ERNEST DALE EDWARDS AND SHIRLEY EDWARDS v. HOP SIN, INC.
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RENDERED:
MODIFIED:
AUGUST 29, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
September 19, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-001482-MR
ERNEST DALE EDWARDS
AND SHIRLEY EDWARDS
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-002759
v.
HOP SIN, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, COMBS, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
In November 1998, Ernest Edwards ate raw oysters
from the seafood bar at China Town restaurant on the Outer Loop
in Louisville.
By the next day he had become ill with what
proved to be septicemia, a bacterial invasion of his blood
stream.
The bacterium was Vibrio vulnificus, an organism
naturally occurring in sea water and commonly found in oysters
and other marine filter feeders.
In May 1999 Edwards and his
wife brought suit against the owner of the restaurant, Hop Sin,
Inc.1
They alleged that China Town’s raw oysters were the source
of Ernest’s infection and that the illness had worsened his
already bad liver condition and had caused chronic swelling of
his lower right leg and foot.
By order entered May 16, 2002,
the Jefferson Circuit Court granted Hop Sin’s motion for summary
judgment.
The court ruled that even if the bacterium was
present it did not render the oysters “defective” for products
liability purposes and further ruled that the owner had not
breached a duty to warn Ernest about the health risks posed by
raw oysters.
We believe that the warning issue presents a jury
question.
Summary judgment is inappropriate, of course, unless
the movant demonstrates that on a dispositive aspect of the case
there is no genuine issue of material fact.2
Both the trial
court and this Court assess such motions, not by weighing the
evidence, but by reviewing the record in the light most
favorable to the opposing party.3
It is well settled that one selling or distributing a
defective product may be liable for harm resulting from the
1
The complaint originally sought relief from United China, Inc.,
but a subsequent amendment named Hop Sin, Inc., as the
defendant.
2
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Ky., 807 S.W.2d
476 (1991).
3
Id.
2
defect.4
In general, a product is defective if it “does not meet
the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its
safety. . . .
[T]his amounts to saying that if the seller knew
of the condition he would be negligent in marketing the
product.”5
Courts have distinguished three types of product
defect: (1) manufacturing defects or deviations from the
product’s design that create unreasonable risks of harm; (2)
design defects or unreasonable risks of harm inherent in the
product’s design; and (3) warning defects or unreasonable risks
of harm that could have been reduced or avoided by the provision
of reasonable instructions or warnings.6
We agree with the trial court that the presence of
Vibrio bacteria in raw oysters does not constitute either a
manufacturing or a design defect.7
The record indicates that
4
Montgomery Elevator Company v. McCullough, Ky., 676 S.W.2d 776
(1984); Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Company, Ky., 532 S.W.2d 197
(1976). Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability § 1
(1998).
5
Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Company, 532 S.W.2d at 200 (citing
Jones v. Hutchinson Manufacturing, Inc., Ky., 502 S.W.2d 66
(1973); internal quotation marks omitted).
6
Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Company, supra; Post v. American
Cleaning Equipment Corporation, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 516 (1968);
Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability § 2 (1998).
7
The presence of an unusually large bacterial population could,
of course, indicate mishandling of the food, but we are
3
there are no reasonably available alternatives to bacteria-laced
oysters.
The bacterial presence occurs naturally under commonly
occurring conditions and screening is not feasible because
current methods of testing for the bacterium destroy the oyster.
Furthermore, the bacterium poses little threat of harm to
healthy persons.
According to a Food-and-Drug-Administration
fact sheet included in the record, there were only about one
thousand reports of Vibrio infection nationwide for the
reporting year 1997-98.8
We agree with the trial court that,
Vibrio notwithstanding, it is not per se unreasonable to market
raw oysters.
We are not willing to say, however, that, as a matter
of law, the restaurant could market raw oysters without warning
of the bacterial risk.
In general, a manufacturer must warn of
latent risks that reasonably foreseeable “users and consumers
would reasonably deem material or significant in deciding
whether to use or consume the product.”9
This does not mean that
manufacturers must warn against every conceivable risk.
There
concerned here only with the sort of bacterial presence common
to oysters in the wild.
8
See Clime v. Dewey Beach Enterprises, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 341
(D.C. Del. 1993); Simeon v. Doe, 618 So. 2d 848 (La. 1993).
9
Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability § 2, comment i
(1998).
4
is no duty to warn against obvious risks.10
A reasonable
consumer, moreover, expects warnings only against latent risks
that are substantial, those risks sufficiently likely and
sufficiently serious to demand attention.
The graver the risk,
of course, the less likely it need be to be substantial.
Here
the record indicates that, although for healthy persons Vibrio
poses little more than a slight risk of indigestion, for
persons, such as Ernest, with stomach, liver, or blood
conditions or with compromised immune systems, the bacterium
poses a slight, but real, risk of serious illness or death.11
Although a reasonable consumer is probably aware that raw
seafood poses a certain risk of mild illness, the ordinary
consumer was not in 1998 and probably still is not aware of this
much graver risk.
warned.
A reasonable consumer could expect to be
At least, we believe, a jury could find that in
November 1998, knowledge of this grave risk was available to
oyster producers and a reasonable producer would have deemed the
risk substantial enough to warn against it.12
10
Post v. American Cleaning Equipment Corporation, Ky., 437
S.W.2d 516 (1968); Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability
§ 2, comment j (1998).
11
Clime v. Dewey Beach Enterprises, Inc., supra; Simeon v. Doe,
supra.
12
Simeon v. Doe, supra (deeming the risk substantial but
remanding for consideration of whether knowledge of the risk
existed in 1986). Several, if not all, of the Gulf states have
5
Of course, as Hop Sin points out, the appellee in this
case was the retailer, not the manufacturer, and KRS 411.340
limits the potential products liability of retailers.
Under
that statute, if the manufacturer is subject to the court’s
jurisdiction, and if the retailer sold the product in the same
condition as it received it, then the retailer shall not be
subject to products liability unless it “breached an express
warranty or knew or should have known at the time of
distribution or sale of such product that the product was in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer.”
Prior to this statute, a retailer could be held
strictly liable for a product rendered defective by a
manufacturer’s breach of a duty of care.13
For two reasons we believe that this statute does not
bar the Edwardses’ claim.
First, we have held that a jury could
find that raw oysters unaccompanied by a manufacturer’s warning
enacted regulations that require oyster warnings. See for
example, Gregor v. Argenot Great Central Insurance Company, 2003
La. Lexis 1611 (La. 07/14/2003); Texas Administrative Code, 25
TAC § 229.164(r) (2003); Florida Administrative Code, 64D3.013(7) (2003). Also cf. Livingston v. Marie Callenders, Inc.,
85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528 (Cal. App. 1999) (discussing restaurant’s
duty to warn of latent allergen); Brown v. McDonald’s
Corporation, 655 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio App. 1995) (discussing both
manufacturer’s and retailer’s duty to warn of latent allergen).
13
Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Company, supra.
6
of the serious health risks to certain people were defective for
products liability purposes.
In fact, however, the oysters
Ernest consumed arrived at the appellee’s restaurant in a case
with a tag reciting the following manufacturer’s warning:
There is a risk associated with consuming
raw oysters or any raw animal protein. If
you have chronic illness of the liver,
stomach, blood or have immune disorders, you
are at greater risk of serious illness from
raw oysters. You may, however, eat your
oysters fully cooked. If unsure of your
risk you should consult your physician.
Please share this information with your
customers.
A jury could find, we believe, that by failing to pass along
this warning, the restaurant altered the product and thereby
forfeited the statutory immunity from the down-the-line sort of
strict liability.14
Alternatively, a jury could find that the restaurant
knew or should have known that absent a warning the oysters were
defective--that they posed an unreasonable risk of harm to some
persons--and so, under the statute, incurred its own duty to
warn, the breach of which constituted negligence.
The
manufacturer’s warning would serve as evidence of this
14
The other sort of strict liability is that imposed on
manufacturers, no matter how careful, for manufacturing defects.
The consensus seems to be that a manufacturer’s liability for
design and warning defects requires negligence. Ulrich v. Kasco
Abrasives Company, supra; Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284
(Iowa 1994). But see Carlin v. The Superior Court of Sutter
County, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 162 (Cal. 1996).
7
knowledge.
The Edwardses have alleged both theories.
We
believe that they are entitled to present these theories to a
jury.
Accordingly, we reverse the May 16, 2002, summary
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court and remand for
additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Freeda M. Clark
Louisville, Kentucky
Marvin L. Coan
Hummel & Coan
Louisville, Kentucky
8
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