DEBBIE HENSLEY AND MARK HENSLEY, AND VENCARE, INC. v. FIRST HEALTHCARE CORPORATION A/K/A LEXINGTON CENTRE FOR HEALTH AND REHABILITATION A/K/A VENTAS REALTY, LTD. PARTNERSHIP F/K/A VENTAS, INC.
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RENDERED:
September 19, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NOS.
2002-CA-001342-MR & 2002-CA-001387-MR
DEBBIE HENSLEY AND MARK HENSLEY, AND
VENCARE, INC.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-04142
v.
FIRST HEALTHCARE CORPORATION
A/K/A LEXINGTON CENTRE FOR HEALTH
AND REHABILITATION A/K/A VENTAS
REALTY, LTD. PARTNERSHIP
F/K/A VENTAS, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; AND MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE1.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
In April 1998, Debbie Hensley slipped on the
freshly waxed hallway just outside her workplace and suffered a
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
disabling injury.
Her employer, Vencare, Inc., a provider of
respiratory therapy services, paid her workers’ compensation
benefits.
Hensley brought suit seeking negligence damages
against First HealthCare Corporation (a/k/a Lexington Centre for
Health and Rehabilitation), a Lexington nursing home, which
owned and operated the premises where the injury occurred.2
At
the time of the accident, both Vencare and First HealthCare were
wholly owned subsidiaries of Vencor, Inc.
By order entered May
21, 2002, the Fayette Circuit Court dismissed Hensley’s suit.
First HealthCare, the court ruled, was Hensley’s up-the-ladder
employer and thus was immune from Hensley’s negligence action
under the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers Compensation
Act.
Hensley maintains that First HealthCare is not entitled to
the statutory immunity.
We believe that it is, and so affirm.
It is observed in Larson’s highly regarded treatise on
workers’ compensation law that
[t]he definition of employment status almost
always takes the form of distinguishing an
employee from an independent contractor.
The reason is simple. If one wants to get
something done without doing it oneself,
there are really only two ways open: to hire
2
Joining Hensley’s suit is her husband, who seeks damages for
the loss of his wife’s consortium. They have brought appeal no.
2002-CA-1342. Also joining Hensley’s suit is Vencare, which
seeks reimbursement of the compensation benefits it has
provided. Vencare has brought appeal no. 2002-CA-1387.
2
an employee to do it, or to contract out the
work to an independent entrepreneur.3
This case raises the possibility of a third way to get work done
and forces us to consider whether that third way is covered by
the compensation act.
We conclude that is.
It is well settled that under the Workers’
Compensation Act (KRS Chapter 342) an employer accepts insurance
liability for workplace injuries in exchange for immunity from
“all other liability,” and that “employer” includes both those
who, as Larson says, depend on employees as well as those who
depend on independent subcontractor entrepreneurs.4
The preliminary evidence in this case indicates that
prior to Hensley’s injury both Vencare and First HealthCare had
obtained compensation insurance and thus were entitled to rely
on the Act’s exclusive remedy provision with respect to covered
workers.
The evidence also indicates that First HealthCare
contracted with Vencor to receive respiratory therapy services,
a necessary and regular part of First HealthCare’s nursing-home
business.
The parties dispute, however, how Vencare came to be
involved.
The trial court found that a contract between Vencare
and First HealthCare was implicit in their relationship, but
3
Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 60.02 (2003).
4
KRS 342.690, KRS 342.610(2), Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company
v. Sherman & Fletcher, Ky., 705 S.W.2d 459 (1986).
3
Hensley denies this, suggesting instead that Vencor, as
Vencare’s controlling parent, simply directed Vencare to service
the nursing home and that no Vencare contract, either with
Vencor or with First HealthCare, existed.
We agree with Hensley that for summary judgment
purposes the trial court’s finding of a contract between First
HealthCare and Vencare was premature.
Although there is
apparently no dispute that First HealthCare contracted with
Vencor, Hensley may well be able to prove that Vencare’s
involvement came about as she suggests, by corporate direction
rather than by contract.
If this fact is material, therefore,
then summary judgment ought not to have been granted.
Hensley, of course, insists that the basis of
Vencare’s involvement is material.
She relies on a Sixth
Circuit case, Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Company,5 in which the
court was confronted with the same possibility of a third way of
having work performed—not by direct employment or by independent
contract, but by corporate direction.
In that case a mine
holding company obtained mining services from subsidiary
corporations.
An explosion at one of the mines killed several
miners and their survivors sued the holding company in tort.
The court ruled that the holding company qualified as an
5
590 F2d 655 (6th Cir. 1979).
4
employer in neither of the usual ways and so was not entitled to
immunity from the tort claim.
The subsidiary rather than the
holding company had employed the miners, the court noted, and
there was no reason to disregard the subsidiary’s independent
existence.
Furthermore, there was no evidence of a contract
between the subsidiary and the holding company, which precluded,
the court believed, deeming the holding company a “contractor”
under the Act.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
trial court’s inferring a contract because there was no evidence
to support the inference, and, the court noted, parent
corporations commonly deal with subsidiaries without resort to
contract.
When they do, the court held, they do so outside the
Workers’ Compensation Act.
Hensley urges us to reach the same result.
Obviously
she was not First HealthCare’s direct employee, and she contends
that she was not the employee of a subcontractor either because
Vencare was not performing under a contract.
The Act’s
exclusive remedy provision should not then, she insists, bar her
claim.
We disagree, both with Hensley and with the Boggs
court.
Even if Vencare technically had no contract, its
obligation to perform under Vencor’s direction would supply the
functional equivalent of a contract and so would bring the Act’s
“contractor” provisions into play.
5
With those provisions the
General Assembly has made clear its intention that coverage
under the Act not be thwarted by indirect modes of employment.
The result Hensley urges would run counter to that legislative
purpose.
We hold that under the Act’s contractor provisions,
First HealthCare qualifies as an up-the-ladder employer and is
therefore immune from Hensley’s negligence claim.
Thus,
although the existence of a Vencare contract is a disputed issue
of fact, it is not a material issue, and the trial court did not
err when it entered summary judgment dismissing Hensley’s suit.
Accordingly, we affirm the May 21, 2002, order of the Fayette
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS HENSLEY:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
C. William Swinford, Jr.
George B. Cox
Lexington, Kentucky
Calvin R. Fulkerson
Lynn Fulkerson Nichols & Kinkel
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT VENCARE,
INC.:
Martin A. Arnett
William P. Swain
Phillips Parker Orberson &
Moore, P.L.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
Judson F. Devlin
Fulton & Devlin
Louisville, Kentucky
6
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