COMPASS USEAC v. KAYE KENNEDY; HON. BONNIE C. KITTINGER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: May 30, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002192-WC
COMPASS USEAC
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-01-82457
KAYE KENNEDY; HON. BONNIE C. KITTINGER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
Compass USEAC petitions for review of an
opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board that affirmed a
decision of an administrative law judge awarding Kaye Kennedy
permanent partial occupational disability benefits.
We affirm.
Kaye Kennedy was born in 1965, has a ninth grade
education, and has worked primarily in the food service
industry.
She has been employed by Compass since 1997, first as
a prep cook and then as a full cook at a cafeteria operated by
Compass for employees at the Paducah atomic energy plant.
On
April 18, 2000, while placing frozen food stock into a walk-in
freezer, Kennedy slipped and fell on ice injuring her back, hip,
and left leg.
Due to intense pain, she went to the hospital
emergency room where she was given some medication.
Shortly
thereafter, she was referred to Dr. Monte Rommelman, a certified
rehabilitation physician.
Dr. Rommelman examined Kennedy on May 8, 2000, and
reported some tenderness to palpation along the lumbar
paraspinals bilaterally and decreased lumbar flexion greater
than extension.
He noted that a CT scan of her lumbar spine on
April 25, 2000, was negative for fracture or disk herniation.
He prescribed various medications and an outpatient physical
therapy program, and he released her to return to work without
restrictions.
Dr. Rommelman saw Kennedy again on June 6, 2000,
noting some tenderness to palpation over the left sacroiliac
joint.
He diagnosed sacroiliac dysfunction and recommended that
she use a TENS unit and sacroiliac joint belt for support of her
pelvis.
Following Kennedy’s complaint of continued low back
and left leg pain, Dr. Rommelman administered three sacroiliac
joint cortisone injections on September 7, 2000, October 24,
2000, and April 27, 2001, which provided only temporary relief.
On July 11, 2001, Kennedy went to Dr. Rommelman indicating her
pain had become much more severe, so he placed her back in a
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physical therapy program with three weeks off work.
On August
1, 2001, Dr. Rommelman released Kennedy to work with
restrictions of lifting no more than 20 pounds occasionally or
10 pounds frequently, no repetitive twisting, bending or
stooping, and no prolonged standing or walking.
In follow-up
visits in August and October 2001, Kennedy continued to complain
of low back pain with minimal relief from the physical therapy
program, the TENS unit, and the sacroiliac belt.
returned to work performing only light duty tasks.
Kennedy
When she
could not perform the lighter work, she was assigned to
bookkeeping duties but left her job because she was not educated
or qualified for that type of work.
Prior to the April 2000 incident, Kennedy had been
treated by Dr. William Hogancamp, a neurologist, in 1999-2000
for a variety of conditions including low back and left leg pain
with an unknown etiology.
Dr. Hogancamp’s notes indicate that
Kennedy had developed significant low back pain with radicular
left leg pain in September 1999, which moderated with
medication.
On April 10, 2000, eight days before Kennedy fell,
Dr. Hogancamp diagnosed low back pain with left sacroiliitis and
recommended physical therapy and a referral for pain management
treatment.
Kennedy decided not to pursue pain management at
that time.
However, on April 25, 2000, following her fall, she
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notified Dr. Hogancamp’s office that she needed a referral for
pain management treatment.
On July 27, 2001, Kennedy was evaluated by Dr.
Theodore Davis, a neurosurgeon, upon referral by Compass.
His
examination revealed straight leg raising unrestricted on the
right to about 80°, but Kennedy expressed pain after 60° on the
left and resisted any dorsiflexion of the foot.
She tired with
plantar flexion on the left, but her sensation was intact.
Dr.
Davis’ diagnosis was lumbar strain and lumbar radiculitis.
He
saw Kennedy again on August 14, 2001, and noted that an
examination indicated she was able to perform straight leg
raising “fairly well with no gross weakness.”
A subsequent
lumbar myelogram conducted at his request was normal with no
evidence of disk herniation.
Dr. Davis recommended that Kennedy
remain in sedentary work.
In September 2001, Kennedy filed an application for
injury claim involving the April 18, 2000, fall.
On November
15, 2001, Dr. Monte Rommelman was deposed and stated that based
on reasonable medical probability, Kennedy’s lower back injury
was causally related to the April 2000 slip and fall.
He
assessed a 5% whole person impairment under the American Medical
Association Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
(Guides) based upon a diagnosis of sacroiliac dysfunction with
persistent pain.
Dr. Rommelman stated that although different
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from his diagnosis, Dr. Davis’ diagnosis of lumbar radiculitis
would also result in an impairment rating of 5-8% under the AMA
Guides.
During cross-examination, Kennedy’s attorney objected
when Compass’ attorney attempted to question Dr. Rommelman about
Dr. Hogancamp’s treatment of Kennedy for her back complaints
prior to the April 2000 incident because Compass had not
provided him with Dr. Hogancamp’s medical records as required by
803 Kentucky Administrative Regulation (KAR) 25:010 Section
5(4).1
Dr. Rommelman went on to testify that he was unaware of
Dr. Hogancamp’s prior treatment and that he believed Dr.
Hogancamp would be the best person to determine whether
Kennedy’s condition worsened or changed after her fall.
Dr.
Rommelman also said Dr. Hogancamp’s description of Kennedy’s
condition was consistent with the type of complaints she had
voiced to him.
Kennedy’s counsel orally moved to strike this
testimony.
In his deposition taken on January 2, 2002, Dr.
Hogancamp stated that Kennedy complained of lower back pain
beginning in September 1999 and had exhibited percussion
tenderness and some muscle spasms on the left side.
1
She also
803 KAR 25:010 Section 5(4) provides that any party obtaining
medical records shall serve a copy of the records upon all other
parties within 10 days following their receipt.
5
reported experiencing severe back pain after twisting her back
in October 1999, which was treated with pain medication.
An
examination of Kennedy on April 10, 2000, eight days prior to
her fall, also suggested tenderness in the left sacroiliac
region.
Dr. Hogancamp testified that Kennedy’s complaints to
Dr. Rommelman were similar to those she made to him and that
their diagnoses of sacroiliac dysfunction and sacroiliitis were
similar.
On cross-examination, Dr. Hogancamp admitted that he
had never placed restrictions on her work activity or treated
her with cortisone injections or a TENS unit.
His last
examination of Kennedy on June 9, 2000, indicated some
tenderness in the left sacroiliac region.
Dr. Hogancamp stated
that based on information received from Kennedy, he “understood”
that her condition had worsened after the April 2000 incident.
On January 22, 2002, the ALJ conducted a hearing at
which Kennedy acknowledged she had been treated for lower back
pain by Dr. Hogancamp prior to the April 2000 incident, but
stated that the pain was different and more severe after her
fall.
She testified that her prior problems had not affected
her ability to work, but that after she fell she was unable to
perform even the light duty work she had been assigned to
perform.
Kennedy stated she had not missed any work for her
back or hip problems prior to the fall.
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On March 22, 2002, the ALJ issued an opinion awarding
Kennedy permanent partial disability benefits commensurate with
a 5% functional impairment rating and appropriate multiplier
under KRS 342.230(1)(c)(1).
The ALJ relied extensively on the
testimony of Kennedy and Dr. Rommelman and, to a lesser degree,
on the testimony of Dr. Davis.
As part of the opinion, the ALJ
sustained the objection and motion to strike raised by Kennedy’s
attorney during Dr. Rommelman’s deposition and stated she would
not consider his responses to the questions regarding Dr.
Hogencamp’s treatment of Kennedy.
The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s
decision despite disagreeing with her handling of the procedural
issue.
It stated that the ALJ should have ruled on the
objection raised in Dr. Rommelman’s deposition prior to
submission of the case for a decision and allowed Compass an
opportunity to correct any procedural inadequacy without
prejudicing the other party if possible prior to submission.
Nevertheless, the Board believed that the ALJ’s ruling
constituted harmless error because the testimony would not have
affected the ultimate decision of the ALJ.
This petition for
review by Compass followed.
Compass argues that the award of benefits must be
reversed because the ALJ’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence.
It also claims that its right to due
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process was denied because the ALJ failed to consider the crossexamination testimony of Dr. Rommelman.
See, e.g., Union
Underwear Co., Inc. v. Scearce, Ky., 896 S.W.2d 7, 9 (1995).
This latter complaint is predicated on the ALJ’s handling of the
objection and motion to strike during Dr. Rommelman’s
deposition.
This issue was rendered moot, however, because the
Board found the ALJ erred but that the error was harmless.
We
agree with the Board that the ALJ should have made a ruling on
the objection and given Compass an opportunity to correct its
failure to comply with the discovery rules.
For instance,
Compass could have been allowed to cross-examine Dr. Rommelman
at a later date at its expense after Kennedy’s counsel had been
provided Dr. Hogancamp’s medical records.
In any event, the primary issue is whether the Board
erred in holding that the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence even in light of Dr. Rommelman’s crossexamination testimony.
causation.
Compass questions the evidence on
As Compass correctly points out, the claimant bears
the burden of proving by substantial evidence every essential
element of a claim.
Burton v. Foster Wheeler Corp., Ky., 72
S.W.3d 925, 928 (2002); Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, Ky., 19 S.W.3d
88, 96 (2000).
Among those elements are that a work-related
injury proximately caused the impairment resulting in
occupational disability, see, e.g., Jones v. Newberg, Ky., 890
8
S.W.2d 284 (1994); KRS 342.0011(1) and (11), and the extent and
duration of the injury, see Stovall v. Collett, Ky. App., 671
S.W.2d 256 (1984); Codell Const. Co. v. Dixon, Ky., 478 S.W.2d
703 (1972).
fact-finder.
Causation is a factual issue to be decided by the
Coleman v. Emily Enterprises, Inc., Ky., 58 S.W.3d
459, 462 (2001).
In addition, a claimant must establish an “injury,”
which includes showing harmful change in the human organism
evidenced by “objective medical findings,” defined as
“information gained through direct observation and testing of
the patient applying objective or standardized methods.”
342.0011(33).
KRS
A claimant’s complaints of symptoms alone are not
objective medical findings as defined by statute, but rather,
they must be confirmed by direct observation or standardized
tests.
Gibbs v. Premier Scale Co./Indiana Scale Co., 50 S.W.3d
754 (2001).
The existence of a compensable injury may be shown
with either direct evidence in the form of objective medical
findings or indirectly through information gained by direct
observation and/or testing applying objective or standardized
methods demonstrating the existence of symptoms of a harmful
change.
Id. at 762-63; Staples, Inc. v. Konvelski, Ky., 56
S.W.3d 412 (2001).
Although KRS 342.0011(1) clearly requires
that there be objective medical findings of a harmful change in
the human organism in order for that change to be compensable,
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it does not require causation to be proved by objective medical
findings.
See Konvelski, 56 S.W.3d at 415; Ryan’s Family
Steakhouse v. Thomason, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 889, 894 (2002).
As the fact-finder, the ALJ has the authority to
determine the quality, character, and substance of the evidence.
Burton, 72 S.W.3d at 928; Square D Co. v. Tipton, Ky., 862
S.W.2d 308, 309 (1993).
Similarly, the ALJ has the sole
authority to determine the weight and inferences to be drawn
from the evidence.
Miller v. East Kentucky Beverage/PepsiCo,
Inc., Ky., 951 S.W.2d 329, 331 (1997); Luttrell v. Cardinal
Aluminum Co., Ky. App., 909 S.W.2d 334, 336 (1995).
The fact-
finder also may reject any testimony and believe or disbelieve
various parts of the evidence even if it came from the same
witness.
Magic Coal, 19 S.W.3d at 96; Whittaker v. Rowland,
Ky., 998 S.W.2d 479, 481 (1999).
When the decision of the fact-finder is in favor of
the party with the burden of proof, the issue on appeal is
whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,
which is defined as some evidence of substance and consequence
sufficient to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable
people.
Transportation Cabinet v. Poe, Ky., 69 S.W.3d 60, 62
(2001); Rowland, 998 S.W.2d at 481-82.
A party challenging the
ALJ’s factual findings must do more than present evidence
supporting a contrary conclusion to justify reversal.
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Poe,
supra; Ira A. Watson Dep’t Store v. Hamilton, Ky., 34 S.W.3d 48,
52 (2000).
Upon review of the Board’s decision, the appellate
court’s function is limited to correcting the Board only where
it has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so
flagrant as to cause gross injustice.
Western Baptist Hospital
v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687 (1992); Phoenix Manufacturing
Co. v. Johnson, Ky., 69 S.W.3d 64, 67 (2002).
Compass contends that Kennedy failed to present
substantial evidence of causation.
It asserts that the
overwhelming medical evidence indicates that her current
“complaints” existed prior to the April 2000 fall.
argument misses the point.
This
Kennedy readily admits that she
suffered some lower back and left leg pain prior to her fall.
The issue is whether her condition was different in either
nature or degree resulting in an impairment rating following the
injury.
Compass’ focus on the generic similarity in the
complaints expressed by Kennedy ignores the other evidence
indicating a change in Kennedy’s condition.
For example,
Kennedy testified that the pain was different and more intense,
preventing her from performing her previous duties, which
testimony the ALJ found credible.
The ALJ also pointed out that
Kennedy had never been assessed an impairment rating, been given
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work restrictions, or been taken off work because of her
condition prior to the injury.
Both Dr. Rommelman and Dr. Davis
assessed a 5% functional impairment and restricted Kennedy to
light duty work after the April 2000 incident.
Prior to her
fall, Kennedy eschewed pain management treatment, but
subsequently she sought such treatment and used a TENS unit and
a sacroiliac joint belt.
Compass’ citation to the absence of abnormalities in
the CT scans and myelogram after the April 2000 incident is
unpersuasive.
As noted earlier, causation need not be proven by
objective medical findings.
Nonetheless, even though the
sophisticated diagnostic tests were normal, both Drs. Rommelman
and Davis noted decreased range of motion and Dr. Rommelman
reported muscle spasms.
Although not extensive, these findings
based on direct observation were sufficient to constitute
objective medical findings supporting Kennedy’s complaints.
See
Konvoleski, supra.
Compass’ reliance on the testimony of Dr. Rommelman
and Dr. Hogancamp likewise is misplaced.
While Dr. Rommelman
deferred to Dr. Hogancamp as to the existence of a change of
condition, Dr. Hogancamp’s testimony is equivocal.
He saw
Kennedy only once after the April 2000 incident and his notes
indicate that Kennedy told him her lower back problems had
worsened.
Dr. Hogancamp was not asked for and did not express
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an opinion on whether Kennedy’s problems after the April 2000
incident were attributable to a pre-existing injury or the fall.
See, e.g., Robertson v. United Parcel Service, Ky., 64 S.W.3d
284 (2002)(physician who examined claimant before and after
work-related injury reported pre-existing impairment rating and
no objective evidence of changed condition).
He merely stated
that she had similar complaints, but he added that it was his
understanding that her condition had worsened.
We agree with
the Board that Dr. Hogancamp’s testimony was not conclusive, but
rather it only raised an inference subject to resolution by the
ALJ.
In light of the entire record, we believe the ALJ’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence and the Board did
not overlook or misconstrue controlling law or commit a flagrant
error in assessing the evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the opinion of
the Workers’ Compensation Board.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Lyn A. Douglas
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, Kaye
Kennedy:
Rodger W. Lofton
Paducah, Kentucky
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