AND MICHAEL WILSON v. KEITH RUSSELL
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RENDERED: October 10, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-001426-MR
AND
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2002-CA-001474-MR
MICHAEL WILSON
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEALS FROM PENDLETON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT McGINNIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00073
v.
KEITH RUSSELL
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
In May 1999, Keith Russell fell several feet when
a scaffold upon which he was standing to do carpentry work for
Michael Wilson collapsed.
Russell suffered a broken heel, and
in May 2000 he sued Wilson for damages arising from that injury.
He alleged that Wilson had negligently used an unsound wooden
ladder as one of the supports for the scaffold and that the
ladder’s failure had caused his injury.
At trial in February
2002, the jury returned a defense verdict, but by order entered
June 4, 2002, the Pendleton Circuit Court granted Russell’s
motion for judgment notwithstanding that verdict.
In retrospect
the court believed it should have granted Russell’s motion for a
directed verdict on the issue of Wilson’s liability.
On appeal,
Wilson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
overturning the jury’s verdict.
We disagree.
As our Supreme Court has explained,
[t]he purpose of a motion for judgment
N.O.V. is the same as that of a motion for
directed verdict. . . . When either motion
is made the trial court must consider the
evidence in its strongest light in favor of
the party against whom the motion was made
and must give him the advantage of every
fair and reasonable intendment that the
evidence can justify. On appeal the
appellate court considers the evidence in
the same light.1
The accident occurred while the parties were working
on an addition to Wilson’s house.
As the possessor of the
premises, Wilson owed his invitee a duty to have his premises in
a reasonably safe condition.2
Wilson was thus subject to
liability for physical harm caused to Russell by a condition of
the land if he either knew or should have known that the
1
Lovins v. Napier, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 921, 922 (1991) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
2
Edwards v. Johnson, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 845 (1957).
2
condition involved an unreasonable risk of harm to Russell, if
it was reasonable to foresee that Russell would not protect
himself against the risk, and if Wilson failed to exercise
reasonable care to protect Russell from the danger.3
The evidence introduced at trial showed that Russell
and Wilson are friends and that for several years Wilson had
worked for Russell’s home construction and remodeling company.
Both men have extensive experience in the sort of remodeling
work in which they were engaged at Wilson’s house.
Presumably
both men are familiar with the risks inherent in scaffolds and
with the need to ensure the soundness of scaffolding supports.
Nevertheless, the scaffold Wilson assembled the day of the
accident included as one of its primary supports a wooden ladder
several years old that had cracked with age or wear and had
begun to loosen in some of its joints.
Almost as soon as
Russell had climbed onto the scaffold this ladder broke.
Russell fell and broke his heel, an injury that required three
surgeries and left him with reduced flexibility.
As the trial court noted, a jury could certainly find
Russell negligent for agreeing to use such a scaffold, but we
agree with the trial court that no reasonable juror could fail
to find Wilson liable in these circumstances: he possessed the
3
Creech v. Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc., Ky., 497 S.W.2d 934
(1973) (citing Restatement of the Law, Torts 2nd § 343, 343A);
Lloyd v. Lloyd, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 623 (1972).
3
premises, supplied the unsound ladder, and assembled the
hazardous scaffold.
As part of his duty to protect Russell from
unreasonable risks on the premises, it was his duty to discover
the risk posed by the old ladder.
He could have done so easily.
A cursory visual inspection would have told him that the ladder
was not fit for this task.
ladder.
He breached that duty by using the
The ladder’s failure caused Russell’s injury.
We agree
with the trial court that it should have granted Russell’s
directed-verdict motion and therefore conclude that its grant of
his motion for judgment N.O.V. was appropriate.
renders Russell’s cross-appeal moot.
This result
Accordingly, we decline to
address the cross-appeal and affirm the June 4, 2002, order of
the Pendleton Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Frank V. Benton, IV
Benton, Benton & Luedeke
Newport, Kentucky
Richard A. Woeste
Bathalter & Woeste, P.S.C.
Alexandria, Kentucky
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