TIMOTHY MARTEVES TAYLOR v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
October 3, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002363-MR
TIMOTHY MARTEVES TAYLOR
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00778
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS, and DYCHE, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE.
Appellant Timothy Marteves Taylor entered a
conditional plea of guilty to one felony count of trafficking in
a controlled substance (cocaine) and possession of marijuana.
On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by overruling
his motion to suppress statements that he made to the police and
the drug evidence found on his person.
We affirm.
On May 30, 2002, Detectives Hart, Schnelle, and Smoot
received information from a confidential source that the
appellant was in possession of crack cocaine.
When the officers
approached Taylor, he began walking away.
They then moved him
up against a nearby building and handcuffed him.
Detective Hart
testified at trial that the officers had so restrained him
because they feared that he was a flight risk.
After
handcuffing Taylor, the officers advised him that he was not
under arrest.
However, they proceeded to relate to him the
informant’s statement that he was trafficking in cocaine.
At
that point, Taylor voluntarily admitted to the officers that he
had cocaine and marijuana in his pockets.
Detective Hart then
placed him under arrest, searched him, and found the cocaine and
marijuana.
After Taylor was formally arrested, he was read his
Miranda rights, after which time he refused to answer any more
questions.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S. Ct.
1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
On July 29, 2002, appellant was indicted by the
Fayette County Grand Jury on one count of trafficking in a
controlled substance and on one count of possession of
marijuana.
He filed a motion to suppress the evidence, and a
hearing was held on September 9, 2002.
The court overruled his
motion to suppress both the statements that he made to the
police and the drugs that were found on his person.
Taylor then
entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to five
years in prison.
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Taylor argues that the interview conducted by the
detectives constituted a custodial interrogation, thus
triggering the duty of the police to advise him of his rights.
He relies upon Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct.
1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980).
In Innis, the Court defined
interrogation as any words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally incident to arrest and a taking into
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
Thus, Taylor
believes that custodial interrogation had occurred prior to his
arrest because the police related the informant’s statement to
him.
Following the suppression hearing, the trial court
determined that no interrogation had taken place, holding that
the police had had a legitimate reason for initiating the
contact with Taylor based upon the informant’s tip.
Furthermore, because Taylor had attempted to flee from the
police, the court agreed that he had been properly handcuffed
for his own protection and for the sake of police safety as well
as to prevent destruction of evidence.
15:20:42-15:21:24).
(Videotape 09/20/02,
Formal warnings are not required unless
there is a custodial interrogation.
Miranda, supra.
Although
he was obviously not free to leave, he was not undergoing formal
interrogation.
He had been advised that he was not under arrest
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before he freely volunteered the information contained in the
statements that he later sought to suppress.
Our standard of review of a decision of the circuit
court on a suppression motion following a hearing is twofold.
First, the factual findings of the circuit court are conclusive
if they are supported by substantial evidence.
RCr 9.78;
Commonwealth v. Whitmore, Ky., 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (2002).
Second,
when the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence,
the question then becomes whether the trial court correctly
applied the rule of law to the established facts.
Whitmore, 92
S.W.3d at 79.
Our review of the videotapes persuades us that the
court correctly found that no custodial interrogation had taken
place at the time that Taylor uttered the statements.
Since
Taylor voluntarily affirmed the information reported by the
informant prior to being placed under arrest, no Miranda warning
was required.
Therefore, suppression of the evidence was not
required.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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