DOROTHY STONE AND JOHN STONE v. EDNA CUMMINS, D/B/A B&E RESTAURANT; AND MARY FRANKS, D/B/A B&E RESTAURANT
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RENDERED: October 31, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-00341-MR
DOROTHY STONE AND
JOHN STONE
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00160
v.
EDNA CUMMINS,
D/B/A B&E RESTAURANT;
AND MARY FRANKS, D/B/A
B&E RESTAURANT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
In this personal injury action, Dorothy Stone
(hereinafter “Dorothy”) and John Stone (hereinafter “John” or
collectively “the Stones”) have appealed from the Grant Circuit
Court’s January 14, 2003, summary judgment dismissing their
claims against Edna Cummins, d/b/a B&E Restaurant (hereinafter
“Cummins”), B&E Restaurant (hereinafter “B&E”), and Mary Franks,
d/b/a B&E Restaurant (hereinafter “Franks” or collectively
“appellees”).
The sole issue on appeal, as framed by the
Stones, is whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the concrete humps in B&E’s parking lot were open and
obvious.
Because we agree with the appellees that no duty was
owed as Dorothy actually saw the concrete humps, we must affirm.
On April 8, 2002, the Stones filed a complaint in
Grant Circuit Court alleging that Dorothy sustained bodily
injury when she tripped over one of several concrete humps used
to divert water in B&E’s parking lot.
loss of consortium.
John claimed damages for
Cummins owned and operated B&E, and she
originally rented the building from Robert Franks until his
death, and then from his widow, Franks.
While he was alive,
Robert Franks installed the concrete humps and apparently
maintained the parking lot.
On April 19, 2001, Dorothy, a
resident of Ohio, was traveling southbound on I-75 on her way to
Lexington, Kentucky.
At approximately 10:45 a.m., she exited
the interstate at the Crittenden exit and proceeded to B&E, a
restaurant she had visited approximately four times over an
eight-year period.
The weather on that April morning was clear,
and it was not too sunny according to Dorothy’s deposition
testimony.
Upon entering B&E’s parking lot in her automobile,
Dorothy drove over two concrete humps that diagonally traversed
the parking lot, and parked her vehicle in a parking place
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through which one of the concrete humps ran.
Dorothy was aware
of the concrete humps because she crossed over them in her
vehicle and walked over the one running underneath her
automobile as she made her way from the driver’s side door to
B&E’s entrance.
Once inside, she used B&E’s facilities and
refreshed her coffee.
She then returned to her car, but did not
see the concrete hump as she was looking straight ahead, and
therefore she tripped, fell, and broke her hip.
The only depositions taken in this action were of the
parties themselves.
On November 23, 2002, Cummins and B&E filed
a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Dorothy admitted in
her deposition testimony that she was aware of the concrete hump
prior to her fall.
Because the concrete hump was open and
obvious, they asserted, no duty was owed as a matter of law.
The Stones argued that the hump was not open and obvious when
she tripped on it as it was blocked by the shadow cast by her
automobile.
The circuit court, in an order entered January 14,
2003, granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
Stones’ claims as follows:
This matter has come before the Court
on Motion of Defendants for Summary
Judgment. The parties have filed memoranda
with the Court and the Court having reviewed
the memoranda,
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
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This case involves a trip and fall case
in which the Plaintiff fell over a speed
bump or drainage bump that crossed the
parking lot of the restaurant owned by
Defendants. The accident occurred after she
had been in the restaurant and was leaving.
The incident happened in mid-morning on an
April day when the conditions were clear
and, whether sunny or overcast, visibility
was normal.
The argument of the Defendants is that
the bump in the pavement was an open and
obvious condition that should have been
visible to this Plaintiff and they are
therefore not liable to this Plaintiff.
Interestingly, the Plaintiff admitted in her
deposition that she was aware of the bump
when she drove over it as she parked her car
and that she saw the speed bump as she
entered the restaurant. She had parked her
car straddling the speed bump and had then
crossed it on her way into the restaurant on
foot.
It is the Plaintiff’s position that the
bump was a dangerous condition that should
have been marked in some way by the
Defendants and that the combination of sun
angle, shadows from utility poles and
shadows from the Plaintiff’s automobile made
the condition one that creates a fact issue
for the jury.
The Court has reviewed the cases cited
by the parties and finds the dispositive
fact in this case to be that the Plaintiff
stated that she was aware of and saw the
speed bump as she crossed over it going into
the restaurant. Plaintiff relies on the
fact that she testified that she did not see
it as she came out because of the various
conditions mentioned above and the fact that
she was not looking down as she approached
[the] bump to create a fact issue herein.
However, this Court’s review of the cases
cited by the parties indicates that even if
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this condition was a dangerous one under the
circumstances, the open and obvious cases
dictate that the fact that Plaintiff should
have seen the condition removes any
liability on the part of the Defendants.
In other words, we never get to the
question of open and obvious because
Plaintiff testified, quite candidly, that
she saw the speed bump as she entered the
restaurant. Having therefore been on notice
of its presence in the area, it was beyond
open and obvious in this particular case and
the case law of the Commonwealth mandates a
judgment in favor of the Defendants. The
Court therefore finds that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact
relating to the liability of the Defendants
and that the Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
It is therefore Ordered that the Motion
for Summary Judgment of Defendants is
GRANTED and the Plaintiff’s claims herein
are DISMISSED.
There being no reason for delay in the
entry of this Order, it shall be entered by
the clerk immediately and distributed to the
parties pursuant to CR 77.04. This is a
final and appealable Order.
By stipulation of the parties, on February 27, 2003, the circuit
court entered an order nunc pro tunc as of January 14, 2003, to
the effect that the term “defendants” as used in its previous
order referred to all of the defendants rather than just to
Franks and B&E, and that the judgment dismissed all of the
Stones’ claims against each of the defendants.
followed.
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This appeal
On appeal, the Stones argue that they presented an
issue of material fact that the construction, placement and
maintenance of unmarked concrete humps in the pedestrian area of
a parking lot could be tripped over by a person walking
normally.
On the other hand, the appellees1 argue that they did
not owe any duty to Dorothy because she admitted that she was
aware of and saw the concrete humps as she crossed the parking
lot to enter B&E.
Furthermore, they argue that the case law
upon which the Stones relied is for the most part inapplicable.
As a result, the circuit court properly entered a summary
judgment as there were no issues of material fact to be decided.
We agree that the circuit court properly entered a summary
judgment.
The law regarding the review of a summary judgment is
well settled in this Commonwealth:
The standard of review on appeal when a
trial court grants a motion for summary
judgment is “whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” The trial court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, and summary judgment
should be granted only if it appears
impossible that the nonmoving party will be
able to produce evidence at trial warranting
a judgment in his favor. The moving party
bears the initial burden of showing that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, and
1
In her brief, Franks adopted the arguments advanced by Cummins and B&E in
their brief filed July 11, 2003.
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then the burden shifts to the party opposing
summary judgment to present “at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial.”
The trial court “must examine the evidence,
not to decide any issue of fact, but to
discover if a real issue exists.” While the
Court in Steelvest used the word
“impossible” in describing the strict
standard for summary judgment, the Supreme
Court later stated that that word was “used
in a practical sense, not in an absolute
sense.” Because summary judgment involves
only legal questions and the existence of
any disputed material issues of fact, an
appellate court need not defer to the trial
court’s decision and will review the issue
de novo. (citations in footnotes omitted)
Lewis v. B&R Corporation, Ky.App., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (2001).
With this standard in mind, we shall review the circuit court’s
decision below.
In Rogers v. Professional Golfers Association of
America, Ky.App., 28 S.W.3d 869, 872 (2000), this Court recently
revisited the area of premises liability as to invitees.
Generally, the owner of premises to which
the public is invited has a general duty to
exercise ordinary care to keep the premises
in a reasonably safe condition. McDonald v.
Talbott, Ky., 447 S.W.2d 84, 86 (1969).
However, “reasonable care on the part of the
possessor of business premises does not
ordinarily require precaution or even
warning against dangers that are known to
the visitor or so obvious to him that he may
be expected to discover them.” Johnson v.
Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Kentucky,
Inc., Ky.App., 997 S.W.2d 490, 492 (1999),
quoting Bonn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Ky.,
440 S.W.2d 526, 528 (1969). . . .
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Further, the court in Smith v. Smith,
Ky., 441 S.W.2d 165 (1969), held that
An invitee has a right to assume that
the premises he has been invited to use
are reasonably safe, but this does not
relieve him of the duty to exercise
ordinary care for his own safety, nor
does it license him to walk blindly
into dangers that are obvious, known to
him, or would be anticipated by one of
ordinary prudence.
Id. at 166.
See also Standard Oil Company v. Manis, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 856
(1968); Winn-Dixie Louisville, Inc. v. Smith, Ky., 372 S.W.2d
789 (1963).
In most of the cases the Stones cited, the plaintiff
either did not see or notice the substance or item that caused
him or her to fall, or a natural condition, such as snow and
ice, or a spilled substance or object in an aisle caused the
fall.
The line of cases that includes the Kentucky Supreme
Court’s recent opinion of Lanier v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Ky.,
99 S.W.3d 431 (2003), is inapplicable here as the present case
does not involve a foreign substance or object on the floor or
the length of time the substance or object was on the floor.
Furthermore, in those cases dealing with manmade curbing or
abutments, the issue of adequate lighting was of importance.
In
Downing v. Drybrought, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 711 (1952), the plaintiff
tripped over a concrete coping in a parking lot at 8:00 p.m. in
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November.
She testified that it was dark, but there was no
evidence introduced regarding the lighting conditions that
actually existed.
In Jones v. Winn-Dixie of Louisville, Inc.,
Ky., 458 S.W.2d 767 (1970), the plaintiff tripped over a
concrete abutment in a parking lot after dark in a location
where she had never walked before.
Again, the former Court of
Appeals emphasized the time of day and lighting conditions.
Lastly, in Cantrell v. Hardin Hospital Management Corp., Ky.,
459 S.W.2d 164 (1970), the plaintiff arrived at the hospital
parking lot during daylight hours, but left hours later after
dark and tripped over curbing in front of her automobile.
Evidence established the lack of lighting in the parking lot
that night.
In the present matter, it is undisputed that Dorothy
actually saw the concrete hump in the parking lot and crossed
over it on her way to B&E’s entrance.
It is also undisputed
that Dorothy spent very little time in B&E prior to exiting the
building.
She testified that she used the facilities and then
proceeded to the counter to purchase coffee.
She was not
required to wait in line in order to make her purchase.
Furthermore, she arrived at and left B&E in the late morning
during daylight hours, and testified that the weather conditions
and visibility were clear, although it was “not real sunny”.
Based upon the hour of day and the weather conditions, we can
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only conclude that there was sufficient sunlight for her to see
in the parking lot.
As a result, we must hold that Dorothy did not
exercise ordinary care for her own safety, and that as a result,
none of the appellees owed her any type of duty.
In Humbert v.
Audubon Country Club, Ky., 313 S.W.2d 405, 407 (1958), the
former Court of Appeals stated that although a person does not
have to look at his feet for each step, “in the exercise of
ordinary care for his own safety, one must observe generally the
surface upon which he is about to walk.”
It is undisputed that
Dorothy knew about the concrete humps when she exited her car
and entered B&E.
She cannot be permitted to then “turn off her
knowledge of the humps,” as argued by the appellees, and claim
that she failed to notice the concrete hump protruding from
underneath her car when she both drove and walked over the hump
a short time earlier.
Therefore, the circuit court properly
entered a summary judgment as no issues of material fact
remained and as the defendants were entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the Grant Circuit Court’s
summary judgment dismissing the Stones’ claim is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Thomas G. Eagle
Franklin, OH
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, EDNA
CUMMINS:
Jeffrey A. Stepner
Covington, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, MARY
FRANKS:
William F, Threlkeld
Williamstown, KY
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