BRENDA HUDSON MAGGARD , FAMILY COURT DIVISION v. JAMES MAGGARD, JR.
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RENDERED: MARCH 21, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001589-MR
BRENDA HUDSON MAGGARD
APPELLANT
v.
APPEAL FROM LESLIE CIRCUIT COURT,
FAMILY COURT DIVISION
HONORABLE GENE CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CI-00087
JAMES MAGGARD, JR.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, McANULTY AND PAISLEY, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Brenda Hudson Maggard appeals from an order
of the Leslie Circuit Court, Family Division, which granted her
ex-husband’s motion to modify custody of their oldest child,
Brittany.
Because we believe that the evidence was insufficient
to warrant modification of custody, we reverse and remand.
Brenda and her ex-husband, James Maggard, Jr., were
married in 1990 and were divorced by a decree of the Leslie
Circuit Court on April 14, 1994.
Brenda was awarded sole
custody of the two minor children, Brittany, who was born on May
24, 1989, and Brianna, who was born on September 24, 1990.
The children resided with Brenda and James in Leslie
County until Brenda and James separated in April 1992.
For the
eight years following the divorce in 1994 until this litigation
commenced, Brenda and the children lived outside of Leslie
County.
During the three years immediately preceding this
litigation in 2002, Brenda and the children resided in Jefferson
County.
In the spring of 2002, during one of James’s
visitation periods with Brittany, James’s father, James Maggard,
Sr., obtained an emergency custody order for Brittany from the
Leslie District Court.
James Jr. then filed a motion for change
of custody in the Leslie Circuit Court on May 15, 2002.
He also
filed an affidavit in support of his motion, wherein he alleged
“[t]hat the respondent [Brenda] is presently living with a male
which has physically abused the child.”
The motion and
affidavit were served on Brenda by mail, and the hearing was
noticed to be heard on June 20, 2002.
When Brenda and James appeared before the court for
the hearing, James was accompanied by an attorney to represent
him.
However, while Brenda stated that she was represented by
an attorney, she also stated that her attorney was unable to
come from Louisville to the hearing.
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No attorney had entered an
appearance of record on Brenda’s behalf, and Brenda stated to
the court that she did not want the hearing postponed but wanted
James’s motion to be heard that day.
During the hearing on the motion, the court heard
testimony from Brenda, James Jr., James Sr., and Arthur Rogers.
Rogers stated that he lived with Brenda and her daughters and
had helped raise them during the eight years since Brenda’s
divorce.
Before hearing testimony, the court found that the
affidavit in support of the motion was sufficient to warrant a
custody modification hearing.
After hearing testimony from the
witnesses, the court orally granted James’s motion for
modification of custody and granted him custody of Brittany with
visitation for Brenda.
A brief written order, which did not
contain any findings or conclusions setting forth the reasons
for custody modification, was entered a few days later.
This
appeal by Brenda followed.
Brenda raises several arguments, and we will address
them in a different order from which Brenda has presented them
in her brief.
First, Brenda argues that the trial court erred
in refusing to dismiss the motion or transfer it to Jefferson
County, the county where Brittany had lived in the three years
prior to the entry of the emergency custody order by the Leslie
District Court.
Although Brenda’s argument of improper venue
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may have had merit, she is deemed to have waived it by not
properly raising the issue as required in CR1 12.08(1).
Second, Brenda argues that the trial court erred in
entertaining a hearing on the issue of custody modification even
though the affidavit to support the motion was not sufficient to
warrant a hearing.
KRS2 403.350 requires a party seeking custody
modification to submit a supporting affidavit together with the
motion.
The statute further states that “[t]he court shall deny
the motion unless it finds that adequate cause for hearing the
motion is established by the affidavits.”
See also West v.
West, Ky. App., 664 S.W.2d 948, 949 (1984).
As we have noted, the affidavit supporting James’s
motion stated that Brenda was living with a male who had
physically abused Brittany.
The court in the West case stated
that “the movant must present facts in his affidavit that compel
the court’s attention.”
Id.
We conclude that the affidavit
supporting James’s motion compelled the court’s attention and
was adequate cause for the court to grant a hearing.
The remainder of Brenda’s arguments addresses matters
that cause us to reverse the court’s order.
Citing KRS 403.340
and Quisenberry v. Quisenberry, Ky., 785 S.W.2d 485 (1990),
Brenda argues that the trial court made insufficient and
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4-
erroneous findings to support its ruling.
KRS 403.340(3) states
in pertinent part that “the court shall not modify a prior
custody decree unless after hearing it finds . . . that a change
has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian,
and that the modification is necessary to serve the best
interests of the child.”
The statute then sets forth factors
for the court to consider in making these determinations.
The
most relevant factor in this case is “[w]hether the child’s
present environment endangers seriously his physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health.”
KRS 403.340(3)(d).3
Furthermore,
in determining whether the child’s present environment endangers
his or her physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, KRS
403.340(4) states that the court shall consider “all relevant
factors.”
These factors include the interaction of the child
with his or her parents or any other person who may
significantly affect the child’s best interests and the repeated
or substantial failure of either parent to pay child support.
KRS 403.340(4)(a) and (c).
As we have noted, the written order of the court made
no findings and conclusions concerning any of these matters.
Therefore, our review is limited to the findings and conclusions
3
James states in his brief that this factor is the factor that
is applicable in this case. We will accept that for purposes of
addressing his argument. However, James addresses this factor
in the context of KRS 403.340 before it was amended in 2001.
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stated orally by the court at the conclusion of the hearing.
It
is not clear to us exactly why the trial court changed the
custody of Brittany from Brenda to James.
After noting that
Brittany had stated that she desired to live with her father,
the court went on to note that her grades had improved and that
she appeared to be happy and well-adjusted in her new
environment.
The court further noted that the Leslie District
Court granted a temporary change of custody based on concerns
about the interaction between Brittany and Arthur Rogers.
In
that regard, the court stated as follows:
He doesn’t seem like a dangerous fellow to
me. He seems quite well intentioned. I do
have a problem, however with the idea that
mother’s boyfriend, even one of such a long
standing and apparent stable nature,
administers any type of discipline or
attention getting to the children. I asked
a question of Mr. Rogers by what right do
you administer any discipline and he
candidly answered, none. He doesn’t have a
right.
Finally, after expressing its concern with splitting up Brittany
and Brianna, the court found that it would be in the best
interest of Brittany for the modification motion to be granted.
Concerning whether Brittany’s environment with Brenda
seriously endangered her physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health, there was little testimony.
James stated that he
instituted these proceedings to get custody of Brittany because
she wanted to live with him and “her [Brenda’s] boyfriend was
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smacking her [Brittany] around a little bit.”4
Arthur Rogers
testified that he had a good and loving relationship with
Brittany but that he occasionally tapped Brittany and Brianna on
the back of the head to get their attention when they were
misbehaving.
He testified that he had never administered
corporal punishment to Brittany at any time and had never
physically disciplined either of the children other than to tap
them on the back of the head to get their attention.
He also
testified that he put the children in “timeout” when they
misbehaved.
Rogers stated unequivocally that he had never
spanked Brittany in the eight years that he had lived with
Brenda and the children.
Brenda, a registered nurse, testified that she had
witnessed the girls being tapped on the back of the head by
Rogers but that “it was in no shape, form or fashion, abuse.
would not allow it.
She’s my daughter.”
I
Brittany was
interviewed in chambers by the court, but the court did not
cause a record of the interview to be made a part of the record
as required by the statute.
Therefore, it is not known if
Brittany testified to any form of abuse.
There are problems with the order granting custody
modification.
First, the written order made no findings or
4
This testimony was inadmissible hearsay testimony on the issue
of abuse, but Brenda did not object to it.
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conclusions.
Second, regarding the oral ruling by the trial
court, it did not make any finding that there was such a change
in Brittany’s circumstances as to warrant modification.
KRS
403.340(3) requires such a finding before a modification may be
made.
Further, the court made no reference to whether
Brittany’s environment seriously endangered her physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health.
Additionally, the court
made no finding concerning whether Brittany had been abused or
otherwise mistreated by Rogers.5
There was also a problem with the court’s in chambers
interview with Brittany that alone would merit reversal.
KRS
403.290(1) allows the court to “interview the child in chambers
to ascertain the child’s wishes as to his custodian and as to
visitation.”
The statute further provides that “[t]he court
shall cause a record of the interview to be made and to be part
of the record in the case.”
case.
Id.
That was not done in this
Such has been held to be reversible error where the court
relies, at least in part, on the interview.
See Schwartz v.
Schwartz, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 851, 853 (1964).
Also, see Holt v.
Chenault, Ky., 722 S.W.2d 897, 899 (1987).
The court in the
5
Rogers testified that James Jr. and James Sr. had said that
they would see to it that Rogers, Brenda, and the children did
not move to Florida. In other words, Rogers implied that the
custody modification proceedings were an attempt by James to
prevent Brenda and the children from moving away and that the
allegations of abuse were fabricated.
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case sub judice obviously relied, at least in part, on the
interview.
Were the problems with the written and oral orders of
the court and the problem with the in chambers interview with
Brittany the only problems, we would simply vacate the order and
remand the matter for additional review, findings, and
conclusions by the trial court.
However, separate and apart
from the inadequate findings of the court, there was
insufficient evidence to warrant custody modification.
There
was no evidence that the child’s environment with Brenda
seriously endangered her physical, mental, moral or emotional
health.
The only evidence of anything remotely close to abuse
was the testimony of Rogers that he tapped the girls on the back
of the head when they misbehaved.
Brenda testified that Rogers’
actions did not constitute abuse, and no other witness provided
any testimony that any abuse had ever occurred.
Brittany was
interviewed by the court in chambers, but no record was made of
that portion of the proceeding, and the record is thus void of
evidence from her.
At any rate, the trial court apparently did
not find any abuse because it did not mention abuse in its
ruling.
Furthermore, Brittany’s sister, Brianna, a witness who
might have been able to either substantiate or refute James’s
allegations, was not allowed to testify.
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In short, we believe
the evidence was insufficient to prove that a change had
occurred in the circumstances of the child or the custodian.
Had there been evidence of abuse, we likely would have been
constrained to conclude otherwise.
“KRS 403.340 reflects a strong legislative policy to
maximize the finality of custody decrees without jeopardizing
the health and welfare of the child.
The statute creates a
presumption that the child’s present custodian is entitled to
continue as the child’s custodian.”
App., 566 S.W.2d 173, 175 (1978).
Wilcher v. Wilcher, Ky.
Further, “[i]t is obvious the
provision of [KRS 403.340(3)] intend to inhibit further
litigation initiated simply because the noncustodial parent, or
the child, or both, believe that a change in custody would be in
the child’s best interest.”
Quisenberry, 785 S.W.2d at 487.6
In this case it appears that the trial court changed
custody based on the fact that the child was well adjusted in
her new environment, had improved her grades in schools, and
desired to be with her father.
Although an argument can be made
that it would have been in the child’s best interest to move to
the home of her father, the statutory requirement of a change in
circumstances was not shown.
“A prior custody decree may not be
6
Wilcher and Quisenberry addressed KRS 403.340 prior to the
amendment of the statute in 2001. The standards for custody
modification are not as strict in the statute as amended.
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modified absent a finding of changed circumstances that
necessitate the modification.”
Holt, 722 S.W.2d at 899.
Finally, we can not leave this case without mentioning
the apparent unfairness of the proceedings.
Brenda made the
decision to proceed with the custody hearing without the
services of an attorney.
Her decision was an unwise one, and
the trial court cannot be faulted for telling Brenda at the
beginning of the hearing that it would hold her to the same
standards of proof and evidence as it would if she had an
attorney.
Nevertheless, we are disturbed that Brenda, a
litigant from Jefferson County facing her Leslie County exhusband, a Leslie County attorney, and a Leslie County judge in
the Leslie Circuit Court, was required to follow the rules of
procedure to the extent it appeared the court was more
interested in Brenda following the rules than in the court
getting to the truth of the matter before it.
We will cite a
few examples in the hope that other litigants will have a level
playing field and will not face the hostility that Brenda
endured.
First, at the outset of the hearing, when Brenda
advised the court that she wanted to proceed without an attorney
because she had spent a considerable amount of money by hiring a
Jefferson County attorney to represent her, the court stated,
“You should be spending your money locally.
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You might get a
better return.”
While this comment by itself might only raise
an eyebrow, it set the stage for what was to follow.
Brenda attempted to call her eleven-year-old daughter,
Brianna, as a witness.
Undoubtedly, as a sibling of Brittany
living in Brenda’s home, Brianna would have relevant testimony
concerning Brittany’s relationship with Arthur Rogers and
whether Brittany was being abused or otherwise mistreated.
Nevertheless, because Brenda did not properly qualify Brianna as
a witness, the court did not allow her to testify.
We
understand that Brenda was held to the standards of an attorney
in her attempts to present evidence to the court.
However, this
case did not involve something of the nature of a traffic
ticket, but it involved an attempt to take a child from the
custody of her mother.
We believe the court, in the interest of
fairness and in the interest of getting to the truth, would have
assisted Brenda by asking one or two questions to determine the
child’s competency and maturity to testify as a witness.
After
all, the issue of Brianna’s competence and maturity were matters
for the court to determine (see KRE7 601(b)).
Further, the court
had the authority to ask questions (see KRS 614(b)), as it did
when it chose to cross-examine Rogers.8
7
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
8
We will discuss this matter later in the opinion.
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Brenda also attempted to introduce evidence that James
had been convicted of nonsupport.
As we have noted previously
herein, KRS 403.340(4)(c) states that the “[r]epeated or
substantial failure, without good cause as specified in KRS
403.240, of either parent to observe visitation, child support,
or other provisions of the decree which affect the child” are
relevant factors in a court’s determination of whether a child’s
present environment may endanger his or her health.
We
understand that Brenda should have had a proper document to
introduce concerning any conviction that James may have had for
the offense of nonsupport, but it was apparent that the court
was not going to consider the issue of child support as it
related to the custody modification motion.
See page 34, lines
5 and 6 of the transcript of the hearing.
We also note that the court interjected a question of
its own during the testimony of Arthur Rogers.
The court asked
Rogers, “Do you think it’s appropriate to cohabitate with a
woman with whom you are not married in the presence of the two
infant children?”
It seems strange that the court would be
interested in the living arrangement of Rogers but not the
living arrangement of James.
Furthermore, the basis of James’s
motion was abuse, not the fact that Brenda and Rogers lived
together.
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We are also concerned with numerous instances of
apparent hostility by the court toward Brenda.
For example, in
response to a question by James’s attorney concerning whether
she was willing to put Brittany “through anything to fight with
the Maggards,” Brenda responded that she was not trying to put
her child through anything but was like a lioness fighting for
her lion cub.
The court responded that “I don’t need the
Discovery Channel.”
At another point in the hearing, Brenda
attempted to ask James a question and stated that she thought
“the court needs to know how long a time that that child has
been out of my care.”
The court then interrupted and stated,
“Don’t worry about what the Court needs to know.
questions.”
Just ask your
At another point in the hearing, Brenda handed
James’s attorney a document and attempted to tell him what it
was.
The court interjected that “you don’t have to tell him; he
can read real well.”
We question whether the court would have
said this to an attorney who was identifying a document for a
witness.
Several additional comments by the court deserve being
mentioned.
At one point the court inquired of Brenda concerning
why “my questions only have a few words and your answers have so
many?”
At yet another point in the proceedings, Brenda
explained to the court that she was attempting to introduce an
affidavit into evidence because her attorney had advised her
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that it would likely be accepted by the court.
After denying
Brenda’s attempt to introduce the affidavit into evidence, the
court commented on the advice Brenda had received from her
attorney and stated “[y]ou tell him to come down here and
explain that to the Judge.”
Later in the hearing when Brenda
attempted to explain an answer, the court stated “I don’t need
editorializing.”
In short, the evidence to support custody
modification was insufficient, and the hearing appeared to be
unfair.
The order of the Leslie Circuit, Family Division, is
reversed, and this case is remanded for the entry of an order
denying James’s motion for modification.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Justin Genco
Stanford, Kentucky
Phillip Lewis
Hyden, Kentucky
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