JAMES GARLAND v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 27, 2003; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001293-MR
JAMES GARLAND
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN K. MERSHON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-001775 & 97-CR-002453
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
James Garland (hereinafter, Garland or the
Appellant) appeals from the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit
Court, which denied his motion seeking to vacate his convictions
for assault, unlawful imprisonment, and persistent felony
offender.
We affirm.
Upon conclusion of a jury trial in November of 1997,
Garland was convicted of unlawful imprisonment in the first
degree and assault in the fourth degree of Mary Hilbert.
Garland then pled guilty to the charge of persistent felony
offender.
He was sentenced to fifteen years in the
penitentiary.
Thereafter, Garland moved for belated appeal,
which motion was granted by this court on February 16, 1999.
On
April 24, 2001, this court rendered its opinion affirming the
convictions.
On June 4, 2001, Garland, pro se, filed a motion to
vacate his convictions pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
In his supporting memorandum, Garland
argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
throughout his trial, resulting in prejudice and an inability
“to place the prosecution’s case under meaningful adversarial
testing as envisioned by the Sixth Amendment.”
Thereafter,
Garland was appointed counsel and a supplemental memorandum was
filed.
On May 3, 2002, the circuit court entered an order
denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Garland
moved the circuit court, pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure (CR) 59.05, to vacate the order, which motion was
denied.
This appeal followed.
As an initial matter, Appellant’s Notice of Appeal was
filed timely.
Under CR 73.02(1)(e), the running of the time for
filing an appeal is tolled by “‘a timely motion made pursuant to
any of the rules hereinafter enumerated,’ including the
‘granting or denying a motion under Rule 59 to alter, amend or
vacate the judgment. . . .’”
University of Louisville v. Isert,
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Ky. App., 742 S.W.2d 571, 573 (1987).
The Appellant’s CR 59.05
motion was filed timely, thus tolling the time for an appeal.
Id. at 574.
The Appellant argues that the trial court erred when
it denied his RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing
because his trial was fundamentally unfair as a result of
prosecutorial misconduct and the ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Under RCr 11.42(5), a prompt evidentiary hearing is
required “if the answer raises a material issue of fact that
cannot be determined on the face of the record. . .
11.42(5).
.”
RCr
A hearing is only required “if there is a material
issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e.
conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the
record.
Fraser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (2001)
(emphasis added).
However, a RCr 11.42 movant “is not automatically
entitled to an evidentiary hearing.”
Ky., 89 S.W.3d 380, 385 (2002).
Sanders v. Commonwealth,
A hearing is not required where
the issues in the motion are “refuted by the record of the trial
court,” where the motion contains only “conclusory allegations
which are not supported by specific facts,” or “where the
allegations, even if true, would not be sufficient to invalidate
the conviction.”
Id.; Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 981 S.W.2d
545, 549 (1998).
The trial judge “may not simply disbelieve
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factual allegations in the absence of evidence in the record
refuting them.”
Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 452-53 (citations
omitted).
As discussed in greater detail below, Appellant’s
arguments are refuted by the record, contain conclusory
allegations, and are insufficient to invalidate the conviction.
Therefore, an evidentiary hearing was not required.
Sanders, 89
S.W.3d at 385; Bowling, 981 S.W.2d at 549.
The Appellant argues that the trial court erred when
it “deprived him of his right to litigate his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.”
The Appellant, in his reply
brief, correctly points out the many shortcomings of the
Commonwealth’s arguments contained in its brief.
However, where
the Commonwealth’s arguments may have exhibited a lack of
effort, Appellant’s, simply put, lack merit.
Regardless of the
appropriateness of the raising of the claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in a RCr 11.42 motion, when the claim is
without merit an evidentiary hearing is not required.
The Appellant next argues that he is entitled to a new
trial, alleging that his Constitutional rights were violated as
a result of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance
of counsel.
A thorough review of the evidence presented
demonstrates a new trial is not warranted.
The Appellant argues
that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when the Commonwealth
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“did nothing to clarify or correct” the allegedly false
testimony of the victim.
To establish prosecutorial misconduct,
“the defendant must show (1) the statement was actually false;
(2) the statement was material; and (3) the prosecution knew it
was false.”
Commonwealth v. Spaulding, Ky., 991 S.W.2d 651, 654
(1999).
Here, Appellant’s argument is conclusory and his
evidence fails to meet the standard set forth.
The testimony
concerning the victim’s injury to her ribs is not material; it
was not “of such decisive value or force that it would, with
reasonable certainty, have changed the verdict or that it would
probably change the result if a new trial should be granted.”
Commonwealth v. Spaulding, Ky., 991 S.W.2d 651, 654 (1999).
The Appellant was convicted of assault in the fourth
degree, which requires only “physical injury, substantial
physical pain, or any impairment.”
(KRS) 508.030; KRS 500.080(13).
Kentucky Revised Statute
Bruising or pain requiring
medical attention satisfies this requirement.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 849 S.W.2d 560 (1992).
Covington v.
Evidence of such
injuries to the victim, other than those relating to her ribs,
is found in the medical records appended to Appellant’s brief.
Brief for Appellant, App. p. 22.
Because the testimony of the victim concerning
injuries to her ribs is not material and any false statements
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contained therein are harmless, there was no prosecutorial
misconduct and a new trial is not required.
Therefore, we do
not reach the Commonwealth’s argument that the Appellant should
have raised this issue on direct appeal.
Turning to the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Appellant offers six instances in which trial counsel
was allegedly ineffective: (1) failure to adequately investigate
and prepare Appellant’s case; (2) failure to object to
photographs of the victim; (3) failure to object to the
admission of a 911 call into evidence; (4) failure to object to
improper use of a rebuttal witness and a taped telephone
conversation; (5) failure to testify on Appellant’s behalf; and
(6) failure to object to out-of-court statements.
The Appellant
also argues that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors
resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.
To succeed, a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel must satisfy the two-prong Strickland standard: (1) “the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) “the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
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reliable.”
Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1985)
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
In McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 694
(1986), the Kentucky Supreme Court explained:
The twin standard for such review is
the proper measure of attorney performance
or simple reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms and whether the alleged
errors of the attorney resulted in prejudice
to the accused. The defendant must
demonstrate that there is a reasonable
possibility that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
trial would have been different.
721 S.W.2d at 697 (emphasis added).
Unless both prongs of the
Strickland test are satisfied, “it cannot be said that the
conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable” and ineffective
assistance of counsel has not been shown.
Gall, 702 S.W.2d at
39-40.
In determining whether counsel was effective, the
“performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was
reasonable considering all the circumstances.”
U.S. at 688.
Strickland, 466
In Baze v. Commonwealth, Ky., 23 S.W.3d 619, 625
(2000), the court held that “[d]epending on the circumstances,
there are many ways a case may be tried.
The test for
effectiveness of counsel is not what the best attorney would
have done, but whether a reasonable attorney would have acted,
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under the circumstances, as defense counsel did at trial.”
When
assessing reasonableness, “every effort [must] be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight . . .[and] to
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
There is a strong presumption that
“counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.”
Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, Ky., 998
S.W.2d 460, 463 (1999).
In determining whether there is a “reasonable
possibility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the trial would have been different,” McQueen, 721
S.W.2d at 697, “[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show
that the error by counsel had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 89
S.W.3d 380, 386 (2002) (citing Strickland).
A reasonable
probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine the
outcome.”
Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 151, 160
(2001) (citing Strickland).
In making a decision on prejudice,
the court should consider all the evidence presented.
89 S.W.3d at 387.
Sanders,
In making this determination, “the critical
issue is not whether counsel made errors but whether counsel was
so thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the
hands of probable victory”—that counsel’s errors “caused the
defendant to lose what he otherwise would probably have won.”
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Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436, 441 (2001) (citing
United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992)).
In view of this exacting standard, we now turn to an
evaluation of Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
With regard to failure of counsel to adequately
investigate and prepare his case, the Appellant alleges three
instances: when trial counsel failed to investigate outstanding
warrants for the victim, thus destroying his “main line of
defense” that Hilbert did not answer the door upon the arrival
of the police because she did not want to be discovered by the
police; when counsel failed to investigate and call potential
witnesses (Edith Brown and Dr. Jack Gerughty) whose testimony
could have impeached that of the victim; and when counsel failed
to investigate medical reports, the effect of which could have
been to impeach the victim.
A careful examination shows that none of these
satisfies Strickland.
The mere fact that the victim had
outstanding warrants does not necessitate a finding in accord
with the Appellant’s contentions.
A jury, despite this
evidence, could easily have found that the victim had been
unlawfully imprisoned.
The addition of this evidence does not
make it reasonably probable that the outcome would have been
different.
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Trial counsel’s failure to investigate or call Brown
and Gerughty as witnesses “did not fall outside of the wide
range of professionally competent assistance,” Harper v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311, 317 (1998).
The Appellant
merely concludes, without support of facts or even allegations,
that counsel failed to investigate.
There are myriad reasons
for not calling a particular witness to the stand, for example,
hearsay or credibility problems.
Counsel “must enjoy great
discretion in trying a case, especially with regard to trial
strategy and tactics. . . [and the court] must be especially
careful not to second-guess or condemn in hindsight [his
decisions].”
Id.
The Appellant has not presented evidence
sufficient to overcome the strong presumption of the
reasonableness of counsel’s assistance.
Pelfrey, 998 S.W.2d at
463.
Trial counsel’s failure to investigate medical
records, or use them for the impeachment of the victim’s
testimony, also fails to satisfy either prong of Strickland.
“A
reasonable investigation is not. . . the investigation that the
best defense lawyer, blessed not only with unlimited time and
resources but also with the inestimable benefit of hindsight,
would conduct.”
Baze v. Commonwealth, Ky., 23 S.W.3d 619, 625
(2000) (citations omitted).
The fact that the victim’s ribs may
not have been broken, contrary to her testimony, has no bearing
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on the existence of her other injuries.
The difference in the
medical records and victim’s testimony is not “crucial” to the
case.
Any impeachment value such evidence would carry is
minimal.
Defeat has not been snatched from probable victory and
therefore, counsel’s failure to utilize it was not unreasonable.
The Appellant contends that trial counsel was
ineffective when he failed to object to the introduction of
photographs depicting the victim’s appearance two weeks after
the alleged incident.
It was not unreasonable for counsel not
to object to the admission of this evidence and Appellant’s
suggestion that an objection, without a doubt, would have
resulted in the exclusion of this evidence is unsupported.
In
support of his argument, he cites Turpin v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
352 S.W.2d 66 (1961) and Slaughter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 45
S.W.3d 873 (2000), but distorts their meaning.
In Turpin, the
photograph was excluded because it was remote in time from the
incident and not accompanied by any explanation as to what it
was intended to establish.
352 S.W.2d at 67.
In Slaughter, the
photographs were excluded because they did not support the
proffered assertion nor accurately represent their subject.
S.W.3d at 875.
45
Here, Appellant is correct in that the
photographs do not depict the victim’s appearance on the night
of the incident.
Instead, they depict the victim’s condition
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two weeks later, exactly as purported in the Commonwealth’s
foundation for their introduction.
Furthermore, assuming that counsel had objected to the
introduction of the photographs and that the court had excluded
them from evidence, it is not reasonably probable that the
outcome of the trial would have been different.
evidence of the injuries the victim sustained.
There was other
Failure to
object to this evidence did not result in the ineffective
assistance of counsel and Appellant’s Constitutional rights were
not violated thereby.
The Appellant also argues that trial counsel was
ineffective when he failed to object to the introduction of a
911 call due to alleged authentication, hearsay, and
confrontation problems associated therewith.
Counsel was not
ineffective for allowing this evidence to be introduced without
objection.
Even if this evidence had been excluded, no
reasonable possibility exists that the outcome of the trial
would have been different.
The Appellant argues that the 911
call was used to prove that an altercation occurred in the
street.
Brief for Appellant, p. 18.
Indirectly the Appellant
has admitted that other evidence established this very fact,
namely the testimony of the victim.
See Brief of Appellant, p.
14 (“[The victim] testified that [Appellant] ‘threw me on the
front porch and he stomped me . . .”).
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Moreover, it was not unreasonable for counsel to not
object to the admission of the 911 call.
There are many
strategical reasons for counsel not to object to evidence (i.e.
to avoid the irritation of jurors by frequent objections or the
unlikelihood of success).
tactics and strategy.
Courts should not second-guess trial
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Harper v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311, 317 (1998) (“Inasmuch as we
might not necessarily agree with trial counsel's trial strategy
and may likely have employed other tactics, we do not believe
that in light of all of the circumstances his performance was
‘outside of the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.’”)
The Appellant argues that he received ineffective
assistance when his counsel failed to object to the improper use
of a rebuttal witness and a taped telephone conversation used to
impeach his testimony.
Strickland.
This, too, fails both prongs of
It is difficult to see how counsel’s performance
was deficient due to his failure to object, when, as admitted by
the Appellant, he did, in fact, make a timely objection to the
introduction of this evidence.
19.
See Brief of Appellant, pp. 4,
The outcome of the trial would be no different had this
evidence been excluded.
The Appellant argues next that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to testify
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on his behalf as to the victim’s appearance, where other
witnesses that could testify to this fact were unavailable.
As
evidenced by Appellant’s own citations, the precedent for such
action by defense counsel is scant, and none directly discusses
the issue presented here.
In Hall v. Renfro, 60 Ky. 51, 53
(1860), the court held, “[w]hether [defense counsel] should, or
should not testify. . . is a question of professional propriety,
which he alone is to determine for himself, and with which the
court has no concern.”
Counsel’s performance was not deficient.
Appellant has failed to overcome the strong presumption that
counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance.
998 S.W.2d at 463.
Pelfrey,
Furthermore, any prejudice suffered by
Appellant as a result of counsel’s conduct was harmless.
Appellant’s arguments cannot be reconciled.
Regardless, the
admission of counsel’s testimony would not have changed the
outcome of the trial.
The Appellant’s contentions simply fail
the double prong standard of Strickland.
The Appellant argues that he received ineffective
assistance when trial counsel failed to object to the victim’s
testimony of an out of court statement made to her by Jaggers, a
mutual friend.
It is asserted that this statement was
inadmissible hearsay and that its admission resulted in
prejudice.
We are not persuaded.
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Counsel’s performance was not deficient.
The
statement involved was non-hearsay and admissible for the
limited purpose of showing that it was made to the victim and
that its making caused her to seek the assistance of law
enforcement.
Whether the assertion (that Appellant had a gun
and intended to use it) was true is not necessary for that
argument.
Where a statement is non-hearsay there is little
reason for counsel to object and his failure to do so was not
unreasonable.
The Appellant’s final argument is that the cumulative
effect of counsel’s errors rendered his assistance ineffective.
In support, he cites Funk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 476
(1992).
This case, however, does not stand for the proposition
asserted; instead, it suggests, in dicta, that the cumulative
effect of erroneous judicial rulings could require reversal.
Funk does not speak to the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s
errors.
This issue was, however, addressed in McQueen, where
the court held that “defense counsel was not ineffective as a
result of cumulative error. In view of the fact that the
individual allegations have no merit, they can have no
cumulative value.”
721 S.W.2d at 701 (emphasis added).
Appellant’s contentions that he received the ineffective
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Here,
assistance of counsel have no merit; thus, their cumulative
effect cannot amount to such.
Based upon a review of all the evidence, we do not
find that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s RCr 11.42
motion without an evidentiary hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Stutsman
Marguerite Neill Thomas
Assistant Public Advocates
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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