DOROTHEA E. BRENYO v. NINA JEAN WITTENBARGER AND DANIEL R. BRENYO
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 7, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002354-MR
DOROTHEA E. BRENYO
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 90-CI-01854
NINA JEAN WITTENBARGER AND
DANIEL R. BRENYO
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Dorothea E. Brenyo (hereinafter “Dorothea”)
has appealed from the Fayette Circuit Court’s October 11, 2002,
order denying her motion to alter, amend or vacate the September
3, 2002, order terminating grandparent visitation without having
held an evidentiary hearing.
The grandchild in question is
Daniel Alexander Brenyo (hereinafter “Alex”), the natural child
of Nina Jean Wittenbarger (hereinafter “Nina”) and Dorothea’s
son, Daniel Brenyo (hereinafter “Daniel”).
Having considered
the applicable case law in light of the specific facts of this
case, we must affirm.
At the outset, we note that both Nina and Daniel are
proceeding without counsel and that neither filed a brief in
this matter.
For this reason, we could invoke CR 76.12(8)(c)
and either accept Dorothea’s statement of the facts and issues
as correct, reverse the circuit court’s decision if Dorothea’s
brief reasonably appears to sustain the action, or consider
Nina’s and Daniel’s failure to file a brief as a confession of
error and reverse without considering the merits of the appeal.
However, we choose not to invoke any of those options, and we
shall review the merits of this appeal, although we shall not
spend considerable time reciting the factual background.
Alex was born on December 28, 1989, in Lexington,
Kentucky to Nina and Daniel, who were never married to each
other.
Daniel filed a petition with the circuit court in 1990
regarding custody and support, and the circuit court entered an
agreed judgment on July 9, 1990, awarding permanent custody to
Nina.
Daniel was ordered to pay child support and was also
awarded visitation.
Daniel moved out of the state for
employment purposes for several years following the entry of the
agreed judgment.
During this time, Dorothea spent considerable
time watching Alex in order to assist Nina.
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In 1998, Daniel
filed a motion to amend the agreed judgment pursuant to CR
60.02(f), requesting custody of Alex.
Nina was eventually
restored to her full custodial rights as sole custodian, and
Daniel was permitted to continue his visitation rights.
On August 6, 1998, Dorothea and her husband, Daniel
Brenyo, Sr.,1 filed a motion to intervene and for visitation
pursuant to KRS 405.021, Kentucky’s grandparent visitation
statute.
Although Nina initially opposed the motion due to the
interference with Alex’s schedule, she eventually relented in
order to end their conflict.
On January 25, 1999, the circuit
court granted the motion to intervene and for visitation, and
set grandparent visitation for every Tuesday.
It is evident in
the record that problems continued between the parties as the
circuit court ordered them all to attend parenting coordination
sessions.
The circuit court later granted Dorothea several days
of visitation during Alex’s summer breaks.
In 2002, all of the parties continued to have problems
agreeing upon visitation times, and Dorothea filed a motion to
set the summer visitation schedule and to clarify visitation
rules and procedures.
Nina objected to the motion and also
moved to terminate grandparent visitation, asserting that
visitation with Dorothea every Tuesday was not in Alex’s best
interest and that Dorothea would be able to see Alex during
1
Daniel Brenyo, Sr., passed away at some point during the course of
proceedings, although the record does not reflect when this occurred.
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Daniel’s visitation time.
On July 26, 2002, the circuit court
heard arguments from counsel for Nina and Dorothea.
Nina argued
that Dorothea could not prove that Alex would be harmed because
she would still be able to see him.
Dorothea argued that
visitation with her would be in Alex’s best interest, and that
Daniel was prepared to testify to this.
On September 3, 2002,
the circuit court granted Nina’s motion to terminate grandparent
visitation, and indicated that Dorothea “is not precluded from
spending time with Alex during periods of visitation to which
[Daniel] is permitted.”
Dorothea filed a motion to vacate the order
terminating grandparent visitation on September 13, 2002,
arguing that Nina had waived her right to claim that KRS 405.021
was unconstitutional, that Nina’s use of Dorothea as a child
provider created a “special factor”, and that the circuit court
failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing and determine whether
harm to the child might result.
Nina, on the other hand, argued
that she had not used Dorothea as a childcare provider, that no
“special factors” existed, and that an evidentiary hearing was
unnecessary under the current case law because no harm could
come to the child as there was no denial of a relationship
between Dorothea and Alex.
By a bench ruling on September 26,
2002, and by written order entered October 11, 2002, the circuit
court denied Dorothea’s motion to alter, amend or vacate,
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finding that she had ample time to see Alex during times Daniel
had visitation with him.
This appeal followed.
In her brief, Dorothea argues that Nina’s right to
raise her child as she sees fit is not absolute, that she waived
her right to oppose grandparent visitation, that the trial court
erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make
specific findings of fact or conclusions of law, and that the
applicable standard for termination of visitation in this case
should be the best interest of the child.
It is apparent from
the record that Daniel is aligned with Dorothea’s interest, so
it is not surprising that he did not file a brief in opposition
to her arguments.
However, we are aware that Nina, through her
attorney, objected to Dorothea’s arguments below, and although
she has not filed a brief with this Court, we have reviewed her
filings contained in the record on the issue of grandparent
visitation.
Below, Nina relied on this Court’s at that time new
opinion in Scott v. Scott, Ky.App., 80 S.W.3d 447 (2002), to
argue that Dorothea could not establish a right to a hearing
because she could never establish that harm to the child would
result by clear and convincing evidence.
She asserted that
there was no denial of a relationship between Alex and Dorothea.
The primary issue before this Court is the proper
procedure a trial court must follow in terminating previously
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ordered grandparent visitation.
As Dorothea suggests, this
appears to be an issue of first impression in the Commonwealth.
KRS 405.021 provides for grandparent visitation rights
in the Commonwealth, and allows a circuit court to “grant
reasonable visitation rights to either the paternal or maternal
grandparents of a child and issue any necessary orders to
enforce the decree if it determines that it is in the best
interest of the child to do so.”
KRS 405.021(1).
In Scott v.
Scott, 80 S.W.3d 447, 448 (2002), this Court noted that this
statute “has withstood a facial constitutional challenge.”
Citing King v. King, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 630 (1992), this Court
repeated the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s holding:
The [Supreme] Court [of Kentucky] assumed
that a special bond exists between
grandparents and grandchildren, which must
be considered in abridging the fundamental
right of parents to object to grandparent
contact. [Id. at 632.] “The arbitrariness
of the statute,” the Court said, “is
obviated by the requirement that visitation
be granted by a court only after finding
that it is in the best interest of the
child.” [Id.]
Scott, supra, at 448.
Therefore, we need not address the
constitutionality of KRS 405.021 any further, nor shall we need
to address Dorothea’s contention that Nina is precluded from
raising a constitutional challenge due to her failure to notify
the Attorney General of her intention to do so.
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Although this appeal deals with the termination of
grandparent visitation, a review of the statute and cases
addressing the petition for grandparent visitation will be
helpful.
In King, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed
Kentucky’s grandparent visitation statute, KRS 405.021, and held
that “visitation cannot be granted until an action is filed in
Circuit Court, a hearing conducted before a judge or
commissioner, and findings of fact and conclusions of law
entered finding that the best interests of the child will be
served by granting or denying visitation.”
King, supra, at 632.
Although not explicitly required by the statute, the requirement
for a hearing on grandparent visitation was implied by the
Supreme Court in the King decision.
Ky.App., 971 S.W.2d 830 (1998).
Mustain v. Kennedy,
In 2000, the United States
Supreme Court issued its opinion of Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), which this Court
discussed at length in Scott, supra.
We stated that in Troxel,
the Supreme Court “recognized an established line of cases
holding that the right of parents to control the care, custody
and upbringing of their children is one of the oldest and most
fundamental rights recognized by the constitution.”
supra, at 449.
Scott,
Furthermore, we noted that the Supreme Court
stated that a trial court must accord deference to a parent’s
decision that visitation would not be in the best interest of
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the child, and that its failure to do so would amount to an
unconstitutional application of the statute.
Id. at 449-50.
Finally, we addressed Justice Lambert’s dissent in King and held
that in order to apply KRS 405.021 “in a constitutionally
permissible manner,”
based on Kentucky precedent, that
grandparent visitation may only be granted
over the objection of an otherwise fit
custodial parent if it is shown by clear and
convincing evidence that harm to the child
will result from a deprivation of visitation
with the grandparent.
Id. 450-51.
In the present appeal, Dorothea argues that Scott
should not be applied retroactively so that the best interest of
the child standard should still be applied.
Additionally, she
asserts that she should have been afforded an evidentiary
hearing as she requested and that the circuit court should have
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon
evidence introduced at the hearing.
Based upon the
circumstances of this case, we disagree, and hold that the
circuit court did not commit any error in terminating
grandparent visitation without an evidentiary hearing.
We agree with Nina’s argument below that Dorothea
failed to establish her entitlement to an evidentiary hearing.
Dorothea certainly cannot argue that she is no longer able to
have any contact with Alex.
Rather, Daniel’s visitation with
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Alex is still continuing, and the record does not reflect that
he has expressed any reservation regarding Dorothea’s continued
interaction with his son, unlike the parent or parents in the
cases Dorothea cites.
In fact, counsel for Dorothea stated that
Daniel was ready to testify that it would be in Alex’s best
interest for grandparent visitation to continue.
Furthermore,
the circuit court made a finding on the record that Dorothea was
still seeing Alex.
Therefore, Dorothea would be unable to
establish in a hearing either that it would be in Alex’s best
interest for grandparent visitation to continue or that harm
would result from a deprivation of visitation because their
contact would not be extinguished.
Additionally, we believe that the circuit court
adequately supported its decision in bench rulings and written
orders.
We disagree with Dorothea’s assertion that the circuit
court rested its decision solely on the basis of Nina’s
objection to continued visitation.
Our review of the record
indicates that the circuit court based its decision on a number
of factors, including Nina’s wishes, Alex’s age as well as his
school and extra-curricular activities, and the fact that
Dorothea would still be able to see Alex during his visitation
with her son, Daniel.
In conclusion, we note that the facts of this case,
most importantly that Dorothea still has contact with Alex, have
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not required us to make the determination as to whether a
circuit court must hold an evidentiary hearing and enter
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon
evidence introduced at the hearing prior to terminating
grandparent visitation or as to the applicable standard of
proof.
Those determinations must wait for a later day.
For the foregoing reasons, the Fayette Circuit Court’s
orders terminating grandparent visitation and denying the motion
to alter, amend or vacate are affirmed.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FILED FOR APPELLEES
Michael L. Judy
Frankfort, KY
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