JIMMIE LEE HAWKINS v. CITY OF LAWRENCEBURG, KENTUCKY AND GARY CHILTON, MAYOR
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 12, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001706-MR
JIMMIE LEE HAWKINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ANDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00205
v.
CITY OF LAWRENCEBURG, KENTUCKY
AND GARY CHILTON, MAYOR
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Jimmie Lee Hawkins (Hawkins) appeals from an
order of the Anderson Circuit Court affirming a police
disciplinary decision of the City Council of the City of
Lawrenceburg.
The disciplinary decision, among other things,
determined that Hawkins was guilty of incompetency,
inefficiency, and the accumulation of minor infractions, and
demoted Hawkins from Chief of Police of the Lawrenceburg Police
Department to the rank of Patrolman 2.
For the reasons stated
below, we affirm.
On August 19, 1982, Hawkins was hired by the City of
Lawrenceburg as a police officer.
In January 1999, appellee
Gary Chilton took office as the Mayor of Lawrenceburg.
On
April 12, 1999, Chilton appointed Hawkins Chief of Police of the
Lawrenceburg Police Department.
During the following months,
various incidents involving Hawkins occurred and were reported
to Mayor Chilton.
Among these were allegations that Hawkins
verbally abused and berated police officers; used inappropriate
language when disciplining police officers; disciplined police
officers in front of others; created a hostile work environment;
and threatened to commit suicide.
On August 23, 2000, Mayor Chilton sent Chief Hawkins a
letter placing him on administrative leave with pay pending a
psychological evaluation.
On August 31, 2000, Hawkins underwent
an evaluation by Dr. Dan Langer.
On September 8, 2000, Dr.
Langer issued a report concluding, among other things, that
“[b]ased upon the evaluation, Mr. Hawkins appears
psychologically fit for duty in the field of law enforcement.”
During this period Mayor Chilton continued to
investigate conditions at the Police Department by visiting
police headquarters and talking to various police officers.
As
a result of his inquiries, Mayor Chilton concluded that Hawkins
2
should not remain in his position as Chief, and on September 20,
2000, Chilton presented Hawkins with an offer to take a demotion
to the rank of Sergeant “performing such police and public
safety duties as the Mayor may direct, including but not limited
to enforcement of the existing codes of the City.”
By letter
dated September 21, 2000, Hawkins rejected the offer, asserted
that he was entitled to the protections contained in KRS1
15.520,2 and threatened legal action against the City.
Following Hawkins’ rejection of his offer, on
September 22, 2000, Chilton issued a letter to Hawkins placing
him on suspension.
The letter charged Hawkins with
incompetency, inefficiency, and the accumulation of minor
infractions.
The letter also scheduled a hearing on the
charges.
The same day, September 22, 2000, Hawkins filed a
“Verified Complaint with Jury Demand” in Anderson Circuit Court.3
Named as defendants were Mayor Chilton and the City of
Lawrenceburg.
1
The complaint alleged, among other things,
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
KRS 15.520 addresses complaints against a police officer, the manner of
investigating a complaint, and provides a police officer with the right to a
hearing upon the filing of a complaint. The statute is sometimes referred to
as “The Police Officers’ Bill of Rights.” See City of Munfordville v.
Sheldon, Ky., 977 S.W.2d 497 (1998).
3
While not relevant to the issues in this appeal, we note at the time of this
filing Hawkins had not exhausted his administrative remedies. "[P]roper
judicial administration mandates judicial deference until after exhaustion of
all viable remedies before the agency vested with primary jurisdiction over
the matter." Board of Regents of Murray State University v. Curris, Ky.
App., 620 S.W.2d 322, 323 (1981).
3
wrongful discharge and extreme and outrageous conduct, and
sought, among other things, Hawkins’ reinstatement as Chief of
Police and monetary damages, including monetary damages for past
and future wages and benefits, past and future mental anguish,
psychological pain and suffering, and punitive damages.
In
conjunction with the complaint, Hawkins also filed a motion for
temporary injunctive relief requiring that he be reinstated as
Chief of Police.
On October 10, 2000, Hawkins filed an amended
motion for injunctive relief requesting the additional relief
that the defendants be enjoined from conducting any hearings
regarding disciplinary action against Hawkins.
On October 16,
2000, Hawkins filed a motion for a temporary restraining order
preventing the defendants from holding a hearing regarding
Hawkins’ situation.
These motions to stop the hearing were
denied.
On October 17, 2000, a hearing was held before the
Lawrenceburg City Council addressing the disciplinary issues
contained in Mayor Chilton’s September 22, 2000, letter.
The
City Council subsequently announced its decision in its undated
“Findings, Conclusions and Order.”
Under the decision, Hawkins
was found guilty of incompetency, inefficiency, and the
accumulation of minor infractions.
Further, he was demoted to
the rank of Patrolman 2 with his salary not to exceed that of
the highest paid officer of that rank in the Lawrenceburg Police
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Department.
In addition, Hawkins was suspended from duty
without pay for six months, and at the conclusion of his
suspension, was to be assigned to the duties of code enforcement
officer.
On October 23, 2000, the defendants filed a notice in
Anderson Circuit Court that they were removing Hawkins’ lawsuit
against the City and Mayor Chilton to Federal District Court on
the basis that Hawkins’ complaint had raised federal
constitutional issues.
On November 28, 2000, the Federal
District Court issued an order dismissing Hawkins’ federal due
process claim and remanding the case back to Anderson Circuit
Court for final determination.
On March 7, 2001, Hawkins filed an amended complaint.
The amended complaint substantially mirrored his September 22,
2000, complaint except that the amended complaint sought the
additional relief that the circuit court reverse the Findings,
Conclusions, and Order of the Lawrenceburg City Council.
On
March 16, 2001, the defendants filed their answer to the amended
complaint.
On June 25, 2001, Hawkins filed a motion for judgment
on the pleadings pursuant to CR4 12.03.
On August 6, 2001, the
defendants filed a response to Hawkins’ motion for judgment on
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
5
the pleadings and, in addition, filed their own motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
On October 23, 2001, the circuit court entered an
order denying Hawkins’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The order did not address the defendants’ outstanding motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
Hawkins subsequently filed a notice
of appeal with this Court.
On June 7, 2002, this Court entered an order
dismissing Hawkins’ appeal as interlocutory.
See Hawkins v.
City of Lawrenceburg, Case No. 2001-CA-002569-MR.
On July 1,
2002, Hawkins filed a motion in the circuit court requesting
that the circuit court enter findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and a judgment based upon the record as submitted together
with the briefs of the parties.
On June 12, 2002, the circuit court entered an order
again denying Hawkins’ motion for judgment on the pleadings,
affirming the Lawrenceburg City Council’s findings, and
dismissing Hawkins’ appeal with prejudice.
This appeal
followed.
First,5 Hawkins contends that general principles of due
process mandate a reversal of the circuit court and that the
5
To facilitate continuity, we address the arguments raised by Hawkins in a
different order than presented in his brief.
6
findings of the City Council should be reversed as its findings
are clearly erroneous and not based upon substantial evidence.
Hawkins has appealed the City Council’s disciplinary
decision pursuant to KRS 15.520(2)6 and KRS 15.520(3).7
As KRS
15.520(2) is a trial de novo statute, the duty of the circuit
court in this case is as set forth in Brady v. Pettit, Ky., 586
S.W.2d 29 (1979), as follows:
[I]n public employee discharge cases where
there is a trial de novo statute, the
discharged employee is entitled to something
less than a classic trial de novo in circuit
court. In this proceeding in circuit court
the burden of proof shifts to the discharged
employee. After review of the transcript of
evidence or hearing the witnesses, the trial
court is limited in its decision. The trial
court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the administrative body, that is,
there may not be a substitute punishment.
The trial court may find the discharged
employee has failed to meet the burden of
proof and affirm the action of the
administrative board; or if it is found that
the employee has sustained the burden of
proof, the trial court may set aside the
punishment.
. . .
6
KRS 15.520(2) provides as follows: “Any police officer who shall be found
guilty by any hearing authority of any charge, may bring an action in the
Circuit Court in the county in which the local unit of government may be
located to contest the action of that hearing authority, and the action shall
be tried as an original action by the court.”
7
KRS 15.520(3) provides as follows: “The judgment of the Circuit Court shall
be subject to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The procedure as to appeal to
the Court of Appeals shall be the same as in any civil action. As the
provisions of this section relate to a minimum system of professional
conduct, nothing herein shall be construed as limiting or in any way
affecting any rights previously afforded to police officers of the
Commonwealth by statute, ordinance, or working agreement.”
7
[R]eview of the transcript of evidence in
circuit court is a corollary to the burden
of proof which has shifted to the discharged
employee. In circuit court the transcript
of evidence is reviewed but the proceeding
is not limited to this review; the
discharged employee is accorded the right to
call such additional witnesses as he may
desire. The trial court's review is limited
to a determination of whether the
administrative body acted arbitrarily.
(emphasis original).
Id. at 32–33.
To determine arbitrariness, the appellate court may
review the record, the briefs, and any other evidence or
testimony which would be relevant to that specific, limited
issue.
The appeal is not the proper forum to retry the merits.
It is limited only to the question of whether the hearing body’s
action was clearly unreasonable.
Crouch v. Jefferson County,
Kentucky Police Merit Bd., Ky., 773 S.W.2d 461, 464 (1988).
The decision of the hearing body, though resting
ultimately on opinion as distinguished from pure fact,
represents a factual finding and is not to be disturbed unless
it is arbitrary or unreasonable.
"Arbitrary" means “clearly
erroneous,” which, in turn, means unsupported by substantial
evidence.
“Unreasonable” means that under the evidence
presented there is no room for difference of opinion among
reasonable minds.
Crouch at 464 (quoting Thurman v. Meridian
Mutual Insurance Company, Ky., 345 S.W.2d 635, 639 (1961)).
8
In its July 12, 2002, order, the circuit court
affirmed the findings of the City Council, including its finding
that Hawkins was guilty of all charges proffered against him.
The findings of the City Council were, in relevant part, as
follows:
Based on the evidence presented at hearing,
the majority of which was uncontested and
demonstrated a pattern of abusive and
obscene language and discourtesy to other
members of the department rising to the
level of abusive behavior, City Council
finds that Mr. Hawkins has lost the
confidence of a considerable number of
officers of the Lawrenceburg Police
Department, and that this failure of
leadership constitutes incompetency as chief
of police pursuant to Part III, D.,2.,a. of
the personnel policy and has made it
impossible for Mr. Hawkins to perform his
duties as chief in an efficient manner
constituting inefficiency pursuant to Part
III, D.2.,b. of the personnel policy. There
was further evidence of an extensive
accumulation of minor infractions on the
part of Mr. Hawkins contrary to Part III,
D.,2.,s. of the personnel policy.
The Council concludes that Hawkins is guilty
of all charges proffered in the
September 22, 2000, letter against him.
The City Council’s finding that Hawkins was guilty of
incompetency, inefficiency, and an extensive accumulation of
minor infractions in violation of the City of Lawrenceburg’s
personnel policies is supported by substantial evidence.
At the October 17, 2000, hearing, extensive testimony
regarding Chief Hawkins’ tenure as Chief of Police was
9
presented.
Among the witnesses called were various current and
former police officers, other Police Department employees, and
Mayor Chilton.
The witnesses called by Mayor Chilton testified
that, among other things, under Hawkins, morale was very low,
that there was a tense mood in the office, that working for
Chief Hawkins “was like walking on pins and needles,” and that
Chief Hawkins underwent significant mood swings.
Many of the
officers testified that they had considered leaving the
Department as a result of Hawkins’ conduct.
A primary complaint was Hawkins’ method of discipline.
Many witnesses testified that they had seen, or were aware, that
Hawkins frequently, as a method of discipline, berated and
criticized officers in front of others using obscene language.
For example, in June 1999, Officer Chris Atkins was conducting
an observation prior to administering a DUI test when he was
informed that Chief Hawkins wanted to talk to him.
Atkins
completed the DUI test prior to reporting to Hawkins, and
Hawkins told Atkins, in the presence of others, “When I tell you
I need to talk to you, that means f_ _ _ing right now.”
The
witnesses testified to several incidents of this type.
Jason Briscoe, and several other officers, testified
regarding an incident involving Briscoe in which Hawkins berated
Briscoe in front of others by stating to the effect that Briscoe
“was just like his father and that he [Hawkins] had to have duct
10
tape on his slapjack because he wore his [Briscoe’s father] head
out so many times with it.”
Again, the witnesses testified
regarding several instances where Hawkins berated officers in
this manner.
In addition, there was testimony to the effect that
Hawkins had various problems involving his girlfriend and that
these problems would affect his mood.
There was testimony that
Hawkins was heard to say that he “would be better off dead” and
other statements which could be interpreted as suicide threats.
Witnesses also testified that Hawkins had told them not to
patrol in the downtown area, apparently because he did not want
the officers around his girlfriend’s workplace.
As a final example of inappropriate conduct, Officer
Kevin Crum testified that on an occasion he had arrested an
African-American and had transported the prisoner to the
station.
Crum asked Hawkins if he wanted to see the prisoner,
and Hawkins replied, “I don’t want anything to do with that n _
_ _ _.”
Chief Hawkins later tried to rationalize his comment by
stating that he “didn’t mean anything derogatory by it.”
The above examples provide a representative sample of
the testimony concerning Hawkins’ misconduct as Police Chief.
In consideration of this testimony, the findings of the City
Council, including the finding that Hawkins was guilty of the
charges contained in the September 22, 2000, letter were
11
supported by substantial evidence.
Moreover, the City Council’s
decision was not unreasonable, as even if another hearing body
would have found differently, there is room for difference of
opinion among reasonable minds.
Next, Hawkins contends that the circuit court erred by
failing to make findings of fact pursuant to CR 52.01 even
though he had requested findings pursuant to CR 52.04.
Following this Court’s dismissal of Hawkins’
interlocutory appeal, on July 1, 2002, Hawkins filed a motion
requesting the circuit court to “enter Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and a Judgment in this case based upon the
record as submitted to the Court together with the Briefs of the
parties.”
The circuit court entered its order on July 12, 2002,
and on August 12, 2002, Hawkins, without filing a motion for
entry of additional findings of fact, filed his notice of appeal
to this Court.
CR 52.01 provides that “[I]n all actions tried upon
the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specifically and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon and render an appropriate
judgment[.]”
As the proceeding in circuit court was an action
pursuant to KRS 15.520(2), a modified trial de novo action, it
is questionable whether CR 52.01 applies.
As previously noted,
judicial review of Hawkins’ challenge to the City Council’s
12
decision is limited to the question of arbitrariness.
Hawkins
chose not to present any additional testimony, so it is unclear
what “findings of fact” he believes should have been made by the
circuit court.
Moreover, the circuit court specifically
affirmed the City Council’s findings of fact.
Further, the record discloses that following the entry
of the trial court’s July 12, 2002, order, Hawkins filed his
notice of appeal to this Court without any additional filing
bringing to the attention of the circuit court its failure to
make proper findings.
See CR 52.02 and CR 52.04.
As Hawkins
elected not to request more specific findings, any alleged error
relating to the circuit court’s failure to make findings is
waived on appeal.
CR 52.04; Crum v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for
Human Resources, Ky. App., 928 S.W.2d 355, 357 (1996).
Next, Hawkins contends that the trial court erred by
failing to grant his motion for judgment on the pleadings even
though the Mayor and the City Council failed to follow the
applicable statutes and procedures for police officer
discipline.
When a party moves for a judgment on the pleadings, he
admits for the purposes of his motion not only the truth of all
his adversary’s well-pleaded allegations of fact and fair
inferences therefrom, but also the untruth of all his own
allegations which have been denied by his adversary.
13
Archer v.
Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., Ky., 365 S.W.2d 727, 729
(1963).
The judgment should be granted if it appears beyond
doubt that the nonmoving party cannot prove any set of facts
that would entitle him/her to relief.
Spencer v. Woods, Ky.,
282 S.W.2d 851, 852 (1955).
Accepting as true all of the instances of Hawkins’
misconduct alleged by the City, and accepting as untrue all of
the allegations of procedural deficiencies alleged by Hawkins
but denied by the City, under this rigorous standard, Hawkins
was not entitled to a judgment on the pleadings.
Next, Hawkins contends that his due process rights
provided under KRS 15.520 were violated because he was not
advised in writing prior to or within 24 hours of his suspension
from duty of the reasons therefore pursuant to KRS 15.520(1)(b).
Hawkins’ argument is based upon the premise that he was first
suspended on August 23, 2000, when he was placed on
administrative leave with pay and directed to attend an
appointment with Dr. Dan Langer for “counseling and evaluation.”
The August 23, 2000, letter stated, in relevant part, as
follows:
Effective immediately, I am placing you on
administrative leave with pay. I have
scheduled you an appointment with Dr. Dan
Langer . . ., for counseling and evaluation.
You will remain on administrative leave
until such time as Dr. Langer has diagnosed
14
your condition and provided the City with
his report, at which time a determination
will be made on your position with the City.
I must ask you not to return to the police
station or perform any policing activity of
any type, while on this leave. I will hold
your administrative car, badge,
identification card and any assigned police
equipment in safety during this time.
Hawkins argues that, in reality, he was first
suspended, and the notification provisions of KRS 15.520 were
first triggered, on August 23, 2000, when he was notified that
he was being placed on administrative leave with pay.
However,
the August 23, 2000, letter placing Hawkins on administrative
leave, in combination with Mayor Chilton’s testimony, discloses
that the purpose of the August 23 suspension was in connection
with Mayor Chilton’s concern regarding statements made by
Hawkins which could be construed as suicidal, not for
disciplinary reasons.
The letter specifically states that the
purpose of the leave is for “counseling and evaluation” by Dr.
Dan Langer, and, further, the text of the letter lacks any
suggestion that the purpose of the personnel action is related
to discipline.
The record reflects that Hawkins was first suspended
from duty for disciplinary reasons on September 22, 2000, in a
letter delivered to him on that day.
In addition, the subject
matter of the hearing, and the charges which led to Hawkins’
demotion, are related to the September 22 letter, not the
15
August 23 letter.
The City Council’s Findings, Conclusions, and
Order specifically states that “The Council concludes that Mr.
Hawkins is guilty of all charges proffered in the September 22,
2000, letter to him.”
As such, the August 23 letter placing
Hawkins on leave of absence did not trigger KRS 15.520, and, in
the September 22 letter, Hawkins was notified of the charges
against him simultaneously with his suspension, thereby
complying with KRS 15.520(1)(b).
In the alternative, Hawkins contends that the
September 22, 2000, letter was not specific enough to comply
with KRS 15.520(1)(e).
KRS 15.520(1)(e) provides as follows:
Any charge involving violation of any local
unit of government rule or regulation shall
be made in writing with sufficient
specificity so as to fully inform the police
officer of the nature and circumstances of
the alleged violation in order that he may
be able to properly defend himself. The
charge shall be served on the police officer
in writing;
The September 22, 2000, letter proffering charges against
Hawkins stated, in relevant part, as follows:
Pursuant to the Personnel Policies of the
City of Lawrenceburg, this letter confirms
my decision of which you were informed last
evening that you have been suspended without
pay from the your [sic] position with the
City. Also, pursuant to the policies of the
City, this suspension could lead to
dismissal from employment with the City. As
you and your counsel have been informed,
this action is not being taken on the basis
of a citizen complaint as the City has not
16
received one. Rather, it appears that you
have lost the confidence of the members of
the police department.
Although I continue to believe that under
state law you are an employee at will of the
City, and therefore subject to dismissal
without cause, I respect your desire to have
a hearing in this matter and will observe
the provisions of KRS 15.520 as I believe
that is in the best interest of the City and
the public. For purposes of complying with
subsection (1)(b) of that statute, the
reasons for the suspension are as follows:
1. Incompetency (Part III, D.,2.,a. of the
Personnel Policy): Maintaining the
confidence of the members of the police
department is one of the primary
competencies of a chief.
2. Inefficiency (Part III, D.,2.,b. of the
Personnel Policy): Without the confidence
of the members of the police department, it
is impossible to fulfill the other duties of
the chief in an efficient manner.
3. An accumulation of minor infractions
(Part III, D.,2.,s. of the Personnel
Policy): I have been made aware of and have
discussed with you your repeated use of
abusive and obscene language and discourtesy
to other members of the police department
(Part III, D.,2.,l. and m.).
You are hereby notified that, pursuant to
Part III, D.,3,d.,(4) of the Personnel
Policy and subsection (1)(h)l. of KRS 15.520
that a hearing in this matter will be held
before me at City Hall on October 9, 2000,
at 9:00 a.m.
The letter complies with the requirements of KRS
15.520(1)(e).
The contents of the letter notified Hawkins of
his suspension, the reasons for his suspension, and cited to
17
particular sections of the City Personnel plan.
The letter
specifically notifies Hawkins that the charges relate to
incompetency, inefficiency, and an accumulation of minor
infractions.
Given this level of specificity, we do not believe
any violation occurred regarding the level of detail included in
the September 22, 2000, letter.
Compare Mason v. Seaton, 303
Ky. 528, 198 S.W.2d 205 (1946); and Bregel v. City of Newport,
208 Ky. 581, 271 S.W. 665 (1925).
Next, Hawkins contends that his due process rights
were violated because the appellees failed to provide him with a
hearing on charges filed against him within 60 days pursuant to
KRS 15.520(1)(h)(8).
In support of his argument Hawkins states
“[s]ince all of the alleged complaints made by witnesses who
testified at the October 17th hearing were of events that had
occurred well before Chief Hawkins’ original suspension on
August 23, 2000, but were never reduced to any written, filed
charges, all of those charges were dismissed with prejudice per
KRS 15.520(1)(h)(8) by operation of statute, and can not support
the Findings, Conclusions and Order made by the City Council as
a result of the October 17th hearing.”
KRS 15.520(1)(h)(8) provides as follows:
Any police officer suspended with or without
pay who is not given a hearing as provided
by this section within sixty (60) days of
any charge being filed, the charge then
shall be dismissed with prejudice and not be
18
considered by any hearing authority and the
officer shall be reinstated with full back
pay and benefits;
By its plain language, KRS 15.520(1)(h)(8) does not
establish a general statute of limitations period beyond which a
specific instance of misconduct may not be considered in a
disciplinary proceeding.
Rather, the statute is only triggered
once a charge has been filed and the officer has been suspended;
and then a hearing has to be held within 60 days following the
filing of the charge.
The statute does not limit what may be
considered in a disciplinary proceeding to events which occurred
within 60 days prior to the suspension.
Next, Hawkins contends that the appellees erred by
considering allegations against him which were older than 60
days in contravention of KRS 15.520(1)(h)(8).
This argument is, in substance, merely a rehash of the
previous argument.
However, again, the 60-day requirement
established in KRS 15.520(1)(h)(8) refers to the time in which a
hearing must be held after the filing of charges.
The plain
language of the statute does not prohibit the consideration of
events older than 60 days from the date charges are filed.
Finally, Hawkins contends that the Mayor and the City
violated the terms of their own personnel plan.
Specifically,
Hawkins contends that under the applicable provisions of the
personnel plan, the first infraction calls for a verbal
19
reprimand of the employee; the second violation calls for a
written warning; and after repeated violations, suspension may
be imposed.
The function of the hearing body in instances of
charges against police officers is to make two determinations:
first, whether the officer has violated the rules and
regulations of the department and if so, second, it must
exercise its discretion in imposing a penalty.
The first is
subject to judicial review; the second is not.
Sound public
policy requires that the matter of punishment and discipline of
a police officer be left to the city.
City of Columbia v.
Pendleton, Ky. App., 595 S.W.2d 718, 719 (1980); Stallins v.
City of Madisonville, Ky. App., 707 S.W.2d 349, 350 (1986).
As this argument is concerned with the penalty imposed
by the City Council, this issue is not subject to our review.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Anderson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Mark A. Bubenzer
Frankfort, Kentucky
Dave Whalin
Louisville, Kentucky
20
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