MARILYN W. CRAWFORD v. NATIONAL CITY BANK OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: November 21, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000011-MR
MARILYN W. CRAWFORD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-000414
v.
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
The present matter is a foreclosure action in
which the home of Appellant, Marilyn W. Crawford, was sold to
satisfy a mortgage on the property.
We dismiss for failure to
file a timely appeal.
Appellee, National City Bank, filed a foreclosure
action in Jefferson Circuit Court against Crawford.
Initially,
Crawford answered National City Bank’s complaint pro se.
She
later hired Julius Price as counsel to defend this action, and
he filed a second answer.
However, before receiving the second
answer, National City Bank filed a motion for summary judgment,
but failed to include Price on the certificate of notice.
Although Price admitted in an affidavit to having received a
copy of the motion for summary judgment via fax, he did not file
a response thereto on Crawford’s behalf.
The Master
Commissioner filed a report recommending the entry of National
City Bank’s motion.
Price thereafter filed objections to the report, and a
hearing was held on the matter.
On April 20, 2002, the trial
court granted Crawford twenty additional days to respond to
National City Bank’s motion for summary judgment.
Despite this,
no response was filed, and the trial court granted the motion
and entered a Final Judgment and Order of Sale on June 20, 2002.
Crawford maintains that Price never informed her of
this order.
Nonetheless, in a letter she wrote on July 8, 2002,
to Judge James Shake she stated that she learned of the order on
June 21, 2002.
She subsequently fired Price and proceeded in
this case pro se.
On August 28, 2002, Crawford filed a motion asking the
court to allow her to present proof that she had made her
mortgage payments.
However, in this motion she failed to
include the procedural grounds under which she was entitled to
relief from the June 21, 2002, order.
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The trial court denied
the motion on September 5, 2002, finding that if it was made
pursuant to CR. 59.05, it was untimely, or alternatively, if it
was made pursuant to CR 60.02, Crawford failed to show the
appropriate grounds for relief to which she was entitled.
Proceedings continued in this matter resulting in the
sale of Crawford’s home on September 10, 2002.
On December 3,
2002, the trial court entered an Order Confirming Sale.
On December 26, 2002, Crawford filed a Notice of
Appeal from the December 3, 2002, Order Confirming Sale.
However, in her pre-hearing statement, she referenced only the
summary judgment for the disposition from which she appealed.
Nonetheless, she attached both the December 3, 2002 Order
Confirming Sale and the June 20, 2002, Judgment to her prehearing statement.
In her brief, however, she attacks only the
Judgment of June 20, 2002.
Crawford does not present any
arguments whatsoever regarding the December 3, 2002, Order
Confirming Sale.
In Kentucky an order of sale is a final appealable
order.
See Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Mayfield v.
Nesler, Ky., 697 S.W.2d 136, 139 (1985).
In fact, although no
magic words were required to make it so, see id., the order
itself stated that it was final and appealable.
While the
December 3, 2002, order was also a final appealable order,
Crawford cannot rely on it to challenge the judgment of sale.
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See, e.g., Shuput v. Lauer, 325 N.W.2d 321 (Wis. 1982).
This is
so because the validity of a sale is distinct from the validity
of the judgment of sale.
Ramey v. Francis, Day and Co., 169 Ky.
469, 184 S.W. 380, 382 (1916).
The order of confirmation is
only an adjudication that the sale was properly conducted.
See,
e.g., Heilman v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 506 So.2d 1088, 1090
(Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1987).
It does not go to the underlying
validity of the sale.
While it may not be fatal to fail to specify in the
notice of appeal the proper judgment or order appealed from
under substantial compliance rules, see Ready v. Jamison, Ky.,
705 S.W.2d 479 (1986), failing to timely file a notice of appeal
is.
Excel Energy, Inc. v. Com. Institutional Securities, Inc.,
Ky., 37 S.W.3d 713, 716-17 (2000); CR 73.02.
Despite the fact
that Crawford specifically included the December 3, 2002, order
in her notice of appeal, the merits of her appeal are directed
only at the June 20, 2002, order.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure require that “[t]he
notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after the date of
notation of service of the judgment or order under Rule
77.04(2).” CR 73.02(1)(a).
Although we may sympathize with
Crawford’s troubles, including those with counsel, strict
compliance with CR 73.02 (1)(a) is mandatory.
Thus, she was
required to appeal the judgment within thirty days.
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Such a
technicality in the law is a pitfall for those unfamiliar with
the practice of law.
Nonetheless, a “notice of appeal is a
procedural device prescribed by the rules of the court by which
a litigant may invoke the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction
of the court as constitutionally delegated.”
Excel, 37 S.W.3d
at 716 (quoting Johnson v. Smith, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 944, 949-50
(1994)).
Accordingly, we are compelled to dismiss this appeal
as our jurisdiction to review the merits of it has not been
properly invoked.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: _November 21, 2003
_/s/ __R. W. DYCHE______
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Marilyn W. Crawford, Pro Se
Louisville, Kentucky
Thomas D. Murphy, II
Matthew F. Coogle
Ackerson & Yann, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
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