TRAVIS SUGGS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 14, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2002-CA-002318-MR
TRAVIS SUGGS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SIMPSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00184
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
*** *** ***
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
Travis Suggs appeals from a final judgment
of the Simpson Circuit Court sentencing him to seven years’
imprisonment on a conviction for trafficking in a controlled
substance (marijuana) within 1,000 yards of a school building
and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO
II) following a jury trial.
Suggs challenges the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained in the
execution of a search warrant.
He also challenges an order of
the trial court denying his motion for a new trial based on the
failure of the Commonwealth to disclose the existence of an eye
witness prior to trial.
We conclude that his arguments are
without merit and thus affirm.
In the late afternoon of August 6, 2001, Officers
Scott Wade and Brian Smith of the Franklin Police Department
were patrolling an area of high drug activity in Franklin,
Kentucky.
The officers saw Roscoe Clark approach a residence on
Breckinridge Street on his bicycle and enter the residence.
Officer Wade was familiar with Clark as a drug user from
previous encounters with him.
A few minutes later, Clark exited
the residence.
The police officers stopped Clark when they observed
him violate some traffic regulations.
When Officer Wade
approached him, Clark placed a small bag of marijuana in his
mouth, which the officer recovered.
When asked about the
marijuana, Clark allegedly told Officer Wade that he had just
purchased the item at the Breckinridge Street residence from a
black male in a white tee shirt and a blue or black hat.
After
arresting Clark for possession of marijuana, Officer Wade
decided to seek a search warrant.
A few hours later, a trial commissioner issued a
search warrant based on an affidavit prepared by Officer Wade
describing the incident and his discussion with Clark.
2
In the
affidavit, Officer Wade stated that Clark had given him
reliable, truthful information in the past.
The search warrant
authorized a search of the residence for property or things of
evidence tending to show crimes related to the sale of drugs and
for an unknown black male wearing a white tee shirt and a blue
or black hat.1
At approximately 9:00 p.m. the same night, Officer
Wade and several other police officers executed the search
warrant.
A young woman answered and allowed them into the
residence after Officer Wade knocked on the front door and told
her of the search warrant.
Upon entering, the police had their
guns drawn. They encountered two persons in the kitchen and six
persons, including Suggs, in a back entertainment room.
When Officer Wade and another officer entered the back
room, Suggs was playing billiards.
Officer Wade told the
occupants that he had a search warrant and directed them to lie
down on the floor and place both of their hands in front of them
where they could be seen.
Suggs did not lie down on the floor,
but he did drop the pool stick and put his hands in front of
him.
Suggs then started repeatedly placing his right hand
behind him and bringing it back in front of him.
1
Unfortunately, the affidavit and search warrant documents are not
included in the appellate record even though they were admitted into
evidence at the suppression hearing. Our discussion of these
documents is based on testimony at the suppression hearing.
3
After Officer Wade asked him several times to leave
both of his hands in front of him, he allegedly saw Suggs take a
large Ziploc plastic bag containing what appeared to be
marijuana from behind his back as he was going down on the floor
and throw it to his side.
At that point, while pointing his gun
at Suggs, Officer Wade again told Suggs to lie face down on the
ground.
Officer Wade then handcuffed Suggs, placed him under
arrest, and performed a search of his person.
In the search, Office Wade discovered a small bag of
marijuana, $6,072 mostly in $20 bills, and a vial containing
several Viagra pills.
Officer Wade also retrieved the large bag
thrown by Suggs, which later analysis revealed contained 89
grams2 of marijuana.
The search of the residence uncovered
various items of drug paraphernalia, including scales and
plastic baggies, and a police scanner.
In November 2001, Suggs was indicted on one felony
count of trafficking in a controlled substance (marijuana)
within 1,000 yards of a school building,3 one misdemeanor count
of prescription drugs in improper container,4 one misdemeanor
count of possession of drug paraphernalia,5 one misdemeanor count
2
There are 28 grams in one ounce.
3
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 218A.1411.
4
KRS 218A.210.
5
KRS 218A.500(2).
4
of possession of a police radio,6 and being a persistent felony
offender in the first degree (PFO I).7
Suggs subsequently filed
a motion to suppress the evidence seized by the police during
the search.8
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion
with Officer Wade as the only witness.9
Suggs challenged the
sufficiency of the description of the reliability of Clark in
the affidavit submitted to support the search warrant and the
validity of the search of Suggs’s person.
The trial court
denied the motion holding that the search warrant was validly
issued and that the search of Suggs was a valid search incident
to arrest.
At the trial on August 15, 2002, Officers Wade and
Smith testified about the events involving the search.
Suggs
testified and admitted having the small bag of marijuana and
cash but denied ever possessing or handling the large bag of
marijuana.
During the defense case, Clark testified that he did
not tell Officer Wade that he had purchased marijuana from a
person at 528 Breckinridge Street and denied ever having been at
6
KRS 432.570.
7
KRS 532.080.
8
The written motion only requested suppression of the money seized,
but Suggs’s attorney later orally expanded the request.
9
Roscoe Clark had escaped from jail and his whereabouts was unknown.
Therefore, he was not available for the hearing.
5
that residence.
Clark also stated that his girlfriend was with
him on August 6 when he was stopped and arrested by Officer
Wade.
Prior to submitting the case to the jury, Suggs orally
renewed his motion to suppress without stating the grounds for
the motion, and the trial court summarily denied the request.
The jury found Suggs guilty of trafficking in a controlled
substance (marijuana) and being a PFO II and recommended a
seven-year sentence.10
Suggs filed a motion for a new trial that included,
among others things, alleged error in the denial of his earlier
motion to suppress.
Clark as support.
The motion cited the trial testimony of
On October 7, 2002, the trial court conducted
a hearing on sentencing and the new trial motion.
Suggs’s
attorney argued that the affidavit for the search warrant was
insufficient, the Commonwealth should have given the defense
information that Clark’s girlfriend was with him when he was
stopped, and the police used excessive force in executing the
search warrant.
The trial court denied the new trial motion
stating the police had acted properly in executing the search
warrant and the defense had not established that Clark’s
10
Prior to submitting the case to the jury, the Commonwealth had moved
to dismiss the charges of prescription drugs in an improper container
and possession of a police radio, and had moved to amend the original
PFO I charge to PFO II. The trial court also had granted the
defendant’s motion for directed verdict in part by dismissing the
charge of possession of drug paraphernalia.
6
girlfriend would have provided exculpatory evidence.
Suggs was
sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment on trafficking in a
controlled substance (marijuana) and being a PFO II.
This
appeal followed.
On appeal, Suggs first contends the police officers
violated his Fourth Amendment rights in the manner in which they
executed the search warrant.
Suggs questions the actions of the
police in displaying their weapons and ordering the occupants to
get down on the floor.
He asserts that there was no threat or
danger to the police to justify their actions and that their
actions constituted an illegal arrest of him.
With respect to
denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court reviews the
trial court’s factual findings for clear error and the legal
issues de novo.
See Commonwealth v. Whitmore, Ky., 92 S.W.3d
76, 79 (2002); United States v. Miller, 314 F.3d 265, 267 (6th
Cir. 2002).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits unreasonable search and seizures.
See United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85
(1984)(Fourth Amendment protects against both illegal searches
and seizures).
A person whose liberty is restrained by means of
physical force or show of authority and is not free to leave a
residence while officers are conducting a search is “seized” for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
7
See Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 696, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2590-91, 69 L.Ed.2d 340
(1981)(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
Generally, a seizure amounting to an
arrest must be supported by probable cause.
See, e.g., Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).
However, the Supreme Court has held that “a warrant to
search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly
carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of
the premises while a proper search is conducted.”
U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. at 2595.
Summers, 452
Justification for this
incremental intrusion on personal liberty when a search of a
home has been authorized by a valid warrant includes the
substantial law enforcement interest in preventing the flight of
a suspect in the event incriminating evidence is found,
protecting the safety of the officers, and the orderly
completion of the search.
Id. at 703, 101 S.Ct. at 2594.
The Fourth Amendment also protects against the use of
excessive force in the manner of executing a search warrant or
making an arrest or investigatory detention.
Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Ingram v.
City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 596 (6th Cir. 1999).
The right
to make an arrest or investigatory stop, however, necessarily
carries with it the right to use some degree of physical
coercion or threat to affect it.
8
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109
S.Ct. at 1872.
In deciding whether the amount of force was
excessive, courts examine the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the countervailing government interests
justify the intrusion on the person’s Fourth Amendment
interests.
See, e.g., Pray v. City of Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154,
1158 (6th Cir. 1995).
The test is an objective one based on
reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable police
officer on the scene.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. at
1872; Gross v. Pirtle, 245 F.3d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 2001).
Factors relevant to the inquiry include the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to flee or interfere with the
officer’s execution of his duties.
See Graham, supra; Jacobs v.
City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 773 (7th Cir. 2000); Scott v. Clay
County, Tennessee, 205 F.3d 867, 876-77 (6th Cir. 2000).
Suggs’s claim that the police officers used excessive
force in executing the search warrant is unpersuasive.
The
warrant involved a search for drug contraband at a residence
known for drug activity.
The courts have recognized that
weapons are “tools of the trade” for drug traffickers and that
drug dealing is a “crime infused with violence.”
See Clay v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 867 S.W.2d 200, 203 (1993); United
9
States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir. 1999)(quoting United
States v. Gambrell, 178 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir. 1999)).
There were nine persons in the residence at the time
the search warrant was executed.
The police knocked on the
door, were allowed in, and pronounced that they were serving a
search warrant.
Based on Officer Wade’s testimony, the trial
court found that the police feared for their safety and that
Suggs was uncooperative in failing to lie down on the floor and
placing his right hand behind his back several times where it
could not be seen.
Suggs’s assertion that the police officer’s pointing
of their guns at him constituted an arrest is erroneous.
Several courts have held that if the circumstances give use to a
justifiable fear for personal safety, a seizure effectuated with
weapons drawn is proper and does not constitute excessive force
or convert it into an arrest.
See, e.g., Sharrar v. Felsing,
128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1997); Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156
(11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357
(6th Cir. 1986).
Viewing the totality of the circumstances in
this particular case, we believe the trial court’s factual
findings were not clearly erroneous and the police did not use
excessive force and acted reasonably in executing the search
warrant.
10
Suggs also claims the trial court erred in denying him
a new trial because the Commonwealth failed to provide him with
the identity of Clark’s girlfriend.
Suggs contends he was
entitled to this information under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), which
held that due process requires the government to turn over
evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused
and material to guilt or punishment, regardless of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
See also Eldred v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694 (1994).
Impeachment evidence
as well as exculpatory evidence falls within the Brady doctrine.
See United States v. Begley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375,
87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 119
S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); Mounce v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
795 S.W.2d 375 (1990).
Evidence is material if there is a
reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been
different had the evidence been disclosed.
Begley, supra; Kyles
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490
(1995); Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 151 (2001).
In
addition, the evidence must be within the exclusive possession
of the government and not available to the defense in the
exercise of due diligence.
See, e.g., Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d
320, 344 (6th Cir. 1998); Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 80 S.W.3d
405, 410 (2002).
11
The defendant bears the burden of establishing that
the undisclosed evidence was favorable to the accused because it
was exculpatory or impeaching; that it was suppressed by the
government, either willfully or inadvertently; and that
prejudice ensued.
1948.
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282-83; 119 S.Ct. at
With respect to the timing of the disclosure, as long as
the defendant possesses the Brady material in time for its
effective use, the government has not deprived the defendant of
due process simply because it did not produce it sooner.
See
United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Patrick, 965 F.2d 1390, 1400 (6th Cir. 1992); See v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 746 S.W.2d 401 (1988).
Although a new trial
motion usually is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, a trial
court’s denial of a new trial based on an alleged Brady
violation is reviewed de novo.
See United States v. Antonakeas,
255 F.3d 714, 725 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Quintanilla,
193 F.3d 1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 1999).
While Suggs relies on Brady, his claim implicates the
Supreme Court’s decision in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98
S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).
In Franks, the Court
modified the previous rule that any challenge to an affidavit
for a search warrant could be made only to the adequacy of the
matters stated in the affidavit and not the validity of the
contents.
See also Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation,
12
Disputation of Truth of Matters Stated in Affidavit in Support
of Search Warrant—Modern Cases, 24 ALR 4th 1266 (1983).
The
Court recognized a strong presumption of validity for an
affidavit supporting a search warrant and created a narrow rule
of limited scope permitting challenge to the affidavit that
includes both a subjective and objective component.
Franks, 438
U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2682.
In order to obtain even a hearing on the integrity of
the affidavit, a defendant first must make “a substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit.”
56, 98 S.Ct. at 2676-77.11
Id. at 155-
This preliminary showing must be more
than conclusory and must include a detailed offer of proof such
as affidavits or sworn testimony or a satisfactory explanation
for their absence.
Id. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684; United States
v. Anderson, 243 F.3d 478, 482 (8th Cir. 2001).
Second, no hearing is required unless the false
information was necessary or material to issuance of the
warrant, which involves whether the affidavit would be
11
Franks involved only affirmative statements in the affidavit, but
subsequent cases have extended its application to situations of
alleged omissions in the affidavit. See, e.g., United States v.
Atkins, 107 F.3d 1213 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Colkey, 899
F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775 (9th
Cir. 1985).
13
sufficient to establish probable cause if the alleged false
material is redacted or excluded.
98 S.Ct. at 2684-85.
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72,
United Sates v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d
973, 979 (9th Cir. 2002).
If a defendant makes an adequate
preliminary showing for a hearing, he must then satisfy a higher
burden of establishing both of the two elements of falsity and
necessity or materiality by a preponderance of the evidence in
order to justify voiding the search warrant.
at 156, 98 S.Ct. at 2676.
Franks, 438 U.S.
Mere negligence or innocent mistake
is insufficient to void a warrant, and the deliberate falsehood
or reckless disregard involves only that of the affiant and not
any nongovernmental informant.
Id. at 171-72, 98 S.Ct. at 2684-
85.
If the defendant satisfies his burden of proof, then
the evidence gathered pursuant to the warrant must be suppressed
under the exclusionary rule.
Id.; United States v. Graham, 275
F.3d 490, 505 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mick, 263 F.3d
553, 563-64 (6th Cir. 2001).
On appellate review of a trial
court’s decision on suppression under the Franks standard, its
findings on the falsity of statements in the affidavit and the
reckless character of any misrepresentations or omissions are
reviewed for clear error, but its legal conclusion on
materiality is reviewed de novo.
14
See, e.g., United States v.
Elkins, 300 F.3d 638, 649 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 505 (6th Cir. 2001).
Suggs’s challenge to the search warrant based on the
Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the existence of Clark’s
girlfriend fails for several reasons.
First, he relies on the
Brady doctrine, but it is unsettled whether that doctrine even
applies in this situation.
There is a split in the cases on
whether Brady applies to suppression hearings.
See, e.g.,
United States v. Scott, 245 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2001)(discussing
split in cases).
A few courts have applied Brady to information
relevant to a suppression hearing.
See, e.g., Smith v. Black,
904 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lanford, 838 F.2d
1351 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gomez-Orduno, 235 F.3d 453
(9th Cir. 2000).
Only one court has suggested that Brady’s
principles should be applied to suppression hearings involving a
challenge to the truthfulness of allegations in a search warrant
affidavit.
See United States v. Barton, 995 F.2d 931 (9th Cir.
1993)(applying rationale of Franks to use of destruction of
evidence as impeachment evidence for challenge to allegations in
search warrant affidavit).
Two other courts have questioned the application of
Brady to challenges of search warrants under Franks because of
differences in the requirements and the protected interests
involved under the principles established in the two cases.
15
See
Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1990).
For instance,
Brady concerns ensuring due process through fair criminal trials
while protecting the presumption of innocence without regard to
the good or bad faith of the prosecution; whereas, probable
cause does not involve an adjudication of guilt or innocence,
Franks requires a showing of intent by the police affiant and is
based on the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment.
Nevertheless, even if the Brady principles apply to a challenge
to the truthfulness of allegations in a search warrant
affidavit, those principles should be applied consistent with
the requirements and within the framework of Franks, so a
defendant would need to show a reasonable probability that a
failure to disclose favorable evidence would have affected the
outcome of the Franks suppression proceeding.
See, e.g., United
States v. LaRouche Campaign, 695 F.Supp. 1290 (D. Mass.
1988)(stating failure to satisfy Franks rendered Brady claim
insufficient because of failure to establish materiality); Owens
v. United States, 236 F.Supp.2d 122 (D. Mass. 2002)(same).
Assuming that Brady applies to Franks type challenges,
Suggs has not shown the requirements necessary to establish a
due process violation by the Commonwealth’s failure to
affirmatively identify Clark’s girlfriend in discovery.
First,
Suggs has not shown that the girlfriend’s identity was within
16
the exclusive possession of the Commonwealth and not
discoverable by Suggs through due diligence.
Clark obviously
had this information and, although he was unavailable at the
time of the suppression hearing due to his having escaped from
jail, he was available for a period of time prior to trial.
Even though Officers Wade and Smith testified at trial that
there was a female with Clark at the time he was stopped, there
is no evidence that they obtained her name or identity at the
time.
Second, Suggs did become aware of her identity in time
for its effective use through Clark’s trial testimony.
This
information consequently was available for any post-trial
motions and challenges to the search warrant.
As the trial court noted, perhaps the most significant
deficiency in Suggs’s position is his failure to demonstrate that
Clark’s girlfriend possessed and would have provided favorable
material evidence.
“There is no general constitutional right to
discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one . . .
.”
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846,
51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977).
The duty to disclose the identity of a
potential witness is derived from that witnesses’ ability to
provide favorable material evidence.
See, e.g., United States v.
Clark, 988 F.2d 1459 (6th Cir. 1993).
The mere speculation that a
witness may have some evidence helpful to the defendant’s case is
not sufficient to show the need for disclosure.
17
See, e.g.,
United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 1981).
Cf.
United States v. Van Brocklin, 115 F.3d 587, 594 (8th Cir.
1997)(mere application that police file may contain impeaching
information is insufficient).
The fact that Clark provided
testimony impeaching Officer Wade’s search affidavit concerning
his statements to Wade does not establish that his girlfriend
would have provided identical testimony.
Suggs merely assumes
that the girlfriend would corroborate Clark’s testimony.
In addition, even if Clark’s girlfriend could have
provided impeaching testimony, it was not material because it
was not sufficient to have altered the outcome of the
suppression hearing under a Franks analysis.
While Clark’s
trial testimony may have been sufficient to justify a Franks
hearing, see, e.g., State v. Walls, 170 W.Va. 419, 294 S.E.2d
272 (1982), in order to void the warrant, the defendant must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the police officer
deliberately included false material12 statements in the search
warrant affidavit.
At the trial, both Officers Wade and Smith testified
to the truthfulness of the statements in the affidavit.
During
the new trial hearing, the trial court discounted Clark’s
impeachment testimony and reaffirmed its denial of the
12
This court is unable to determine whether the alleged false
statement in the affidavit was material or not because the affidavit
is not included in the appellate record.
18
suppression motion.
The trial court’s credibility assessment is
entitled to great weight.
While a fuller Franks hearing would
have been beneficial, Suggs did not request such a hearing and
did not produce an affidavit or live testimony from Clark’s
girlfriend concerning her purported impeachment evidence.
Under these circumstances, Suggs has not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the search warrant affidavit
contained deliberate falsehoods so as to justify voiding the
search warrant.
See, e.g., State v. Wood, 177 W.Va. 352, 352
S.E.2d 103 (1986)(upholding denial of suppression motion under
Franks where trial court found informants impeaching testimony
not credible); Johnson v. State, 472 N.E.2d 892 (Ind.
1985)(conflicting evidence from police affiant and informant did
not establish falsehood in affidavit); United States v. Brown, 3
F.3d 673 (3d Cir. 1993).
As a result, Suggs has not established
that the undisclosed information was material under Brady in
that the outcome of a Franks hearing would have been different.
Given Suggs’s failure to satisfy his burden of proof under Brady
and Franks, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
denying his motion for a new trial.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Simpson Circuit Court.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
19
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Morris Lowe
Dixie Satterfield
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
N. Susan Roncarti
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
20
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