PHILIP HISEL v. TRIM MASTERS, INC.
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RENDERED: JUNE 27, 2003; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001759-MR
PHILIP HISEL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00303
TRIM MASTERS, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE. Philip Hisel (“Hisel”) appeals from a summary
judgment of the Jessamine Circuit Court in his action alleging
that his former employer, Trim Masters, Inc. (“TMI”), unlawfully
discriminated against him in violation of KRS 344.040 et. seq.
when it failed to reasonably accommodate him and terminated his
employment because of his disability.
The circuit court found
that Hisel failed to establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination, and accordingly rendered a summary judgment in
favor of TMI.
We affirm the summary judgment.
Hisel began his employment with TMI in Jessamine
County, Kentucky in 1996.
Hisel’s job duties consisted of
working on an assembly line making seats for Toyota automobiles.
On the production line, referred to as the left front assembly
line, 9 employees each had specific duties.
Under the system
used at TMI, an employee would work at a particular position for
two hours, then move to the next position in the line.
Hisel was injured during the course of his employment
in December, 1998, when he was pulling a seat and felt his back
pop.
He was examined by the plant physician assistant the
following day, who placed him on modified duty and limited the
repetitive use of his back.
The following month, Hisel was
examined by a physician, Dr. John Allen (“Dr. Allen”), who
diagnosed a lumbosacral strain and degenerative disc disease,
and who recommended that Hisel remain on light duty.
Thereafter, Hisel’s work assignment was limited to the two
positions on the production line which placed the least amount
of strain on his back.
In April, 1999, orthopedic surgeon Dr.
Thomas Menke (“Dr. Menke”) diagnosed Hisel with a herniated
lumbosacral disc, and later in the summer Hisel received
chiropractic treatment.
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All TMI employees were subject to an attendance
policy, which provided that excessive unexcused absenteeism
would result in the issuance of a reprimand referred to by TMI
as a “corrective action.”
Two or more corrective actions could
result in the termination of employment.
Hisel received
corrective actions on February 8, 1999, and June 1, 1999.
Hisel’s vehicle was repossessed on July 14, 1999, and
he failed to show up for work.
Hisel contacted TMI employee
David Ruggles (“Ruggles”) and human resources administrator
Virginia Rustay (“Rustay”) regarding his absence, and told one
or both of them that his car had broken down.
The following
day, he called again and stated that his doctor had advised him
not to come to work.
On July 16, 1999, Hisel brought in a note from Dr.
Menke requesting that Hisel be excused from work for back pain
from July 14, 1999, to July 16, 1999.
On July 16, 1999, human
resource manager Larry Fletcher (“Fletcher”) determined that
Hisel had not been seen by Dr. Menke and had received the
medical excuse after calling the doctor’s office and speaking to
an assistant.
Hisel received a third corrective action shortly
thereafter.
It stated that his employment was being terminated
because he had lied about the basis for his July 14, 1999,
absence (his car being broken down), and because he had not
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actually seen Dr. Menke before getting the medical excuse.
Hisel met with Fletcher on August 3, 1999, and Fletcher stated
that Hisel was being suspended pending termination for
submitting false information to obtain a leave of absence, and
for providing false information on his employment application in
violation of TMI policy.
The false information on the
employment application related to Hisel failing to note that he
had been terminated from a prior job for absenteeism.
Hisel’s
employment with TMI was terminated.
Hisel filed the instant action in Jessamine Circuit
Court on May 16, 2001.
He alleged therein that TMI unlawfully
discriminated against him in violation of KRS Chapter 344 when
it failed to reasonably accommodate him and terminated him
because of his disability.
After discovery was conducted, TMI
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing therein that Hisel
was not a qualified individual with a disability and, even if he
was, he could not establish that TMI’s reason for terminating
his employment was mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.
On June 27, 2002, the circuit court sustained the motion and
rendered a summary judgment in favor of TMI.
Hisel’s motion to
amend the judgment was unsuccessful, and this appeal followed.
Hisel now argues that the circuit court committed
reversible error in sustaining TMI’s motion for summary
judgment.
He maintains that the court erred in failing to rule
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that he was entitled to discovery materials relating to job
descriptions which became open while he was on light duty at
TMI, as well as the names and personal information of employees
who received the open positions.
He also argues that the court
erred in granting summary judgment because issues of fact
remained unresolved.
As part of this second argument, he
maintains that the court improperly ruled that an accommodation
that requires an employer to violate a disability-neutral rule
is not a reasonable accommodation, and claims that questions of
fact exists as to whether TMI took part in an interactive
process to address the issue of accommodation as required by
statute.
He also argues that an issue of fact exists as to
whether TMI’s reasons for terminating his employment were
actually pretexts for unlawful discrimination.
He seeks to have
the summary judgment reversed, and the matter remanded for
additional discovery and trial.
On Hisel’s first argument, he asserts that he was
entitled to discover all written job descriptions and all
documents showing the job duties, educational qualifications and
physical qualifications for the positions that came available
when he was on light duty.
He also claims that he was entitled
to the names, home addresses, and other information relating to
the 25 employees who received the open positions.
Hisel
apparently argues that he needed this discovery material in
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order to show that the transfer policy was not consistently
applied to disqualify individuals with active corrective
actions.
We find no error.
At issue is whether, as TMI
maintains, it barred Hisel from receiving a transfer to these
posted positions because he was subject to an active corrective
action, or whether there existed an unlawful, discriminatory
purpose for the action.
In denying Hisel’s motion to compel,
the circuit court opined Hisel was not entitled to such
discovery because his active corrective actions made him
ineligible for transfers like any other employee who had the
same number of active corrective actions.
refutes this conclusion.
Nothing in the record
Hisel did receive discovery material
on the 25 posted positions, as well as the identities of all
persons who sought transfers and the persons who received them.
The circuit court opined that he was entitled to no additional
data as it related to this issue, and we find no basis in the
record or the law for tampering with that conclusion.
Hisel’s second argument, and the corpus of his appeal,
is that the circuit court improperly sustained TMI’s motion for
summary judgment because issues of fact remain to be resolved.
Having closely studied the record, the law, and the written
arguments, we find no error on this issue.
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One of the stated purposes of KRS Chapter 344 is to
provide for execution within the Commonwealth of the policies
embodied in various federal laws, including federal civil rights
acts and the Americans with Disabilities Act. KRS 344.020(1)(a).
As such, Kentucky courts look to federal law for guidance in
interpreting the state statute.
Harker v. Federal Land Bank of
Louisville, Ky., 679 S.W.2d 226, 229 (1984).
United States
Supreme Court decisions regarding the federal statutes "are most
persuasive, if not controlling, in interpreting the Kentucky
statute." Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v. Commonwealth, Dept.
of Justice, Ky. App., 586 S.W.2d 270, 271 (1979).
Therefore,
any claim arising under KRS Chapter 344 is properly analyzed
under both state and federal case law.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the United States Supreme
Court established an allocation of proof framework which applies
in discrimination cases.
The court noted that the plaintiff has
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. If
the plaintiff is successful, the burden of production then
shifts to the employer.
Id. It then becomes the duty of the
employer to articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason
for the employer's actions.
Assuming the employer meets
Id.
its burden of proof, the plaintiff is then afforded the
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opportunity to show that the employer's reasons are mere
pretext.
Id. at 804.
The first question on this issue is whether Hisel set
forth a prima facie case of discrimination.
In McKay v. Toyota
Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997), the
federal court described the elements necessary to establish a
prima facie case of disability discrimination.
The court stated
that the claimant had to show (1) that he is a disabled person
within the meaning of the Act, (2) that he is qualified to
perform the essential functions of his job with or without
reasonable accommodation, and (3) that he suffered an adverse
employment decision because of his disability.
Id.
at 371. In
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742,
125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), the Supreme Court noted that the
"establishment of a prima facie case in effect creates a
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against
the employee."
590 U.S. at 506.
As TMI notes, Hisel stated in deposition that he
agreed with his chiropractor’s assessment that his back injury
prohibited him from ever working again at the position he held
at the time of the injury; that he was incapable of working at
the wires position, which was among the easiest of the jobs;
and, that “any positions in the plant on the lines themselves
would have conflicted” with his doctors’ recommendations against
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using his injured back.
(See Hisel deposition, pp. 193–200).
He went on to state that all of the production, maintenance, and
material handlings jobs in the plant required the type of
repetitive lifting, bending and squatting from which he was
restricted.
One may reasonably conclude from Hisel’s own
statements that he was unable to perform any production,
maintenance, or material handling job in the plant.
As such, it
would be impossible for him to satisfy the second element of
McKay, supra, to wit, that he was qualified to perform the
essential functions of his job with or without reasonable
accommodation.
The failure to satisfy this element, taken
alone, means that Hisel could not establish a prima facie case
of discrimination, and it forms a basis upon which the trial
court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of TMI.
See
generally, Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., Ky.,
807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
Arguendo, even if Hisel could have established a prima
facie case pursuant to McKay, TMI was able to offer rebuttal
evidence that its reasons for terminating his employment were
not a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
See McDonnell
Douglas Corp., supra, requiring the employer to articulate some
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employer's actions.
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Human resource manager Fletcher stated in deposition that
Hisel failed to indicate on his employment application that he
had been discharged from prior employment within the last three
years for excessive absenteeism.
This was especially relevant
to TMI management in light of the fact that Hisel’s February 9,
1999, and June 1, 1999 corrective actions resulted from
absenteeism.
TMI’s Rules of Conduct manual provided that
providing false information on any company document could result
in the immediate termination of employment.
Since TMI had a
written employee policy in effect at the time of Hisel’s
termination, and as evidence exists in the record that Hisel
violated that policy, TMI would have been able to rebut a prima
facie case if one had been made.
Again, this fact, taken alone,
is a basis upon which we may affirm the circuit court’s entry of
summary judgment.
Lastly, Hisel argues that a question of fact exists as
to whether TMI took part in an interactive process as required
by statute for the purpose of determining if an accommodation
can be reached.
The record does not support this assertion.
TMI and Hisel engaged in an ongoing process over several months
in an attempt to accommodate Hisel’s needs, resulting in Hisel’s
assignment to perform only two of the nine functions on the
assembly line.
termination.
Hisel continued in this capacity until his
It cannot reasonably be argued that TMI failed to
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engage in an interactive process, and we find no error on this
issue.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the summary
judgment of the Jessamine Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Tracey E. Burkett
Richmond, KY
Craig P. Siegenthaler
Louisville, KY
Tiffany Stoker Madsen
Louisville, KY
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