CHARLES L. WHITLEY v. JOHN J. JENKINS, d/b/a STOCKYARDS BANK; d/b/a STOCKYARDS BANK
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 17, 2003; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002600-MR
CHARLES L. WHITLEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-006125
JOHN J. JENKINS,
d/b/a STOCKYARDS BANK;
and DAVID BROOKS,
d/b/a STOCKYARDS BANK
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, GUIDUGLI AND PAISLEY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE. Charles L. Whitley (“Whitley”) appeals from an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing his action
against John J. Jenkins (“Jenkins”) and David Brooks (“Brooks”).
Whitley’s pro se complaint alleged that Jenkins and Brooks
engaged in fraud, forgery, breach of contract, and other claims
arising from four promissory notes entered into by Whitley and
made payable to Stockyards Bank.
For the reasons addressed
below, we must affirm the order on appeal.
On September 5, 1997, Whitley entered into a personal
loan agreement with Stockyards Bank.
1997 Chevrolet van.
The note was secured by a
In 1999, 2000, and 2001, Whitley entered
into three additional loan agreements with Stockyards Bank, each
note being secured by an additional vehicle.
Sometime thereafter, it appears from the record that
Whitley defaulted on the loans.
Whitley and Stockyards Bank
entered into a series of written communications regarding the
defaults, and on June 13, 2002, Stockyards Bank proposed to take
title to the security in full satisfaction of the notes.
Whitley apparently rejected the offer.
On June 24, 2002, Whitley filed the instant action
against Stockyard Bank vice-president Jenkins and Chairman and
CEO Brooks in their personal capacities.1
He alleged therein
that Jenkins and Brooks engaged in fraud, forgery, violation of
the “Truth and Lending Act”, failure to possess the original
notes, failure to give consideration, breach of contract,
attempting to destroy his marriage, and, other causes of action.
It is fair to say that the complaint is incoherent and does not
set forth generally recognized causes of action.
1
The action was filed in Jessamine Circuit Court, and transferred to
Jefferson Circuit Court via an order rendered on August 13, 2002 because the
notes were executed in Jefferson County and Stockyard Bank’s registered
office is in Jefferson County.
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On July 15, 2002, Jenkins and Brooks filed a motion to
dismiss the action.
As basis for the motion, they noted that
Stockyards Bank is a corporate entity and that Whitley’s claims
would lie, if at all, only against the corporation.
Since
Whitley did not bring the action against Stockyards Bank, did
not serve its registered agent, and instead sued Jenkins and
Brooks in their individual capacities, they maintained that they
were entitled to a dismissal.
They also maintained that the
action should be dismissed for improper venue (see footnote 1).
Whitley responded with a reply to the motion, and a motion for
summary judgment.
After Whitley tendered additional motions, the trial
court rendered an order on November 18, 2002 granting the motion
of Jenkins and Brooks to dismiss the action, and denying
Whitley’s motion for summary judgment.
Whitley’s subsequent
motion to vacate the order of dismissal was denied, and this
appeal followed.
Whitley now argues that the trial court erred in
dismissing the action.
He first claims that CR 8.04 should
operate to extend or otherwise support his cause of action
against Jenkins and Brooks because they did not file an answer
to his complaint.
He regards their failure to answer as an
admission that his causes of action are meritorious, and relies
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on this tacit admission as a basis for seeking reversal of the
order on appeal.
CR 8.04 states in relevant part that, “[A]verments in
a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading . . . .”
In
the matter at bar, Jenkins and Brooks did not file an answer to
Whitley’s complaint.
They did, however, file a motion to
dismiss, and did so within the time period during which an
answer may be filed.
This clearly is a responsive pleading, and
Jenkins and Brooks denied therein that Whitley was asserting an
actionable claim.
Since the motion to dismiss was made before
the answer was required, we do not regard either its filing or
the subsequent failure to file an answer as a tacit admission
that Whitley’s claims were meritorious.
Since the trial court
ruled on the motion in favor of Jenkins and Brooks, the action
was dismissed and no answer was necessary.
Not only was the motion to dismiss a responsive
pleading made in conformity with CR 8.04, it was also allowable
under CR 12.02 which permits certain motions to be filed in
advance of filing an answer.
It states that,
[E]very defense . . . shall be asserted in
the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses
may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (b) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (c) improper venue, (d)
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insufficiency of process, (e) insufficiency
of service of process, [and] (f) failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be
granted . . . . (Emphasis added).
Jenkins and Brooks’ motion to dismiss alleged improper venue and
failure to state a claim upon can be granted.
As such, it
clearly was a proper responsive pleading under CR 12.02.
Whitley next argues that the failure of Jenkins and/or
Brooks to respond to his written communications constitutes a
tacit admission that the allegations contained in the written
communications were true.
He notes that the letters contained
language advising Jenkins and/or Brooks that their failure to
respond would be regarded as an admission of his claims, and
relies on this alleged admission as a basis for reversing the
order on appeal.
Whitley’s argument on this issue is specious and is
not supported by the law.
Jenkins and Brooks were under no
legal duty to respond to the written communications, and their
failure to respond is not the functional equivalent of an
admission.
This claim of error does not serve as a basis for
tampering with the order on appeal.
In his final argument, Whitley apparently maintains
that the court erred in concluding that he failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
While Whitley
characterizes the issue in terms of whether the word “pray” was
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used in his complaint, the dispositive question is whether the
court erred in concluding that action should be dismissed
because the real party in interest was Stockyards Bank.
Since
Stockyards Bank was not served by its registered agent nor named
as a defendant, and as Whitley’s causes of action could not be
prosecuted against Jenkins and Brooks individually, we find no
basis for concluding that the trial court erred in dismissing
the action.
Accordingly, we find no error on this issue.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing Whitley’s action.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Charles L. Whitley
Nicholasville, KY
John T. McGarvey
M. Thurman Senn
Hal D. Friedman
Louisville, KY
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