COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. WILLIAM W. JACKSON
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 19, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000271-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANN O’MALLEY SHAKE, JUDGE
NO. 02-CR-001056
v.
WILLIAM W. JACKSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, PAISLEY,1 AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE.
This is an interlocutory appeal from an opinion
and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting the motion of
William W. Jackson to suppress evidence on the grounds that it
was the fruit of an unlawful search.
Because we agree with the
Commonwealth that there was no “seizure” triggering the
protections of the Fourth Amendment and that, consequently, the
1
Judge Paisley voted in this matter prior to his retirement
effective December 1, 2003.
circuit court erred when it analyzed the incident under the
Terry v. Ohio
“stop and frisk” exception to the warrant
requirement,2 we reverse the suppression order of the Circuit
Court.
On the afternoon of September 10, 2001, Officer Ryan
Scanlon saw Jackson standing on a sidewalk in a courtyard of the
Beecher Terrace Housing Complex, an area known for drug
trafficking activity and posted as no trespassing.
Scanlon, a
five-year veteran of the Louisville Police Department, testified
that once Jackson saw Scanlon, who was driving slowly with
another officer in a marked vehicle, he did a “double-take” and
began walking in the opposite direction from the police car.
Jackson had walked approximately twenty feet before Scanlon
pulled the car next to Jackson in a maintenance roadway of the
housing complex.
Scanlon got out of the car, approached Jackson
and asked him whether he had anything on him that could get him
into trouble.
Scanlon testified that this was a standard
question used by police officers to determine whether an
individual had a weapon.
Jackson replied “No.”
Scanlon then
asked Jackson for permission to search his person.
Jackson
consented and placed his hands on the police car.
During the
2
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a brief
investigative stop, detention and frisk for weapons based on
reasonable suspicion does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
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pat-down search, Scanlon felt something in Jackson’s pocket,
removed it and believed it to be a baggie of cocaine.
did not recover a weapon from Jackson.
Scanlon
Scanlon then arrested
Jackson and placed him in handcuffs.
Jackson testified that he had just left his own car
and was walking through the housing complex to greet a friend
when Scanlon stopped him.
Jackson also stated that he did not
recall Scanlon asking for permission to search him.
Our standard of review of a decision of the
circuit court on a suppression motion
following a hearing is twofold. First, the
factual findings of the circuit court are
conclusive if they are supported by
substantial evidence. Second, when the
findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence, the question then
becomes whether the rule of law as applied
to the established facts is violated.3
The circuit court’s findings of fact are amply
supported by the testimonial evidence offered at the suppression
hearing, and the parties themselves do not dispute what took
place.
The question therefore is whether the trial court
employed the correct standard in its analysis of these facts,
and whether that standard was properly applied.
In its opinion, the circuit court proceeded on the
assumption that Jackson was seized when Scanlon stopped to talk
3
Commonwealth v. Whitmore, Ky., 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (2002)(citing
RCr 9.78; Canler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d 219 (1994);
Adcock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 6 (1998)).
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to him, and consequently ruled that reasonable suspicion had not
existed to justify a Terry stop and frisk.
In the
Commonwealth’s view, however, there was no seizure prior to the
arrest and the search was permissible because Jackson had
voluntarily consented to it.
The United States Supreme Court has defined a
“seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in the
following manner.
“[A] person is ‘seized’ only when, by means
of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of
movement is restrained.
Only when such restraint is imposed is
there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional
safeguards.”4
Moreover, “a person has been ‘seized’ . . . only
if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.”5
Some factors that may be considered in making the
latter determination include “the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer’s request might be compelled.”6
4
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870,
64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).
5
Id. at 554.
6
Id.
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The Supreme Court has also cautioned that “[l]aw
enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable seizures merely by approaching
individuals on the street or in other public places and putting
questions to them if they are willing to listen.”7
These standards have been applied by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in two cases which are factually similar to the
one presently before us.
In Baker v. Commonwealth,8 two police
officers on patrol late at night in a high crime area observed
Baker standing on a corner conversing with a known prostitute.
One of the officers approached Baker and asked him to remove his
hands from the pockets of his baggy pants.
Baker refused to do
so and the officer then ordered him to remove his hands from his
pockets.
Analyzing this set of circumstances, the Kentucky
Supreme Court ruled that the officer’s first request to Baker to
remove his hands from his pockets was clearly not a seizure,
because Baker was not under suspicion at that time, and the
request was merely a safety precaution.9
7
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S.Ct. 2105,
153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).
8
Baker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 5 S.W.3d 142 (1999).
9
Id. at 145.
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In Commonwealth v. Banks,10 two police officers on foot
patrol in a high crime area observed Banks walking towards them
through the front yard of an apartment building.
The officers
did not recognize Banks as one of the apartment complex
residents.
When Banks saw the police, he stopped, quickly put
his hands in his pockets, turned, and then began to walk away
from the officers.
After taking a few steps, he stopped again
and appeared startled.
One of the officers approached Banks,
and noticed a bulge in his pocket.
The officer asked Banks to
remove his hands from his pockets.
Banks did so, but the bulge
remained in his pocket.
The officer conducted a pat-down search
and found a crack pipe.
The Supreme Court held that “the seizure of [Banks]
did not occur when [the officer] requested him to remove his
hands from his pockets, since the request was merely a safety
precaution.
If [Banks] had not agreed to remove his hands from
his pockets and the officer had ordered that [he] remove his
hands, there would have been a seizure.
Consequently, the
seizure of [Banks] did not occur until [the officer] frisked
him.”11
The Kentucky Supreme Court also commented that “[p]olice
officers are free to approach anyone in public areas for any
10
11
Commonwealth v. Banks, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 347 (2001).
Id. at 350.
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reason.
Officers are entitled to the same freedom of movement
that the rest of society enjoys.”12
Under the holdings of these cases in which the fact
patterns so closely mirror those before us, we conclude that
Jackson was not “seized” when Scanlon asked him whether he had
anything on him that could get him into trouble.
Jackson has argued that the location of the encounter
in a high-crime area, and the nature of the police officer’s
comments, meant that no reasonable person would expect to be
free to go his own way.
Jackson also maintains that the marked
police vehicle was the “ultimate” show of authority, and that
his immediate submission to the request for a search indicates
that he was subjected to a show of force.
As the United States Supreme Court has stated,
however, the reasonable person test is objective and
“presupposes an innocent person.”13
There is no indication that
the presence of a marked police vehicle in a high-crime area
would exercise a coercive influence on a reasonable person.
Jackson’s personal reaction does not prove that he was subjected
to physical force or a show of authority such that he was
compelled to remain.
There were only two officers present.
Scanlon did not raise his voice or threaten Jackson, and the
12
Id.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437-38, 11 S.Ct. 2382, 115
L.Ed.2d 389 (1991).
13
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encounter took place in broad daylight.
If Scanlon’s conduct
was coercive and intimidating, it is puzzling that Jackson’s
testimony at the suppression hearing was, at best, ambiguous.
When he was asked by his attorney to describe what Scanlon had
said to him, he stated that he could not recall.
The circuit court erred, therefore, in proceeding
immediately to an analysis of this episode as a seizure.
Under
the standards established by the United States Supreme Court and
applied by the Kentucky Supreme Court, there was no seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when Scanlon drove up
to Jackson and questioned him.
Jackson also claims that he did not consent to the
search.
The circuit court’s opinion states that Jackson did
consent.
Consent constitutes one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement.14
The burden is on the government to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that valid, voluntary consent
was obtained.15
The issue of whether the consent was indeed
voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances.16
This issue is a preliminary
question to be decided by the trial court, and its findings are
14
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d
598 (1976).
15
Cook v. Commonwealth, Ky., 826 S.W.2d 329, 332 (1992).
16
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36
L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
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conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence.17
Furthermore, “[t]he question of voluntariness is to be
determined by an objective evaluation of police conduct and not
by the defendant’s subjective perception of reality.”18
Scanlon
testified that Jackson had consented to the search, had placed
his hands on the police car, and had never at any time withdrawn
his consent to the search.
In his motion to suppress, Jackson
admitted that he had told Scanlon “go ahead, you can search.”
Scanlon also testified that he felt that Jackson knew what he
was doing when he consented to the search.
Jackson testified
that he could not recall Scanlon’s questions nor could he
remember whether Scanlon had asked permission to search him.
Jackson’s testimony did not seriously repudiate that of
Scanlon,19 and considered under the standards outlined above, the
circuit court did not err in determining that Jackson had
consented to the search.
Jackson has also argued that when Scanlon retrieved
the cocaine from his pocket he exceeded the scope of the
protective search permissible under the Terry stop and frisk
standard.
Such a search “must be strictly limited to that which
17
See RCr 9.78; Talbott v. Commonwealth, Ky., 968 S.W.2d 76, 82
(1998).
18
Cook at 331-32, citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107
S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).
19
Cook at 331.
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is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to
harm the officer or others nearby.”20
The purpose of the limited
search is not to discover evidence of a crime.21
Even if this
had been a legitimate Terry stop, however, Scanlon may well have
been permitted to remove the cocaine under the “plain feel”
rule.22
Scope is assessed differently, however, when the
search is consensual.
In Florida v. Jimeno, the United States
Supreme Court held that “[t]he standard for measuring the scope
of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of
‘objective’ reasonableness--what would the typical reasonable
person have understood by the exchange between the officer and
the suspect?”23
Scanlon testified that he was initially
concerned with determining whether Jackson had a weapon.
Thereafter, when Jackson gave consent to be searched, Scanlon
stated that he felt that there was no objection to a more
20
Commonwealth v. Whitmore, Ky., 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (2002)(reh’g
den. 2003).
21
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d
612 (1972).
22
“When a police officer lawfully pats down the outer clothing of
a suspect and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its
identity immediately apparent, there is no violation of privacy
beyond that already permitted by the pat-down search for
weapons.” Whitmore at 80, citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993).
23
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114
L.Ed.2d 297(1991)(citations omitted).
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thorough search.
Scanlon also testified that at no time did
Jackson tell him not to search his pockets or any other part of
his clothing or person.
Under the standard outlined in Jimeno,
we conclude that a reasonable person would have understood that
the scope of the search would have extended to items in his
pockets, particularly in light of Scanlon’s question regarding
whether Jackson had anything on his person that could get him
into trouble.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court granting Jackson’s motion to suppress is reversed,
and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
PAISLEY, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Scott Drabenstadt
Louisville, Kentucky
Jeanne D. Anderson
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Louisville, Kentucky
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