JOHN D. SHORT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 26, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002400-MR
JOHN D. SHORT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00635
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES; AND MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
John D. Short (hereinafter “Short”) has
appealed from the Fayette Circuit Court’s November 7, 2002,
order and opinion denying his RCr 11.42 motion to vacate.
The
sole issue on appeal concerns the timeliness of Short’s RCr
1
Senior Status John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
11.42 motion.
Having considered the parties’ briefs, the
record, and the applicable case law, we affirm.
As the facts underlying this appeal are not disputed,
we shall only briefly outline the proceedings below.
On
December 29, 1998, the circuit court entered a Final Judgment
and Sentence of Probation following its acceptance of Short’s
guilty plea.
Short pled guilty as charged in the indictment to
charges of Flagrant Non-Support2 and for being a Persistent
Felony Offender in the First Degree.3
The circuit court withheld
imposition of his enhanced fifteen-year sentence, and placed
Short on probation for five years, subject to several
conditions.
On May 11, 1999, the judgment was modified to
include the condition that he successfully complete the Fayette
County Drug Court program.
Because Short failed to successfully
complete this program, an affidavit to revoke was filed on July
20, 1999, by treatment coordinator Connie Reed.
Subsequent to a
probation revocation hearing, the circuit court entered a final
judgment sentencing Short to fifteen years in the State
Penitentiary on October 22, 1999, and then entered an amended
order on October 26, 1999, revoking his probation and sentencing
him to serve the original term of imprisonment due to his
failure to complete the Drug Court program.
2
3
KRS 530.050.
KRS 532.080.
-2-
On October 2, 2002, Short filed a motion to vacate
pursuant to RCr 11.42, arguing that his guilty plea was not
entered voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently due to
ineffective assistance of counsel, and that he was coerced into
accepting a sentence enhancement.
On November 7, 2002, the
circuit court entered an order and opinion denying his motion
without an evidentiary hearing, on the basis that Short did not
file his RCr 11.42 motion within the applicable three-year time
limit.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Short argues that his motion to vacate was
timely filed as the three-year time period in RCr 11.42(10) did
not begin to run until the circuit court entered the October 22
and October 26, 1999, orders because the fifteen-year sentence
was not imposed until that time.
On the other hand, the
Commonwealth argues that the December 29, 1998, order became
final thirty days from its entry because he did not take a
direct appeal and that the three-year period began running from
that date.4
We agree with the Commonwealth that the three-year
time limit began to run no later than thirty days from the entry
of the original 1998 judgment.
RCr 11.42(10) provides that:
Any motion under this rule shall be filed
within three years after the judgment
4
We note that Short could not have taken a direct appeal from the December
29, 1998, judgment because he entered an unconditional guilty plea.
-3-
becomes final, unless the motion alleges and
the movant proves either:
(a)
that the facts upon which the claim is
predicated were unknown to the movant
and could not have been ascertained by
the exercise of due diligence; or
(b)
that the fundamental constitutional
right asserted was not established
within the period provided for herein
and has been held to apply
retroactively.
The rule also provides that for those judgments that became
final prior to the effective date of the rule,5 the three-year
time period would begin to run from that date.
This Court
addressed the three-year time limitation of RCr 11.42(10) in
Palmer v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 3 S.W.3d 763 (1999).
In
Palmer, we held that by the phrase “the judgment becomes final,”
the Supreme Court was referring to “the conclusive judgment in
the case, whether it be the final judgment of the appellate
court on direct appeal or the judgment of the trial court in the
event no direct appeal was taken.
Id. at 765.
In the matter presently before us, the conclusive
judgment was the circuit court’s original judgment entered on
December 28, 1998, adjudging Short guilty and probating his
fifteen-year sentence.
Whether that judgment became final upon
entry, as Short entered an unconditional guilty plea, or at the
end of the thirty-day period during which Short could have filed
5
October 1, 1994, is the effective date of the rule.
-4-
a direct appeal had he entered a conditional guilty plea or had
he proceeded to trial and been convicted, Short did not file his
RCR 11.42 motion until well after the expiration of the threeyear period prescribed by the rule.
Furthermore, Short has
never argued that he would be subject to any of the exceptions
to the three-year time limit.
That Short failed to abide by the
terms of his probation and eventually had his probation revoked
is of no consequence.
Therefore, we hold that the three-year
period of RCr 11.42(10) began to run, at the latest, thirty days
from the entry of the circuit court’s December 29, 1998,
judgment.
Short did not file his RCr 11.42 motion until October
2, 2002, well over three years later.
Therefore, the circuit
court did not commit any error in denying Short’s RCr 11.42
motion to vacate as untimely filed.
For the foregoing reasons, the November 7, 2002, order
and opinion of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael C. Lemke
Louisville, KY
A. B. Chandler
Attorney General
N. Susan Roncarti
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.