DIANE W. SIMPSON v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT AND WALTER F. SKIBA
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SEPTEMBER 26, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001856-MR
DIANE W. SIMPSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-03495
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY
GOVERNMENT AND WALTER F. SKIBA
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
In this discrimination action, Diane W.
Simpson (hereinafter “Simpson”) has appealed from the Fayette
Circuit Court’s April 10, 2002, summary judgment in favor of
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (hereinafter “LFUCG”)
and Walter F. Skiba (hereinafter “Skiba”) and from the August
20, 2002, order denying her motion to alter, vacate or amend.
Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, the
record, and the applicable case law, we affirm.
Simpson is an African-American female with a date of
birth of March 27, 1952.
She began working for LFUCG in 1988 as
a Human Resources Specialist and at the time of her lawsuit was
a Human Resources Analyst.
On August 27, 1997, Simpson filed a
charge of discrimination with the Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights, alleging racial and sexual discrimination due to actions
taken by Skiba, the Director of Human Resources.
She received a
right to sue letter in 1998, and on September 28, 1998, Simpson
filed a multiple-count verified complaint in Fayette Circuit
Court against LFUCG and Skiba.
In her complaint, Simpson made
allegations of (1) race, gender and/or age discrimination in
violation of KRS Chapter 344 against LFUCG and Skiba; (2)
retaliation against LFUCG and Skiba; (3) fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation against Skiba; (4) defamation of character
against Skiba; (5) intentional infliction of emotional and
physical distress and outrageous conduct against Skiba; and (6)
violations of the Equal Pay Act against LFUCG and Skiba.
She
requested a jury trial and judgments against both LFUCG and
Skiba for actual, general, compensatory, and punitive damages.
Both LFUCG and Skiba filed answers to Simpson’s complaint, and
requested that the suit be dismissed for various reasons.
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LFUCG and Skiba moved for summary judgment on January
30, 2000, arguing that many of Simpson’s claims were barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, that she failed to establish
a prima facie case to support several of her claims, and that
she failed to prove any adverse job action.
Prior to the
hearing on the motions, the suit was placed into abeyance to
allow the Supreme Court to decide several cases regarding
sovereign immunity.
Once those cases were decided, Simpson
filed her response to LFUCG’s motion.
The circuit court held a
hearing on the motions for summary judgment on August 17, 2001,
after which Simpson filed her response to Skiba’s motion.
Upon
the filing of LFUCG’s reply and copies of the depositions the
parties intended to rely upon, the matter was submitted for a
decision.
On April 10, 2002, the circuit court entered an order
granting LFUCG’s and Skiba’s motions for summary judgment as
follows:
This case came before the Court on the
Defendant[]s[‘] Motion[s] for Summary
Judgment. Plaintiff filed claims for race,
gender and/or age discrimination;
retaliation; fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation; defamation of character;
intentional infliction of emotional and
physical distress; and claims under the
Equal Pay Act. Having heard from all
parties, the Court rules as follows:
1.
Kentucky law bars Plaintiff’s common law
tort claims under the doctrine of
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sovereign immunity. Thus, Defendant
Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment
is granted as to Plaintiff’s claims of
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation,
defamation of character and intentional
infliction of emotion and physical
distress/outrageous conduct.
2.
Plaintiff, based on the evidence
presented to the Court, has not
established a prima facie case of wage
discrimination. Plaintiff has not shown
that Defendant paid Plaintiff a lower
salary than wages paid to another for
work requiring the same skill and
performed under similar conditions.
Thus defendant LFUCG’s Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Equal
Pay Act claim is granted.
3.
Plaintiff has not established a prima
facie case of race, age and gender
discrimination because Plaintiff has not
presented evidence that Plaintiff was
subjected to an adverse employment
decision on the basis of her race, age
or gender. Thus the Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted.
4.
The Court holds that Defendant LFUCG’s
and Defendant Skiba’s Motion for Summary
Judgment as to the retaliation claim
must be granted because the Court finds
there is insufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie retaliation
claim. Specifically the Court holds
that Plaintiff did not produce any
evidence that Defendants participated in
actionable retaliatory conduct against
Plaintiff.
5.
As to Plaintiff’s claim of intentional
infliction of emotional
distress/outrageous conduct the Court
grants Defendant Skiba’s Motion for
Summary Judgment because Plaintiff has
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not shown such outrageous conduct that
would offend generally accepted
standards of decency.
6.
Defendant Skiba’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s
claim of defamation because the
communications in question are
absolutely privileged from suit.
7.
For the foregoing reasons, the
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment
are SUSTAINED.
Simpson then filed a motion to alter, vacate or amend
the circuit court’s summary judgment.
In her motion, Simpson
relied upon deposition testimony to argue the existence of a
hostile work environment and upon case law holding that
discriminatory workplace harassment claims are rarely summarily
dismissed.
LFUCG and Skiba filed a joint response, arguing that
even if Simpson had pled a hostile work environment, which they
argued she did not, the allegations she relied upon failed to
support her claim.
Furthermore, they argued that the circuit
court properly granted summary judgment on the remaining claims.
On August 20, 2002, the circuit court entered an order
denying Simpson’s motion to alter, vacate or amend as follows:
This matter came before the Court on
Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter, Vacate or
Amend. Plaintiff argues that the Court
issued its previous opinion without regards
to the law or a thorough review of the
record. The Court, having further reviewed
the record and having extensively considered
the law now rules as follows on Plaintiff’s
Motion to Alter, Vacate or Amend.
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Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476[, 483]
(1991) states that “summary judgment is to
be cautiously applied. . . . [and] used
[‘]to terminate litigation when, as a matter
of law, it appears that it would be
impossible for the respondent to produce
evidence at the trial warranting a judgment
in his favor and against the movant.[‘]” CR
56.03 states: “The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories,
stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The Court, in making its decision, has kept
the appropriate standard in mind and thus
has ruled accordingly.
The Court holds that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s common
law tort claim pursuant to the Kentucky
Constitution, unless the legislature has
expressly waived such immunity. The Court
also notes that Withers v. University of
Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340, 345 (1997)
affirmed the right of the Commonwealth to
immunity from suit absent an explicit waiver
of such by the General Assembly. The Court
again holds that [Defendant’s] Motion for
Summary Judgment as to the claims of fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation, defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional and
physical distress is SUSTAINED.
With the above analysis, the Court also
holds that sovereign immunity bars
Plaintiff’s claim under the Equal Pay Act.
The Court further points out that Plaintiff
has not met her burden of establishing a
prima facie claim under the Equal Pay Act.
Kentucky law prohibits an employer from pay
discrimination by making it unlawful for the
employer to pay any employee of the opposite
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sex at a lower rate for comparable work
requiring the same skill and effort. The
law does allow for pay differentials
pursuant to an established seniority system
or merit system. Employers can defend
against charges of wage discrimination where
the differentials are based on a bona fide
use of ‘other factors than sex.’ Washington
County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170; 101
S.Ct. 2242, 2248; 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981).
In the present case, the Court is
pressed to find where Plaintiff has proved a
pay differential based on the sex of an
employee. Regardless, the Court does hold
that the Defendants have been successful in
establishing that the wage system in place
is nondiscriminatory. The Defendants have
extensively detailed the process by which
Lexington Fayette Urban County Government
employees are paid and the factors
considered in determining wage pay. The
Court is satisfied that the Defendants have
a complex method of determining the
appropriate employee wage compensation and
it is not believed that the said method
considers the sex of the employee. The
Court thus SUSTAINS the Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiff’s
claim of wage discrimination.
The Plaintiff has alleged that the
Defendants have discriminated against her on
the basis of race, gender and/or age.
Plaintiff, to meet her prima facie case of
discrimination as set forth in her
complaint, must prove that: (1) she was a
member of a protected class; (2) she applied
for and was qualified for the position; (3)
she was subjected to an adverse employment
decision; and (4) that a similarly situated
employee outside the protected
classification was not subject to the
adverse employment action. St. Mary’s Honer
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct.
2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). If the
Plaintiff meets her burden, then the
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Defendant is required to refute the burden
by articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s
rejection. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
The Court again holds that the
Plaintiff has not met her burden of proof.
The Court feels that while Plaintiff is a
member of a protected class, she has not
proved that she was subjected to an adverse
employment decision due to her race, age or
gender. Plaintiff’s own testimony indicated
she had no evidence she was not promoted
because of her race. In any event, the
Court further holds that the evidence in the
record proves that the Defendants indeed
have legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for not choosing Plaintiff to fill
particular positions. Such reasons include
the fact that Plaintiff was not as qualified
or experienced as other applicants. For
these reasons, the Court SUSTAINS the
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as
to the Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination
based on race, gender or age.
The Court also SUSTAINS Defendant
Skiba’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff’s claims of fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation. The Court does not find
sufficient evidence in the record to support
this claim to continue forward. The same is
true for Plaintiff’s claims for outrageous
conduct and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Taken in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court does not
believe the conduct complained of rises to
the level of outrageousness required by
Kentucky law. Thus, the Court SUSTAINS the
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as
to Plaintiff’s claim for outrageous conduct
and intentional inflection of emotional
distress.
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The Plaintiff has also made a claim for
defamation. The Court holds that Kentucky
law deems communications about an employee’s
job performance absolutely privileged from
suit. The Court rules that Plaintiff’s
defamation claim is barred by absolute
privilege based on Plaintiff’s claim and
thus SUSTAINS Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
The Plaintiff’s complaint sets for[th]
a claim for retaliation against the
Defendants based on Plaintiff filing an
employment discrimination claim. To prove
such a claim, the Plaintiff must prove that:
(1) she was engaged in a protected activity,
(2) she was disadvantaged by an act of her
employer, and (3) there was a causal
connection between the activity engaged in
and the employer’s act. Barnett v. Dept. of
Veteran’s Affairs, 153 F.3d 338, 343 (6th
Cir. 1998). If the Plaintiff meets this
burden by proving each of these three
elements, the employer may then articulate a
legitimate, non retaliatory reason for the
action. Id.
The Court, after thoroughly looking
through the record, is pressed to find any
evidence to indicate that the Plaintiff was
retaliated against. The Plaintiff was never
demoted nor given a decrease in pay. The
Plaintiff’s own testimony reveals that she
was never disciplined or suspended. The
stated instances involving office furniture,
office relocation and the souvenir doll
given to another employee do not rise to the
level of retaliation in this Court’s
opinion. Even considering all the instances
together, in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, the Court does not feel the
Plaintiff has been retaliated against by
LFUCG. With the Summary Judgment standard
in mind, the Court does not find that there
is any evidence of retaliation by Defendant
LFUCG and SUSTAINS the Motion for Summary
Judgment.
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The Court also SUSTAINS Defendant
Skiba’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation. The
Court notes that Defendant Skiba and the
Plaintiff obviously have not had the ideal
working relationship, but the Court does not
believe the Plaintiff has proved a claim for
retaliation. The Court does not see where
Plaintiff has suffered job detriment.
Plaintiff’s own deposition states she had
not ever been suspended or formally
disciplined. The Court is of the opinion
that a retaliation claim needs something
more concrete than what Plaintiff has
presented. While the Court sympathizes with
Plaintiff’s situation, as a matter of law,
it is of the opinion that Plaintiff has not
produced enough evidence indicating job
detriment as a result of engaging in
protected activity. This is a final and
appealable Order.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Simpson argues that the circuit court
improperly granted summary judgment because several genuine
issues of material fact still exist.
In particular, she argues
that she in fact presented evidence sufficient to establish a
prima facie case on her claims, that LFUCG has no immunity from
the Equal Pay Act, that the deposition testimony of Darrylyn
Combs constituted binding judicial admissions, and that the
circuit court erred in dismissing her common law claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation.1
1
Simpson has not raised as an issue the circuit court’s entry of summary
judgment on her claim of fraud, deception and misrepresentation. Therefore,
that ruling shall stand without the necessity for further review.
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Both LFUCG and Skiba filed briefs opposing Simpson’s arguments,
to which Simpson filed reply briefs.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Lewis v. B&R Corporation, Ky.App., 56 S.W.3d 432
(2001), this Court detailed the standard of review applicable in
appeals from summary judgments:
The standard of review on appeal when a
trial court grants a motion for summary
judgment is "whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." The trial court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, and summary judgment
should be granted only if it appears
impossible that the nonmoving party will be
able to produce evidence at trial warranting
a judgment in his favor. The moving party
bears the initial burden of showing that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, and
then the burden shifts to the party opposing
summary judgment to present "at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial."
The trial court "must examine the evidence,
not to decide any issue of fact, but to
discover if a real issue exists." While the
Court in Steelvest used the word
"impossible" in describing the strict
standard for summary judgment, the Supreme
Court later stated that that word was "used
in a practical sense, not in an absolute
sense." Because summary judgment involves
only legal questions and the existence of
any disputed material issues of fact, an
appellate court need not defer to the trial
court’s decision and will review the issue
de novo. (citations in footnotes omitted).
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Id. at 436.
With this standard in mind, we shall review in turn
each of the preserved issues Simpson raised in her complaint.2
I. KRS CHAPTER 344 ALLEGATIONS OF RACE, GENDER AND/OR AGE
DISCRIMINATION
Simpson argues that the circuit court erred in
granting a summary judgment on the issue of discrimination as
genuine issues of material fact existed, which should have been
submitted to a fact-finding jury.
The circuit court held that
although Simpson was a member of a protected class, she failed
to establish that she had been subjected to an adverse
employment decision.
Here, she argues that she presented
sufficient evidence of both direct and indirect discrimination
to establish a prima face case, and argues that this evidence
should have allowed her to defeat LFUCG’s motion for summary
judgment.
She also argues that KRS Chapter 344 allows for
individual liability for supervisors, so that her claims against
Skiba should be allowed to continue.
On the other hand, LFUCG
argues that, as a matter of law, Simpson has failed to establish
a prima facie case of race, gender or age discrimination, either
through direct or circumstantial evidence.
Although Simpson was
a member of a protected class, she could not establish that she
2
Simpson did not allege any common law claims against LFUCG in her complaint;
her claims against LFUCG were limited to discrimination, retaliation, and
violations of the Equal Pay Act. She only alleged common law claims against
Skiba. Therefore, we shall ignore those portions of the circuit court’s
orders granting summary judgment to LFUCG on Simpson’s common law claims as
she did not allege any such claims against LFUCG.
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had been subjected to an adverse employment decision or that she
was rejected for different positions on the basis of her race,
gender or age.
In KRS 344.040(1) of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act,
which mirrors its federal counterpart, the General Assembly made
it an unlawful practice for an employer:
To fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge
any individual or otherwise to discriminate
against an individual with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges or employment, because of the
individual’s race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, age forty (40) and over,
because the person is a qualified individual
with a disability, or because the individual
is a smoker or non-smoker, as long as the
person complies with any workplace policy
concerning smoking.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L.Ed.2d
668, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973), the United States Supreme Court set
out the requirements to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination:
This may be done by showing (i) that he
belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant’s
qualifications.
Id. at 802.
In a footnote, the Supreme Court noted that the
facts would vary from case to case, and that the proof necessary
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to establish a prima facie case would not be applicable in every
case.
Once a prima facie case is established, “[t]he burden
then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”
Id.
Finally, “should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff
must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.”
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 215, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093
(1981).
See also St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 125 L.Ed.2d 407, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993).
LFUCG concedes, and we agree, that Simpson has met the
first prong of the prima facie case as she is an AfricanAmerican female over the age of forty.
However, she failed to
establish that she had been subjected to an adverse employment
action due to her race, gender or age because she had never been
demoted, suspended or even formally disciplined.
Furthermore,
LFUCG did an excellent job in its brief detailing the reasons
why Simpson’s failure to receive the three positions for which
she applied were not the result of any type of discrimination,
but rather were the result of lack of experience on her part or
better qualifications of other candidates.
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Although we are inclined to agree with LFUCG’s
argument that Simpson failed to assert a claim of discrimination
based upon a hostile work environment, we shall nevertheless
review this issue.
In order to establish a racially hostile
work environment under Title VII, the
plaintiff must show that the conduct in
question was severe or pervasive enough to
create an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive, and
that the victim subjectively regarded it as
abusive. . . . The plaintiff must also
prove that his employer ‘tolerated or
condoned the situation,’ or knew or should
have known of the alleged conduct and did
nothing to correct the situation.
Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 2000).
Although we are aware of our decision in Kirkwood v.
Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., Ky.App., 858 S.W.2d
194, 198, that “[c]laims of discriminatory workplace harassment
are rarely summarily dismissed where there is any colorable
evidence of such harassment[,]” we agree with LFUCG that Simpson
has not presented sufficient objective or subjective evidence of
a hostile work environment to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.
A mere belief that Skiba was a racist and taking
offense at Skiba’s gift of a souvenir “mammy” doll to another
employee, along with Simpson’s other allegations, do not even
collectively create evidence of a hostile work environment.
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Based upon the evidence she presented, we cannot hold
that the circuit court erred in granting a summary judgment on
her discrimination claim because Simpson failed to establish a
prima face case and there are no genuine issues of material fact
to be decided.
II. RETALIATION
In Count II of her complaint, Simpson detailed her
retaliation claims against both LFUCG and Skiba, alleging a
violation of KRS 344.280 in that they retaliated against her
after she had opposed “certain of Defendants’ unlawful
practices.”
Simpson had completed and filed a charge of
discrimination form with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights
on August 22, 1997, alleging race and sex discrimination in that
Skiba told her that minorities were responsible for the majority
of workplace violence, that he refused to speak to her and told
others not to talk to her, and that he thwarted her attempts to
transfer out of the department.
The circuit court granted
summary judgments on this issue to both LFUCG and Skiba, holding
that Simpson failed to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation pursuant to Barnett v. Dept. of Veteran’s Affairs,
153 F.3d 338, 343 (6th Cir. 1998).
On appeal, Simpson argues
that the deposition testimony she presented was sufficient to
allow her claim for retaliation to go to a jury and that the
trial court ignored evidence favorable to her in making its
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decision.
On the other hand, LFUCG maintains that the circuit
court properly granted a summary judgment in its favor because
the claims of retaliation Simpson asserted did not establish a
tangible employment action relating to her compensation or the
terms of her employment.
Skiba, in turn, argues that KRS
Chapter 344 does not create a private cause of action against
supervisors in their individual capacities.
Although it appears
that Chapter 344 does allow for retaliation suits against
supervisors in their individual capacities unless protected by
qualified immunity,3 we need not address Skiba’s argument because
we agree with the circuit court that Simpson has not established
a prima facie case of retaliation.
In Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Handley, Ky., 827
S.W.2d 697 (1991), this Court addressed the necessary elements
to establishing a prima facie case of retaliation:
“The
plaintiff, in making out a prima facie case, must show that 1)
she engaged in a protected activity, 2) she was disadvantaged by
an act of her employer, and 3) there was a causal connection
between the activity engaged in and the employer’s act.”
701.
Id. at
In Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784 (6th
Cir. 2000), the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Title
VII plaintiff must also prove that the defendant took an adverse
employment action against her, which would include hiring,
3
See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F3d 784 (6th Cir. 2000).
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firing, failing to promote, reassignment, or a significant
change in benefits.
See also Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 663 (1998).
Furthermore, personal dislike has been held not to equal a
discriminatory animus.
Barnett v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs,
153 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1998).
In the present case, we hold that the actions Simpson
has set forth as evidence of retaliation do not meet the
standard required under the law and that she has failed to
establish that she experienced any adverse job action.
Simpson
was never fired or demoted, nor were her benefits or job
responsibilities changed.
Her relocation to a smaller office to
make room for a copy room, Skiba’s late approval of new office
furniture for her, the change of the office to non-smoking
status, the gift of a souvenir doll to another employee, and the
review of her work by Skiba do not rise, either separately or as
a whole, to an actionable level of retaliation.
The situation
between Simpson and Skiba appears to more one of personal
dislike, which is simply insufficient to establish
discriminatory animus.
The circuit court properly granted a summary judgment
on Simpson’s retaliation claim.
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III. DEFAMATION
In her complaint, Simpson alleged a defamation claim
against Skiba, stating that he had “engaged in conduct designed
to defame Plaintiff’s character in an attempt to downplay his
discriminatory actions taken against Plaintiff.”
In their
answer, LFUCG and Skiba argued that any communications about
Simpson were not published outside the legitimate business
affairs of LFUCG and were privileged.
The circuit court held
that the communications4 in question were absolutely privileged
from suit because they were about an employee’s job performance.
Simpson now argues that Skiba’s actions were not protected by
sovereign immunity and that the circuit court’s dismissal of
this claim was in error.
We disagree.
In Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v. Hay, Ky.App., 627
S.W.2d 270 (1981), this Court addressed the tort of defamation.
In order to establish an action for defamation, a plaintiff must
show:
1) defamatory language; 2) about the plaintiff; 3) that
is published; and 4) that causes injury to the reputation.
at 273.
Id.
However, the defendant is entitled to affirmatively
plead the defense of privilege, as was done in the present
matter.
The circuit court must determine the question of
4
In his brief, Skiba notes that these allegations were that Skiba told
Simpson and others that she had “screwed up” a job packet, which had to be
redone, and that Skiba had written a letter to other department heads to
assist her in a position transfer. Simpson never saw the letter or knew what
it said.
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privilege as a matter of law.
Caslin v. General Electric Co.,
Ky.App., 608 S.W.2d 69 (1980).
In Caslin, this Court held that
job performance appraisal reports were privileged as they were
communications within the company that were necessary to its
functioning.
See also Rich v. Kentucky Country Day, Inc.,
Ky.App., 793 S.W.2d 832 (1990).
We agree with the trial court that the communications
in question were privileged as they concerned Simpson’s job
performance.
Therefore, the circuit court properly entered a
summary judgment in Skiba’s favor because, as a matter of law,
the communications were privileged.
IV. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS/OUTRAGEOUS
CONDUCT
Simpson alleged in her complaint that Skiba inflicted
upon her severe emotional and physical distress due to his acts,
omissions, conduct and discrimination.
The circuit court held
that the conduct about which Simpson complained did not rise to
the level of outrageousness required in the Commonwealth in that
it would not offend generally accepted standards of decency.
On
appeal, Simpson argues that her demonstration of a long-standing
pattern of discrimination and retaliation entitles her to
present her evidence to a jury, and that therefore the circuit
court improperly entered a summary judgment against her.
Skiba,
on the other hand, argues that even in a light most favorable to
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her, the allegations Simpson made do not rise to the level of
outrageousness necessary for her to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.
In Kraft v. Rice, Ky., 671 S.W.2d 247 (1984), the
Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 46, which defines the tort of outrageous conduct as
follows:
“(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and
if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm.”
In Kraft, the Court held that the alleged harassment --
including keeping Kraft under surveillance, threatening to put
her husband in jail, and forcing her vehicle off the road -that took place over a period of months was enough to satisfy
the threshold requirements for the tort of outrageous conduct.
In Humana of Kentucky, Inc. v. Seitz, Ky., 796 S.W.2d 1 (1990),
the Supreme Court went further and set out the four element
necessary to sustain a cause of action for outrageous conduct:
1) the wrongdoer’s conduct must be
intentional or reckless;
2) the conduct must be outrageous and
intolerable in that it offends against the
generally accepted standards of decency and
morality;
3) there must be a causal connection between
the wrongdoer’s conduct and the emotional
distress; and
-21-
4) the emotional distress must be severe.
Id. at 2-3.
In Seitz, the Court determined that the conduct
relied upon regarding the circumstances of the birth of Seitz’s
stillborn child was not sufficient to establish the tort.
Seitz
had offered proof that she believed the intercom in her room had
been disconnected, that there was a 12 to 15 minute lapse in
time between the start of her delivery and the nurses’ arrival
in her room, that a nurse told her to shut up, and that a nurse
told her that the baby would be disposed of in the hospital.
In The Kroger Company v. Willgruber, Ky., 920 S.W.2d
61 (1996), however, the Supreme Court of Kentucky found that
Willgruber had presented sufficient evidence to entitle him to
defeat a motion for directed verdict on his claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Court
recognized that, “[c]itizens in our society are expected to
withstand petty insults, unkind words and minor indignities.
Such irritations are a part of normal, every day life and
constitute no legal cause of action.”
Id. at 65.
In his case,
Willgruber presented evidence of Kroger’s calculated attempt to
force him to sign a release that would exonerate Kroger’s
wrongful discharge of him.
Finally, in Wilson v. Lowe’s Home
Center, Ky., 75 S.W.3d 229 (2001), the Supreme Court of Kentucky
again held that there was sufficient evidence of intentional
-22-
infliction of emotional distress to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.
Wilson, an African-American, had been subject to
racist remarks by three store managers virtually every day
throughout his seven years of employment, and that superiors had
taken no action to stop the store managers from continuing this
conduct.
In determining that the issue should not have been
decided on summary judgment, the Court looked to Comment h of §
46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:
It is for the court to determine, in the
first instance, whether the defendant’s
conduct may reasonably be regarded as so
extreme and outrageous as to permit
recovery, or whether it is necessarily so.
Where reasonable men differ, it is for the
jury, subject to the control of the court,
to determine whether, in the particular
case, the conduct has been sufficiently
extreme and outrageous to result in
liability.
In Wilson, the Supreme Court determined that based upon the
conduct alleged to have occurred, a jury could have found such
conduct to be intentional, outrageous and intolerable.
In applying the law to the facts of this case, we
agree with Skiba that Simpson’s allegations, even if true, do
not rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to defeat a
motion for summary judgment.
Simpson claimed that Skiba did not
talk to her, that he told other employees not to talk to her,
that he scrutinized her work, that he gave a souvenir “mammy”
doll to another employee, that he told her minorities were
-23-
responsible for the majority of workplace violence, and that he
asked her if her niece’s death was expected.
She also claimed
that she had to move from a larger to a smaller office so that
her larger office could be a copy room and that there was a
delay in her receiving approval for new officer furniture.
Even
if Simpson’s allegations are true, we cannot conclude that such
conduct rises to the level of outrageousness necessary to
establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Reasonable minds would not differ in finding such
conduct not sufficiently extreme or intolerable so as to permit
recovery.
Therefore, the circuit court did not err in granting
Skiba’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.
V. EQUAL PAY ACT
In her complaint, Simpson alleged Equal Pay Act5
violations against both LFUCG and Skiba, claiming that LFUCG
specifically discriminated against her by paying her at a lower
rate of wages than similarly situated male employees and that
Skiba caused or attempted to cause LFUCG to discriminate against
her.
On the other hand, LFUCG argued that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity operates to protect it from this claim.
any event, both LFUCG and Skiba argue that Simpson failed to
In
5
KRS 337.420 et seq.
-24-
establish a prima facie case to support her allegations of Equal
Pay Act violations.
We shall first address LFUCG’s sovereign immunity
argument.
In its order ruling on the motion to alter, vacate or
amend, the circuit court held that sovereign immunity acted to
bar Simpson’s claim.
Simpson now argues that KRS Chapter 337
extends, in its entirety, to state employees and that a plain
reading of the statute reveals a waiver of sovereign immunity by
the General Assembly.
She directs our attention to KRS
337.010(2)(a)(9), which provides a definition of the term
“employee” to include state government workers.6
Simpson also
directs our attention to OAG 86-73, in which she claims the
Attorney General stated that LFUCG is not exempt from the
provisions of KRS Chapter 337.7
We disagree with Simpson’s
assertions.
In Withers v. University of Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d
340 (1997), the Supreme Court of Kentucky confirmed that the
Commonwealth is entitled to sovereign immunity unless waived by
the General Assembly.
Citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
6
The definitions contained in KRS 337.010(2) are specifically limited to KRS
337.275 to 337.325, 337.345 and 337.385 to 337.405. The Equal Pay Act is not
included in any of the sections listed, and has its own definitional section,
including a definition of “employee”.
7
OAG 86-73 deals with the Lexington Fayette Urban County Airport Board, not
the Lexington Fayette Urban County Government, and the opinion held that
because the Airport Board was not a city, county, or urban county government,
it was not exempted from the prevailing wage law of KRS 337.010(3)(e). The
opinion did not state that LFUCG was exempt from KRS Chapter 337 or even
address the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
-25-
673, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1361, 39 L.Ed.2d 662, 678 (1974), the
Withers Court adopted the following rule:
“We will find waiver
only where stated ‘by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room
for any other reasonable construction.’
Murray v. Wilson
Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S.Ct. 458, 464-65, 53
L.Ed. 742 (1909).”
Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 346.
In the present matter, we disagree with Simpson’s
argument that the General Assembly waived its immunity for suits
involving the Equal Pay Act.
KRS 337.420, the definitional
section for the Equal Pay Act, defines an employer in section 2
as “a person who has two (2) or more employees within the state
. . . .”
KRS 337.420(7) then defines a person as “one (1) or
more individuals, partnerships, corporations, legal
representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or voluntary
associations.”
The General Assembly clearly did not include the
state or any of its political subdivisions or agencies in the
definition of person, as was done in the definitional section of
Kentucky’s Civil Rights Act, KRS Chapter 344.
Because we have
determined that the General Assembly did not in any way waive
the Commonwealth’s immunity from suit, we hold that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity acts to bar Simpson’s claim under the
Equal Pay Act against LFUCG.
-26-
Likewise, we agree with Skiba’s argument that KRS
Chapter 337 does not create a private cause of action against
supervisors in their individual capacities, so that any claim
against Skiba individually must fail.
Even if Simpson could properly have raised an Equal
Pay Act claim, her claim would have failed because she failed to
establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination.
“In order
to make out a case under the Act, the [plaintiff] must show that
an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes
‘for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions.’”
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,
417 U.S. 188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2228, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974).
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to prove that the wage differential falls
under one of the four exceptions.
In the present case, Simpson failed to establish a
prima facie case because James Muschette, the only employee she
compared herself to for purposes of her wage discrimination
claim, earned less money than she did at all relevant times.
Therefore, the circuit court properly granted a summary judgment
to LFUCG and Skiba on Simpson’s wage discrimination claim under
the Equal Pay Act.
-27-
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Fayette Circuit Court’s
summary judgment and order denying the motion to alter, amend or
vacate are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Sharon K. Morris
James Michael Morris
Lexington, KY
Teresa L. Holmes
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
James Michael Morris
Lexington, KY
Robert L. Roark
LaDonna Koebel
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Robert L. Roark
Lexington, KY
-28-
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