MARK STEVEN DALTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: November 21, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001587-MR
MARK STEVEN DALTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARTIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL SPARKS, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 00-CR-00047
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER and SCHRODER, Judges; HUDDLESTON, Senior Judge.1
HUDDLESTON,
Senior
Judge:
Mark
Steven
Dalton
appeals
from
Martin Circuit Court’s April 26, 2002, denial of his pro se
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
On appeal, Dalton argues
that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion
to
withdraw
his
guilty
plea
that
was
based
on
the
assertion that his plea was involuntary under the totality of
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
the circumstances.
Because the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion, we affirm its decision.
On
December
21,
2000,
a
Martin
County
grand
jury
indicted Dalton on one count of sodomy in the first degree and
one count of assault in the second degree.
On March 21, 2001,
Dalton appeared for arraignment and pled not guilty.
At his trial attorney’s request, the circuit court, on
August 9, 2001, ordered the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric
Center
(KCPC)
to
evaluate
criminal responsibility.
Dalton
regarding
competency
and
On November 16, 2001, Dr. Richard K.
Johnson, the licensed clinical psychologist at KCPC assigned to
evaluate Dalton, sent a letter to the circuit court in which he
related
that
Dr.
psychiatrist
depressive
opined
that
at
KCPC,
disorder
if
Nasiruddin
had
and
Dalton
Siddiqui,
diagnosed
an
anxiety
were
returned
Dalton’s
Dalton
with
disorder.
to
the
Dr.
local
attending
a
major
Siddiqui
detention
center without additional treatment he would be at risk of selfharm.
In response to Dr. Johnson’s letter, the circuit court
ordered Dalton to remain at KCPC for an additional thirty days
to receive treatment.
After
Dalton
returned
from
KCPC,
the
circuit
court
scheduled a jury trial for February 11, 2002.
On the day of
trial,
Commonwealth’s
Dalton
pled
guilty
in
reliance
on
the
offer for Dalton to serve concurrent ten-year sentences on each
-2-
count.
The
circuit
court
had
scheduled
Dalton
for
final
sentencing on April 26, 2002.
However, before the circuit court
could
without
sentence
Dalton,
he,
withdraw his guilty plea.
motion
at
that
time,
competency hearing.
explanation,
moved
to
The circuit court denied Dalton’s
but
in
response
to
it
scheduled
a
Following the competency hearing, the court
once again denied Dalton’s motion to withdrawal his guilty plea
and
sentenced
him
recommendation.
in
accordance
with
the
Commonwealth’s
After final sentencing, Dalton timely appealed
to this Court.
On appeal, Dalton cites Brady v. United States2 and
Boykin
v.
Alabama3
and
points
out
that
the
United
States
Constitution mandates that before a trial court accepts a guilty
plea
it
must
ascertain
that
the
defendant
knowingly and intelligently pleading guilty.
is
voluntarily,
Dalton argues that
the circuit court failed to do so in his case.
Dalton asserts
that the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
to withdrawal his guilty plea and in the process violated his
Fourteenth
Amendment
due
process
rights
because
under
the
totality of the circumstances his plea was neither knowing nor
voluntary.
Dalton
circuit
2
3
court
if
points
he
out
could
that
be
at
sentencing
paroled
after
a
he
little
397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970).
395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969).
-3-
asked
the
while.
According to Dalton, this clearly demonstrates that he did not
understand his parole eligibility; thus, he did not understand
the consequences of pleading guilty.
Dalton insists that this
statement clearly implies that he did not understand that he was
required to serve eighty-five percent of his sentence before
becoming eligible for parole.
demonstrates
that
consequences
of
his
trial
pleading
ineffective assistance.
Furthermore, he insists, this
attorney
guilty,
and
never
explained
therefore
the
rendered
Consequently, the circuit court abused
its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to
consider
his
ineffective
assistance
of
counsel
claim.
And,
because his trial attorney was ineffective, there was a conflict
of interest between Dalton and his trial counsel when he moved
to withdraw his guilty plea.
Dalton contends that his guilty plea was involuntary
because he has an IQ of 76.
He reminds this Court that Dr.
Siddiqui at KCPC had diagnosed him with major depression and
anxiety.
In addition, Dr. Johnson testified that while at KCPC,
Dalton’s depression and anxiety interfered with his ability to
think during the evaluation process.
According to Dalton, Dr.
Johnson testified that Dalton was confused, indecisive, easily
distracted and unable to concentrate.
Furthermore, Dr. Johnson
testified that while at KCPC Dalton was competent, he could not
state that Dalton was still competent several months later.
-4-
At final sentencing, Dalton told the circuit court:
On the day that we were suppose to have trial, I was
ready to have trial then I got a lot of confusion and
couldn’t
what
I
think
was
straight
doing.
I
and
I
didn’t
didn’t
actually
know
.
I
even
.
.
don’t
remember reading the papers that I signed.
remember nothing right now.
just didn’t understand it.
I can’t
I was so confused.
I was nervous.
I
I never
really fully understood all of the statements that was
on that.
Dalton
argues
statements.
that
the
Commonwealth
never
refuted
these
Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, his
plea was involuntary.
Dalton argues that the circuit court based the denial
of
his
motion
solely
on
the
Boykin
colloquy.
According
to
Dalton, the colloquy was insufficient to show that his plea was
voluntary because on two occasions during the colloquy he told
the circuit court that he did not understand what the court was
saying regarding the sentencing recommendation.
When
a
criminal
defendant
pleads
guilty,
Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.10 requires the trial court
taking the guilty plea to determine on the record whether the
-5-
defendant is knowingly, freely and voluntarily pleading guilty.4
Once a defendant has pled guilty, he may move the trial court to
withdraw his guilty plea, pursuant to RCr 8.10 and the trial
court
may
motion.5
within
its
discretion
either
grant
or
deny
the
When a trial court denies a criminal defendant’s motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, this Court will not reverse the
denial unless the trial court has abused its discretion.6
trial
court
has
abused
its
discretion
when
its
arbitrary and capricious under the circumstances.7
actions
A
were
A court acts
arbitrarily and capriciously when its actions are not supported
by substantial evidence.8
On February 11, 2002, the circuit court held a hearing
regarding Dalton’s motion to enter a guilty plea, and it engaged
in a thorough Boykin colloquy to ascertain whether Dalton was
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently pleading guilty.
The
court explained to Dalton that he had certain constitutional
rights and if he pled guilty he would be waiving those rights.
On the record, Dalton acknowledged this.
The court asked Dalton
if his trial counsel had read the Commonwealth’s offer and his
own motion to enter a guilty plea to him; and the court asked if
Dalton had read the documents himself.
4
5
6
7
8
Dalton answered both
Bronk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 58 S.W.3d 482, 486 (2001).
Id.
Id. at 487.
Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, Ky., 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (1994).
NCAA v. Lasege, Ky., 53 S.W.3d 77, 85 (2001).
-6-
questions
affirmatively.
The
court
then
asked
if
understood the documents; he indicated that he did.
elicited
from
Dalton
that
he
was
taking
Dalton
The court
medication
for
depression and followed by asking him whether the medications
affected
his
ability
to
make
a
rational
indicated the medication did not.
decision.
Dalton
The court asked Dalton what
he understood the Commonwealth’s offer to be.
At first, this
confused Dalton, but Dalton quickly indicated he understood the
offer to be ten years on each count to be served concurrently.
During the colloquy, Dalton stated that he was pleading guilty
because he was, in fact, guilty and that he was satisfied with
his trial attorney’s performance.
At the July 2, 2002, competency hearing, the circuit
court
swore
testified
in
only
regarding
one
the
witness,
results
Dr.
of
Richard
Dalton’s
Johnson,
who
psychological
evaluation at KCPC.
According to Dr. Johnson, Dalton’s IQ of 76
placed
lower
him
However,
retarded.
in
Dr.
the
Johnson
five
opined
percentile
that
Dalton
of
the
was
population.
not
mentally
Dr. Johnson testified that Dr. Siddiqui, Dalton’s
attending psychiatrist, had diagnosed Dalton as suffering from
major
depression
several
and
medications
anxiety.
for
Dr.
Dalton
Siddiqui
including
had
Zoloft,
prescribed
an
anti-
depressant; Trazedone, a sleep aid; Naprosyn, a pain medication;
and Seraquel, a calming agent.
Dr. Johnson testified that none
-7-
of these medications would have interfered with Dalton’s ability
to think rationally;
in fact, according to Dr. Johnson, Zoloft
would
Dalton’s
have
Johnson
observed
stressful
compose
enhanced
and
that
would
himself,
Dalton
have
yet,
ability
may
have
probably
despite
to
concentrate.
found
required
this,
Dalton
a
jury
short
was
Dr.
trial
breaks
to
competent
to
stand trial and could be held criminally responsible for his
actions.
The
voluntariness
of
a
guilty
plea
can
only
be
determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding
it.9
Dalton asserted that his plea was involuntary because he
was confused, nervous and could not think straight.
the
record
of
both
the
Boykin
colloquy
and
the
However,
competency
hearing support the circuit court’s finding that Dalton’s plea
was,
in
fact,
intelligently,
knowingly
and
voluntarily
made.
Furthermore, contrary to what he now claims, Dalton never argued
before the circuit court that his trial counsel was ineffective.
Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Dalton’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
The
order
denying
Dalton’s
motion
guilty plea is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
9
Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, Ky., 87 S.W.3d 8, 10 (2002).
-8-
to
withdraw
his
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
PIKE AND SCHMIDT LAW OFFICE
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Carlton S. Shier, IV
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-9-
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