JAMES D. SCHMITT v. HENDERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY; RONALD E. JOHNSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
January 31, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-001795-WC
JAMES D. SCHMITT
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 01-98685
v.
HENDERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY;
RONALD E. JOHNSON, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND THE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
In February 2001, in the course of his employment
with Henderson Electric Company, James Schmitt fell and struck
his left knee.
He had injured the same knee several other times
during the preceding eighteen years, in accidents unrelated to
work, but apparently this fall made a bad situation much worse.
Schmitt underwent surgery about a month after the accident.
was at least his third knee surgery, but whereas the earlier
surgeries had provided a measure of relief from pain and had
This
enabled Schmitt to return to work, this surgery was not as
successful.
The knee remained extremely sore and stiff and
severely limited Schmitt=s ability to walk, stand, crawl, or
bend.
The pain also interfered with his ability to concentrate.
In September 2001, Schmitt applied for workers= compensation
benefits.
He claimed to be totally and permanently disabled.
By
order entered March 27, 2002, an administrative law judge (ALJ)
found that Schmitt was indeed unable to perform any kind of work.
Nevertheless he awarded benefits for only partial disability
(calculated in accordance with KRS 342.730(1)(b)) because a
significant portion of Schmitt=s impairment, he believed, was a
result not of the February 2001 work incident but of Schmitt=s
prior injuries.
Schmitt appealed from that ruling to the Workers=
Compensation Board.
His argument was essentially two-fold.
First, he contended that the ALJ had unlawfully extrapolated from
the medical testimony when he apportioned Schmitt=s impairment
between current and prior injuries.
Second, he maintained that,
even if a portion of his disability was deemed unrelated to the
work injury, his award should still have been based on total
disability (in accordance with KRS 342.730(1)(a)) rather than
partial disability.
By order entered July 31, 2002, the Board
rejected these contentions and affirmed the ALJ=s award.
Schmitt
thereupon appealed to this Court, where he raises the same two
issues he brought before the Board.
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We too affirm.
Under the version of the Workers= Compensation Act1
applicable to Schmitt=s injury, to be eligible for either partial
or total disability benefits, a worker must show that he or she
has suffered a work-related injury or disease that has given rise
to a whole-body impairment as determined by the American Medical
Association=s AGuides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.@
The worker must then further show that the impairment has
resulted in either a partial or a total inability to work.2
In this case, Dr. David Thurman examined Schmitt in
October 2001 and testified on his behalf to the effect that
Schmitt=s knee showed significant signs of degenerative disease
and post-operative degenerative changes.
percent impairment under the AGuides.@
He assigned an eight
Based apparently on
Schmitt=s having told him that he had had little trouble with the
knee since his last surgery in 1990, Dr. Thurman opined that all
of Schmitt=s current impairment could be attributed to the
February 2001 injury.
Against this evidence, the employer presented the
testimony of Dr. Thomas Reichard, the physician who had performed
at least one of Schmitt=s prior surgeries, the one in 1990, and
who had overseen his treatment until about 1994 and then had seen
Schmitt again beginning in 1999.
He testified that Schmittâs
knee was seriously damaged at least as early as the 1990 surgery
1
KRS Chapter 342.
2
McNutt Construction v. Scott, Ky., 40 S.W.3d 854 (2001).
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and that the re-examination in 1999 had shown that the earlier
repairs had degenerated.
At that time, he had recommended that
Schmitt wear a brace and had given him a series of Hyalgan
injections.
Although he had not examined Schmitt after the
latest incident, it was his opinion that Schmitt had had an eight
percent impairment a year before the work-related injury
occurred.
On the basis of this testimony, the employer argued
that none of Schmitt=s impairment should be attributed to the
recent injury.
Although the parties thus tried to confront the ALJ
with an all-or-nothing choice, the ALJ instead rejected both
extremes and ruled that Schmitt=s eight-percent impairment would
be attributed half to his prior injuries and half to the recent
one.
He justified this result by noting that Dr. Thurman had
apparently not had the benefit of an accurate history of
Schmitt=s problems and that Dr. Reichard had not had the benefit
of a post-injury examination.
On the one hand, Dr. Reichard=s
testimony strongly suggested that Schmitt had incurred some
degree of pre-injury impairment.
Dr. Thurman=s testimony, on the
other hand, was good evidence that with his recent injury
Schmitt=s impairment had become worse.
Splitting the difference,
the ALJ believed, was fair to all concerned.
The Board agreed
and so do we.
Schmitt notes, rightly, that ALJs are generally not
authorized to arrive at their own impairment assessments, but
must make their findings in accordance with medical testimony.
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Because there was no expert testimony attributing a four-percent
impairment to his February 2001 injury, Schmitt insists that the
ALJ exceeded his authority by making a four-percent finding.
Schmitt reads this rule too narrowly, however.
Although ALJs are
not authorized to make impairment findings in excess of or at
odds with the expert assessments, they are authorized, indeed
they will often be obliged, to choose from among such testimony
and to make reasonable inferences from it.3
We agree with the
Board that the ALJ did not abuse this discretion.
He found, in
accordance with the only expert testimony provided, that
Schmitt=s impairment rating was eight percent.
His further
finding that some of that impairment was attributable to
Schmitt=s prior injuries and some to his February 2001 injury was
a reasonable inference from the competing medical opinions, both
of which were based on less than all of the pertinent
information.
It is true that the ALJ=s choice of four-percent as
the impairment attributable to the work-place injury, as opposed
to five-percent, say, or two-percent, was arbitrary with respect
to the medical proof.
But it was not unreasonable.
On the
contrary, we agree with the Board that it was a reasonable and
fair response to the limited information the parties submitted.
The ALJ also found, in agreement with Schmitt and Dr.
Thurman, that Schmitt was completely and permanently unable to
perform any type of work.
Schmitt contends that this finding
3
Ira A. Watson Department Store v. Hamilton, Ky., 34 S.W.3d 48 (2000); Jackson v.
General Refractories Company, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 10 (1979).
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amounts to a finding of total and permanent disability and that
his award should thus have been half (in line with the fact that
half of his impairment was deemed work-related.) of the award for
total disability provided for in KRS 342.730(1)(a).
Unfortunately for Schmitt, the cases he cites in support of this
contention have been superceded by changes in the Workers=
Compensation Act.
Under the version of the Act applicable to
Schmitt=s injury, Apermanent total disability@ means not just the
inability to perform any type of work, but rather the Ainability
to perform any type of work as a result of an injury,@4 where
Ainjury@ means a work-related harmful change in the human
organism.5
The ALJ found that some of Schmitt=s inability to
work was attributable to his nonwork-related impairment.
The ALJ
correctly ruled, therefore, that Schmitt was not totally disabled
under the Act.
Indeed, KRS 342.730(1)(a), which provides for the
calculation of total disability awards, excludes nonwork-related
impairment from the determination of total disability.
Our
Supreme Court has stated that this statutory exclusion renders a
claim such as Schmitt=s--where the claimant suffers from a prior,
active, nonwork-related disability and where the work-related
injury is not alone sufficient to cause total disability--a claim
for partial disability only.6
4
KRS 342.0011(11)(c).
5
The ALJ did not err, therefore, by
KRS 342.0011(1).
6
Spurlin v. Adkins, Ky., 940 S.W.2d 900 (1997); Edwards v. Louisville Ladder, Ky.
App., 957 S.W.2d 290 (1997).
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finding Schmitt only partially disabled, notwithstanding his
complete inability to work, and by calculating his benefits
accordingly pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(b) rather than KRS
342.730(1)(a).
Schmitt=s contention that this result is unfair
would be better addressed to the General Assembly.
In sum, we agree with the Workers= Compensation Board
that the ALJ=s apportionment of Schmitt=s impairment was not an
abuse of discretion and that, given that apportionment, Schmitt
was entitled only to partial disability benefits.
Accordingly,
we affirm the Board=s July 31, 2002, order.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Robert L. Catlett, Jr.
Sales, Tillman & Wallbaum
LPPC
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE HENDERSON
ELECTRIC COMPANY:
David L. Murphy
Clark & Ward Attorneys
Louisville, Kentucky
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