GRIFFIN INDUSTRIES, INC. v. HON. LEONARD L. KOPOWSKI, JUDGE TURNER ENVIROLOGIC, INC.
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 12, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001714-MR
GRIFFIN INDUSTRIES, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HON. LEONARD L. KOPOWSKI, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00586
TURNER ENVIROLOGIC, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE:
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BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Griffin Industries, Inc. (Griffin) appeals
from an order of the Campbell Circuit Court dismissing its cause
of action for lack of personal jurisdiction over the appellee,
Turner Envirologic, Inc. (Turner).
Griffin has its principal
place of business in Kentucky and is incorporated in Kentucky.
Turner has its principal place of business in Florida and is
incorporated in Florida.
The Campbell Circuit Court found that
Kentucky could not assert personal jurisdiction over Turner.
The circuit court stated the correct test for specific
jurisdiction, but erroneously based its decision on a general
jurisdiction inquiry.
Griffin argues that minimum contacts
necessary for finding specific jurisdiction are present and that
personal jurisdiction can be asserted over Turner under
Kentucky’s long-arm statute, KRS1 454.210.
Griffin.
We agree with
Therefore, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
Turner does not have offices in Kentucky, is not
licensed to do business in Kentucky, and has never conducted any
previous business in Kentucky.
However, in 1999, Art Eberle of
Compliance Assurance Associates, Inc., contacted Griffin to
solicit business on behalf of Turner.
Eberle is an independent
contractor and manufacturer’s representative for several
companies, including Turner.
Eberle represents Turner in
Kentucky pursuant to a contract, and is assigned to the western
territory of the state.
Although Eberle is authorized to make
non-binding price estimates for Turner, he is not authorized to
form contracts or make bids for Turner.
Eberle visited Griffin at its primary Kentucky offices
either three or four times.
During these visits, Eberle became
aware of needs Griffin had for products Turner sells.
Eberle
contacted Turner to inform it of this potential business.
As a
result, Turner mailed to Griffin a proposal for a Regenerative
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
Thermal Oxidizer (RTO) for a plant Griffin owns in Pennsylvania.
Turner was not awarded the Pennsylvania contract.
However, officials at Griffin mentioned to Eberle an
interest in purchasing other products from Turner.
As a result,
Tom Turner, President of Turner, contacted Griffin to discuss
other potential business between the two corporations.
Turner
mailed a proposal dated October 23, 2000, to Griffin for an RTO
at a plant Griffin owns in Alabama.
RTO exceeded $300,000.
The quoted price for the
Negotiations continued between the two
corporations via phone and mail, and Jack Crowley of Griffin
visited Turner in Florida to inspect the RTO.
A contract was
formed for purchase of the RTO, for installation of the RTO at
Griffin’s Alabama plant, and for training at the Alabama plant
to operate the RTO.
Over the course of the next two years, Griffin and
Turner negotiated for other products to be used at plants
Griffin owns in Kentucky.
These discussions apparently followed
the same sequence of events described previously, with Griffin
expressing an interest in Turner’s products to Eberle and then
Turner sending proposals by mail or telephone.
These further
negotiations did not result in the formation of additional
contracts between Griffin and Turner.
During the two years following installation of the
Alabama Plant RTO, Griffin encountered problems with it not
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operating up to design specifications and needing repairs.
As a
result, Griffin filed a complaint for rescission of contract,
breach of contract, breach of warranty, and unjust enrichment on
May 3, 2002, in the Campbell Circuit Court.
On July 8, 2002,
Turner filed its “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of In Personam
Jurisdiction.”
The Campbell Circuit Court, by order dated
August 2, 2002, granted Turner’s motion.
This appeal followed.
Review of a dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction is de novo.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the
Water Pub., 327 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir. 2003).
A de novo
standard is used, in part, because “‘[t]he decision to exercise
personal jurisdiction is a question of law based on the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution.’”
Id. (quoting Tobin v.
Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-472, 105 S.
Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985))).
However, factual findings
necessary for the personal jurisdiction determination must be
reviewed for clear error.
Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v.
Consolidated Fiber Glass Products Co., 75 F.3d 147, 150 (3d Cir.
1996) (citations omitted).
Finally, the burden is on the party
seeking jurisdiction to present a prima facie showing that
personal jurisdiction is proper.
Kentucky Practice:
(5th ed. 1995).
6 Kurt A. Phillips, Jr.,
Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated, at 219
See also Aristech Chemical International Ltd.
4
v. Acrylic Fabricators Ltd., 138 F.3d 624, 626 (6th Cir. 1998).
We thus examine de novo whether Griffin established a prima
facie showing of jurisdiction over Turner.
Griffin argues that Kentucky has in personam
jurisdiction over Turner through Kentucky’s long-arm statute,
KRS 454.210.
KRS 454.210 provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
(2)(a) A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person who acts directly
or by an agent, as to a claim arising from
the person’s:
1. Transacting any business in this
Commonwealth; . . .
5. Causing injury in this Commonwealth to
any person by breach of warranty expressly
or impliedly made in the sale of goods
outside this Commonwealth when the seller
knew such person would use, consume, or be
affected by, the goods in this Commonwealth,
if he also regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered in this Commonwealth.
KRS 454.210 reaches “to the full constitutional limits
of due process in entertaining jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants.”
Wilson v. Case, Ky., 85 S.W.3d 589, 592 (2002)
(citations omitted).
In addition, under the framework used in
Wilson, “‘the traditional two step approach of testing
jurisdiction against first statutory and then constitutional
standards is . . . collapsed into the single inquiry of whether
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jurisdiction offends constitutional due process.’”
Wilson, 85
S.W.3d at 592 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Louisville v. Bezema,
569 F.Supp. 818, 819 (S.D.Ind. 1983)).
The United States Supreme Court established in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct.
154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), that due process requires the
satisfaction of certain “minimum contacts” with the forum state
before specific jurisdiction may be asserted over a nonresident.
Kentucky has since adopted, in Tube Turns Div. of
Chemetron Corp. v. Patterson Co., Inc., Ky. App., 562 S.W.2d 99,
100 (1978), the three-prong test used by the Sixth Circuit in
Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374,
381 (6th Cir. 1968).
This test attempts to simplify the minimum
contacts inquiry and “to determine the outer limits of personal
jurisdiction based upon a single act.”
Wilson, 85 S.W.3d at
593.
The three prongs of the Southern Machine test are: (1)
whether the defendant purposefully availed “himself of the
privilege of acting within the forum state or causing a
consequence in the forum state;” (2) whether the cause of action
arose “from the alleged in-state activities;” and (3) whether
the defendant has “such connections to the state as to make
jurisdiction reasonable.”
Wilson, 85 S.W.3d at 593 (citing Tube
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Turns, 562 S.W.2d at 100).
For jurisdiction to be proper, all
three requirements must be satisfied.
Id.
The first prong of the Southern Machine test is
whether Turner purposefully availed itself “of the privilege of
acting within the forum state or causing a consequence in the
forum state.”
Wilson, 85 S.W.3d at 593.
In deciding whether
this first prong is satisfied, two sub-prongs are considered:
(1) whether the defendant transacted business in the state, and
(2) whether the defendant “should have reasonably foreseen that
the transaction would have consequences in that state.”
Southern Machine, 401 F.2d at 382-383.
In the present case, Turner’s own unequivocal
admissions in its affidavits and briefs support satisfaction of
both sub-prongs of the first part of the Southern Machine test.
Turner actively sought and transacted business in Kentucky by
contracting with Eberle to serve as a manufacturer’s
representative in the western part of the state.
Turner also
transacted business in Kentucky by entering a contract with a
Kentucky corporation.
And finally, Turner’s admission in its
brief that Eberle “made a sales call” to Griffin which resulted
in Turner submitting a proposal for the Alabama RTO and other
projects also supports the conclusion that it transacted
business in Kentucky.
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Likewise, Turner should have reasonably foreseen the
consequences its solicitation of and entering into business with
Griffin would have in Kentucky.
When Turner entered the
contract, it was aware that Griffin was a Kentucky corporation
with its principal place of business in Kentucky.
It was
foreseeable that Griffin would make payments from Kentucky bank
accounts and that the operations at its Alabama plant would have
a financial effect in Griffin’s principal place of business.
Moreover, since the RTO is a major article of industrial
equipment, it was likewise foreseeable to Turner “[t]hat the
making (and breaking) of a contract . . . would have substantial
consequences with the state.”
In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van
Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 1972) (citations
omitted).
Turner argues at length that Art Eberle was not its
“agent” and that therefore his activities do not fall under the
scope of KRS 454.210.
However, our review is more concerned
with satisfying due process in asserting long-arm jurisdiction
than with applying a strict construction to the terms of the
statute.
Wilson, 85 S.W.3d at 592.
This is because KRS 454.210
is to be interpreted as reaching to the full constitutional
limits in entertaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
Id.
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Thus, for our jurisdictional analysis, the
classification of Eberle as a “manufacturer’s representative” or
“independent contractor” instead of an “agent” is less
significant than his presence in Kentucky soliciting business on
behalf of Turner.
Eberle, despite not being able to form
contracts or make sales himself, nonetheless solicited business
in Kentucky for Turner.
Moreover, but for Eberle’s efforts on
behalf of Turner, Griffin would not have entered into a contract
with Turner for the purchase of the Alabama RTO.
Finally, with regard to the first prong of Southern
Machine, Sixth Circuit cases have noted that “[t]he making of a
substantial business contract with a corporation based in
another jurisdiction has been held to be adequate to satisfy the
requirements of the ‘purposeful’ test of Southern Machine.”
In-
Flight Devices, 466 F.2d at 227 (citing Simpson Timber Co. v.
Great Salt Lake Minerals and Chemicals Corp., 296 F. Supp. 243
(D.Or. 1969)).2
The Alabama contract was a substantial business
contract requiring an outlay by Griffin in excess of $300,000.
As such, the “purposeful availment” test of Southern Machine is
satisfied under this analysis.
In summary, we are persuaded that the first prong of
the Southern Machine test has been satisfied in this case.
2
Concern about unfairness resulting from a flat application of this rule was discounted in In-Flight Devices by
reference to “[t]he third part of the Southern Machine approach” which “requires an investigation of the general
fairness of the assertion of jurisdiction.” In-Flight Devices, 466 F.2d at 228 n. 13.
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Through the efforts of Eberle, Turner directed its activities at
Kentucky and purposefully availed itself of acting in Kentucky.
Also, by forming a contract with a Kentucky corporation for a
major article of industrial equipment, the Alabama RTO, Turner
“’purposefully entered into a connection with [Kentucky] (such
that [it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.)’”
Wilson, 85 S.W.3d at 594 (quoting LAK, Inc. v. Deer
Creek Enterprises, 885 F.2d 1293, 1300 (6th Cir. 1989) (citation
omitted).
The second prong of the Southern Machine test
“considers whether the cause of action arises from the alleged
in-state activities.”
Wilson, 85 S.W.3d at 593.
is also met in the present case.
This criterion
The present case has the same
foundation for satisfaction of this prong as seen in In-Flight
Devices where the Sixth Circuit stated, “Defendant’s transaction
of business in Ohio – its entering of a contractual relationship
with an Ohio corporation – is necessarily the very soil from
which the action for breach grew.”
at 229.
In-Flight Devices, 466 F.2d
Similarly, the Alabama RTO contract is the very soil
from which Griffin’s cause of action against Turner grew.
Griffin’s cause of action for breach arises from Turner’s instate solicitation and contract formation.
second prong is established.
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As a result, the
The third prong of the Southern Machine test inquires
into fairness and “requires such connections to the state as to
make jurisdiction reasonable.”
Wilson, 85 S.W.3d at 593.
Among
the factors considered in resolving this issue are (1) the
state’s interest in resolving the controversy, (2) whether the
defendant is a buyer or seller, (3) the existence of substantial
interstate business in general, and (4) the quantity and quality
of physical contacts with the state.
In-Flight Devices, 466
F.2d at 232-235.
In the present case, “Kentucky has an interest in
seeing that contracts formed in this Commonwealth are carried
out.”
Texas American Bank v. Sayers, Ky. App., 674 S.W.2d 36,
40 (1984).
In addition, the defendant is a seller and
“[j]urisdiction has more often been assumed over non-resident
sellers than . . . buyers.”
(citations omitted).3
than an individual.
In-Flight Devices, 466 F.2d at 232
Further, Turner is a corporation, rather
It is engaged in substantial interstate
business and actively solicits additional interstate business
through its manufacturer representatives.
Finally, Eberle,
through his efforts to solicit business for Turner in Kentucky,
establishes direct physical contact with the state.
The third
prong of the Southern Machine test is thus also satisfied.
3
The rationale for this tendency is explained by noting that it is more often the seller who “initiates the deal, tends to
set many, if not all of the terms on which it will sell” while the buyer “is frequently a relatively passive party.” InFlight Devices, 466 F.2d at 233. “It is understandable that sellers more often seem to have acted in a manner
rendering them subject to long-arm jurisdiction.” Id.
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An overarching concern inherent in all personal
jurisdiction inquiries is that “‘“the facts of each case must
[always] be weighed” in determining whether personal
jurisdiction would comport with “fair play and substantial
justice.”’”
Wilson, 85 S.W.2d at 596 (quoting Burger King v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485-486, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2189, 85 L.
Ed. 2d 528 (1985) quoting Kulko v. Superior Ct. of California,
436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 St. Ct. 1690, 1697, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132
(1978)).
These considerations are particularly important “in
the single contract context” where due process analysis “is a
matter of some dispute.”
Continental American Corp. v. Camera
Controls Corp., 692 F.2d 1309, 1314 (1982) (citations omitted).
Calling on a corporation to defend in a distant forum is
generally not as burdensome as in the past and thus comports
with notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Id. (citing
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-251, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L.
Ed. 2d 1283 (1958)).
Further, through Eberle, Turner actively
sought to conduct business with a Kentucky corporation, did so,
and a resulting lawsuit should not be a surprise.
Finding
personal jurisdiction to exist over Turner thus does not offend
notions of fairness or substantial justice.
In summary, the three criteria in the Southern Machine
test, adopted by Kentucky in Tube Turns, are satisfied by the
facts of this case.
Cases concerning personal jurisdiction
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often note that “talismanic jurisdictional formulas” should be
rejected and instead emphasize the need to consider the facts of
each case.
Wilson, 85 S.W.3d at 596 (citing Burger King, 471
U.S. at 485-486).
However, the facts of this case satisfy the
Southern Machine test and indicate that Griffin has made the
required prima facie showing that jurisdiction is proper.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Campbell Circuit Court is
reversed and this case remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kevin L. Murphy
David C. Nalley
Covington, Kentucky
David B. Sloan
Suzanne Cassidy
Covington, Kentucky
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