MICHAEL D. SPALDING, SR. v. TIMAL N. HALL
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RENDERED:
October 3, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001778-DR
MICHAEL D. SPALDING, SR.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN K. MERSHON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-XX-000044 AND 02-XX-000045
v.
TIMAL N. HALL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, JOHNSON AND PAISLEY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
This Court granted Michael D. Spalding, Sr.’s
petition for discretionary review of an opinion and order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court entered on July 25, 2002, which affirmed
a judgment of the Jefferson Family Court entered on March 1,
2002.
The family court’s judgment modified its earlier order of
child support and ordered Spalding to pay $55.15 per week in
child support commencing on July 24, 2001, plus $14.85 per week
toward arrearages totaling $18,763.35, for a total weekly
payment of $70.00.
Having concluded that the Jefferson Family
Court did not err either in establishing the original child
support obligation or in later modifying that obligation, we
affirm.
On May 26, 2000, Timal Hall, the appellee herein,
filed a complaint with the Jefferson Family Court alleging that
Spalding was the father of her two children1 and seeking an
appropriate amount of child support.
On February 27, 2001,
after Spalding admitted to being the father of both children,
the family court entered an order establishing paternity.
On
May 25, 2001, the family court held a hearing on the issue of
child support which was attended by Hall but not by Spalding or
his counsel.2
At the hearing held on May 25, 2001, the family court
ordered Spalding to pay child support in the amount of $1,226.59
per month.
The child support was calculated based upon a
determination of the “needs of the child” pursuant to KRS3
403.211(5), rather than the statutory child support guidelines
1
Spalding and Hall were never married and ceased living together sometime
around May 2000. Michael was born on March 17, 1993, and Mason was born on
November 18, 1994.
2
The original hearing to determine child support was scheduled for February
26, 2001, but was continued twice; once to May 11, 2000, and thereafter to
May 25, 2001. Spalding claims that he went to court on May 11, 2001, but was
told by court personnel that he would receive notice of the new hearing date.
Spalding claims that he received no notice of the hearing held on May 25,
2001. The family court accepted Spalding’s explanation and declined to hold
Spalding in contempt of court for failing to make child support payments
pursuant to the order entered on May 25, 2001.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2-
under KRS 403.212.
Spalding was also ordered to pay an
additional amount of $23.41 per month, representing arrearages
which had accrued from May 26, 2000, when Hall filed her request
for child support until May 25, 2001, the date the child support
order was entered.4
When Spalding was jailed on July 24, 2001, on
unrelated charges, he had not made any child support payments
pursuant to the order of May 25, 2001.
As a result of
Spalding’s failure to make any child support payments, on
October 29, 2001, the Jefferson County Attorney’s Office
requested that he be held in contempt of court.
On November 16,
2001, Spalding filed a motion for the family court to modify his
child support obligation.
After several continuances, a hearing
was held on March 1, 2002, and the family court considered both
the Jefferson County Attorney’s contempt motion and Spalding’s
motion to set aside or modify the child support order entered
approximately nine months earlier.
At this hearing, both Hall and Spalding presented
evidence regarding the parties’ relationship and their economic
status during the years 1996 through 2001.
Spalding also
testified in his own defense on the contempt motion.
The family
court declined to hold Spalding in contempt of court for failing
to make any child support payments, finding that he had not
4
The amount of arrearages for that time period totaled $14,719.08.
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received proper notice of the hearing held on May 25, 2001, when
the child support order was entered.
The family court further
ruled that the original amount of child support ordered at
$1,226.59 per month would remain unchanged until Spalding became
incarcerated on July 24, 2001.
Finally, the family court
modified Spalding’s monthly child support obligation for the
period in which he was in jail and thus less able to earn
income.
The family court ultimately ordered Spalding to pay
$55.15 per week in child support and $14.85 per week on the
arrearages.
The child support arrearages included child support
that had accrued from the date of the original child support
order of May 25, 2001, which established a $1,226.59 monthly
obligation.5
Spalding appealed the order of March 1, 2002, to the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
On July 25, 2002, the circuit court
affirmed the family court’s order, concluding that the family
court had not abused its discretion either in first establishing
Spalding’s child support obligation or in subsequently modifying
that obligation. Spalding then filed a motion for discretionary
review, which this Court granted on October 30, 2002.
5
The total arrearage amount of $18,763.35 breaks down in the following
manner. The original child support obligation of $1,226.59 per month was
ordered for the time period from when Hall filed her request for child
support on May 26, 2000, until the time Spalding was incarcerated on July 24,
2001. Arrearages from this time period totaled $17,164.00. The final
$1,599.35 in arrearages reflects the $70.00 per month obligation which became
effective when Spalding was incarcerated on July 24, 2001, until the date the
modified child support order was entered on March 1, 2002.
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Spalding’s first and primary claim of error is that
the family court erred in establishing his original child
support obligation at $1,226.59 per month.
Specifically,
Spalding argues:
On May 25, 2001, the court entered its
original child support payment order without
regard to the statutory child support
guidelines set out in KRS 403.212. . . .
Instead, the court merely accepted Ms.
Hall’s speculative estimate of $1,250.00 per
month [ ] at face value and without
consulting the guidelines at all. The
evidence was, therefore, insufficient for
the court to enter this payment order.
Moreover, no reason for deviating from the
guidelines was noted in the record [citation
to record omitted].
The resolution of this alleged error rests on the
interpretation and construction of two statutory provisions
found under KRS 403.211.
Since the exact language of these
provisions is crucial to our decision, we will set out the
relevant provisions in full.
KRS 403.211(2) provides:
At the time of initial establishment of
a child support order, whether temporary or
permanent, or in any proceeding to modify a
support order, the child support guidelines
in KRS 403.212 shall serve as a rebuttable
presumption for the establishment or
modification of the amount of child support.
Courts may deviate from the guidelines where
their application would be unjust or
inappropriate. Any deviation shall be
accompanied by a written finding or specific
finding on the record by the court,
specifying the reason for the deviation.
KRS 403.211(5) provides:
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When a party has defaulted or the court
is otherwise presented with insufficient
evidence to determine gross income, the
court shall order child support based upon
the needs of the child or the previous
standard of living of the child, whichever
is greater. An order entered by default or
due to insufficient evidence to determine
gross income may be modified upward and
arrearages awarded from the date of the
original order if evidence of gross income
is presented within two (2) years which
would have established a higher amount of
child support pursuant to the child support
guidelines set forth in KRS 403.212.
Spalding argues that establishing a child support
obligation based upon the “needs of the child” standard under
KRS 403.211(5) constitutes a “deviation” from the child support
guidelines within the meaning of KRS 403.211(2).
Hence, he
contends that before the family court could have applied the
“needs of the child” standard, the court was first required to
make specific factual findings on the record explaining why the
child support guidelines of KRS 403.212 would not be used to
determine his child support obligation.
Spalding then asserts
that since the family court made no such findings, the order
requiring him to pay $1,226.59 per month in child support was
improper.
We reject Spalding’s interpretation of these
provisions.
The child support guidelines under KRS 403.212 use the
“combined monthly adjusted parental gross income” as the basis
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for determining a parent’s child support obligation.6
Hence, it
follows that before the guideline tables can be applied, a trial
court must first determine each parent’s “gross income.”
After
the gross income is determined, KRS 403.211(2) permits a trial
court to “deviate” from the amount specified in the guideline
tables if that amount would be “unjust or inappropriate” under
the facts of that particular case.
Thus, a “deviation” as the
term is used under KRS 403.211(2), refers to those cases where
it is possible to determine each parent’s gross income, but
peculiar circumstances justify a payment obligation different
than that amount specified under the statutory guidelines.7
On the other hand, KRS 403.211(5) specifically states
that the “needs of the child” standard is to be used in those
cases where “a party has defaulted or the court is otherwise
presented with insufficient evidence to determine gross income”
[emphasis added].8
Hence, when a court uses the “needs of the
child” standard in lieu of the statutory guidelines to set child
support, it is not deviating from those guidelines.
Rather, the
statutory scheme provides for an alternative measure that a
trial court can utilize to determine the appropriate child
support obligation, if it is not possible to determine each
6
KRS 403.212(2)(g).
7
See Rainwater v. Williams, Ky.App., 930 S.W.2d 405 (1996).
8
KRS 403.211(5).
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parent’s gross income.
Therefore, when there is no “deviation”
within the meaning of KRS 403.211(2), a trial court is not
obligated to make specific findings explaining why the statutory
guidelines will not be used to determine the appropriate child
support obligation.
At the hearing held on February 19, 2001, the family
court directed both parties9 to be prepared to present proof
regarding their respective incomes at a subsequent hearing
scheduled to determine the appropriate child support obligation.
The family court also expressly advised counsel for Spalding
that the court would be “inclined” to grant child support based
upon the “needs of the child” standard if Spalding were to fail
to present proof of his income.
On May 25, 2001, when the family court ordered
Spalding to pay $1,226.59 per month in child support, the order
was in fact based upon the “needs of the child” standard.
Such
action was proper since the record up until that date was devoid
of any evidence whatsoever regarding Spalding’s income during
the relevant time period, but it did include evidence presented
by Hall outlining the needs of the two children.
Although
Spalding was not present when this original child support order
was entered, he has not argued that his absence at this hearing
prevented him from offering proof of his income.
9
It should also
Hall was in attendance at this hearing, but Spalding was not.
counsel for Spalding was present at the hearing on this date.
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However,
be noted that in the approximate two-year period from the time
Hall first filed her complaint until the date of the final child
support order, Spalding’s only proffered evidence regarding his
income was his brief testimony on March 1, 2002, wherein he
stated that he had been unable to find employment since
approximately 1999.
Thus, it is clear that as of May 25, 2001,
the family court had insufficient evidence by which to determine
Spalding’s gross income.
The court therefore properly ordered
child support based upon the “needs of the child” standard.
Contrary to Spalding’s assertion, the family court’s
use of the “needs of the child” standard was not a “deviation”
from the child support guidelines under KRS 403.212.
Thus, the
family court was under no obligation to make factual findings
explaining why the guidelines would not be followed.
Accordingly, Spalding’s claim that the family court erred in
failing to make such findings is without merit.
Spalding’s final claim of error is that the family
court abused its discretion in affirming his original payment
obligation in part on March 1, 2002:
Although the court had the opportunity
to remedy [the original payment order] on
March 1, 2002, when it properly listened to
testimony from both parties concerning their
respective incomes in 2000 and 2001, the
court once again merely accepted the
$1,226.59 amount without any factual basis.
At that hearing, Timal Hall provided no
evidence as to [Spalding’s] income for 2000
-9-
and 2001 and ultimately admitted that she did
not know his income on May 25, 2001. . . .
In fact, the only evidence presented
concerning [Spalding’s] income for those
years was [Spalding’s] own testimony that he
was unemployed.
First, we note that Spalding has apparently conceded
that there is little to no evidence in the record regarding his
income for the relevant time period.
This absence of evidence
is precisely why it was proper for the family court to use the
alternative “needs of the child” standard in determining
Spalding’s child support obligation.
Second, based upon our
review of the record, we cannot say that the family court abused
its discretion in affirming the original child support order in
part on March 1, 2002.
In Downing v. Downing,10 this Court discussed the
standard of review for appellate courts in child support
matters:
Kentucky trial courts have been given
broad discretion in considering a parent's
assets and setting correspondingly
appropriate child support. . . . However, a
trial court's discretion is not unlimited.
The test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial judge's decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles.
In the case at bar, we find no abuse of discretion by the family
court.
10
Ky.App., 45 S.W.3d 449, 454 (2001).
-10-
As Spalding himself has noted, the only evidence
available to the family court regarding his income for the
relevant time period was his bald assertion that he had been
unable to find employment since approximately 1999.
However,
based upon evidence provided by Hall, the family court
specifically found that Spalding was a “talented entrepreneur”
who had both made a great deal of money in the past and who was
also capable of continued financial success.
Coupling this fact
with the absence of any significant evidence related to
Spalding’s income, the family court found that the original
amount of child support of $1,226.59 per month was an
“appropriate amount.”
Recognizing however, that Spalding’s
incarceration hampered his ability to earn income, the family
court modified his monthly obligation to reflect this change of
circumstances.
Based upon these facts, we cannot say that the
family court abused its discretion in finding that the $1,226.59
per month obligation was an “appropriate amount” for the time
period prior to Spalding’s incarceration.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the opinion and order
of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Elizabeth B. McMahon
Louisville, Kentucky
Jason E. Taylor
Assistant County Attorney
Louisville, Kentucky
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