HAROLD BAKER v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE; SPECIAL FUND; R. SCOTT BORDERS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD; ALBERT B. CHANDLER III, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
September 19, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000079-WC
HAROLD BAKER
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-95-15819
CITY OF LOUISVILLE; SPECIAL FUND;
R. SCOTT BORDERS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD; ALBERT B. CHANDLER III, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: PAISLEY AND TACKETT, JUDGES; AND HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
JUDGE1
PAISLEY, JUDGE.
This is a petition for review from an opinion
of the Workers’ Compensation Board (board) affirming an opinion
and order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing
appellant Harold Baker’s motion to reopen his workers’
compensation claim.
1
Because Baker’s motion to reopen is barred
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
by the four-year limitations period set out in KRS 342.125(8),
we affirm.
On April 4, 1995, while employed by the City of
Louisville (city) in the Division of Solid Waste Management,
Baker suffered a work-related injury to his lumbar spine as a
result of lifting garbage cans.
Baker initially received total
temporary disability (TTD) benefits from April 4, 1995, through
August 7, 1995.
On January 11, 1996, Baker filed an application
for adjustment of claim with the Department of Workers’ Claims.
The Special Fund was named as a party because of the existence
of a preexisting condition.
On June 11, 1996, the ALJ entered
an order approving the parties’ settlement of the claim, whereby
Baker received a 13% permanent partial disability award in the
form of a lump sum of $12,042.58.
Although Baker thereafter returned to employment as a
mechanic for Hauseman Jeep, as of August 2000 his back condition
had worsened to the point that he underwent back surgery at the
hands of Dr. David Petruska.
The city not only paid Baker’s
medical expenses, but it also paid him voluntary TTD benefits
between August 29, 2000, and March 24, 2001.
On October 5, 2001, Baker filed a motion to reopen his
settled workers’ compensation claim based on a worsening of his
physical condition and an increase in his occupational loss.
The city and the Special Fund each asserted in response that
2
Baker’s motion to reopen was barred by the four-year statute of
limitations set out in KRS 342.125(8).
However, this defense
was initially rejected and the reopening was permitted to
proceed.
Medical proof was filed, Baker’s deposition was taken,
and a final hearing was conducted on April 22, 2002.
On June
19, the ALJ entered an opinion and order dismissing Baker’s
reopening based upon the four-year limitations period set out in
KRS 342.125(8).
On December 11, 2002, the board entered an
opinion affirming the dismissal.
This petition for review
followed.
KRS 342.125 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(3) Except for reopening solely for
determination of the compensability of
medical expenses, fraud, or conforming the
award as set forth in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2.,
or for reducing a permanent total disability
award when an employee returns to work, or
seeking temporary total disability benefits
during the period of an award, no claim
shall be reopened more than four (4) years
following the date of the original award or
order granting or denying benefits, and no
party may file a motion to reopen within one
(1) year of any previous motion to reopen by
the same party.
. . . .
(8) The time limitation prescribed in this
section shall apply to all claims
irrespective of when they were incurred, or
when the award was entered, or the
settlement approved. However, claims decided
prior to December 12, 1996, may be reopened
within four (4) years of the award or order
or within four (4) years of December 12,
3
1996, whichever is later, provided that the
exceptions to reopening established in
subsections (1) and (3) of this section
shall apply to these claims as well.
(Emphasis added.)
Since the original settlement in this case was entered prior to
December 12, 1996, KRS 342.125(8) permitted Baker to bring a
reopening within four years of December 12, 1996.
As Baker
brought his motion more than four years later on October 5,
2001, his filing on its face did not satisfy the limitations
period prescribed by KRS 342.125(8).
Nevertheless, Baker raises
various arguments in his attempt to avoid KRS 342.125(8).
First, Baker contends that under the circumstances of
this case, the abeyance provisions of KRS 342.265(5) and KRS
342.185(1) should be applied so as to extend the statute of
limitations.
KRS 342.265(5) provides as follows:
An application for resolution of claim shall
be held in abeyance during any period
voluntary payments of income benefits are
being made under any benefit sections of
this chapter to the maximum which the
employee's wages shall entitle unless it
shall be shown that the prosecution of the
employee's claim would be prejudiced by
delay. (Emphasis added).
KRS 342.185(1) in turn provides in relevant part that:
If payments of income benefits have been
made, the filing of an application for
adjustment of claim with the department
within the period shall not be required, but
shall become requisite within two (2) years
following the suspension of payments or
within two (2) years of the date of the
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accident, whichever is later. (Emphasis
added.)
Baker asserts that since he was receiving TTD benefits on
December 12, 2000, as a result of his August 2000 surgery, the
abeyance provisions of KRS 342.265(5) and KRS 342.185(1) apply
so as to toll the limitations period set out in KRS 342.125(8).
We disagree.
KRS 342.265(5) applies to “an application for
resolution of claim,” while KRS 342.185(1) refers to “an
application for adjustment of claim.”
Based upon their plain
language, we construe these statutes as being applicable to
initial claims for workers’ compensation benefits, rather than
to motions to reopen workers’ compensation claims.
Moreover,
although KRS 342.265(5) and KRS 342.185(1) are general statutes
of limitations, the four-year limitations period set out in KRS
342.125(8) deals specifically with the reopening of a claim.
It
is well established that when two statutory provisions deal with
a similar subject matter, the specific statute controls over the
general statute.
Boyd v. C & H Transportation, Ky., 902 S.W.2d
823, 824 (1995);
Land v. Newsome, Ky., 614 S.W.2d 948 (1981).
As KRS 342.125(8) specifically and unambiguously addresses the
filing deadline for the reopening of a claim, it clearly applied
in the situation before us on appeal.
5
Baker next argues that the ALJ should have applied KRS
342.730, concerning among other things the determination of
disability income benefits, so as to extend the statute of
limitations.
Baker relies upon the portion of KRS 342.730(1)(b)
which provides:
Any temporary total disability period within
the maximum period for permanent, partial
disability benefits shall extend the maximum
period but shall not make payable a weekly
benefit exceeding that determined in
subsection (1)(a) of this section.
Contrary to Baker’s contention, we construe this provision as
applying only to the duration of permanent partial disability
benefits, and not to the establishment or extension of the
limitations period which is applicable to either an initial
filing or a reopening.
Simply put, this statute has no
relevance to the limitations period set out in KRS 342.125(8).
Next, Baker contends that the city is estopped from
asserting a statute of limitations defense because of its
postsurgery payment of TTD benefits to him between August 29,
2000, and March 24, 2001.
Baker in effect argues that the
city’s voluntary payment of benefits precluded him from bringing
an action within the proper limitations period, that the
payments lulled him into a period of complacency, and that the
city failed to advise him that the limitations period would end
on December 12, 2000.
According to Baker, these factors are
6
sufficient to estop the city from invoking the protections of
KRS 342.125(8).
Although Baker does not identify a specific estoppel
theory, we construe his argument as relying upon the doctrine of
equitable estoppel.
The essential elements of that doctrine
are:
(1) conduct which amounts to a false
representation or concealment of material
facts, or, at least, which is calculated to
convey the impression that the facts are
otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those
which the party subsequently attempts to
assert; (2) the intention, or at least the
expectation, that such conduct shall be
acted upon by, or influence, the other party
or other persons; and (3) knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the real facts. And,
broadly speaking, as related to the party
claiming the estoppel, the essential
elements are (1) lack of knowledge and of
the means of knowledge of the truth as to
the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good
faith, upon the conduct or statements of the
party to be estopped; and (3) action or
inaction based thereon of such a character
as to change the position or status of the
party claiming the estoppel, to his injury,
detriment, or prejudice.
Weiand v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement Systems, Ky.,
25 S.W.3d 88, 91 (2000)(quoting Electric and Water Plant Board
of City of Frankfort v. Suburban Acres Development, Inc., Ky.,
513 S.W.2d 489, 491 (1974)).
Clearly, the facts herein do not satisfy the
requirements for equitable estoppel.
7
The city’s payment of
voluntary TTD benefits, consistent with its obligation under KRS
Chapter 342, was not conduct which amounted to a false
representation of a material fact.
Further, it cannot be said
that Baker lacked the means to acquire knowledge regarding the
limitations period set out in KRS 342.125(8).
Hence, no basis
exists for applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel so as to
deprive the city of its limitations defense.
Next, Baker contends that his motion to reopen should
be controlled by the statute of limitations in effect on the
date of his injury, with the result that his reopening could be
made “at any time” upon proof that one of the permissible
grounds for reopening existed.
However, this issue was
specifically addressed in Meade v. Reedy Coal Co., Ky., 13
S.W.3d 619, 622 (2000), which held that “[t]he four year
limitation contained in KRS 342.125(8) governs the reopening of
claims decided prior to December 12, 1996.”
As the parties
settled this case on June 11, 1996, the four-year limitations
period set out in KRS 342.125(8) is clearly applicable.
Finally, Baker contends that KRS 342.125(8) violates
Section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides that
“the General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to
be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to
person or property.”
We disagree.
8
KRS 342.395(1) provides in relevant part that:
Where an employer is subject to this
chapter, then every employee of that
employer, as a part of his contract of
hiring or who may be employed at the time of
the acceptance of the provisions of this
chapter by the employer, shall be deemed to
have accepted all the provisions of this
chapter and shall be bound thereby unless he
shall have filed, prior to the injury or
incurrence of occupational disease, written
notice to the contrary with the employer;
and the acceptance shall include all of the
provisions of this chapter with respect to
traumatic personal injury, silicosis, and
any other occupational disease.
Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571, 186 S.W. 648 (1916),
established that the rights guaranteed by Section 54 of the
Constitution could be waived by an employee who made a
voluntary, affirmative election to accept the benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
Subsequently, in Wells v. Jefferson
County, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 462 (1953), the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of KRS 342.395 and concluded that a waiver of
Section 54 could be activated by an employee’s implied
acceptance of the Workers’ Compensation Act as provided by KRS
342.395.
Here, there is no allegation that Baker ever filed a
rejection of workers’ compensation coverage, and his decision
not to follow such a course of action is dispositively shown by
his prior acceptance of coverage and his current motion to
reopen.
Hence, pursuant to KRS 342.395, Baker is deemed to have
9
voluntarily accepted all provisions of Chapter 342 including KRS
342.125(8).
It follows, therefore, that Section 54 is not
violated by the application of the limitations provisions of KRS
342.125(8) to Baker’s motion to reopen.
As stated in Green, 186
S.W. at 652,
in this legislation the General Assembly did
not arbitrarily or at all undertake to limit
the amount of recovery. It merely proposed
a statute to a certain class of people for
their individual acceptance or rejection.
It did not assume to deprive these classes
or individuals without their consent of any
constitutional rights to which they were
entitled. The General Assembly merely
afforded by this legislation a means by and
through which individuals composing classes
might legally consent to limit the amount to
which the individual would be entitled if
injured or killed in the course of his
employment.
See also Brooks v. University of Louisville Hospital, Ky., 33
S.W.3d 526 (2000); Edwards v. Louisville Ladder, Ky. App., 957
S.W.2d 290 (1997).
For the foregoing reasons, the board’s opinion is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
10
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Edward A. Mayer
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CITY OF
LOUISVILLE:
Peter J. Glauber
Louisville
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE WORKERS’
COMPENSATION FUNDS:
David W. Barr
Frankfort, Kentucky
11
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