereof and unless an application for
adjustment of claim for compensation with
respect to the injury shall have been made
with the department within two (2) years
after the date of the accident, or in case
of death, within two (2) years after the
death, whether or not a claim has been made
by the employee himself for compensation. .
. . If payments of income benefits have been
made, the filing of an application for
adjustment of claim with the department
within the period shall not be required, but
shall become requisite within two (2) years
following the suspension of payments or
within two (2) years of the date of the
accident, whichever is later.
The ALJ concluded that Wal-Mart’s voluntary payment after the
statute of limitations had expired rendered Lawson’s claim for
the 1994 injury timely.
The Board reversed the ALJ’s determination, finding
that Lawson’s failure to bring her claim prior to the expiration
of the statute of limitations extinguished her right to bring a
claim for the 1994 injury.
Further, the Board’s decision
relieved the Special Fund of liability since its obligation to
-4-
compensate Lawson flowed solely from the 1994 injury.
We
affirmed in a published decision wherein this Court analyzed the
issue presented in Lawson’s original appeal as follows:
The . . . issue presented in [this appeal]
is whether after the limitations period has
run for a claim the payment of TTD
[temporary total disability] benefits
revives the claim as to allow an extension
of the period for filing the claim. In other
words, does a claimant have two years after
the last voluntary payment of TTD benefits
by an employer to file a claim if the
limitations period has run on the original
injury?
Although there are no Kentucky cases
directly on point, we have been directed to
a number of sources that lend support to the
proposition that the voluntary payment of
benefits subsequent to the running of the
filing period for an original injury does
not extend the filing period for a claimant.
As the Supreme Court said in [Newberg v.
Hudson, Ky., 838 S.W.2d 384, 387 (1992)]:
“While statutes of limitation protect
employers from the problems associated with
litigating stale claims, the statutory
exception recognizes that a worker may be
lulled into a false sense of security by
voluntary payments and might fail to
actively pursue a claim." Therefore, the
rationale behind KRS 342.185(1), which
provides that if TTD payments have been made
the claimant has two years from the last
payment to file the claim, is to prevent an
employer from paying TTD for two years and
lulling the claimant into believing that the
claimant need not file a claim. As the Board
has pointed out, this rationale no longer
exists if the original time period for
filing a claim has passed.
. . .
-5-
Further, Professor Larson has noted that
voluntary payment leads the
claimant to refrain from making
claim and renders purpose
disappears, it may be doubted
whether the waiver can survive.
Thus, if the voluntary payment
of after the entire claim period
has run, it cannot be accused of
influencing the claimant as a
reasonable person to withhold
making claim. Therefore, just
as actual knowledge acquired
for the first time waiver of
statutory notice, so voluntary
payment or promise of compensation
made only after the claim period
had expired has been held
ineffectual to waive the statutory
bar.
[ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION § 78.70 (Desk ed.
1998)](citations omitted).
We find the rationale of the Board [and]
Professor Larson . . . persuasive. Once the
time period within which a potential
claimant may file a claim has expired, the
claim is "forever barred." Because no
benefits were paid [to Lawson] within the
two years after [her] accident, it cannot be
contended that [she was] "lulled" into
believing that [she] did not need to file [a
claim] within the two years following [her
1994 injury], as required by KRS 342.185(1).
Lawson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Ky. App., 56 S.W.3d 417, 419420 (2001)(footnotes omitted).
After our decision in the previous appeal became
final, the Board remanded the case to the ALJ to determine
Lawson’s claim in accordance with our decision.
On remand, a
second ALJ issued an opinion and order finding that the parties
-6-
had not challenged several aspects of the original ALJ’s
decision.
On appeal, neither party had contested that Lawson’s
total disability was the result of the combined injuries from
1994 and 1997 or that her disability was seventy percent
attributable to the 1994 injury.
Lawson argued that her entire
injury is compensable under KRS 342.730(1)(a), which states in
part that “Nonwork-related impairment . . . shall not be
considered in determining whether the employee is totally
disabled for purposes of this subsection.”
However, the ALJ
found that the seventy percent impairment from her 1994 injury,
while not compensable due to her untimely filed claim, was still
work-related and, therefore, ordered Wal-Mart to pay thirty
percent of Lawson’s permanent total disability award.
The Board
affirmed this second opinion and order from the ALJ, and this
appeal followed.
On appeal, Lawson still argues that KRS 342.730(1)(a)
prevents the Board from considering the seventy percent of her
disability attributable to the noncompensable 1994 injury.
Lawson contends that, as a consequence of that statute, Wal-Mart
should be ordered to pay her the entire permanent total
disability award.
We believe that the Board properly found
Lawson was only entitled to thirty percent of the permanent
total disability award and adopt its reasoning as expressed in
the following portion of the Board’s opinion affirming the ALJ:
-7-
Citing Spurlin v. Brooks, Ky., 952
S.W.2d 687 (1997), and Fleming v. Windchy,
[Ky.,] 953 S.W.2d 604 (1997), Lawson argues
that since the 1994 injury was found
noncompensable, there would be no
overlapping benefits payable as a result of
that claim for which an offsetting reduction
in benefits payable on the 1997 injuries
should be taken. She points out that the
purpose of the reduction would be to avoid
duplication of benefits that might otherwise
result from an award of benefits that arises
during the compensable period of a previous
award. Because the 1994 injury was found
noncompensable, she argues Wal-Mart is not
entitled to credit for any benefits that
might otherwise have been payable as a
result of that claim. Wal-Mart responds
that Spurlin and Fleming are inapposite
because they involve consecutive
“compensable” injuries. Wal-Mart directs
our attention to Kern’s Bakery v. Tackett,
Ky. App., 964 S.W.2d 815 (1998), which does
address the situation of a compensable workrelated injury superimposed upon a prior
work-related but noncompensable injury.
Although the issue presented to us here was
not directly decided in Tackett, Wal-Mart
asserts that the court of appeals’ decision
nonetheless implicitly endorses its position
that Lawson is entitled only to lifetime
benefits at the rate of 30% of a PTD
[permanent total disability] award and not
100%. After thoroughly reviewing once more
the evidence of record and the applicable
law, we disagree with the reasoning put
forward by Lawson and agree with the
position taken by Wal-Mart. To be more
precise, we are convinced that the outcome
reached by the ALJ finds support in the
supreme court’s holding and rationale set
out in Spurlin and its progeny. We,
therefore, affirm the ALJ’s determination.
. . .
-8-
Both Spurlin, supra, and Fleming,
supra, involved consecutive compensable work
injuries that combined to render the
employees permanently and totally disabled.
The rule established by the supreme court in
such cases is that the employer at the time
of the first injury is responsible for
permanent partial disability benefits at the
rate and for the duration commensurate with
the occupational disability that arose after
that date. To this extent, the court
overruled its prior holding in Campbell v.
Sextet Mining Co., Ky., 912 S.W.2d 25
(1995).
. . .
It will be noted that, had the 1994
back injury not been work-related, then
Lawson would have been entitled to only 30%
permanent partial disability benefits,
payable for 425 weeks, as a result of the
1997 injuries. Prior to the 1994 amendments
to the Workers’ Compensation Act, the factfinder was permitted to consider preexisting, noncompensable disability
resulting from the work injury in question
during the initial determination of extent
and duration. Teledyne-Wirz v. Wilhite, Ky.
App., 710 S.W.2d 858 (1986). Citing
Transport Motor Express, Inc. v. Finn, Ky.,
575 S.W.2d 277 (1978), the Teledyne court
explained that the procedure for determining
the final amount of income benefits to be
paid involves two steps. The first step is
to determine whether the claimant is
disabled and, if so, whether the disability
is partial or total. In this part of the
analysis, explained the court, it is proper
for the fact-finder to consider the whole of
the claimant’s disability, regardless of the
source. In other words, the ALJ was
permitted to consider the disabling effects
of a noncompensable injury along with the
disability resulting from the work-related
injury at issue. It was in the second step,
the apportionment process, that any
-9-
disability due to a noncompensable injury
was to be excluded, in accordance with the
principles set forth in Young v. Fulkerson,
Ky., 463 S.W.2d 118 (1971). Teledyne at
859-860.
The Legislature statutorily overruled
Teledyne, Id. as part of the 1994 amendments
to the Act to the extent that the holding
permitted the fact-finder to consider preexisting disability from nonwork-related
causes in determining the extent and
duration of the claimant’s disability. With
respect to disability attributable to prior
work-related causes, however, Teledyne
remains viable to this day. This is even
true where the prior work-related disability
is noncompensable. Kern’s Bakery v.
Tackett, supra. It is by virtue of this
rationale that Lawson is entitled to
benefits for the duration of her disability,
subject to the limitation set out in KRS
342.7130(4), rather than the 425-week period
for which permanently partial disability
benefits at the rate of 30% would otherwise
be payable. While Lawson would have us
adopt the first step of the above-described
process outlined in Teledyne, she
nevertheless would have us discard the
second step, the process of apportionment
pursuant to Fulkerson, supra. Rather,
Lawson seeks to replace the apportionment
rule set out in Fulkerson, supra, with the
more favorable method outlined in Spurlin
and Fleming. As previously stated, however,
the case sub judice is materially
distinguishable from the latter two cases,
inasmuch as the prior injuries involved
therein were both “work-related” and
“compensable.”
Where the pre-existing active
disability is the result of a noncompensable
injury, we believe the apportionment step of
the process is governed by Fulkerson, Id.,
just as Teledyne, Id., remains the rule of
law for the first step when the pre-existing
disability is work-related. . . .
-10-
Once it was determined that Lawson’s
1994 back claim was time-barred, any
disability resulting from that injury
essentially became a pre-existing, active
disability for which a carve-out is still
mandated. It will be noted that Fleming v.
Winchy, supra, also involved pre-existing,
active disability resulting from workrelated injuries. The injuries at issue in
Fleming occurred in 1990 and 1991. The ALJ
concluded that the claimant was permanently
and totally disabled as a result of those
two injuries, along with prior work-related
injuries occurring on 1977 and 1988, for
which the claimant had previously been
compensated. Of the claimant’s 100%
disability, 16% was attributed to the 1977
and 1988 injuries, and there was no question
but that this amount was to be excluded as
prior active disability. If Lawson’s
argument in the case sub judice were taken
to its logical conclusion, then the claimant
in Fleming would be entitled to recover from
the 1991 employer that additional 16% of his
permanent total disability attributable to
the 1977 and 1988 injuries, as there would
be no overlap in benefits for which a
reduction in the last employer’s liability
would be taken. The absurdity of this
outcome is apparent and, yet, careful
inspection reveals that this is precisely
the logic offered by Lawson in the instant
appeal. We believe it misses the mark.
For the forgoing reasons, the decision of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
John E. Anderson
Cole, Cole & Anderson PSC
Barbourville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE WALMART
STORES, INC.:
Walter A. Ward
Clark & Ward
Lexington, Kentucky
-11-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.