SIDNEY COAL COMPANY v. MARVIN THACKER; HON. LLOYD R. EDENS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: August 15, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002582-WC
SIDNEY COAL COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-00-058507
MARVIN THACKER;
HON. LLOYD R. EDENS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, SCHRODER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE.
Sidney Coal Company (Sidney Coal) appeals from
the Workers’ Compensation Board’s opinion of November 20, 2002,
affirming the May 21, 2002, opinion, order and award of the Hon.
Lloyd R. Edens, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
The ALJ found
that Marvin Thacker (Thacker) was permanently partially disabled
at the rating of 24.15% and awarded $276.60 per week for four
hundred twenty-five weeks beginning November 6, 2001.
later modified this amount.
The ALJ
The ALJ awarded Thacker temporary
total benefits (TTD) in the amount of $661.74 per week from
December 2, 2000, until November 5, 2001.
Furthermore, the ALJ
found that Sidney Coal had intentionally failed to comply with
its roof control plan as required by 30 CFR 75.220(a)(1).
Thus,
the ALJ applied the penalty found in KRS 342.165(1) and
increased Thacker’s award by 30 percent.
On appeal to this Court, Sidney Coal argues that
Thacker was not entitled to additional TTD since he failed to
reserve it as a contested issue before the ALJ and that the
ALJ’s decision to award additional TTD was not supported by
substantial evidence.
Sidney Coal also argues the ALJ’s
imposition of the 30% penalty pursuant to KRS 342.165(1) was not
supported by substantial evidence.
Finding that Thacker was
entitled to additional TTD and that both of the ALJ’s decisions
were supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
The record reflects that Sidney Coal had paid TTD
benefits to Thacker from December 1, 2000, to April 24, 2001.
However, in its opinion, order and award, the ALJ awarded
Thacker TTD benefits from the date of the injury, December 1,
2000, to November 5, 2001, the date Dr. Fannin recommended
Thacker consult with neurosurgeon Dr. Gilbert, although the ALJ
did credit Sidney Coal for the amount it had previously paid.
On appeal, Sidney Coal argues that Thacker was not
entitled to the additional TTD benefit period because he did not
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demand additional TTD benefits when his claim was originally
pending before the ALJ.
Sidney Coal insists that the ALJ lacked
the ability to award the additional TTD benefits because Thacker
failed to preserve the issue as a contested issue.
Thacker
never argued for additional TTD benefits before the ALJ; thus,
the ALJ could not address the issue.
Moreover, Sidney Coal insists the ALJ’s decision was
not based on substantial evidence because in its opinion, order
and award it relied exclusively on Dr. Fannin’s testimony to
support the award.
Sidney Coal argues that Dr. Fannin’s
testimony does not constitute substantial evidence because he
never opined that Thacker had reached maximum medical
improvement.
Further, Sidney Coal points out that Dr. Fannin
never described Thacker as temporarily totally disabled.
Also in its opinion, order and award, the ALJ imposed
the 30% penalty pursuant to KRS 342.165(1).
In support of this,
the ALJ found that Sidney Coal had intentionally failed to
comply with its roof control plan as required by federal
regulation 30 CFR 75.220(a)(1) and had caused the accident to
some degree due to this intentional failure.
Sidney Coal argues that the ALJ’s decision was not
supported by substantial evidence.
According to Sidney Coal,
Thacker had the burden of proving:
1) that Sidney Coal failed
intentionally to comply with its roof control plan and 2) that
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Sidney Coal’s intentional failure contributed to Thacker’s
injury to some degree.
Sidney Coal argues that Thacker failed
to prove that it intentionally spaced the roof bolts improperly.
Sidney Coal points to Billy Slone’s testimony in which he opined
that the roof bolts were being spaced wide because the roof
bolters were inexperienced.
Sidney Coal argues that
inexperience does not equal intent; thus, Thacker failed to
prove it intentionally failed to comply with its roof control
plan.
Sidney Coal also points out that Thacker, Blackburn,
Williamson, and Slone, all experienced miners, testified that
100% compliance with a roof control plan did not guarantee that
a roof fall would not occur.
Furthermore, Sidney Coal argues
that Thacker failed to prove that the rock, which fell on him,
fell from an area that had been improperly bolted.
When we review decisions of the Workers’ Compensation
Board, we will reverse the Board only when we determine that it
has overlooked or misconstrued the controlling law or so
flagrantly erred in evaluating the evidence that it has caused
gross injustice.
Daniel v. Armco Steel Company, Ky. App., 913
S.W.2d 797, 798 (1995).
ALJ’s decision.
This ultimately leads us to review the
Where, as in the case sub judice, the ALJ has
found in favor of the claimant who had the burden of proof, we
must determine whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by
substantial evidence.
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d
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641, 643 (1986); see also Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky.,
673 S.W.2d 735 (1984).
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has
defined substantial evidence as, “some evidence of substance and
relevant consequence, having the fitness to induce conviction in
the minds of reasonable people.”
Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich
Chemical Co., Ky., 474 S.W.2d 367, 369 (1971).
Stated more
simply, substantial evidence is, “evidence which would permit a
fact-finder to reasonably find as it did.”
at 643.
Francis, 708 S.W.2d
We point out that the ALJ, not this Court nor the
Board, had the sole discretion to determine the quality,
character, and substance of the evidence presented before it.
Whittaker v. Rowland, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 479, 481 (1999), citing
Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 418 (1985);
see also Snawder v. Stice, Ky. App., 576 S.W.2d 276 (1979).
Furthermore, as the fact-finder, the ALJ may choose to believe
or disbelieve any part of the evidence presented, regardless of
its source.
Whittaker, 998 S.W.2d at 481, citing Caudill v.
Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15, 16 (1977).
Regarding temporary total benefits, this Court stated:
To summarize, TTD is payable until the
medical evidence establishes the recovery
process, including any treatment reasonably
rendered in an effort to improve the
claimant’s condition, is over, or the
underlying condition has stabilized such
that the claimant is capable of returning to
his job, or some other employment, of which
he is capable, which is available in the
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local labor market. Moreover, . . . the
question presented is one of fact no matter
how TTD is defined.
W.L. Harper Constr. Co. v. Baker, Ky. App., 858 S.W.2d 202, 205
(1993).
As the Board pointed out in its opinion, Dr. Daniel
Primm (Dr. Primm) performed an independent medical examination
of Thacker on September 14, 2001.
Dr. Primm opined that Thacker
could return to light duty work and from the date of
September 14, 2001, Thacker would reach MMI in four to six
weeks.
According to Dr. Primm, Thacker could have reached MMI
as early as October 12, 2001, or as late as October 26, 2001.
Based on Dr. Primm’s report alone, the ALJ reasonably determined
that Thacker’s underlying condition had stabilized, he had
reached MMI by November 5,2001; thus, Thacker was entitled to
receive TTD benefits until that time.
Moreover, as Thacker mentioned in his brief, reports
and testimony of Dr. William Fannin (Dr. Fannin) support the
ALJ’s decision as well.
Thacker points out that on November 5,
2001, Dr. Fannin, Thacker’s treating physician, recommended that
Thacker consult with a neurosurgeon to explore the possibility
of surgery.
As Thacker points out, Dr. Fannin could not have
felt that Thacker had reached MMI since Dr. Fannin wished to
explore the possibility of surgery.
We believe that the ALJ
could have reasonably inferred from Dr. Fannin’s testimony that
Thacker did not reach maximum medical improvement until
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November 5, 2001.
Based on this inference, the ALJ not only
could but also did reasonably find that Thacker’s underlying
condition did not stabilize until November 5, 2001.
At that
point, the ALJ reasonably found that Thacker had reached MMI.
As a result, Thacker was entitled to receive TTD benefits until
November 5, 2001; thus, we deem that the ALJ’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence.
In addition, Sidney Coal fails to cite any statute,
administrative regulation or case law to support its proposition
that Thacker was not entitled to the additional TTD benefits
because he failed to reserve it as a contested issue.
Noting
this deficiency, we fail to find Sidney Coal’s argument
persuasive and decline to disturb the ALJ’s decision.
In KRS 342.165, the General Assembly codified a
penalty against employers that fail to comply with safety laws.
KRS 342.165(1) reads in pertinent part:
If an accident is caused in any degree by
the intentional failure of the employer to
comply with any specific statute or lawful
administrative regulation made thereunder,
communicated to the employer and relative to
installation or maintenance of safety
appliances or methods, the compensation for
which the employer would otherwise have been
liable under this chapter shall be increased
thirty percent (30%) in the amount of each
payment.
According to the former Court of Appeals of Kentucky, now the
Supreme Court of Kentucky, “[t]he basis of the statutory penalty
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is that the injury is the result of an intentional failure to
comply with a regulation which has been communicated to the
employer.”
Gibbs Automatic Moulding Company v. Bullock, Ky.,
438 S.W.2d 793, 794 (1969).
Furthermore, the high court
concluded, “[i]n order to have an intentional failure to comply,
there must be actual knowledge, or such period of time must have
elapsed as would create a presumption of knowledge.” Id.
In Apex Mining v. Blankenship, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 225
(1996), appellee was permanently disabled due to an accident
that he had while operating a road grader.
The ALJ found that
appellant-employer had supplied to appellee a grader that had
its throttle tied wide open and had defective brakes and brake
pedal.
The ALJ found that appellant knew about the defective
condition of the grader, failed to repair it, and intentionally
failed to comply with KRS 338.031.
The ALJ concluded that
appellant would have been subject to the penalty in KRS 342.165
but for the fact that appellee had previously received benefits
for total disability.
Id. at 227.
According to the high court, the record revealed that
appellant’s supervisory personnel, including its foreman, knew
about the defective condition of the grader, and the record
showed that KRS 338.031 had been in effect since 1972,
precluding any argument that appellant lacked knowledge of the
statute.
Id. at 228.
The high court stated:
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Under those circumstances, we agree that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s
inference that the employer’s violation of
KRS 338.031 was intentional. Likewise, the
ALJ cited ample evidence to support the
conclusion that the grader was moving faster
than it would have been had it not been
defective, thereby contributing to the
severity of the accident. This finding
satisfies the requirement of KRS 342.165
that the work-related accident be caused “in
any degree” by the employer’s safety
violation.
Id.
Likewise in this case, we believe that the ALJ’s
decision to impose the penalty found in KRS 342.165 was
supported by substantial evidence.
We note that the FMSHA
requires all mine operators to develop and follow a roof control
plan that has been approved by the federal agency’s district
manager.
30 CFR 75.220(a)(1).
The record reflects that Sidney
Coal knew about this regulation.
Vernon Blackburn, its former
mine manager at Clean Energy, testified that he was familiar
with Sidney Coal’s roof control plan.
He testified that the
plan called for the roof bolts to be spaced no wider than fortyeight inches apart.
He testified that the purpose of the plan
was to provide the mine’s employees with a work environment that
was as safe as possible.
He further testified that he knew the
federal inspector had cited Sidney Coal on both November 20th and
November 30th due to wide roof bolts.
Patsy Cain, Sidney Coal’s
safety director testified that Sidney Coal’s roof control plan
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required the roof bolts to be forty-eight inches apart.
knew about the citations.
She too
She testified that she failed to
report Thacker’s accident to the FMSHA as required and that
Sidney Coal had been fined as a result.
Thacker, a former mine
superintendent himself, testified that Sidney Coal was
pressuring its roof bolters to work faster which resulted in
wide bolts.
Slone, another experienced miner, testified that he
noticed other wide roof bolts and reported them.
He also opined
that Sidney Coal was pressuring its inexperienced roof bolters
to work faster, which caused problems with wide roof bolts.
The record established that Sidney Coal’s supervisory
personnel knew about 30 CFR 75.220, knew about its own roof
control plan and knew about its cited violations of its own roof
control plan.
The record reveals that Sidney Coal was
pressuring its new, inexperienced roof bolters to work faster
and this caused a persistent and re-occurring problem with wide
roof bolts.
Given this evidence, the ALJ reasonably found that
Sidney Coal intentionally failed to comply with its roof control
plan as required by federal regulation.
Furthermore, Thacker testified that when the accident
happened, he was working in the area between the continuous
miner and the rib of the mine.
He testified that in this area
there was approximately six feet between the last roof bolt and
the rib of the mine, which indicates a violation of the roof
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control plan.
Thacker insisted that the rock that fell on him
was approximately five feet long and three and one-half to four
feet wide.
Williamson, who witnessed the accident, testified
that the rock was four and one-half feet long and five and onehalf feet wide.
Slone, who measured the rock, testified that it
was greater than forty-eight inches wide.
He also testified
that the area in which it fell had been improperly spot bolted.
The record reveals that Sidney Coal’s roof control
plan required that its roof bolts be spaced no wider than fortyeight inches.
The record also reveals that the rock that fell
on Thacker was between five and six feet long, in other words,
between sixty and seventy-two inches.
The record reveals that
the accident site had been improperly bolted, since
approximately six feet of space existed between the last line of
roof bolts and the rib of the mine.
The record reveals that the
rock that fell on Thacker was approximately the same size as the
area that was improperly bolted.
Given this, one could
reasonably infer Sidney Coal’s intentional failure to follow its
own plan not only contributed to causing the accident but also
contributed to the severity by causing the large size of the
rock.
We adjudge that the ALJ reasonably found that Sidney
Coal’s intentional failure to comply caused to some degree the
accident.
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As the Administrative Law Judge’s opinion was
supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the Workers’
Compensation Board’s opinion of November 20, 2002.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A. Stuart Bennett
Lexington, Kentucky
Miller Kent Carter
Pikeville, Kentucky
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