COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. JOSHUA W. BAILEY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
October 24, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2002-CA-002172-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ALLEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HARRIS, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 01-CR-00068
v.
JOSHUA W. BAILEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, Chief Judge; McANULTY, Judge and HUDDLESTON,
Senior Judge.1
HUDDLESTON, Senior Judge:
from
Circuit
Court
order
incriminating
statements
that
Bailey
based
its
1
an
Allen
The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals
upon
conclusion
that
suppressing
made
on
a
March
“[b]ecause
of
series
1,
of
2001,
[Josh’s]
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge
by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b)
of the Kentucky Constitution and Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 21.580.
substantial intellectual limitations, based upon the totality of
the
circumstances,
his
will
was
overborne
by
his
limited
intellect and therefore[,] the statements” were not voluntary.
Sometime prior to March 1, 2001, Detective Steve Woods
spoke with Bailey while investigating an allegation of sexual
abuse
against
a
child.
During
their
initial
conversation,
Bailey denied any involvement and agreed to undergo a polygraph
examination.
Detective Woods arranged for Bailey to be examined
in Madisonville, Kentucky, a couple of weeks later.
However,
when Detective Woods went to Bailey’s residence a couple of days
prior to the date of the scheduled examination (March 1, 2001),
Bailey told him that he had changed his mind and no longer
wanted to take the examination at which point Detective Woods
returned
to
his
office.
Approximately
thirty
to
forty-five
minutes later, Bailey called Detective Woods and agreed to go to
Madisonville and take the examination.
On March 1, 2001, Bailey arrived at the Allen County
Sheriff’s
Department
Foster
then
Bruner,
a
at
transported
civilian
the
designated
Bailey
employee
of
to
the
time.
Sheriff
Madisonville2
Kentucky
Bill
where
John
State
Police,
administered the examination to Bailey twice after explaining
2
Both parties agree that the drive from Allen County to
Madisonville takes approximately two hours.
2
the process and informing him of his rights pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona.3
Upon
being
questioned
regarding
his
rights,
Bailey
gave responses indicating that he did not fully comprehend their
meaning.
Although Sheriff Foster was not present during the
examination, he witnessed Bruner inform Bailey of his rights
before exiting the premises.4
It is undisputed that Bailey had
not incriminated himself prior to the examination.
Immediately following the examination, Bruner informed
Bailey
that
implications
he
of
had
failed
negative
test
both
tests
results
to
and
explained
the
Bruner
then
him.5
proceeded to question Bailey.
Upon being confronted with the
accusation
tell
that
he
did
not
the
truth,
Bailey
made
incriminating statements, admitting to sexual abuse of the minor
victim for the first time.
Bailey
had
not
performed
Bruner informed Sheriff Foster that
well
on
the
examination
outside
of
Bailey’s presence before their departure but did not elaborate.
On the ride back to Allen County, Bailey was pensive
for quite awhile but ultimately asked Sheriff Foster what he
3
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966).
4
According to Sheriff Foster, Bruner goes into great detail
in explaining an individual’s rights.
5
In the court’s view, Bruner became an “accusatory cop” at
that point and the examination became a non-custodial
interrogation.
3
should do next.
he
did
not
In response, Sheriff Foster advised Bailey that
know
because
“only
you
know
the
truth”
but,
“apparently, you did not do well on the polygraph” and if you
have
“something
Detective
Woods
more
when
to
we
tell”
return
then
to
you
should
Scottsville
“get
and
“get
with”
this
thing straightened out” because apparently, “there’s something
in your mind that’s still there.”
Sheriff Foster then radioed
Detective Woods at the Sheriff’s Department and, using police
radio jargon, told him to stand by until they returned because
he needed to meet with him.6
Following a lengthy silence, Bailey
volunteered that he might have “laid it on her leg,” but still
denied penetrating the victim as alleged.
Upon their arrival at the parking lot of the Sheriff’s
Department,
Bailey,
who
was
still
not
in
custody,
followed
Sheriff Foster into the building without further discussion and
took a seat in the lobby.
behind
the
private.
front
counter
Detective Woods then emerged from
and
spoke
with
Sheriff
Foster
in
At that time, Sheriff Foster informed Detective Woods
that Bailey had failed the polygraph examination, relayed the
incriminating statement that Bailey made to him en route back
6
Detective Woods had called Bruner to inquire as to whether
Bailey had passed the polygraph examination and learned that
Bailey had failed both of the tests.
4
and
indicated
that
Bailey
seemed
to
want
to
talk
to
him.
Sheriff Foster then left the premises.
After greeting him in the lobby, Detective Woods led
Bailey through the “half door” and into his office.
When Bailey
confirmed that he wanted to talk with Detective Woods, he read
Bailey his rights directly from the “Miranda rights form” used
by the Allen County Sheriff’s Department and Bailey signed a
waiver of those rights.7
Detective Woods then obtained Bailey’s
consent
interview
to
record
the
on
audio
tape.
Although
Detective Woods read Bailey’s rights to him directly from the
form again once the tape began, he failed to read the waiver
portion of the form a second time.
Detective
Woods
appropriate
Bailey
made
given
viewed
the
Bailey’s
responses
circumstances.
incriminating
Based on his experience,
statements,
and
During
as
a
demeanor
the
result
as
interview,8
of
which
Detective Woods placed Bailey under arrest, charged him with
first-degree sexual abuse and took him into custody.
In an indictment handed up on June 12, 2001, the Allen
County Grand Jury charged that “on or about October 8th 2000, in
Allen County, Kentucky, [Bailey] committed the offense of First7
Detective Woods admitted knowing that Bailey could not
read.
8
Detective Woods conducted the interview while sitting in
his desk chair with Bailey sitting across from him in the
visitor’s chair.
5
degree Sexual Abuse by having sexual contact with a minor less
than 12 years of age, . . .”
On June 12, 2002, Bailey filed a
“motion to suppress and to schedule hearing” seeking to suppress
“any
and
all
statements,
oral
or
written,
or
recorded
by
audiotape, made by Joshua Bailey without [the] benefit of having
counsel present.”
that
he
has
“an
As grounds for his motion, Bailey asserted
extremely
diminished
mental
capacity,
was
a
special education student in the Allen County School System, and
functions
on
a
1st
grade
level.”
Consequently,
“there
is
absolutely no way in which [he] understood his Miranda rights on
or
about
March
1,
2001,
or
would
have
understood
the
implications of statements made by him while traveling to and
from
Madisonville,
Kentucky
for
purposes
of
undergoing
a
polygraph examination.”
At the suppression hearing on September 20, 2002,
the
testimony of Sheriff Foster and Detective Woods was consistent
with the foregoing factual summary.
Bailey presented expert
testimony from Patricia Guthrie who was formerly employed as the
Assistant Superintendent for Student Services of Warren County
Schools.9
According to her report, Bailey has an IQ of 50 and is
9
Guthrie has a B.A. in Social Studies/English from the
George Peabody College for Teachers, an M.A. in
Education/Counseling from Western Kentucky University and an
Ed.S. from WKU in Education/Psychology. She currently works as
a consultant.
6
properly
classified
as
“moderately
mentally
disabled.”
His
overall functioning is “equal to or better than .07 percent of
individuals his age” and his achievement test scores “indicate
that for the most part, he is working academically at a first
grade level.”
With respect to adaptive behavior, Bailey was
rated “as being only slightly deficient in all measured areas
compared
to
age
peers.”
Based
on
her
experience
and
professional judgment, Guthrie concluded that Bailey “does not
have the mental capacity to understand the Miranda [r]ights, nor
does he have the personal reasoning and social judgment required
to make an informed decision of this nature.”
Prior to the hearing, the court viewed the video tape
of the polygraph examination and listened to the audio tape of
the confession.
In an order entered on October 9, 2002, the
court made the following findings of fact regarding whether the
confessions at issue were voluntary:10
10
Before addressing the coercion issue, the court found that
Bailey was not in custody and his “freedom of movement was not
curtailed” at any point prior to his arrest on the day in
question and, therefore, Miranda did not apply. As Bailey has
not appealed from this ruling, we need not address the Miranda
issue. “Thus, for purposes of this appeal, [Bailey’s]
understanding of his Miranda rights is relevant only as part of
the totality of the circumstances relevant to questions of due
process.” Rogers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 86 S.W.3d 29, 35 (2002).
In addition to the court’s written findings of fact, we
have also viewed the video tape of the hearing including the
more detailed verbal findings made by the court at its
conclusion.
7
1.
age
Josh Bailey is a young man of 19 years of
with
no
prior
substantially
criminal
limited.
His
experience
limited
who
is
intellectual
functioning [is] borne out by the Court’s observation
of his behavior in court and on the polygraph video,
and is confirmed by the testimony of Mrs. Pat Guthrie
and the contents of his psychological evaluation and
school records.
Josh Bailey functions essentially at
the level of a first grade child who cannot read or
write.
2.
At no time on March 1, 2001, was Josh Bailey
subjected to any kind of physical duress or coercion,
there was no deprivation of food or water, there were
no
threats
of
physical
harm,
there
was
no
sleep
deprivation, and his limited capacity, whatever that
might be, was not influenced by any drugs or alcohol.
3.
During preliminary conversations between the
polygraph
denied
examiner
touching
and
the
Josh
young
Bailey,
girl
he
consistently
sexually.
When
explaining how the entire process of the exam would
work[,] Josh’s heart [rate would increase], his palms
would
sweat,
and
his
muscles
would
clench.
When
confronted with the results and the accusation by the
examiner
that
Josh
did
8
not
tell
the
truth,
the
polygraph
exam
change[d]
to
an
accusatory
police
interrogation.
4.
When
confronted
with
the
accusation
by
an
authority figure coupled with limited intellect, Josh
Bailey began to adapt his behavior in conformity with
the testimony by Mrs. Guthrie as to how someone with
limited
intellectual
functioning
behaves
in
such
situations.
5.
The entire process:
the trip to and from
Madisonville, Kentucky, the polygraph examination and
accusatory
Det.
Woods,
interrogation,
was
coercive
and
the
given
interrogation
[Bailey’s]
by
limited
intellectual capacity.
Based on these findings, the court concluded that all
of the incriminating statements Bailey made on March 1, 2001,
were coerced and therefore involuntary, acknowledging that the
facts presented a “close question.”
In a motion to reconsider
filed on September 26, 2002, the Commonwealth argued that the
court had erred by applying a subjective standard in reaching
this determination, citing the “objective standard” set forth in
Henson v. Commonwealth11 in support of its position.
Further,
“whether [Bailey] actually confessed, rather than just adapting
11
Ky., 20 S.W.3d 466 (1999).
9
his answers to please the police, goes to the weight of the
evidence
instead
application
of
of
an
its
admissibility.”
objective
standard
In
would
its
view,
result
in
a
“different decision on the coercion factor,” leaving Bailey’s
limited intellect as the remaining factor upon which the court
relied and “mental condition alone is not enough of an obstacle”
to prevent “the Commonwealth from meeting its burden considering
the totality of the circumstances.”
Having
Bailey’s
considered
response,
the
court
the
Commonwealth’s
remained
motion
convinced
that
it
and
had
“properly applied the law” in both its verbal ruling and written
order and, accordingly, denied the motion in an order entered on
October 9, 2002.
On appeal, the Commonwealth’s arguments echo
those made below.
Our standard when reviewing a circuit court decision
on a suppression motion following a hearing is twofold.
First,
“the factual findings of the circuit court are conclusive if
they
are
evidence
supported
sufficient
is
to
by
evidence
induce
substantial
of
substance
conviction
people.
‘It
is
within
determine
the
credibility
in
evidence.”12
and
relevant
the
minds
the
province
of
witnesses
12
“Substantial
of
and
the
the
of
consequence
reasonable
fact-finder
weight
to
to
be
Commonwealth v. Whitmore, Ky., 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (2002); Ky.
R. Crim. P. (RCr) 9.78.
10
given the evidence.’”13
supported
by
Second, “when the findings of fact are
substantial
evidence,
the
question
then
becomes
whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is
violated.”14
However,
the
“issue
question of law and fact.”15
conflicting
voluntary,
testimony
“its
credibility,
voluntariness
is
a
mixed
When the trial court is faced with
regarding
determination,
if
conclusive.”16
of
supported
whether
a
by
is
its
including
confession
evaluation
of
evidence,
is
substantial
Here, the testimony and reports of the parties’
respective witnesses, if believed, as well as the video tape of
the
polygraph
confession,
examination
constitute
and
the
substantial
court’s factual findings.
audio
tape
evidence
to
of
Bailey’s
support
the
Because the Commonwealth is arguing
that the court misapplied the law to those facts, our review is
de novo.17
To determine whether a confession is the result
of
coercion,
one
must
look
at
the
totality
of
the
13
Cole v. Gilvin, Ky. App., 59 S.W.3d 468, 472
(2001)(citation omitted).
14
Whitmore, supra, n. 12, at 79.
15
Henson, supra, n. 11, at 469.
16
Id.
17
Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Transp. Cabinet, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 488, 490 (1998).
11
circumstances
to
assess
whether
police
obtained
evidence by overbearing the defendant’s will through
making credible threats.
assess
voluntariness
activity
was
The three criteria used to
are
“objectively
1)
whether
coercive;”
2)
the
police
whether
the
coercion overbore the will of the defendant; and 3)
whether the defendant showed that the coercive police
activity
was
the
“crucial
motivating
factor”
behind
the defendant’s confession.18
As correctly observed by the Commonwealth, the first
inquiry
is
dispositive
separately.
Absent
and
each
confession
“objectively
must
coercive”
be
analyzed
activity,
the
analysis ends and, particularly significant here, “low IQ alone
is
an
insufficient
involuntary.”19
basis
for
finding
the
statement
was
Said another way:
“[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate
to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth
Amendment,”;
and
although
a
defendant’s
mental condition is a significant factor to consider
in
determining
voluntariness,
“this
fact
does
not
18
Henson, supra, n. 11, at 469 (internal citations omitted).
19
Holloman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 37 S.W.3d 764, 769 (2001).
12
justify
a
conclusion
that
a
defendant’s
mental
condition by itself and apart from its relation to
official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry
into constitutional ‘voluntariness.’”20
Rather,
investigating
violence
or
the
relevant
officers
other
suspect’s will.’”21
coerced
deliberate
inquiry
is
whether
the
the
confession
by
“’physical
means
calculated
to
break
the
Despite specifically finding that none of
the traditional, objective indications of coercion were present
in
the
instant
case,
the
court
concluded
that
the
“entire
process” was coercive given Bailey’s “limited intellect.”
reaching
this
interrogation
any
conclusion,
pivotal,
wrongdoing
and
the
observing
did
not
court
that
deemed
Bailey
incriminate
In
the
first
initially
denied
himself
until
he
was
confronted with the accusation that he had not been truthful by
“an authority figure” (Bruner), which was consistent with the
adaptive behavior characteristic of someone with his disability.
Recently,
argument
that
coercion
merely
an
the
Kentucky
interrogation
because
a
Supreme
Court
rejected
constituted
“mentally
retarded”
the
impermissible
defendant
20
was
Price v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d 885, 890 (2000),
citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S. Ct. 515,
522, 93 L. Ed.2d 473 (1986).
21
Rogers, supra, n. 10, at 35 (citation omitted).
13
confronted by officers with the questionable “fact” that he had
“lied”
during
a
polygraph
examination.22
As
the
same
circumstances are presented here, the same outcome necessarily
follows.
Further, it is unreasonable for a suspect to assume
that he will not be informed of polygraph readings and asked to
explain any unfavorable results.23
While the burden is on the
Commonwealth to prove that Bailey’s waiver was voluntary, “where
the
defendant
initiated
contact
with
the
examiner,
did
not
request any restrictions upon the questioning, and waived [his]
right to counsel (along with other constitutional rights) in a
written and signed form, that burden has been met.”24
Such is
the case here.
Again
emphasizing
his
limited
intellect,
the
court
went on to observe that Bailey began “to slide down the slope at
that point.”
However, the court is required to consider “not
only factors surrounding the mental status of the accused, but
also how those factors relate to the police tactics utilized
during the interrogation.”25
As applied to confessions and for
purposes of due process, then, “the term ‘involuntary’ should be
construed to refer not to some property a defendant’s confession
22
Id. at 36.
23
Powell v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 994 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1997).
24
Rogers, supra, n. 10, at 36.
25
Id. at 35.
14
may be said in itself to have or lack, but rather to a certain
relation between the confession and the method or conduct of law
enforcement officials in procuring it.”26
In the instant case,
that relationship is lacking.
Bailey does not contend nor did the court find that
Burner, Sheriff Foster or Detective Woods coerced his confession
by physical intimidation or threats.
To the contrary, the court
explicitly found that “in no way” did any of the aforementioned
authority figures act improperly.
relies
upon
the
“psychological
Instead, Bailey essentially
coercion”
inherent
in
the
polygraph examination and interrogations, and the court agreed
that, under the “totality of the circumstances,” specifically
Bailey’s limited intellect, his “will was overborne” meaning his
incriminating
“objectively
impossible
statements
coercive
to
satisfy
were
coerced.
behavior,”
the
second
Absent
however,
and
it
third
the
is
required
necessarily
criteria.
With
respect to the conversation Bailey initiated with Sheriff Foster
and his subsequent confession to Detective Woods, the fact that
he re-opened the dialogue with authorities while not in custody,
although not determinative, is among the circumstances to be
considered and weighs in favor of the Commonwealth’s position.27
26
United States v. Newman, 889 F.2d 88, 95 (6th Cir. 1989).
27
See Haynes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 948 (1983), and
Denny v. Commonwealth, Ky., 670 S.W.2d 847 (1984).
15
To summarize:
Threshold to the determination that a confession was
“involuntary”
for
due
process
purposes
is
the
requirement that the police “extorted [the confession]
from the accused by means of coercive activity.” . .
.Once it is established that the police activity was
objectively
coercive,
[Bailey’s]
subjective
it
is
state
necessary
of
mind
to
to
examine
determine
whether the “coercion” in question was sufficient to
overbear
the
[Bailey]
must
will
of
prove
the
that
accused.
his
.
will
.
.Finally,
was
overborne
because of the coercive police activity in question.
If the police misconduct at issue was not the “crucial
motivating
factor”
behind
[Bailey’s]
decision
to
confess, the confession may not be suppressed. . . .28
Bailey does not allege, let alone demonstrate, that
his confession was in any way attributable to police misconduct.
While his mental capacity is a factor to consider in assessing
the voluntariness of his confession, standing alone, it is not
determinative.29
A review of the record does not reveal any
attempt by the investigating officers to “take advantage” of
28
Newman, supra, n. 26, at 95 (citation omitted).
29
Rogers, supra, n. 10, at 37.
16
Bailey’s
low
intelligence.30
“Even
if
all
doubts
regarding
[Bailey’s] mental condition were resolved in his favor, that
conclusion would still be legally insufficient to establish that
[his] statements were involuntary.”31
Because the “necessary predicate” of “coercive police
activity”
Bailey’s
is
lacking,
“subjective
the
state
court
of
mind”
sufficient to overbear his will.
close
question,
there
is
erred
in
rendered
the
order
the
that
“coercion”
Although we agree that it is a
nothing
inherently
coercive about the police activity at issue.
determination,
concluding
suppressing
or
objectively
In light of this
Bailey’s
confession
is
reversed and this case is remanded to Allen Circuit Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Dennis Stutsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Clint G. Willis
Special Assistant
Attorney General
Franklin, Kentucky
30
Id.
31
Newman, supra, n. 26, at 95.
17
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.