MICHAEL HOLLOWAY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 25, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001494-MR
MICHAEL HOLLOWAY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00247
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BAKER, BARBER, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Michael S. Holloway appeals from a final
judgment and sentence of imprisonment following a jury verdict
convicting him of third-degree assault.
Holloway contends that
the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after
it improperly accepted the Commonwealth’s peremptory strikes of
two African-American jurors, and that the trial court improperly
permitted into evidence testimony concerning a felony probation
warrant which was outstanding at the time of Holloway’s arrest.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
On April 19, 2002, Holloway was indicted for thirddegree assault (KRS1 508.025).
The charge resulted from the
allegation that on March 8, 2002, Holloway had caused or
attempted to cause physical injury to a police officer.
At the
time of the incident, Covington Police Officers were attempting
to take Holloway into custody following a dispatch call to a
Covington address and their subsequent determination that
Holloway was wanted on outstanding warrants.
As the officers attempted to make the arrest, Holloway
resisted, and was wrestled to the floor and maced.
Holloway
continued to be violent throughout the initial arrest and his
transportation to jail.
At some point during the altercation,
one of the officers injured his left knee and left shoulder and
later sought medical attention at an area hospital.
The case was tried before a jury on June 6 and June 7,
2002.
On June 7, 2002, the jury returned a verdict finding
Holloway guilty of third-degree assault and recommending a
sentence of three years’ imprisonment.
The trial court
subsequently imposed judgment and sentencing in accordance with
the verdict and recommendation.
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This appeal followed.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Holloway, who is Caucasian, contends that the
Commonwealth struck the only two African-American jurors in the
venire in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106
S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
Though Holloway and the
stricken veniremen were not of the same race, a criminal
defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors affected
through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and
the excluded juror share the same race. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); Wiley v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 978 S.W.2d 333, 334 (1998).
At the conclusion of voir dire, the only two AfricanAmericans in the jury pool were struck by the Commonwealth by
use of peremptory strikes.
The first juror, Stephan Jackson,
Juror No. 56, had been previously voir dired individually.
During his individual voir dire, Jackson disclosed that he had
previously been involved in an incident involving one of the
Commonwealth’s principle witnesses, Officer Marcus Jordan.
The
incident involved an occasion when Jordan approached Jackson
because he was smoking a cigarette in the no-smoking area of a
White Castle restaurant.
Jackson stated that he felt that he
had not been properly treated by Officer Jordan during this
incident.
Following the individual questioning of Jackson, there
was a discussion regarding a report by another member of the
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venire who alleged that she had detected an odor of alcohol on
Jackson’s person and that Jackson had been mumbling during voir
dire.
In the discussion, the trial court noted that he could
not detect an odor of alcohol on Jackson; however he also noted
that Jackson had his eyes closed for a period during voir dire
questioning.
Following the individual voir dire, the Commonwealth
moved to strike Jackson for cause, but the trial court denied
the motion.
As its reason for striking Jackson by preemptory
challenge, the Commonwealth cited to its previous attempt to
strike Jackson for cause and to his responses and answers during
voir dire, which would presumably include the incident with
Officer Jordan and his demeanor during voir dire.
The second venireman struck by the Commonwealth,
Terrance Graves, Juror No. 43, was not individually voir dired.
As its reason for using a peremptory strike against Graves, the
Commonwealth stated (1) that Graves had been observed talking to
Jackson during a break, though the Commonwealth did not purport
to know what their conversation had been about; (2) that during
their break-time conversation Graves and Jackson appeared to
share a camaraderie; and (3) that Graves made inappropriate
expressions and gestures during voir dire.
In Batson v. Kentucky, supra, the United States
Supreme Court outlined a three-step process for evaluating
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claims that prospective jurors were stricken on the basis of
race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing
of racial bias for the peremptory challenge.
Second, if the
requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the
Commonwealth to articulate “clear and reasonably specific” raceneutral reasons for its use of a peremptory challenge.
While
the reasons need not rise to the level justifying a challenge
for cause, “self-serving explanations based on intuition or
disclaimer of discriminatory motive” are insufficient. Stanford
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 112, 114 (1990) (quoting
Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1712).
Finally,
the trial court has the duty to evaluate the credibility of the
proffered reasons and determine if the defendant has established
purposeful discrimination.
Washington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 34
S.W.3d 376, 379 (2000).
"A judge cannot merely accept the reasons proffered at
face value, but must evaluate those reasons as he or she would
weigh any disputed fact.
In order to permit the questioned
challenge, the trial judge must conclude that the proffered
reasons are, first, neutral and reasonable, and second, not a
pretext.
These two requirements are necessary to demonstrate
'clear and reasonably specific ... legitimate reasons.' "
Gamble v. Commonwealth, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 367, 371 (2002) (quoting
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Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1991) and State v.
Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1987)).
An appellate court reviewing a trial court's findings
in a Batson challenge should apply the clearly erroneous
standard.
McGinnis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 518, 523
(1994) (overruled on other grounds by Elliott v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 976 S.W.2d 416 (1998)); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991)
"[T]he best
evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who
exercised the challenge.
As with the state of mind of a juror,
evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor
and credibility lies 'peculiarly within a trial judge's
province.'"
Commonwealth v. Snodgrass, Ky., 831 S.W.2d 176, 179
(1992).
With the above standards in mind, we first consider
the peremptory strike of Jackson.
With respect to the first
prong of the Batson test, once the Commonwealth has offered a
race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge and the
trial court has ruled on the ultimate issue of discrimination,
the preliminary issue of whether the defendant has made a prima
facie showing is moot.
Snodgrass at 179.
Thus, the first prong
of Batson with respect to Jackson has been rendered moot by the
circumstances herein.
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The Commonwealth has clearly met the second prong of
the Batson three-prong test.
The Commonwealth articulated
"clear and reasonably specific" race-neutral reasons for its use
of the peremptory challenge in that Jackson and one of the
Commonwealth’s primary witnesses had previously been involved in
an incident in which Jackson felt he had not been treated
properly by the witness.
Further, there was evidence that
Jackson had been inattentive and was mumbling during voir dire.
In the third prong of the Batson test, the trial judge
is charged with weighing the evidence before him and deciding
whether the Commonwealth has exercised purposeful discrimination
in its use of its peremptory challenges.
The trial court is
afforded great discretion in making its determination under
Batson.
"The trial court may accept at face value the
explanation given by the prosecutor depending upon the demeanor
and credibility of the prosecutor."
Snodgrass at 179.
In view of Jackson’s admitted prior experience with a
principle Commonwealth witness and his questionable demeanor
during voir dire, the trial court’s determination that the
Commonwealth did not purposefully discriminate against Jackson
because of his race when it used a peremptory strike against him
was not clearly erroneous.
With regard to Graves, as with Jackson, since the
Commonwealth offered a race-neutral explanation for the
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peremptory challenge and the trial court ruled on the ultimate
issue of discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the
defendant has made a prima facie showing of purposeful
discrimination is moot. Snodgrass, supra.
The second prong of Batson required the Commonwealth
to articulate "clear and reasonably specific" race-neutral
reasons for its use of the peremptory challenge against Graves.
These reasons were his jury-break conversation with Jackson; his
apparent camaraderie with Jackson; and his facial expressions
and gestures during voir dire.
Though problematic, the reasons
given were clear and specific race neutral reasons for striking
Graves, and the second step of Batson does not demand an
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.
"At this
[second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity
of the prosecutor's explanation.
Unless a discriminatory intent
is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered
will be deemed race neutral."
Purkett v. Elm, 514 U.S. 765,
768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 839 (quoting
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d at
406).
Thus, if Holloway’s claim of racial bias in the
peremptory challenge of Graves is to prevail, it must be at the
third step.
Two of the three reasons articulated for striking
Graves involved concerns the Commonwealth had about Jackson, and
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the concerns were ascribed to Graves merely because there was a
perceived “camaraderie” between Jackson and Graves during their
break-time conversation.
In addition, the third-factor, which
involved facial expressions and gestures in voir dire, borders
on the vague.
However, it is the function of the trial court,
not this Court, to evaluate the demeanor and credibility of the
prosecutor with regard to his stated reasons for the peremptory
strike and we may not overturn the trial court’s decision unless
it was clearly erroneous.
Graves’ facial expressions during
voir dire – which presumably reflected a nonreceptivness to the
Commonwealth’s voir dire questioning – is a valid race neutral
reason for exercising a peremptory strike.
Further, we note
that Graves is not of the same race as Holloway, which tends to
suggest that the peremptory strike was not based upon Graves’
race.
We cannot say that the trial court’s finding of fact that
the Commonwealth’s peremptory strike of Graves was not based
upon purposeful discrimination was clearly erroneous.
Next, Holloway contends that the trial court erred
when it denied his motion for a mistrial after it permitted the
Commonwealth to introduce testimony concerning Holloway’s
character in violation of KRE 404(b).
At the time of his arrest, Holloway was wanted on an
outstanding felony probation warrant.
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The trial court granted
Holloway’s pretrial motion in limine to exclude any mention of
the warrant.
The Commonwealth called Officer Jordan as its first
witness.
On direct examination, Officer Jordan testified
regarding the events which lead to the charge of third-degree
assault.
During cross-examination, the following exchange
occurred between Officer Jordan and defense counsel:
Defense counsel:
You didn’t have a gun
call, did you sir?
Officer Jordan:
No, sir.
Defense Counsel:
And so, uh, you and
Officer Bacon surmised there may be a
weapon?
Officer Jordan:
Yes, Sir.
Defense Counsel:
Because of his furtive
activities. That being, he was hiding in
the closet?
Officer Jordan:
that.
There is more to it than
Defense Counsel:
I was talking about based
upon the call, sir.
Officer Jordan:
No, sir. Based upon the
call, we were there to execute a felony
warrant for probation violation. Based upon
the call, we had information that the
suspect was violent and had injured police
officers in the beginning.
Holloway alleges that Officer Jordan’s response was in
violation of the trial court’s in limine order not to mention
the prior felony warrant, and a violation of KRE 404(b) in that
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the reference to the warrant necessarily alluded to prior bad
acts.
Under KRE 404(b), "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible in order to prove the character of a
person or in order to show action in conformity therewith."
Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 83 S.W.3d 522, 528 (2002).
While such evidence may be presented for other purposes,
consistent with this rule, the trial court’s in limine order
excluded any mention of Holloway’s outstanding felony warrant.
However, when the mention of the warrant was made,
trial counsel was aggressively cross-examining Officer Jordan in
furtherance of Holloway’s defense that the police had used
excessive force in the course of the arrest.
To this end
defense counsel’s cross-examination challenged the police
suspicions that Holloway may be armed; suggested that police
could not rationally have suspected that Holloway was armed
because he was hiding in a closet; and suggested that the
information they had from the dispatch call alone could not have
lead to suspicions regarding Holloway.
We are persuaded that defense counsel opened the door
to Officer Jordan’s reference to the outstanding warrant by his
questions concerning police suspicions of the dangers presented
by Holloway and the contents of the dispatch call.
“[O]ne who
opens the book on a subject is not in a position to complain
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when his adversary seeks to read other verses from the same
chapter and page.”
Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 904 S.W.2d 220,
222 (1995).
A mistrial is an extraordinary remedy.
Commonwealth, Ky., 74 S.W.3d 711, 714 (2002).
Lynch v.
The record must
reveal a manifest necessity for a mistrial before such an
extraordinary remedy will be granted.
Ky., 82 S.W.3d 860, 863 (2002).
Maxie v. Commonwealth,
For a mistrial to be proper,
the harmful event must be of such magnitude that a litigant
would be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial
effect could be removed in no other way.
The standard for
reviewing the denial of a mistrial is abuse of discretion. Bray
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 375, 383 (2002).
As we previously noted, defense counsel opened the
door to the reference to the warrant, and the reference amounted
to a direct response to trial counsel’s question.
Under these
circumstances there was not a manifest necessity of granting a
mistrial, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to grant Holloway’s motion for a mistrial.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Kenton
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Alig
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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