JIM BURKE, ELLEN BURKE, VINCENT J. EIDEN, JAMES TODD SHELL, KIRSTEN SHELL, JOHN SUTTON, JEAN SUTTON, AND STAN WICLIFFE v. OLDHAM COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND APPEALS; LITERS, INC.; ROCK SPRINGS FARMS, III, INC.; AND MARY A. HAUNZ
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RENDERED: August 29, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001695-MR
JIM BURKE, ELLEN BURKE, VINCENT
J. EIDEN, JAMES TODD SHELL, KIRSTEN
SHELL, JOHN SUTTON, JEAN SUTTON, AND
STAN WICLIFFE
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL W. ROSENBLUM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00434
v.
OLDHAM COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
AND APPEALS; LITERS, INC.; ROCK
SPRINGS FARMS, III, INC.; AND
MARY A. HAUNZ
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Appellant homeowners (the appellants) appeal
from an opinion and order of the Oldham Circuit Court dismissing
their appeal from a decision of the Oldham County Board of
Adjustments and Appeals (the Board).
The Board granted a
Conditional Use Permit (CUP or permit) to appellee Liter’s Inc.,1
allowing underground quarrying of limestone.
We affirm.
Liter’s operates a rock quarry located in Oldham
County.
On April 25, 2001, Liter’s filed an application with
the Board for a CUP to allow underground quarrying of limestone
on property owned by appellees, Rock Springs Farms III, Inc. and
Mary A. Haunz, and adjacent to appellants’ homes.
The permit
would allow for expansion of Liter’s mining and blasting
operations to an area north of Interstate 71.
The Board held public hearings for three days in May
and June of 2001.
Both parties were represented by counsel
during the hearings.
Counsel presented opening statements,
called witnesses and cross-examined adverse witnesses.
Counsel
also made closing statements, after which the Board continued to
question witnesses.
Further, at the request of one of the Board
members, Liter’s conducted blasting demonstrations on the quarry
property.
The Board granted the Conditional Use Permit, with 19
specific conditions attached.
Appellants filed their appeal in
July of 2001, and in January 2002, appellants filed for Summary
Judgment before the Oldham Circuit Court.
After briefing, the
circuit court entered an opinion and order dismissing the
homeowners’ appeal.
This appeal followed.
1
Liter’s, Inc. is the spelling in court documents, including the opinion of
the circuit court. However, in the Notice of Appeal to this Court, Appellee
is referred to as Liters. For purposes of consistency, throughout this
opinion we have adopted the first spelling.
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The appellant homeowners raise three issues for our
consideration:
First, whether the Oldham County Zoning
Ordinance unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to
the Board of Adjustments; whether a conditional use permit
allowing a quarry operation complies with the Oldham County
Comprehensive Plan; and finally whether the homeowners were
denied their constitutional rights to procedural due process.
The circuit court’s scope of review in the case sub
judice was to determine whether the Board acted in excess of
powers delegated to it by the legislature, whether the parties
affected by the Board’s decision were provided procedural due
process, and whether the action taken by the Board was supported
by substantial evidence.
American Beauty Homes Corp. v.
Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm’n, Ky.,
379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (1971).
Our review is to determine whether
or not the circuit court’s factual findings are clearly
erroneous.
Jones v. Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky. App., 710
S.W.2d 862, 866 (1966).
52.01.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
Furthermore, this Court is not bound by the trial
court’s decision on questions of law.
Our review of the
application of the law to the facts is de novo.
Carroll v.
Meredith, Ky. App., 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (2001).
Appellants argue that Section 211 of the Oldham County
Zoning Ordinance unconstitutionally delegates zoning power from
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the Fiscal Court to the Board.
Section 211 states in pertinent
part:
In the interest of the public convenience,
safety, morals and welfare and to encourage
the best use of land, certain land uses, due
to their extent, nature of operation,
limited application, or relationship to
certain natural resources, must be
considered as singular cases. The uses
listed in this section may be allowed by the
Board of Adjustments in certain districts,
after public hearing, by Conditional Use
Permit, provided the Board of Adjustments
finds such uses to be essential or desirable
[sic] and not in conflict with the elements
and objectives of the Comprehensive Plan.
Subpart A of Section 211 then lists 23 different
conditional uses, including extraction of minerals. It also
allows “uses similar” to those specifically listed.
The appellants’ constitutional argument is based on
the proposition that allowing conditional uses is “no less than
a delegation of the zoning power reserved by the legislature” to
the Fiscal Court, and is therefore unconstitutional and that
further the Board is being given unlimited discretion to make
these decisions thereby resulting in an unconstitutional
delegation of the zoning power.
The circuit court concluded that Section 211 is valid
as a zoning ordinance enacted under the Commonwealth’s enabling
statutes found in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 100
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and that the ordinance “comports to the objectives and goals of
the enabling statutes.”
KRS 100.237 grants the Board “the power to hear and
decide applications for conditional use permits to allow the
proper integration into the community of uses which are
specifically named in the zoning regulations which may be
suitable only in specific locations in the zone only if certain
conditions are met[.]”
It should be noted that the appellants
are not challenging the constitutionality of KRS 100.237, but
only the Oldham County ordinance.
The Fiscal Court exercised
its zoning power in determining what specific conditional uses
were permissible.
The zoning ordinance specifically names the
conditional uses as required by KRS 100.237.
The Board may not
issue a conditional use permit for uses not specifically listed
or uses which are not “similar” to the specifically listed uses.
Contrary to the appellants’ contention, this is not a grant of
zoning power to the Board, in that the Fiscal Court, not the
Board, makes the determination as to what conditional uses are
permissible.
The Board’s discretion is limited by Section 211 of
the ordinance in granting conditional use permits.
As stated,
the Board may only issue conditional use permits for the uses,
or similar uses, listed in the ordinance.
Contrary to the
appellants’ argument, a list of 23 uses is not unlimited.
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The
Board must also make a factual determination that the use is
”essential or desireable [sic] and not in conflict with the
elements and objectives of the Comprehensive Plan.”
In
addition, the Board is required to subject each use to
specifically stated conditions.
The conditions required for
“Extraction, Rock Quarries, Mineral and Earth Products” are as
follows:
1)Establishment by the responsible authority
or approved engineer of the final ground
elevations to be attained for the
operations.
2)Filing of a performance bond equal to
$5,000.00 per acre with the County or City
to insure proper finishing of the area into
a usable condition.
3)Plan of use of the area following
completion of the operation.2
The Board is then required to consider any other
conditions it “feels necessary to further the purposes of this
regulation and further the public’s best interest.”
Here, the
Board attached 19 conditions, in addition to the ones required
by the ordinance.
Given the above requirements and standards,
we do not believe what the ordinance has done can be interpreted
as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to
the Board.
2
Zoning ordinance, section 211, § F.
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Appellants ask us to hold that an application for an
industrial use, such as quarrying, does not qualify as a
conditional use.
They cite Carlton v. Taylor, Ky. App., 569
S.W.2d 679, 681 (1978), in which we held that an application for
a retail liquor store did not qualify as a conditional use in a
residential neighborhood.
Carlton is easily distinguishable
from the case sub judice.
In Carlton, a retail liquor store was
not a specifically listed conditional use, and yet the Board
issued the permit.
Further, in Carlton, this court could not
conclude that a liquor store promoted the public health, safety
or welfare.
Id. at 681.
Here, the Fiscal Court, in exercising
its legislative power, determined that the extraction of
minerals is a conditional use.
By definition, it thereby
determined that the extraction of minerals is “essential to or
would promote the public health, safety, or welfare.”
As we
stated in McCollum v. City of Berea, Ky. App., 53 S.W.3d 106,
110 (2000), "[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary." (citing Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954)).
We
cannot say that access to natural resources, and the economic
benefit to the community derived thereby, do not promote the
public welfare.
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Appellants contend that the use of the terms
“desirable and essential,” render the regulation
unconstitutionally vague.
They complain that the ordinance does
not state to whom the use must be desirable or essential.
KRS
100.111 requires that conditional uses promote the “public
health, safety and welfare.” (Emphasis ours.)
As an extension of the exercise of the
police power, the interference or regulation
by public authority of the use of a
citizen's property must be for the superior
interest and rights of the public, and the
power must be exercised in a reasonable and
fair manner for the promotion of the common
good of a community as a whole, more
particularly, it must bear a substantial
relation to the public health, safety,
morals or welfare.” Hamilton Co. v.
Louisville & Jefferson County Planning and
Zoning Com'n, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 434,
436 (1956).
Clearly, the use must be essential or desirable to the community
or public as a whole.
Appellants next claim that the issuance of the
conditional use permit did not comply with the Oldham County
Comprehensive Plan.
The circuit court acknowledged that, “by
its definition, a CUP introduces a use into an area which may
impair the integrity and character of the zone in which it is
located or in adjoining zones.”
The circuit court determined,
however, that the CUP “does not introduce a use which impairs
the geographic area as a whole because the geographic area
-8-
includes other commercial and industrial uses.”
The court
relied on the specific findings of the Board that the CUP
complied with the Oldham County Comprehensive Plan as follows:
In keeping with the Oldham County
Comprehensive Plan, Chapter 1, Page 5,
“Business and Industry, the goal is to
expand commercial and industrial development
which will provide for increased tax
revenues, and a larger employment base to
satisfy the need of a growing county labor
force.”
(A) Objective A: Assist existing businesses
in expansion.
The court further noted that,
Comprehensive zoning plans are to be used as
guidelines for the development of both
private and public property. KRS 100.183
and KRS 100.187. Liter’s is an existing
business which has been located in Oldham
County, in the same geographic area since
1954.
The circuit court then concluded that the Board’s
finding that the CUP complies with the Oldham County
Comprehensive Plan was supported by substantial evidence.
To support their argument appellants rely on the
following portion of the text of the Comprehensive Plan that the
CUP does not comply with the plan:
Haunz Lane has developed into an industrial
area over the past years. The development
of additional industrial uses along Haunz
Lane should be discouraged in order to limit
any negative impacts on surrounding
residential land uses.
-9-
This text does specifically pertain to the area where Liter’s
proposes to expand its mining operation.
However, appellants
fail to cite the entire provision as it relates to industrial
development of Haunz Lane.
The text that follows appellants’
citation is as follows:
When existing industrial land uses expand or
redevelop on Haunz Lane, measures to reduce
the negative impacts of heavy truck traffic,
noise, and buffering should be enacted.
[Emphasis ours.]
The Comprehensive Plan anticipated expansion of industrial uses
in this particular area and provided for such expansion or
redevelopment.
The conditions imposed on Liter’s were
specifically to address the negative impact of such expansion or
redevelopment in compliance with this provision.
Therefore, the
circuit court did not err in finding that the Board’s
determination that the CUP complied with the Oldham County
Comprehensive Plan was based upon substantial evidence.
Finally, appellants argue that their procedural due
process and equal protection rights were violated.
Appellants
argue that the Board allowed Liter’s to present testimony that
was neither subjected to cross-examination nor rebuttal.
For
the first two days of the three day hearings, the parties made
opening statements, presented their witnesses, cross-examined
their adverse witnesses and made closing statements.
After the
witnesses testified, the Board conducted its own question and
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answer session with the witnesses.
The circuit court in its
findings stated that this procedure complied with KRS 100.345,
which states in pertinent part:
Whenever a public hearing is required by
this chapter, the presiding body may
prescribe the procedures to be followed. No
information offered at the hearing shall be
excluded for failure to follow judicial
rules of evidence. The presiding body may
adopt its own rules to determine the kind of
information that will be received. Members
of the presiding body may visit a site
pertinent to a hearing prior to the final
decision of the presiding body. All
information allowed to be received shall
constitute evidence upon which action may be
based.
The circuit court found that the procedural due
process requirements were maintained during the course of the
public hearing, that a trial-type hearing was held, and that
counsel was not denied the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses during the testimony phase of the hearing.
The court
found that, because KRS 100.354 allowed the Board the discretion
to establish its own procedures, that conducting its own
question and answer sessions of witnesses did not violate due
process.
After careful review of the record, we hold the
procedure the Board followed did not violate appellants
procedural due process.
Questions directed at the witnesses in
the question and answer session were related to what conditions
would be imposed upon approval by the Board.
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Appellants make
much of the fact that almost all of the questions were directed
at Liter’s.
It is apparent that the Board was very concerned
with what conditions would be imposed in order to assure that
the negative impact to the residents would be minimized.
There
is no argument that Liter’s was permitted to present additional
witnesses not subject to cross-examination.
While appellants
were not questioned to the extent that the Board questioned
Liter’s, appellants were not excluded from this question and
answer session.
While administrative due process does require
that cross-examination be guaranteed, Kaelin v. City of
Louisville, Ky., 643 S.W.2d 590 (1982), appellants cite no
authority that supports their argument that the Board must allow
unlimited cross-examination or rebuttal.
We do not believe this
procedure violated appellants’ due process rights.
Appellants next argue that because the blasting
demonstrations were not conducted under conditions substantially
similar to those involved in the proceedings, the evidence was
inadmissible for the Board to consider.
They argue that the
demonstration blasts were misleading as to what the residents
would actually experience.
In reviewing the record, the circuit
court found that the Board asked extensive questions regarding
the blasting demonstrations and that they discussed the
limitations of the demonstrations.
The circuit court correctly
noted that KRS 100.345 allows for a site visit by the Board.
-12-
The court concluded that the Board had the discretion to
determine the weight it gave to such demonstrations.
There is
no allegation that Liter’s attempted to deceive the Board in
conducting the demonstrations.
The record verifies that Liter’s
explained the limitations of the testing and that the Board was
given specific information as to the distances from the blast
and the level of blasting.
Therefore, the trial court’s finding
in this regard is not clearly erroneous.
Appellants claim that the Board’s knowledge of an
offer of a million dollars to the Fiscal Court by Liter’s
tainted the hearing and thereby violated their rights to a fair
hearing.
A thorough review of the record established the
following facts concerning this offer.
Prior to the hearing,
Liter’s offered the City of Orchard Grass Hills $240,000.00,
representing a payment of $.02 per ton of limestone mined at the
new location, if the City would adopt a resolution endorsing and
recommending the proposal to the Board.
offer.
The City rejected the
In the letter to the city, Liter’s stated that it would,
[O]ffer the Oldham County Fiscal Court the
sum of $100,000 payable yearly for the 10
years for the total payment of $1,000,000 to
be earmarked, if the court wishes, for
improvements to Haunz Lane and its’ [sic]
intersection with Kentucky Highway #22 from
which the citizens of Orchard Grass Hills
would obviously benefit. This offer will be
made even though the new location, if
approved, will not result in any increased
traffic on those roads, since for Liter’s
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this amounts to an extension, not an
expansion of its’[sic] operations.
In a letter to the Fiscal Court dated April 27, 2001, Liter’s
stated,
Liter’s has committed to pay the Oldham
Fiscal Court the sum of $100,000.00 per year
for ten years, to be earmarked for
improvements to Haunz Lane or otherwise in
the Court’s discretion. Liter’s will pay
the total sum of $1,000,000.00 directly to
the Court in annual installments beginning
in the calendar year in which mining begins
under the new permit and continuing until
paid, subject only to the new mining
operation’s being halted by Court order or
operation of law. No payment will be made
in any year or part thereof in which mining
is prohibited. To our knowledge, no action
is required of the Court in this matter. We
simply wish to confirm our commitment to the
Court in the event we are permitted to
continue our operations in Oldham County.
Appellants argue that the offer of the money was
intended to influence a favorable decision from the Board and
placed the residents at a distinct advantage.
The circuit court
found that the financial offer to Fiscal Court did not taint the
public hearing for the following reasons:
Liter’s is accustomed to making financial
contributions for road maintenance and
improvements as a condition of previous
permits. The record indicates that Liter’s
counsel addressed the issue of the financial
contribution in his opening statement.
Liter’s indicated that the contribution was
to be designated for improvements to Haunz
Lane and that it had already paid for the
engineering study and design for these
improvements. Liter’s counsel also
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addressed this issue of the financial
incentive offered to the City of Orchard
Grass Hills during his opening statement.
Public policy mandates that private and
corporate citizens contribute to the costs
of improving and maintaining public
facilities when their developments or
businesses place burdens on those
facilities. See Lampton v. Pinaire, Ky.
App., 610 S.W.2d 915 (1980) and LexingtonFayette Urban County Government v.
Schneider, Ky. App., 849 S.W.2d 557 (1992).
The Board would have likely placed financial
contribution conditions on the CUP if
Liter’s had not made the offer. The offer
is not excessive. The one million dollars
is to be disbursed at a rate of one hundred
thousand dollars per year.
While appellants framed their argument in such a way
as to convince the court that Liter’s offered one million
dollars to the Fiscal Court in exchange for the CUP – in essence
a bribe – the evidence is to the contrary.
The offer to the
Fiscal Court, from the beginning, was tied to improvements on
Haunz Lane.
The Board minutes of June 20, 2001, specifically
state as follows:
•
•
•
•
there is a completed preliminary plan
for the upgrading of Haunz Lane and
Hwy. 22 intersection, as well as the
entire length of Haunz Lane
this plan calls for a right hand turn
out of Haunz Lane, a left hand turn out
of Haunz Lane and a single lane going
into Haunz Lane
there would be turning lanes and
storage lanes on Hwy. 22 in both
directions
there will be certain corrective
improvements to Haunz Lane for site
-15-
•
distance, drainage and shoulder
improvements
the complete cost estimate for these
improvements, which is included in the
traffic study, would be approximately
$1.1 million
Because the offer was tied to the costs of the use,
specifically road improvements, we do not believe it was
different than Liter’s offer to reduce its hours of operation,
to pay for pre-mining surveys to owners of nearby homes, or to
agree to blast at levels significantly below state permitted
limits.
While we are concerned that in documents to the Board
and the Fiscal Court the offer is referred to as a “financial
incentive,” under the circumstances we do not believe the offer
was improper.
Therefore, the finding of the circuit court in
this regard was not clearly erroneous.
We are limited in our review of the actions of the
Board.
We may not substitute our judgment as to whether this
use is essential or desirable or would promote the public
welfare.
Minton v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, Ky. App.,
850 S.W.2d 52, 56-57 (1992).
The Board did not act in excess of
powers delegated to it by the legislature, appellants were
provided procedural due process and the actions taken by the
Board were supported by substantial evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Oldham Circuit Court.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
Kyle T. Hubbard
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LITER’S,
INC.:
William P. Croley
Croley, Moore & Snell, PSC
LaGrange, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES OLDHAM
COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS
AND APPEALS:
John R. Fendley
LaGrange, Kentucky
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