ROGER SCOTT NORTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 5, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001510-MR
ROGER SCOTT NORTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-00279
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, GUIDUGLI, AND PAISLEY,1 JUDGES.
BAKER, JUDGE:
Roger Scott Norton brings this appeal from a
denial of his Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42
motion by the McCracken Circuit Court on March 7, 2002.
We
affirm.
The facts are these: In the early morning hours of
Saturday, July 13, 1996, Norton was arrested outside Regina’s II,
a bar in Paducah.
He was indicted on the offenses of Alcohol
Intoxication, Giving a Police Officer a False Name, Resisting
1
This opinion was prepared and concurred in prior to Judge Paisley’s
retirement effective December 1, 2003.
Arrest, Third Degree Criminal Mischief, First Degree Promoting
Contraband, two counts of Fourth Degree Assault, and of being a
First Degree Persistent Felony Offender.
Norton’s defense at
trial was that he was too intoxicated to know what he was doing.
Norton was found guilty on all counts except Alcohol
Intoxication, of which he was acquitted.
After sentencing,
Norton was adjudged guilty of being a First Degree Persistent
Felony Offender and was sentenced to twenty years in prison, in
lieu of the sentences on the other charges.
Norton appealed and, ultimately, the Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment in Appeal No. 1997-SC-000039.
Subsequently, Norton filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42, requesting an evidentiary
hearing.
The trial court denied the motion for an evidentiary
hearing and denied his RCr 11.42 motion.
We affirmed the trial
court’s decision in Appeal No. 1998-CA-002937.
The Supreme Court granted discretionary review and
reversed this Court (Appeal No. 2000-SC-000462), remanding the
case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.
An
evidentiary hearing was held, and the trial court again denied
the 11.42 motion.
Norton subsequently filed a motion for a
belated appeal with this court.
entered September 26, 2002.
The motion was granted by order
This appeal follows.
Norton argues that he was denied effective assistance
of counsel because his counsel (1) failed to call to the stand
exculpatory witnesses, and (2) failed to preserve for appellate
review the trial court’s refusal to give an instruction on
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intoxication.
He also asserts that, even if this Court holds
that his attorney’s alleged errors, standing alone, do not
constitute ineffective assistance, this Court should hold that
his counsel’s errors cumulatively rise to the level of
ineffective assistance.
The standard for addressing a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In order to
be found ineffective, counsel's performance must be below the
objective standard of reasonableness and must be so prejudicial
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial and a reasonable
result.
Id.
In considering ineffective assistance, the
reviewing court must focus on the totality of evidence before the
lower court and assess the overall performance of counsel
throughout the case in order to determine whether the identified
acts or omissions overcome the presumption that counsel rendered
reasonable professional assistance.
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477
U.S. 365, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986).
Under
Strickland, the movant must show that, but for the ineffective
assistance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the proceeding would have been different.
Norton asserts that his counsel was ineffective for not
2
calling to the stand Rebecca Martin (his sister) and Carl Smith.
He argues that both persons could have testified to his level of
intoxication on the night he was arrested, and that his counsel
was aware that both persons were potential witnesses.
1. Rebecca Martin’s name at the time of trial was Rebecca Norton.
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Norton
contends that he told his counsel that his sister was with him at
Regina’s II and that Carl Smith had earlier that night given him
a ride into town.
At the RCr 11.42 evidentiary hearing, Rebecca Martin
testified that she had seen Norton drinking at Mardi Gras,
another bar in Paducah, and had later seen him drinking at
Regina’s II.
Carl Smith testified at the evidentiary hearing
that he approached Norton’s attorney on the day of trial and told
her he could testify that Norton was drunk.
At the evidentiary
hearing, Norton’s attorney denied that Norton told her that his
sister was a potential witness, and she denied being approached
by Carl Smith.
Norton did present, at the hearing, evidence that
his attorney, for some reason, had written down his sister’s
name, address, and phone number, with the letter “W” next to her
name.
We do not need to determine if Norton’s counsel’s
performance was deficient because we do not believe that there is
a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different if Martin and Smith had testified.
Smith
testified that he last saw Norton at 8:30 Friday night, but
Norton was not arrested until 1:30 or 2:00 Saturday morning.
Thus, Smith could have testified only to Norton’s condition some
five hours earlier, not to his condition at the time of arrest or
to his condition later, at the jail, when marijuana was
discovered on his person.
Martin could have testified that Norton had been
drinking earlier that night, but ample evidence of Norton’s
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intoxication was offered by the witnesses for the prosecution.
Both arresting officers testified that Norton was intoxicated and
that he smelled of alcohol.
While one officer qualified his
testimony by stating that Norton was not so drunk as to not know
what was transpiring, we cannot say that Martin and Smith’s
differing opinion of the degree of Norton’s intoxication would
have changed the outcome of the trial.
Norton also argues that his counsel was ineffective for
not preserving for appellate review the trial court’s refusal to
give a voluntary intoxication instruction.
We do not need to
establish if Norton’s counsel did fail to preserve the issue for
review because we are of the opinion that even if the instruction
had been given, the outcome of the trial would not have been
different.
The jury was instructed that to find Norton guilty of
Alcohol Intoxication it must believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that Norton “was manifestly under the influence of alcohol to the
degree that he might have endangered himself or other person or
property.”
Norton was acquitted of this charge.
An intoxication
defense instruction would require the jury to believe that Norton
was “so drunk that he did not know what he was doing.”
Commonwealth, Ky., 86 S.W.3d 29, 43 (2002).
Rogers v.
Since the jury
determined that Norton did not meet the lower standard of
drunkenness needed to convict him of Alcohol Intoxication, we are
of the opinion that it would not have found him not guilty under
the higher intoxication defense standard.
was not ineffective.
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Thus, Norton’s counsel
Finally, Norton argues that if either issue, standing
alone, does not constitute ineffective assistance, then the two
issues, viewed cumulatively, do establish ineffective assistance.
The defense counsel was not ineffective as a result of cumulative
error.
In view of the fact that the individual allegations have
no merit, they can have no cumulative value.
McQueen v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 694, 701 (1986).
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the McCracken
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard Edwin Neal
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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