VINCENT ANDREW MASON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 18, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001281-MR
VINCENT ANDREW MASON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-000200
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE.
The appellant, Vincent Andrew Mason (Mason),
appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court of April
24, 2002, that granted in part and denied in part his motion to
suppress evidence.
On appeal, Mason argues that the circuit
court erred when it failed to suppress all the evidence at issue
after finding that the police officer had no consent either to
enter or to search Mason’s home.
After our review of this case,
we conclude that the trial court’s careful analysis of this
matter was correct.
Therefore, we affirm.
In the early morning hours of December 1, 2000, the
Jefferson County Police discovered an abandoned vehicle that had
left the street and had run over at least one mail box.
It came
to rest in a front yard at 8806 Bost Lane in Jefferson County.
While investigating the apparent accident, the police learned
from a witness that an unidentified person had exited the
wrecked vehicle and headed toward Maple Creek Drive.
The police
found documents in the vehicle containing his address as 8808
Maple Creek Drive, and they proceeded to that location to
question Mason.
When they arrived, Kelly Dean Blair (Blair)
answered the door.
Blair owned the home and identified himself
as Mason’s roommate.
The events that followed and led to Mason’s arrest
were the subject matter of testimony presented at his
suppression hearing.
That hearing was held on March 11, 2002,
following Mason’s indictment by a Jefferson County Grand Jury on
five counts:
(1) Operating a Motor Vehicle under the Influence
of Intoxicants; (2) Criminal Mischief I; (3) Tampering with
Physical Evidence; (4) Operating a Motor Vehicle While License
Is Revoked or Suspended for Driving under the Influence; and (5)
Failure to Stop and Render Aid.
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At the suppression hearing, Officer Glaser testified
that it was very cold that night and that he asked Blair if he
could come in from the cold.
He testified that Blair stepped
back without a word and let him enter.
to the contrary:
However, Blair testified
that he did not consent to Glaser’s entering
the home.
After entering the house but while remaining near the
door, Glaser saw a set of keys lying on the kitchen counter,
which was visible from his location.
While Glaser waited, Blair
went to a bedroom and spoke with Mason.
Mason soon came out to
meet Glaser, and Glaser immediately detected the distinctive
odor of airbag powder and of alcohol; he observed that Mason
appeared to be inebriated.
Glaser then arrested him.
Glaser testified that Mason was barefoot and was
wearing only a T-shirt and sweat pants at the time.
shoes, which were in his bedroom.
He needed
Since Mason was already under
arrest, Glaser accompanied him to the bedroom to get his shoes
and a jacket.
While in Mason’s bedroom, Glaser testified that
he noticed a heightened odor of airbag powder.
He shined his
flashlight on a jacket lying on the floor and noticed a sparkle
characteristic of airbag powder.
smelled strongly of airbag powder.
He picked up the jacket, which
At this point, Glaser did
not claim the jacket as evidence but allowed Mason to wear it to
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jail.
Glaser also took the keys from the kitchen counter after
Blair denied ownership of them.
Mason moved to suppress both the arrest and all the
evidence seized as fruits of an illegal, warrantless search.
The Commonwealth argued exclusively on the consent exception to
the warrant requirement, contending that a valid consent for
Glaser’s presence in the house had never been given.
In its
order of April 24, 2002, the Jefferson Circuit Court agreed that
Glaser may have lacked consent to enter Blair’s home initially.
Accordingly, the court suppressed the keys as evidence since
Glaser arguably discovered them while allegedly present
unlawfully in Blair’s house.
However, the court concluded that
Glaser had probable cause to arrest Mason based upon his
observations of Mason inside the home, the odor of airbag
powder, and Mason’s inebriated condition.
Moreover, it held
that the jacket was also admissible since Glaser saw it in plain
view incident to a lawful arrest – another notable exception to
the warrant requirement.
Subsequently, Mason entered a
conditional plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), reserving the
suppression issue for appeal to this Court.
Mason argues on appeal that the trial erred in failing
to suppress all the evidence after it found that Glaser lacked
consent to enter the house in the first instance.
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He contends
that but for an illegal entry, Glaser would not have been able
to observe Mason and to detect the odor of airbag powder and
alcohol.
Thus, Glaser would not have arrested Mason.
It is true that in order for a warrantless search and
seizure to be valid, a police officer must be in a place where
he has a legal right to be.
679 S.W.2d 827 (1984).
Cloar v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
Mason emphasizes that the court found
that Glaser did not receive consent to enter the home; thus,
when he entered, he was in a place where he had no legal right
to be, a fact that Mason contends tainted both the arrest and
all items of evidence seized.
Howard v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
558 S.W.2d 643 (1977).
After reviewing the order entered by the trial court,
we note that it scrupulously exercised an abundance of caution
by holding in favor of Mason with respect to the contradictory
testimony offered by Blair and Officer Glaser as to consent to
the initial entry by Glaser.
had not been given.
It entered a finding that consent
Accordingly, it suppressed the keys as
evidence because Glaser first observed them while standing by
the front door waiting for Mason to appear.
Then the dynamics of the situation began to change.
Regardless of the arguable, disputed issue of consent, Mason
came out voluntarily to meet with Glaser rather than remaining
in his room.
In electing to appear and to cooperate in an
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interview with a police officer, Mason effectively consented to
being observed by Glaser.
Neither the Commonwealth, Mason, nor
the order of the trial court has alluded to a fact that we find
significant:
documents clearly bearing Mason’s identity in a
wrecked vehicle littered with containers emptied of alcohol.
Those documents under those circumstances gave Glaser the
requisite probable cause to proceed to Mason’s house.
Consent
as to original entry notwithstanding, Glaser legitimately
conversed with and observed Mason when Mason voluntarily came
forth to meet with him.
Mason’s appearance of inebriation, the
smell of alcohol, and the odor of the powder associated with
airbags all validated the arrest that followed.
We agree with
the analysis of the trial court as to the sequence of events:
Despite the fact that the Commonwealth
has not met its burden of proving Blair’s
consent it is worth noting that once inside
the house Glaser did not perform a search in
the traditional sense of the word. Every
indication suggests that Glaser waited by
the door and observed only those things in
plain sight. He did not rummage through
drawers or closets nor did he walk through
the house and look for Mason. Instead, it
was Mason who approached Glaser. Mason
could have refused to meet with Glaser. He
could have told Blair to tell Glaser to
leave. Instead Mason got close enough to
Glaser for Glaser to smell the air bag
powder and to suspect that he was
intoxicated. At this point, given all the
circumstances, Glaser had probable cause to
arrest Mason. Order of April 24, 2002, p.4.
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Mason particularly argues that the court should have
suppressed the jacket since Glaser took it from an area outside
the immediate area of the arrest.
He relies on Commonwealth v.
Elliott, Ky. App., 714 S.W.2d 494 (1986), in support of this
contention.
In Elliott, a parole officer arrested Elliott, a
parolee, who needed proper attire before being transported to
jail.
The parole officer entered the bedroom alone to retrieve
clothes for Elliott.
While in the bedroom, the parole officer
saw illegal drugs in plain view.
This Court held that the
officer had improperly entered a room outside the scope of
Elliott’s control; therefore, the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement accordingly did not apply because the
officer was not in a place where he had a legal right to be when
he observed the illegal items that he seized.
Id.
We believe that the Commonwealth has correctly
distinguished Elliott from the circumstances of this case.
Mason needed shoes and a jacket; he was already under arrest.
Glaser did not proceed alone to the bedroom but merely
accompanied Mason.
Thus, the surrounding premises remained in
the area immediately within Mason’s control while Officer Glaser
properly accompanied him to insure that he would not escape.
While he was legally in Mason’s bedroom incident to the arrest,
Glaser smelled and observed the jacket in keeping with the plain
view exception to the warrant requirement.
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Clark v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 868 S.W.2d 101 (1996).
We find no error
in the court’s ruling not to suppress the jacket as evidence.
The Commonwealth argued in the alternative that the
jacket should have been deemed admissible pursuant to yet
another exception to the warrant requirement, the inevitable
discovery rule first announced in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).
Nix held that evidence
improperly obtained should nonetheless be admissible if it were
inevitable that it would ultimately be discovered by lawful
means.
We agree with the Commonwealth that the inevitable
discovery rule applies in this case as an additional ground to
validate the admissibility of the jacket.
Even if Glaser had remained outside in the cold, Mason
was coming to meet him after being summoned from bed by his
roommate -– whether inside the door or outside.
The smells of
airbag powder and alcohol, the appearance of inebriation,
coupled with the documents in the car linking Mason to the
accident, all would have induced Glaser to arrest Mason.
The
trip to the bedroom for shoes and a jacket would inevitably have
followed the arrest prior to going to the police station.
Thus,
Glaser very likely would have been led to the plain view of the
jacket even if he had waited outside the door for Mason.
This
alternative basis further bolsters the propriety of the ruling
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of the trial court to allow the jacket to be admitted into
evidence.
We affirm the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court of
April 24, 2002.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John M. Longmeyer
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General for Kentucky
Nyra Shields
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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