KENTEC COAL CO., INC. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
JULY 25, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001239-MR
KENTEC COAL CO., INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 98-CI-00580 AND 98-CI-02002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, McANULTY, and PAISLEY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the
Franklin Circuit Court which affirmed a penalty assessed against
Kentec Coal Co., Inc. (Kentec), the appellant, by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet (the Cabinet) as a result of a postmining
land use violation.
We vacate and remand.
The Cabinet issued a surface coal mining permit to
Kentec in 1987 for areas located in Perry and Leslie Counties.
Although its permit expired in 1992, Kentec continued
reclamation work in an effort to correct previous violations and
to obtain its bond release.
In May 1996, a Cabinet inspector
observed the construction of a residential building on increment
number 5 of Kentec’s permitted area.
Since the postmining land
use of this area was designated for forestry land or
hayland/pasture, the presence of the residence constituted a
violation.
The inspector issued a mine inspection report
advising Kentec to submit a revision to the postmining land use
–- a change that essentially would reflect on paper the reality
of the different use to which the land was now being dedicated.
When Kentec failed to do so, the inspector issued additional
mine inspection reports in June, July, August, September, and
October of 1996.
The inspector also met with Kentec’s
representatives during her July inspection and advised them that
the postmining land use had to be changed due to the
construction of the house.
Kentec did not submit the paperwork to reflect the
change in the postmining land use, and in November 1996, the
inspector issued a notice of noncompliance requiring Kentec to
“submit and obtain a revision to allow change in post mining
land use” by December 22, 1996.
Kentec did not obtain the
-2-
revision by the date of the next inspection on December 27,
1996.
The inspector issued Kentec a cessation order that day.
Both the noncompliance and cessation orders were upheld by order
of the Secretary of the Cabinet.
After the cessation order had
remained unabated for thirty days, the Cabinet gave Kentec
notice of a proposed penalty assessment in the amount of
$29,700.
Kentec requested and received an assessment
conference.
Kentec failed to appear, and the conference officer
recommended that the Secretary uphold the proposed assessment.
Kentec subsequently requested a review of the conference
officer’s report and recommendation as well as a formal hearing
regarding the penalty amount.
Kentec failed to submit
prepayment of the penalty as required by KRS1 350.0301 and 405
KAR2 7:092; as a result, the petition was dismissed, and the
proposed penalty assessment was upheld by the Secretary.
Kentec
then appealed this decision to the Franklin Circuit Court, which
affirmed the Secretary’s order and assessment.
Kentec’s motion
to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment was also denied, and
this appeal followed.
Kentec first argues that KRS 350.0301 and 405 KAR
7:092 are invalid and unconstitutional because they deny Kentec
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
-3-
due process and equal protection by requiring prepayment of a
penalty assessment as a condition precedent to obtaining a
formal hearing regarding that very assessment.
Appellant relies
heavily on Franklin v. Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet, Ky., 799 S.W.2d 1 (1990).
In Franklin, our
Supreme Court held that 405 KAR 7:090(4), the predecessor to the
regulation at issue, was “null, void, and unenforceable.”
Franklin, 799 S.W.2d at 4.
Its reasoning was threefold.
First,
the enabling statutes in force at the time did not condition
entitlement to a formal hearing upon the prepayment of a penalty
assessment.
Thus, the Court found that the regulation
improperly modified the underlying statute in violation of KRS
13A.120(1)(i).
Second, the Court held that the regulation
further violated KRS 13A.120(1) because it was more stringent
than comparable federal regulations.
Third, the Court found
that the regulation violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitutions of the United States and
of Kentucky because it “denie[d] the due process hearing to an
aggrieved party based solely on his financial inability to pay
the penalties which he seeks to appeal.”
Franklin, 799 S.W.2d
at 3-4.
As a result of statutory and regulatory amendments
enacted since Franklin, the circumstances now before us differ
somewhat from those at issue in Franklin.
-4-
In response to
Franklin, the General Assembly revised KRS Chapter 350 and
enacted KRS 350.0301, which provides in pertinent part that:
[t]he administrative regulations shall
provide for the conduct of hearings and
investigation of any matter relating to the
regulation of surface coal mining and
reclamation operations; provide for the
assessment and payment of civil penalties,
including the placement of proposed civil
penalty assessments into an escrow account
prior to a formal hearing on the amount of
the assessment; and provide for a waiver of
the placement of the proposed civil
penalties into escrow for those individuals
who demonstrate with substantial evidence an
inability to pay the propose civil penalties
into escrow. (Emphasis added.)
In order to achieve consistency and conformity with
federal law, the more recent regulations were amended as well to
provide for bifurcated hearings regarding the violation itself
and the penalty assessment.
Prepayment is still required to
obtain a formal hearing regarding the penalty, but it is not a
condition to obtaining such a hearing regarding the violation.
While a hearing as to the alleged violation does not require
prepayment of the penalty, prepayment of the contested penalty
is a prerequisite for that portion of the hearing process
concerning the penalty itself.
The newer regulations also
provide for a waiver of the prepayment requirement as to
qualified individuals but not with respect to corporations.
-5-
Kentec contends that the constitutional flaws outlined
in Franklin have not been cured.
We agree that both the
statutory and regulatory changes enacted since Franklin remain
defective constitutionally as impermissibly erecting a monetary
bar to access to the fundamental due process right to a hearing.
Permittees are placed in the anomalous posture of
enjoying access to a hearing as to an underlying violation but
facing perhaps an insurmountable financial hurdle when seeking
to challenge at the subsequent penalty hearing the propriety or
amount of penalty imposed.
It is noteworthy that the propriety
of the penalty cannot be addressed at the hearing on the
violation.
Once a violation is determined at the first hearing,
the opportunity to address the fine or penalty flowing from that
violation comes only at the price of prepayment of the subject
matter of the challenge –- a price that has the very real
potential of foreclosing actual access to stage two of the
bifurcated hearing process.
As a practical matter, the amount
or propriety of the penalty imposed could be as critical as or
perhaps even more weighty than the fact of the violation itself.
We hold that this bifurcated hearing process cannot
satisfy fundamental due process by operating under a double
standard of access to an administrative forum.
Insofar as they
exact such a monetary prerequisite prior to the penalty phase
hearing, both KRS 350.0301 and KAR 7:092 are unconstitutional
-6-
violations of due process, equal protection, and the ban against
arbitrary state action contained at Section 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
Kentec contends that the statutory exception as to a
waiver for individuals but not for corporate permittees
identically situated is a clear violation of its right to equal
protection as provided by the United States and Kentucky
Constitutions.
Kentec claims that corporations that are unable
to prepay the assessment are wrongfully deprived of a formal
hearing regarding their penalty assessment; unlike individuals,
corporations are not allowed to seek a waiver of this
requirement.
There is no attempt to classify corporate permittees
differently from individuals anywhere in the statute or
regulation for any other purposes than for the grace of this
waiver exception.
We have been unable to discern any rational
basis or legitimate state interest to explain -– much less to
justify -– the arbitrary singling out of a corporation for such
disparate treatment.
Particularly disturbing is the fact that
the classification results in erecting a barrier to the due
process right to a hearing.
This is error compounding error.
Therefore, we hold that this classification is repugnant to
settled principles of equal protection of the law pursuant to
Amendment Fourteen of the United States Constitution.
-7-
Kentec next asserts that the issuances of the
noncompliance and cessation order were arbitrary and erroneous
in light of the Cabinet’s own third-party disturbance policy.
That policy has been compiled over the course of three separate
memoranda by the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) of the
Department of the Interior, both pre-empting and subsuming
Kentucky’s laws and regulations on the matter.
The policy
essentially addresses the duties of a permittee undertaking
remedial measures to achieve the postmining land use as set
forth in the permit.
When a third party intervenes and uses the
surface area in a manner differing from the restoration
described in the original permit to the permittee, the policy
comes into play to ascertain the reality of the situation –including the good faith efforts of the permittee to carry out
its postmining land use efforts in light of the interference by
a third party.
The federal policy notes that the third-party
disturbance may not be “an isolated event, but, rather, an
ongoing process which might be discovered, through normal
inspection, before, during, or after the fact.”
Memorandum of
David Nance to all Field Personnel, May 2, 1992, Joint Exhibit
3.
The Nance memorandum directs that a “wait and see approach”
be implemented before issuance of a cessation order unless
-8-
imminent danger be threatened.
The memorandum concludes as
follows:
In summary, one should try to approach third
party situations with common sense. A
violation should not be written prior to the
permittee being able to do anything . . . .
Nance Memorandum, supra.
In this case, Kentec was a lessee.
Prior to being
able to complete restoration of the land in question to use for
hayland/pasture or forestry land according to the terms of its
original permit plan, a third party built a house on the permit
site.
There was literally nothing that Kentec as a lessee could
do to prevent the construction.
Furthermore, the house
constituted no danger -– imminent or otherwise.
The third-party
disturbance effectively terminated Kentec’s ability to restore
the land fully to hayland/pasture or forestry land use according
to the original terms of its permit plan.
The Cabinet nevertheless issued its Noncompliance and
Cessation Order, arguing that Kentec failed to file the
necessary paperwork for a revision of its postmining land use
plan reflecting the reality of what had transpired.
As noted in
the briefs and during oral arguments on this case, the revision
process is rather lengthy and complicated, requiring advertising
in the newspaper for four consecutive weeks before the revision
can be reviewed.
As a practical matter, it is not a process
-9-
that can be achieved within the thirty days allotted.
In this
case, common sense (the approach prescribed by the Nance
Memorandum) clearly indicated that even if the process had been
begun and completed within thirty days, the third-party
disturbance (here, the house) would render moot any meaningful
action by the Cabinet.
Under the unique circumstances of this
case, the Cabinet’s assessment of a penalty without a hearing
was unreasonable and arbitrary in violation of Section Two of
the Kentucky Constitution.
The judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court is vacated
and remanded for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
PAISLEY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Donald Duff
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jennifer Cable Smock
Frankfort, Kentucky
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.