CYPRUS MOUNTAIN COALS D/B/A STARFIRE MINES v. MARLOUS NAPIER; HON. JAMES L. KERR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: APRIL 25, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001815-WC
CYPRUS MOUNTAIN COALS D/B/A
STARFIRE MINES
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-98-81570
v.
MARLOUS NAPIER; HON. JAMES L.
KERR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BAKER, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
BAKER, JUDGE.
Cyprus Mountain Coals1 D/B/A Starfire Mines
petitions for a review of an opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board that vacated in part, reversed in part, and
remanded a decision of the Administrative Law Judge, which
1
The petition for review erroneously pluralizes the name of
appellant. The correct name is Cyprus Mountain Coal.
awarded Marlous Napier permanent total disability benefits equal
to 80% of his average weekly wage after excluding 20% based on a
pre-existing active occupational disability.
The Board reversed
the ALJ’s denial of medical benefits because of psychiatric or
psychological overlay and vacated his decision with respect to
the 20% exclusion for a pre-existing active disability and
denial of medical expenses associated with Napier’s cervical
injury claim.
The Board remanded the case for further
explanation of his decision on the latter two issues.
After
reviewing the record, the law, and the arguments of counsel, we
affirm.
Marlous Napier, who is 52 years old and has a high
school education with no specialized or vocational training, has
been employed by Cyprus as a heavy equipment operator since
1971.
On May 2, 1998, he sustained a work-related injury when
he fell while descending the steps on a drag line he was
operating hitting his head against a handrail and twisting his
back.
He immediately experienced back pain, reported the
incident, and went home.
Napier returned to work the next day
but had to leave after a few hours because of severe neck and
low back pain.
He was initially treated with pain medication
and physical therapy by Dr. George Chaney, a family doctor, and
Dr. Richard Mortara, a neurosurgeon who had operated on Napier
in 1985.
At the time, Napier was also suffering from
2
degenerative joint disease in his left hip from a prior
automobile accident.
Dr. Mortara suggested he be reevaluated
after having hip replacement surgery, which was done by Dr.
Norman Ellingsen in October 1998.
On May 13, 1999, Dr. Mortara
performed lumbar fusion surgery consisting of a total
laminectomy at the L3-L4 level with a partial laminectomy at L2
and L4 bilateral medial facetectomies.
Following the hip and
spine surgeries, Napier had some relief from his hip problems
and right leg pain, but he continued to suffer lower back, left
leg, and neck pain.
Dr. Chaney referred Napier to the Lexington
Pain Center, where he has been treated by Dr. Bosomworth with
medication including Sonata, Zanaflex, Neuroten, Effexor, and
Oxycontin.
Napier filed an Application for Resolution of Injury
Claim on April 18, 2001, involving the May 1998 incident seeking
compensation based on both physical and psychological problems.
In addition to the above referenced physicians, Napier has been
examined and evaluated by several physicians and occupational
experts in connection with his claim.
Their various reports
mention Napier’s medical history that involved a hip injury he
received in a vehicular accident in 1980 and a fractured spine
received in a fall from a tree in 1985.
As a result of the 1985
incident, Dr. Mortara performed spinal surgery with fusion of
the L1-L3 vertebra that included the insertion and subsequent
3
removal of Harrington rods.
Napier was off work approximately
five months and nine months because of the 1980 and 1985
incidents, respectively.
During each of the examinations
following the May 1998 incident, Napier complained of lower back
pain, left leg pain, numbness in the toes of his left foot and
hands, neck pain, headaches, and depression.
On March 23, 2001, Dr. James Templin reported Napier
was suffering from several conditions including degenerative
disc disease, lumbar spondylolysis, chronic cervical pain
syndrome, left leg radiculopathy, chronic left hip pain,
depression, and post-operative scar tissue/adhesions.
He
assessed a conditional 16% whole body impairment due to Napier’s
lumbar spinal condition under the American Medical Association
Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.
Dr. Templin
indicated that the impairment rating was conditional because he
did not believe Napier had reached maximum medical improvement
and further testing and evaluation of his cervical condition was
necessary.
Dr. Templin did state that Napier’s condition was
caused by the May 1998 incident and he did not have an active
impairment prior to that incident.
On October 16, 2000, Dr. Russell Travis examined
Napier and stated that his current complaints of chronic neck
and low back pain were not supported by objective findings.
Dr.
Travis suggested that Napier’s condition was not related to the
4
May 1998 injury but involved degenerative stenosis below the
vertebral levels adjacent to the 1985 spinal fusion, that he had
reached maximum medical improvement, and that he could return to
light work activity.
However, based on the fact that he had the
1999 surgery, Dr. Travis assessed a 10% whole person impairment.
On July 27, 2001, Dr. Charles Hieronymous’ diagnosis
included chronic low back pain with radiculopathy and atrophy,
chronic cervical pain with radiculopathy and atrophy, chronic
pain syndrome, degenerative disc disease, and status post lumbar
laminectomy L3-L4 with partial L2 and L4 bilateral medical
facectomies.
He assessed a 31% whole body impairment and stated
that the May 1998 injury had caused Napier’s complaints and he
did not have an active impairment prior to the 1998 injury.
Dr. Martyn Goldman at the University of Louisville
conducted an independent medical evaluation of Napier on
September 20, 2001, pursuant to a request from the Department of
Workers’ Compensation and the ALJ under Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 342.315.
In a Form 107 report, Dr. Goldman’s diagnosis of
Napier was status post lumbar decompressive laminectomy, mild
degenerative joint disease cervical and dorsal spine, and
narrowing of the L3-L4 level with retrolisthesis narrowing of
the L3-L4.
He stated Napier’s May 1998 injury was at least
partially responsible for his current condition but would not
have resulted in persistent symptoms absent the fused segment
5
from L1 to L3.
Dr. Goldman indicated that 50% of Napier’s
current impairment was due to arousal of a pre-existing dormant
non-disabling condition, that his neck problems were due to the
effects of natural aging, and that he could not return to the
type of work he performed before the May 1998 injury.
Dr.
Goldman assessed a 13% permanent whole body impairment under the
AMA Guides for the 1998 injury.
In a subsequent deposition, Dr.
Goldman expanded on his evaluation by stating that he would have
assessed a total 30% whole body impairment rating based on a
combination of the 1998 and 1985 injuries with a 20% impairment
rating assigned to the 1985 injury, and that he would have
imposed physical restrictions on Napier based on the 1985 injury
and attendant spinal fusion surgery.
Also on September 20, 2001, Dr. John Harpring
conducted a university medical evaluation pursuant to a request
from the Department of Workers’ Claims under KRS 342.315.
Dr.
Harpring diagnosed Napier as suffering from lumbar stenosis and
neck pain caused by the May 1998 injury and did not believe
Napier had a pre-existing active impairment.
Dr. Harpring did
not provide an impairment rating.
The record contains two reports related to Napier’s
psychological claim.
Phillip Pack, a certified clinical
psychologist performed various tests on June 15, 2001, and
concluded Napier suffered from major mild depression without
6
psychotic symptoms.
He assessed a Class 2 impairment rating
under the current AMA guidelines, which he stated corresponded
with a 10% impairment rating under the previous guidelines.
Pack found no evidence of malingering.
On August 30, 2001, Dr. David Shraberg, a
psychiatrist, evaluated Napier at the request of the employer.
Based on his interview and testing, Dr. Shraberg concluded that
Napier exhibited a high degree of symptom magnification and that
any medical problems were due to natural aging and arthritis.
Dr. Shraberg stated Napier had personality factors that
predisposed him to developing physical symptoms under stress and
diagnosed a psychophysiological adjustment disorder associated
with multiple surgeries and a passive/dependant personality.
He
indicated that Napier’s primary psychological problem was an
addiction to Oxycontin.
Dr. Shraberg found no active
psychiatric impairment related to the May 1998 injury and
suggested that detoxifying Napier from Oxycontin would relieve
him of any depression and allow him to return to work.
On January 14, 2002, the ALJ conducted an evidentiary
hearing.
Napier testified that he has constant pain in his
neck, left leg, and lower back.
He said that he is unable to
sit or stand for over thirty minutes, has severe headaches, and
has trouble sleeping.
He stated that he receives treatment and
counseling for depression at the pain clinic.
7
Napier indicated
that he had routinely worked 11-40 hours of overtime per week
without any physical restrictions since his spinal fusion
surgery in 1985-86 and approximately 84 hours per week for
several months just prior to the May 1998 incident.
On March 7, 2002, the ALJ issued an opinion awarding
Napier permanent total disability benefits for his lumbar spinal
condition computed on an 80% occupational disability rate and
denying compensation related to Napier’s cervical condition.
The ALJ found Dr. Goldman’s testimony to be the most credible of
the medical experts and relied heavily on his assessment of a
20% impairment rating for the 1985 injury in carving out 20%
from the total disability award for that injury as a noncompensable pre-existing active disability.
Although the ALJ
referred to the testimony of Napier, Dr. Goldman, and Mr. Pack
as supporting a finding of total occupational disability, he
again relied on Dr. Goldman’s attributing Napier’s cervical
problems to the natural aging process in finding this condition
to be not work-related.
Consequently, the ALJ awarded Napier
permanent income benefits commensurate with 80% of his average
weekly wage and medical expenses associated solely with his
lumbar spinal condition.
On March 13, 2002, Napier filed a petition for
reconsideration seeking reversal or alternatively additional
findings on the 20% exclusion based on the 1985 injury and the
8
denial of benefits for his neck problems.
Napier also requested
findings and clarification as to compensability for the
psychological component of his claim.
On April 2, 2002, the ALJ
issued an order generally reaffirming his previous decision.
He
stated the finding of a 20% pre-existing active disability was
based on Dr. Goldman’s 20% impairment rating and the physical
restrictions he would have imposed as a result of the 1985
injury.
He also reiterated Dr. Goldman’s attribution of
Napier’s neck problems to the natural aging process and a
finding that these problems did not arise for several months
following the May 1995 incident.
The ALJ did supplement his
decision by specifically denying any compensation related to
Napier’s psychological condition based on Dr. Shraberg’s
testimony.
On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Board vacated in
part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further
findings related to the ALJ’s finding that the 1985 injury
constituted a pre-existing active occupational disability and
the compensability of medical care costs in connection with
Napier’s cervical injury.
The Board reversed the denial of
compensation for medical expenses associated with the
psychological component of the claim.
This appeal followed.
Cyprus contends the Board should have affirmed the
ALJ’s opinion because it was supported by substantial evidence.
9
Generally, as the fact-finder, the ALJ has the authority to
determine the quality, character, and substance of the evidence.
Burton v. Foster Wheeler Corp., Ky., 72 S.W.3d 925, 928 (2002);
Square D Co. v. Tipton, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 308, 309 (1993).
Similarly, the ALJ has the sole authority to determine the
weight and inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Miller v.
East Kentucky Beverage/Pepsico, Inc., Ky., 951 S.W.2d 329, 331
(1997); Luttrell v. Cardinal Aluminum Co., Ky. App., 909 S.W.2d
334, 336 (1995).
The fact-finder also may reject any testimony
and believe or disbelieve various parts of the evidence even if
it came from the same witness.
Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, Ky., 19
S.W.3d 88, 96 (2000); Whittaker v. Rowland, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 479,
481 (1999).
Where the party with the burden of proof is not
successful before the ALJ in a workers compensation matter, the
issue on appeal is whether the evidence in that party's favor is
so compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to be
persuaded by it.
Carnes v. Tremco Mfg. Co., Ky., 30 S.W.3d 172,
176 (2000); Bullock v. Peabody Coal Co., Ky., 882 S.W.2d 676,
678 (1994).
The Board’s scope of review is limited to whether
the ALJ exceeded his power, abused his discretion, or issued an
order that was clearly erroneous or not in conformity with
statutory law.
See KRS 342.285(2); Smith v. Dixie Fuel Co.,
Ky., 900 S.W.2d 609 (1995).
In contrast to its authority to
determine legal issues de novo, the Board may not substitute its
10
judgment for that of the ALJ on factual issues that are
supported by substantial evidence and thus not clearly
erroneous.
See Union Underwear Co., Inc. v. Scearce, Ky., 896
S.W.2d 7, 9 (1995); Jecker v. Plumbers’ Local 107, Ky. App., 2
S.W.3d 107, 110 (1999).
This Court’s duty is to correct the
Board only where it has overlooked or misconstrued controlling
statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the
evidence so flagrant as to cause injustice.
Western Baptist
Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (1992); Huff
Contracting v. Sark, Ky. App., 12 S.W.3d 704, 706 (2000).
Initially, Cyprus maintains that the Board erred in
remanding for further findings on the issue of a pre-existing
active disability.
The ALJ relied extensively on the opinion of
Dr. Goldman, who assessed a 20% functional impairment rating to
the 1985 injury and stated he generally would have imposed
restrictions for Napier of no bending forward with knees
straight and no lifting over 25 to 30 pounds.
The Board held
that the ALJ’s findings were insufficient because of
inconsistencies in Dr. Goldman’s testimony and contradictory
evidence from the second university evaluator, Dr. Harpring.
For instance, Dr. Goldman explicitly indicated in his Form 107
report that Napier did not have an active impairment prior to
the May 1998 incident “despite the fact that he certainly would
have had an impairment rating based on his pre-existing spinal
11
fusion from L1 through L3.”
In his report, Dr. Goldman also
attributed 50% of Napier’s condition to “arousal of the preexistent dormant non-disabling condition.”
In addition, Dr.
Harpring indicated in his Form 107 report that the lumbar
fracture and stenosis were pre-existing conditions, but that
Napier was “asymptomatic at the time of his alleged work related
accident [in May 1998] and subsequent low back and leg pain.”2
The Board noted the difference between an
“impairment,” which refers to a health related condition that
produces a physiological limitation quantified in terms of a
rating under the AMA Guides, and an “active disability,” which
is a legal term of art related to occupational limitations that
exist immediately prior to the subject injury.
See e.g., Wells
v. Bunch, Ky., 692 S.W.2d 806 (1985); Griffin v. Booth Memorial
Hospital, Ky., 467 S.W.2d 789 (1971).
The existence or extent
of a functional impairment does not necessarily correlate with
an equal occupational disability.
See Cook v. Paducah Recapping
Service, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 684 (1985); Mosely v. Ford Motor Co.,
Ky. App., 968 S.W.2d 675, 678 (1998).
“Active” with reference
to a pre-existing disability means disabling or negatively
2
We note that Drs. Templin and Hieronymus also indicated that
Napier had no pre-existing active disability at the time of the May
1998 incident.
12
affecting a person’s ability to work prior to the subsequent
injury.
See Yocum v. Devine, Ky. App., 577 S.W.2d 41, 43
(1979).
The fact that a claimant is employed or continues to
work does not necessarily mean he has no active disability.
Wells, 692 S.W.2d at 806.
As the sole fact-finder, the ALJ must
translate the lay and medical evidence into a finding of
occupational disability, and he is not required to rely on the
vocational opinions of either the medical experts or the
vocational experts.
Ira A. Watson Department Store v. Hamilton,
Ky., 34 S.W.3d 48, 52 (2000).
However, as the Board noted, this
case is complicated by the existence of reports from two
university evaluators.
Generally, under KRS 342.315(2), the
opinion of a university evaluator creates a rebuttable
presumption, which requires the ALJ to provide reasons for
rejecting such an opinion.
See Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, 19 S.W.3d
at 96.
Cyprus insists that the Board improperly imposed its
own interpretation of Dr. Goldman’s report rather than allowing
the ALJ to draw his own inferences from the testimony by stating
it contained inconsistencies.
Cyprus states:
The fact that Dr. Goldman described
Respondent’s pre-existing impairment as ‘not
active’ is not inconsistent with his
assessment of a 20% impairment for the 1985
injury and surgery. At most, Dr. Goldman’s
testimony indicates some degree of confusion
by the physicians over the differences
13
between ‘impairment’ and ‘disability.’ It
is unclear exactly what Dr. Goldman and Dr.
Harpring meant by stating that Respondent’s
pre-existing impairment was not ‘active.’
Petitioner submits that the only logical
conclusion is that they intended ‘active
impairment’ to be synonymous with
‘disability.’
In fact, in his deposition, Dr. Goldman acknowledged that the
AMA Guides note a distinction between “impairment” and
“disability.”
Attorney for Napier:
Okay. As I understand the AMA
Guidelines, there’s a distinction
between impairment and disability.
Dr. Goldman:
Absolutely.
. . . .
Attorney for Napier:
Okay. But in that sense, just
because an individual has an
impairment, they don’t necessarily
have any job disability; is that
correct?
Dr. Goldman:
Well, again, they’re two
entirely different things and,
again, I can’t tell you what the
First, Second or Third Editions
said, but the Fifth Edition
specifically says that impairment
is rated as showing the loss of
function to do activities of daily
living, exclusive of work.
Unfortunately, the ALJ merely cited Dr. Goldman’s
testimony concerning his theoretical impairment rating and
14
restrictions without discussing the contradiction between his
conclusion and Dr. Goldman’s indication that Napier had no preexisting active disability even though he may have had an
impairment because of the 1985 injury.
Although the ALJ is not
bound by the medical experts’ characterization and continued
employment does not preclude a finding of active disability, the
ALJ’s failure to explain his finding despite Dr. Goldman’s
recognition of the distinction between “impairment” and
“disability” and explicit indication there was no pre-existing
active disability, Napier’s continued employment without being
placed under restrictions by his treating physicians, and Dr.
Harpring’s opinion that there was no pre-existing active
disability render the ALJ’s finding subject to further scrutiny.
The ALJ also failed to provide reasons for rejecting the opinion
of Dr. Harpring, a university evaluator.
See, e.g., Bright v.
American Greetings Corp., Ky., 62 S.W.3d 381 (2001).
We agree
with the Board that the ALJ needs to provide additional
explanation for his finding of a pre-existing active disability
of 20%.
Alternatively, Cyprus contends that regardless of
whether the 1985 injury could be considered “active” prior to
the 1998 injury, the 1996 version of KRS 342.730(1)(a) requires
any impairment due to the prior injury be excluded from
determining whether Napier was totally disabled.
15
It asserts
that the 1996 amendments created an exclusion for pre-existing
conditions based exclusively on an impairment rating under the
AMA Guides without regard to actual disability.
This
interpretation of KRS 342.730(1)(a), however, has been rejected
by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
In Ira A. Watson Department
Store v. Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d at 52, the court held that under
the 1996 amendments to KRS 342.730, determination of whether a
worker’s occupational disability is total or permanent is not
limited solely to an impairment rating, but must also take into
account the principles set forth in Osborne v. Johnson, Ky., 432
S.W.2d 800 (1968), such as the worker’s post-injury physical,
emotional, intellectual, and vocational status; the likelihood a
particular worker would be able to find work under normal
employment conditions; the worker’s ability to work dependably;
and the effect of the worker’s physical restrictions on his
vocational capabilities.
See also McNutt Construction/First
General Services v. Scott, Ky., 40 S.W.3d 854, 859
(2001)(holding arousal of prior dormant condition by workrelated injury remains compensable under 1996 Act); Hill v.
Sextet, Ky., 65 S.W.3d 503, 508-09 (2001).
The ALJ’s opinion
fails to discuss these various factors or account for the fact
that Napier was not placed on any physical restrictions by his
treating physicians and continued to otherwise function,
16
including working extensive hours in the same job, without
limitations.
Cyprus also challenges the Board’s remand for further
findings on Napier’s cervical condition.
As with Napier’s
lumbar condition, the Board felt the ALJ’s reliance on Dr.
Goldman’s opinion attributing Napier’s neck problems to the
natural aging process was insufficient without further
explanation.
In Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet v. Guffey,
Ky., 42 S.W.3d 618 (2001), the court held that even under the
1996 amendments, arousal of a prior, dormant condition by a
work-related injury remains compensable even if that condition
resulted from the natural aging process.
See also McNutt
Construction, 40 S.W.3d at 859 (distinguishing between condition
resulting solely from natural aging and arousal of dormant
degenerative condition by work-related trauma).
The Board
stated that Dr. Goldman failed to address whether Napier’s
cervical condition was a dormant condition aroused by the 1998
injury.
It also referred to Dr. Harpring’s opinion that the
cervical condition was asymptomatic prior to the 1998 injury.
The Board correctly found that the medical records showed that
the ALJ’s finding that Napier did not voice complaints of neck
pain and headaches until several months after the 1998 incident
was clearly erroneous.
17
In contradiction to its position that Napier’s lumbar
condition was “active,” Cyprus asserts that Dr. Goldman’s
testimony that the lumbar spinal fusion constituted a preexisting dormant condition aroused by the 1998 injury
represented his opinion on Napier’s cervical condition as well.
Cyprus’ assertion that the latter is a reasonable inference from
the former is illogical and certainly does not support denial of
benefits given the compensability of a degenerative condition
aroused by a work-related injury.
We note that Napier’s claim
with respect to his cervical condition appears to be limited to
medical, as opposed to income, benefits.
See, e.g., Cavin v.
Lake Construction Co., Ky., 451 S.W.2d 159 (1970).
We agree
with the Board that the ALJ should provide additional findings
and reasons for his position denying payment of medical expenses
for Napier’s cervical condition.
Finally, Cyprus maintains that the Board erred in
holding that the evidence compelled an award of medical benefits
for the psychological component of Napier’s claim.
It states
that Dr. Shraberg’s testimony represented substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s decision.
The Board felt that even Dr.
Shraberg’s report indicated that Napier’s depression is causally
related to treatment of his physical complaints with the pain
medication Oxycontin.
Cyprus contends that it should not be
liable for these medical expenses because it is responsible only
18
for medical expenses related to necessary treatment of a workrelated injury.
See, e.g., Square D Co. v. Tipton, Ky., 862
S.W.2d 308 (1993); KRS 32.020(1).
The employer, however, bears
the burden of proving a treatment is unnecessary or
unreasonable.
Id.
It appears that the question of necessity
for the medical expenses associated with treatment of Napier’s
psychological condition was not properly preserved by Cyprus.
It did not present this issue before the ALJ or the Board and
raises it for the first time in this appeal.
Failure to raise
an issue at the administrative level generally precludes raising
it in a judicial appeal.
See Whittaker v. Hurst, Ky., 39 S.W.3d
819, 821-22 (2001); Yocum v. Conley, Ky. App., 554 S.W.2d 416,
417 (1977).
Thus, Cyprus’ failure to raise this issue earlier
constituted a waiver.
In addition to the procedural barrier, Cyprus’
argument on the psychological issue lacks substantive merit.
Although Dr. Shraberg questioned the use of Oxycontin, he did
diagnose Napier as having a passive/dependent personality, which
renders him more susceptible to stress and depression, and a
psychological adjustment disorder associated with his multiple
surgeries.
Dr. Shraberg recommended that Napier receive further
counseling stressing physical rehabilitation and detoxification
from Oxycontin.
He stated:
19
A psycholopharmacological evaluation may
help deal with depression, hostility, and
anxiety. A solution-focused therapy may be
necessary to help him control his anxiety,
anger and self-defeating thoughts. This
individual is likely to have enduring,
problematic characterological traits. It is
not possible to eliminate these traits, so
clinicians working with him will need to
focus on how to manage these traits in the
physical rehabilitation setting.
Despite his criticism of the use of Oxycontin and
opinion that Napier had no current active psychiatric
impairment, Dr. Shraberg recognized that Napier did experience
psychological symptoms resulting from his physical condition
that required treatment.
The ALJ found Napier totally disabled
as a result of the May 1998 injury with Cyprus liable for 80% of
the income benefits.
Unlike income benefits subject to
apportionment, the current employer is responsible for payment
of medical expenses related to treatment for a work-related
injury.
See, e.g., Derr Construction Co. v. Bennett, Ky., 873
S.W.2d 824 (1994); Robertson v. United Parcel Service, Ky., 64
S.W.3d 284 (2001).
Dr. Shraberg questioned the use of high
doses of Oxycontin but did not state all the expenses associated
with treatment of Napier’s psychological problems were
unnecessary.
We cannot say the Board erred in holding Cyprus
was liable for payment of medical expenses related to Napier’s
psychological problems.
20
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the opinion of
the Workers’ Compensation Board.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE—Marlous
Napier:
Carl M. Brashear
Lexington, Kentucky
Thomas W. Moak
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
21
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