JASON CHAPMAN v. KENTUCKY STATE UNIVERSITY
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RENDERED:
October 3, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002124-MR
JASON CHAPMAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-01237
v.
KENTUCKY STATE UNIVERSITY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, JOHNSON AND PAISLEY, JUDGES.
PAISLEY, JUDGE.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment
entered by the Franklin Circuit Court dismissing a former
employee’s racial discrimination claim against Kentucky State
University (KSU).
For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
Appellant Jason Chapman was first employed by KSU on
February 28, 1994, as a parking and traffic control officer.
Some nine months later, he was promoted to the position of KSU
police officer.
Chapman was placed on paid suspension on August
28, 1997, after he was involved in the arrest of eight KSU
students.
He remained on suspended status until his one-year
appointment ended and was not renewed on June 30, 1998.
Chapman, a Caucasian, then filed this action alleging
that KSU violated the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA), KRS
344.010 et seq., by racially discriminating against him as to
the terms, conditions, compensation and privileges of his
employment.
The Franklin Circuit Court granted KSU’s motion for
summary judgment, finding that Chapman failed to satisfy his
burden of establishing a prima facie case of reverse
discrimination.
This appeal followed.
Chapman insists that his claim is not a reverse
discrimination case.
However, we are not persuaded by this
assertion, since the term “reverse discrimination” simply refers
to a claim in which, as here, “a white employee alleges to be
the victim of discrimination.”
45A Am.Jur.2d Job Discrimination
§ 121, at 242 (2002).
Issues concerning the KCRA and alleged reverse racial
discrimination were recently addressed in Jefferson County v.
Zaring, Ky., 91 S.W.3d 583 (2002).
There, the supreme court
noted that because the KCRA “was enacted in 1966 to implement in
Kentucky the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964,” and because the
provisions of the two acts are “virtually identical,” we must
give consideration to federal courts’ interpretation of the
federal act.
Zaring noted that the following tripartite
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analysis has been established for reviewing claims of employment
discrimination based on race:
“First, the plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. Second, if the
plaintiff carries his initial burden, the burden
shifts to the defendant to ‘articulate some
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason’ for the
challenged workplace decision. Third, if the
defendant carries this burden, the plaintiff has
an opportunity to prove that the legitimate
reasons the defendant offered were merely a
pretext for discrimination.”
Zaring, id. at 590 (quoting Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971
F.2d 585, 588 (10th Cir. 1992), citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668
(1973)).
Zaring further quoted McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, in noting that the first portion of a
plaintiff’s burden, that of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination, may be satisfied
“by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant’s qualifications.”
91 S.W.3d at 590-91.
This analysis framework “must be
appropriately adjusted” in reverse discrimination cases which
result from affirmative action plans.
Id. at 591.
Thus, in a
reverse discrimination claim, the first prong of a prima facie
case “’is established upon a showing that background
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circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant is that
unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.’”
Id.
at 591 (quoting Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770
F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985)).
The second prong of a prima facie
reverse discrimination case is established upon a showing “that
the employer treated differently employees who were similarly
situated but not members of a protected class.”
Pierce v.
Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 (6th Cir.
1994).
See also Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. College, 314 F.3d
249 (6th Cir. 2002).
Here, we are not persuaded that Chapman satisfied his
initial burden of establishing that a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to whether he could establish a prima facie case
of discrimination.
Chapman asserts that he met his burden of
proving that KSU is “that unusual employer who discriminates
against the majority,” Murray, 770 F.2d at 67 (citations
omitted), by showing both that KSU is a “historically Black
institution,” and that all of his supervisors were AfricanAmericans.
However, Chapman admitted in his deposition below
that after his employment ended, his position was subsequently
filled by two different Caucasian individuals.
Further, it is
undisputed that when the employment of Chapman’s
African-American supervisor ended, a Caucasian was hired for
that position.
Simply put, the record shows that Chapman raised
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no allegations which, even if proven true, would support a
suspicion that KSU is “that unusual employer who discriminates
against the majority.”
Moreover, we are not persuaded that Chapman
established that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether KSU rendered different treatment to “employees who were
similarly situated but not members of a protected class.”
Pierce, 40 F.3d at 801.
First, Chapman alleges that although he
was reprimanded for being tardy to work, a fellow
African-American officer was not reprimanded for being even
tardier on the same day.
However, even if evidence could be
adduced at a trial to support this allegation, the simple fact
remains that the counseling letter placed in Chapman’s file does
not constitute a materially adverse employment action for
purposes of appellant’s race discrimination claim.
Allen v.
Michigan Department of Corrections, 165 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 1999).
Similarly, we need not consider another disciplinary incident
which resulted in a suspension which was set aside and never
served by Chapman.
Next, Chapman alleges that he was disproportionately
disciplined after he lost a KSU master key which, as he admits,
operated some 90% of the doors on the KSU campus.
Chapman
acknowledged that he violated KSU policy by removing the key
from its key chain, that he lost the key while pursuing a
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suspect across campus, and that the loss compelled KSU to change
all campus locks at a cost of $85,000.
A KSU Vice-President
recommended that Chapman’s employment be terminated, but KSU’s
African-American police chief intervened and ultimately Chapman
was suspended without pay for two weeks and was placed on
probation for six months.
Although Chapman opined below that
this punishment was reasonable, he asserts that discrimination
occurred because the African-American police chief allegedly
lost a master key on an earlier date but was not disciplined.
Even if this allegation could be proven at trial, however, and
even if it could be said that Chapman was similarly situated to
the police chief and other KSU employees who lost master keys,
the record clearly shows that Chapman admitted that his own
discipline was much less severe than that meted out to an
African-American maintenance employee whose employment was
terminated after he lost the master key to a single building.
Hence, even if evidence could be adduced at trial to show that
they were similarly situated and that Chapman received less
favorable treatment than the police chief, in light of the
discipline afforded the maintenance employee it could not be
said that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
Chapman was disproportionately treated for the loss of the key.
Finally, we are not persuaded that a genuine issue of
material fact exists in regard to Chapman’s contention that his
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final suspension and the loss of his employment raised an
inference of discrimination.
August 1997 student dance.
The final incident involved an
In a nutshell, when students failed
to obey the officers’ orders to disperse after the dance,
Frankfort police were called and eight KSU students were
arrested.
Although another Caucasian officer who arrested two
students was not disciplined, there is no evidence that he had
any prior disciplinary problems.
Moreover, both Chapman and his
African-American supervisor were placed on paid suspension as a
result of the incident, and they remained on that status until
their employment ended on June 30, 1998.
Given the fact that
Chapman was treated in the same way as his African-American
supervisor, we cannot agree with his argument that he was
afforded disparate treatment.
Further, a different result
clearly is not compelled by Chapman’s argument that his actions
were necessitated by his need to obey his supervisor or face
dismissal for insubordination.
The court’s summary judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Philip C. Kimball
Louisville, Kentucky
J. Guthrie True
Frankfort, Kentucky
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