ALCORP, INC. v. HON. WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE TERESA A. BARTON; JILL E. ROBINSON, MAGISTRATE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY; PHILIP W. KRING, MAGISTRATE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY; HOWARD R. DAWSON, MAGISTRATE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY; IRA W. FANNIN, MAGISTRATE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY; HUSTON WELLS, MAGISTRATE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY; J.W. LUTTRELL, MAGISTRATE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY; JAMES E. BOYD, COUNTY ATTORNEY IN FRANKLIN COUNTY; AND FRANKLIN COUNTY FISCAL COURT
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 5, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2002-CA-001806-MR
ALCORP, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HON. WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-CI-01190
TERESA A. BARTON; JILL E. ROBINSON,
MAGISTRATE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY; PHILIP
W. KRING, MAGISTRATE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY;
HOWARD R. DAWSON, MAGISTRATE IN FRANKLIN
COUNTY; IRA W. FANNIN, MAGISTRATE IN
FRANKLIN COUNTY; HUSTON WELLS, MAGISTRATE
IN FRANKLIN COUNTY; J.W. LUTTRELL,
MAGISTRATE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY; JAMES E.
BOYD, COUNTY ATTORNEY IN FRANKLIN COUNTY;
AND FRANKLIN COUNTY FISCAL COURT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
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**
**
**
BARBER, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
Alcorp, Inc. (Alcorp) appeals from the
dismissal of its statutory administrative appeal and petition
for declaratory judgment by the Franklin Circuit Court.
Alcorp
filed both the administrative appeal and the petition for
declaratory judgment after the Franklin County Fiscal Court
(Fiscal Court) voted down a motion to adopt a zone map amendment
sought by Alcorp.
Alcorp claims that the circuit court erred in
dismissing its administrative appeal because Alcorp failed to
name the Fiscal Court as a party pursuant to Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 100.347(3).
Alcorp also claims that the circuit
court erroneously dismissed its petition for declaratory
judgment on the basis that a judgment on the merits would amount
to an advisory opinion.
After reviewing the record and the
arguments of the parties, we conclude that the circuit court
properly dismissed all of Alcorp’s claims.
We therefore affirm.
In March 2001, Alcorp filed an application with the
Frankfort-Franklin County Planning Commission (Planning
Commission) seeking a zoning classification change.
On April
16, 2001, the Planning Commission voted to recommend approval of
the proposed amendment to the Fiscal Court.
The Fiscal Court
then considered the proposed amendment, and on May 17, 2001,
approved on first reading Ordinance No. 9, 2001 Series.
However, on June 1, 2001, at the second reading, the Fiscal
Court voted 4-3 not to adopt the proposed ordinance.
The Fiscal
Court next considered a second ordinance to deny the zone change
request, Ordinance No. 17, 2001 Series.
First reading was given
to this second ordinance on July 19, 2001.
The second reading,
at which time the Fiscal Court voted to deny the zoning
amendment, was held on August 9, 2001.
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On September 5, 2001, Alcorp filed an administrative
appeal pursuant to KRS 100.347 and a petition for declaration of
rights in Franklin Circuit Court.
Alcorp did not name the
Fiscal Court as a party in the caption of its filing.
Alcorp
did, however, name as a party each member of the Fiscal Court
individually in the members’ official capacity, affected service
of process on each member, and identified the Fiscal Court as a
defendant in several paragraphs of the appeal.
Because Alcorp failed to properly name the Fiscal
Court as a party pursuant to KRS 100.347(3), on September 11,
2001, the Appellees filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
perfect the appeal within the thirty-day period required under
the statute.
In response, Alcorp attempted on October 1, 2001,
to amend its pleading pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
15.01 to include the Fiscal Court as a party.
The circuit court
ultimately rejected this amendment on the basis that the Rules
of Civil Procedure do not apply in this situation until the
appeal is perfected.
The circuit court granted the Appellees’ motion to
dismiss the administrative appeal on January 3, 2002, holding
that strict compliance with KRS 100.347(3) is required.
However, this order specifically retained the petition for
declaration of rights included in the original complaint.
Following additional argument concerning the declaratory
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judgment portion of the complaint, the petition for declaratory
judgment was dismissed on May 2, 2002.
Because the Fiscal Court
was not a party to the lawsuit, the circuit court held that
issuing a declaratory judgment on the proposed zone change would
constitute an advisory opinion.
Alcorp next moved to alter,
amend, or vacate the judgment.
On July 30, 2002, the circuit
court denied Alcorp’s motion.
This appeal followed.
Alcorp first argues that the circuit court erred in
dismissing its administrative appeal.
It claims that the
circuit court did have jurisdiction over the Fiscal Court
pursuant to KRS 100.347.
Because Alcorp’s administrative appeal
was not perfected within thirty days of the final action of the
Planning Commission as required by KRS 100.347(3), we disagree.
Appeal to the courts from actions of administrative
agencies is not as a matter of right.
Further, “[w]hen grace to
appeal is granted by statute, a strict compliance with its terms
is required.”
Board of Adjustments of City of Richmond v.
Flood, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1978)(See also Taylor v. Duke, Ky.
App., 896 S.W.2d 618 (1995); Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com’n v.
Providian Agency Group, Inc., Ky. App. 981 S.W.2d 138 (1998)).
An appeal pursuant to KRS 100.347 thus requires strict
compliance with the terms of that statute.
KRS 100.347(3) provides as follows:
4
Any person or entity claiming to be
injured or aggrieved by any final action of
the legislative body of any city, county,
consolidated local government or urbancounty government, relating to a map
amendment shall appeal from the action to
the Circuit Court of the county in which the
property, which is the subject of the map
amendment, lies. Such appeal shall be taken
within thirty (30) days after the final
action of the legislative body. All final
actions which have not been appealed within
thirty (30) days shall not be subject to
judicial review. The legislative body shall
be a party in any such appeal filed in the
Circuit Court. (emphasis added).
This statute unambiguously provides that Alcorp had to name the
Fiscal Court as a party when appealing the denial of its
proposed zone change amendment.
Flood clearly establishes this
principle and addresses all of the issues raised by Alcorp
concerning its administrative appeal.
We disagree with Alcorp’s contention that Flood is
distinguishable from the present case.
is squarely on point.
To the contrary, Flood
In this case, as in Flood, the
legislative body whose decision was being challenged was not
named as a party to the circuit court appeal as required under
KRS 100.347.
In Flood, the Supreme Court held that the circuit
court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
Flood thus
makes clear that under KRS 100.347, the grace of appeal to the
circuit court mandatorily requires the appellant to perfect that
appeal by filing it in the circuit court, including the
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legislative body as a party, within thirty days.
Flood, 581
S.W.2d at 2.
In the present case, the Fiscal Court approved on
August 9, 2001, an ordinance denying the zone change request.
KRS 100.347(5) defines final action as follows: “For purposes of
this chapter, final action shall be deemed to have occurred on
the calendar date when the vote is taken to approve or
disapprove the matter pending before the body.”
Even assuming
August 9, 2001, as the date of final action, which allows Alcorp
the latest date possible to perfect its appeal, the requirements
of KRS 100.347 are not met.
Alcorp filed its appeal and
petition for declaration of rights on September 5, 2001, without
properly naming the Fiscal Court as a party.
On September 8,
2001, the thirty-day limitations period expired and the Fiscal
Court still had not been named as a party.
Thus, Alcorp’s
failure to name the Fiscal Court as a party within the thirtyday limitations period was fatal to its appeal because one of
the conditions precedent to the exercise of judicial power by
the circuit court was not met and it was required to dismiss the
appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Alcorp’s argument that the circuit court did have
jurisdiction of its statutory appeal and that Flood is
distinguishable is unpersuasive.
Alcorp contends that because
the Fiscal Court was included as a defendant in the body of the
6
complaint and because each member of the Fiscal Court was served
individually, that the requirement to include the legislative
body as a party under KRS 100.347 was satisfied by virtue of
notice pleading principles.
However, as discussed above, an
appeal under KRS 100.347, or any administrative appeal, requires
strict compliance with the terms of the statute permitting the
administrative appeal.
Flood, supra.
Merely providing implied
notice of the appeal is not sufficient to constitute an attempt
to include the Fiscal Court as a party.
CR 10.01 states,
concerning the form of pleading in general, that “[i]n the
complaint the style of the action shall include the names of all
the parties[.]”
(emphasis added).
If a party is not included,
the complaint does not comply with CR 10.01 and dismissal of the
action is required if the opposing party timely objects.
McCoy
v. Western Baptist Hospital, Ky. App., 628 S.W.2d 634, 636
(1981).
These principles, together with Flood, persuade us that
the circuit court properly dismissed Alcorp’s appeal.
Alcorp’s next two arguments are so related that they
will be addressed together.
In these arguments, Alcorp contends
that the circuit court erroneously dismissed its petition for
declaratory judgment because the Fiscal Court was properly made
a party to that claim.
We disagree with this contention and
affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Alcorp’s petition for
declaratory judgment.
7
Alcorp’s petition for declaratory judgment sought to
have the Fiscal Court’s actions pertaining to the proposed
amendment subsequent to July 16, 2001 declared void.
Alcorp
argues this is required under KRS 100.211(1), which prescribes
that unless a majority of the Fiscal Court “votes to override
the planning commission’s recommendation” or “the zoning map
amendment shall be deemed to have passed by operation of law.”
However, the portions of Alcorp’s complaint pertaining
to its petition for a declaration of rights merely allege
grounds for an appeal under KRS 100.347(3).
Alcorp could have
raised all of the issues included in its original and amended
actions styled “Appeal and Complaint for Declaration of Rights”
in an appeal under KRS 100.347(3).
Alcorp is thus attempting,
in effect, to raise issues via a petition for declaratory
judgment that were appealable under KRS 100.347.
As previously noted, appeal must be taken and the
legislative body must be named as a party within thirty days of
the final action of the legislative body whose decision is being
appealed from under KRS 100.347(3).
That did not occur here.
As a result, albeit on different grounds, we affirm the circuit
court’s dismissal of Alcorp’s petition for declaration of
rights.
Alcorp relies on Greater Cincinnati Marine Service,
Inc. v. City of Ludlow, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 427 (1980) for the
8
proposition that in an action containing a statutory appeal from
an administrative agency and a petition for declaratory
judgment, a defective statutory appeal may be dismissed and the
declaratory judgment allowed to stand alone.
Alcorp
misinterprets Greater Cincinnati Marine as it applies to the
case at bar, however.
Greater Cincinnati Marine does not save
Alcorp’s petition for declaratory judgment from dismissal.
Greater Cincinnati Marine involved a statutory
appeal from a decision of the Board of Adjustments under KRS
100.347 and a petition for declaratory judgment.
The appeal was
dismissed for failure to comply with KRS 100.347.
The petition
for a declaratory judgment was retained, however, and was held
to not be subject to the requirements of KRS 100.347.
The
Supreme Court in Greater Cincinnati Marine makes it clear that
they only reach this result because the appellant’s filing,
“judged by its content, is far more than an appeal under the
aegis of KRS 100.347(2).”
Id at 429.
To this end, the Court
stated, “It is clear that if the complaint filed by Marine is
simply an appeal from the decision of the Board of Adjustments,
the failure to join the planning commission is fatal.”
428.
Id at
(emphasis added).
Alcorp’s original and amended “Appeal and Complaint
for Declaration of Rights” are not “far more than an appeal
under . . . KRS 100.347(2).”
Id at 429.
9
Alcorp’s argument that
it was aggrieved by actions of the Fiscal Court occurring after
its amendment took effect by operation of law falls within the
purview of KRS 100.347.
KRS 100.347(3) states, “Any person or
entity claiming to be injured or aggrieved by any final action
of the legislative body . . . shall appeal from the action to
the Circuit Court[.]”
Alcorp claims to have been aggrieved by a
final action of the Fiscal Court occurring after July 16, 2001.
If the same allegations with respect to the jurisdiction of the
Fiscal Court over Alcorp’s proposed amendment were raised in a
statutory appeal, their propriety would be undoubted.
Alcorp thus finds itself in a situation where its
petition for a declaratory judgment, judged by its contents, is
merely an appeal.
As a result, Greater Cincinnati Marine does
not apply in the manner Alcorp urges, and strict adherence with
KRS 100.347 is required.
Given this context, we must again
recognize that, “[s]ince an appeal from an administrative
decision is a matter of legislative grace and not a right, the
failure to follow the statutory guidelines for an appeal is
fatal.”
Taylor v. Duke, Ky. App., 896 S.W.2d 618, 621 (1995).
(See Frisby v. Board of Education of Boyle County, Ky. App., 707
S.W.2d 359 (1986); Flood, supra.)
Dismissal of Alcorp’s alleged
petition for declaratory judgment by the circuit court was thus
proper.
10
The final argument raised by Alcorp is that the
misnomer rule discussed in Jones v. Baptist Healthcare System,
Inc., Ky. App., 964 S.W.2d 805 (1997), applies in the case at
bar.
Alcorp argues that this rule requires its declaratory
judgment action not be dismissed.
We disagree, and therefore
affirm the circuit court’s order on this issue.
Because, as previously noted, all of Alcorp’s
arguments on appeal are barred since the requirements of KRS
100.347 are not satisfied, the misnomer rule does not apply in
this case.
The misnomer rule is concerned with mitigating
potential harshness of CR 15.03 on the relation back of
amendments.
Alcorp’s attempted amendment is not of concern in
this appeal because it clearly falls outside the thirty-day
limitation required by KRS 100.347(3).
The misnomer rule thus
does not apply in this situation and strict application of the
statute in an appeal by grace requires this result.
In summary, appeal of a Fiscal Court’s decision under
KRS 100.347(3) requires strict compliance with that statute.
Alcorp failed to comply with its requirements, thus requiring
dismissal of its statutory appeal.
Alcorp’s declaratory
judgment action also required dismissal because it was merely an
appeal when judged on its terms and did not comply with KRS
100.347.
11
For the foregoing reasons the order of the Franklin
Circuit Court dismissing Appellant Alcorp’s statutory appeal and
declaratory judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Prentice A. Harvey
Frankfort, Kentucky
Richard M. Sullivan
Scott A. Johnson
Conliffe, Sandmann & Sullivan,
PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
12
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