LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, IN THE INTEREST OF PAUL WILKERSON AND STACY JACKSON WILKERSON v. METRO MANAGEMENT, INC.; PICKWAY MANOR APARTMENTS; AND DIANE MALDONADO IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MANAGER OF PICKWAY MANOR APARTMENTS
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October 3, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001234-MR
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, IN THE INTEREST
OF PAUL WILKERSON AND STACY JACKSON WILKERSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-02614
v.
METRO MANAGEMENT, INC.;
PICKWAY MANOR APARTMENTS; AND
DIANE MALDONADO IN HER INDIVIDUAL
AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MANAGER
OF PICKWAY MANOR APARTMENTS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, BARBER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights
Commission has appealed from the opinion and order entered by
the Fayette Circuit Court on March 26, 2002, which granted
summary judgment in favor of the appellees, Metro Management
Inc.,1 Pickway Manor Apartments, and Diane Maldonado, and
1
Metro Management Inc. is the managing agent for Pickway Manor Apartments.
dismissed the Commission’s housing discrimination claim which
had been brought on behalf of Paul and Stacy2 Wilkerson, an
interracial couple.3
Having concluded that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that Pickway is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law, we affirm.
On October 10, 1995, Paul and Stacy Wilkerson applied
for an apartment at Pickway Manor in Lexington, Fayette County,
Kentucky.
Paul and Stacy were not married at the time and Stacy
was unemployed.
Stacy filled out the application and she listed
herself and her son, Marcus, as the proposed occupants of the
apartment.
Paul’s name was not listed on the application, but
the Wilkersons insist that the 1995 application was a joint
application.
The apartment manager, Diane Maldonado, informed
Stacy that she did not qualify for an apartment at Pickway
because she did not have any income.
Paul, who was present when
Stacy filled out the application, told Maldonado that he was
employed and that he intended to move in with Stacy and Marcus.4
Maldonado explained that Pickway did not rent to unmarried
couples.
2
There are several discrepancies in the record as to the correct spelling of
Stacy’s name. For purposes of this appeal, her name will spelled as set forth
in the notice of appeal.
3
Paul is Caucasian and Stacy is African-American.
4
Paul is Marcus’s father.
-2-
On February 11, 1997, Stacy filed a second application
with Pickway.
Paul was also present when Stacy filled out her
second application; however, once again Stacy did not list
Paul’s name on the application, and the Wilkersons do not claim
that Paul was an applicant in 1997.
Stacy was unemployed and on
her application she did not claim to have any income.
Maldonado
asked the couple if they were married or if they intended to get
married, to which Stacy responded, “No.”
According to
Maldonado, she then told Stacy that she did not qualify for the
apartment because she did not have any income.
Maldonado also
informed Stacy that Pickway did not rent to unmarried couples.
Stacy protested that Paul was employed and that he would be
moving in with her.
Maldonado then explained to Stacy that she
would be committing “housing fraud” if she signed a lease as the
sole occupant of an apartment and then permitted someone to move
in with her.
Shortly thereafter, Paul and Stacy moved into a
one bedroom apartment at Autumn Park, which is also located in
Lexington, Fayette County, Kentucky.
On April 22, 1997, Paul and Stacy filed a complaint
with the Commission alleging that they had been discriminated
against by Maldonado pursuant to Title VIII of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA)5 and Lexington-Fayette Urban County
5
42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. The FHAA is the 1988 amendment to the Fair Housing
Act (FHA), which is commonly referred to as Title VIII of the Civil Rights
-3-
Local Ordinance 199-946 because of their “interracial
association.”
The Commission conducted a preliminary
investigation and concluded that probable cause existed to
believe that discrimination had occurred.7
The Commission’s
determination was based in large part upon an affidavit signed
by Matt Maupin, Paul’s cousin, which reads in relevant part as
follows:
Rebecca Stamper and I went to Pickway Manor
Apartments in April of 1997 to inquire about
the possible rental of an apartment unit
there. I told the lady there that I was not
married, and that Rebecca Stamper would be
living with me. The lady at Pickway did not
say that we could live there, being
unmarried. She actually did not say one way
or the other about whether we could live at
Pickway, being unmarried.
The Lady at Pickway did not tell us to lie
about our marital status. When we asked
whether Rebecca should sign on the line
marked “spouse” even though we were not
married, the lady told us “Yes”. We
understood that this was simply because
there was no other line on the form for
Rebecca to sign.
To the best of my recollection, Pickway did
not process our application or run a credit
check on us, as we decided that we did not
like the apartment and did not want to live
there anyway.
Act of 1968. In addition to other modifications, the FHAA expanded the
coverage of the FHA to reach families with children.
6
Local Ordinance 199-94 is simply a codification of the Kentucky Civil Rights
Act contained in Chapter 344 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
7
See KRS 344.625.
-4-
Maupin and Stamper are both Caucasian.
On June 26, 1998, the appellees elected to pursue the
case in a civil action in the Fayette Circuit Court pursuant to
KRS 344.635.8
On July 21, 1998, the Commission filed a complaint
on behalf of the Wilkersons9 alleging that they had been
discriminated against by the appellees due to their “interracial
association” and “familial status” pursuant to the Kentucky
Civil Rights Act.10
The appellees filed an answer on August 3,
1998, in which they averred, among other defenses, that the
Wilkersons’ housing application was denied for “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.”
The case then proceeded to the
discovery process.
On September 20, 2000, the Commission deposed
Maldonado, who testified, in part, as follows:
Q. Did Paul come in with [Stacy] on February
11[, 1997]?
A. Yes.
Q. What do you remember about the
conversation that you had with them?
8
It should be noted that a claim brought “in the interest of” or “on behalf
of” two individuals who claim to have suffered an unlawful housing practice
is not the functional equivalent of a claim brought directly by those
individuals themselves. See Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Eastern
Kentucky University, Ky.App., 988 S.W.2d 41, 43-44 (1999). See also KRS
344.670(2).
9
10
Paul and Stacy were married in January 1998.
See KRS 344.010, et seq.
-5-
A. They came in and asked for an
application, and I handed them a clip board.
She filled out the application and handed it
back to me, and I looked it over, and I see
that I missed something?
A. What did you miss?
Q. Her child was not there. Her child’s name
is not there, and I missed that.
. . .
Q. Continue on. Is there anything else you
remember?
A. I asked them if they were getting married
and--or if they were married, and they said
no . . . And I said, “Do you remember when
you were here before that we have a policy
of not renting to unmarried couples,” and
she said yes. And I said, “You know, you
don’t qualify for the apartment on your own
because you have no income,” and she said,
“Well, he’s going to move in with me,” and I
said-Q. Meaning?
A. Paul Wilkerson was going to move in with
her and that he was employed. And I said,
“You can’t do that. You know, that’s housing
fraud. You can’t sign a lease that you’re
the sole occupant and then have someone move
in with you.”
. . .
Q. Is there any . . . Metro Management
regulation at the time of February 11, 1997,
that would have allowed you to consider
Paul’s income for Stacy?
A. If they were getting married.
Q. And what time frame are we talking about
getting married?
-6-
A. No time frame. Over the years, I’ve had
many people that have come in and--male or
female, one or the other is looking for an
apartment, they tell me they’re getting
married, and not looking specifically
together but looking toward the planning of
their wedding, so-Q. And you would consider that okay to rent
to someone in that situation?
A. We take people at their word. If they say
they’re getting married, I’m not an
investigator, and I take people at their
word until I find out differently.
On April 24, 2001, the appellees filed a motion for
partial summary judgment11 arguing that it would be impossible
for the Commission to establish a prima facie case for its
“familial status” discrimination claim.
The appellees pointed
out that KRS 344.362 specifically provides that “[n]othing in
KRS 344.360 shall apply to . . . [a] landlord who refused to
rent to an unmarried couple of opposite sex[.]”
Thus, the trial
court granted the appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment
as to the Commission’s “familial status” discrimination claim.
On September 21, 2001, the appellees deposed Paul and
Stacy Wilkerson.
Both depositions are replete with
discrepancies, however, given that this is an appeal from an
order granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees, we
must construe the Wilkersons’ deposition testimony in a light
11
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03.
-7-
most favorable to the position advanced by the Commission on
appeal.
Since the facts set forth herein are consistent with
the position advanced by the Commission on appeal, there is no
need to belabor the discrepancies.
On October 30, 2001, the appellees filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing that to the extent the Commission’s
housing discrimination claim was based on the 1995 application,
it was barred by the statute of limitations, and, in the
alternative, that the Commission had failed to establish a prima
facie case of housing discrimination based on the 1997
application.
The appellees claimed that the allegations raised
in the Commission’s complaint stemmed from the Wilkersons’ 1995
application, and not Stacy’s 1997 application, which was
submitted solely on behalf of herself and Marcus.
Thus, the
appellees argued that since the Commission had filed its
complaint on April 22, 1997, over 18 months after the alleged
discriminatory practice occurred, the claim was barred pursuant
to KRS 344.600(1)(a).12
In response, the Commission insisted
that the alleged discrimination occurred in 1997, when Stacy
applied on behalf of herself and Marcus.
However, the appellees
argued that the Commission failed to establish a prima facie
12
KRS 344.600(1)(a) states in relevant part that, “[a]n aggrieved person may,
not later than one (1) year after an alleged discriminatory housing practice
has occurred or terminated, file a complaint with the commission alleging a
discriminatory housing practice.”
-8-
case of discrimination based on the 1997 application since Stacy
had no income and did not qualify to rent the apartment.
On March 26, 2002, the trial court granted the
appellees’ motion for summary judgment reasoning that the
Commission’s housing discrimination claim was barred by the
statute of limitations.
The trial court cited the Wilkersons’
deposition testimony and concluded that both Paul and Stacy had
identified their 1995 application as the basis for their housing
discrimination claim.
The trial court went on, however, to rule
that even assuming that the Commission’s claim was not barred by
the statute of limitations, it was nevertheless barred by the
“absence of any factual support of the [Wilkersons’] allegation
of racial discrimination.”
The Commission then filed a motion
to alter, amend or vacate the trial court’s order pursuant to CR
59.05, which was denied on May 14, 2002.
This appeal followed.
The Commission argues on appeal that the trial court
erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees
because there is a genuine issue as to a material fact
concerning whether the discrimination claim was based on the
1997 application.
The standard of review governing an appeal of
a summary judgment is well-settled.
We must determine whether
the trial court erred in concluding that there was no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party was
-9-
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.13
Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.”14
In Paintsville Hospital
Company. v. Rose,15 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that for
summary judgment to be proper the movant must show that the
adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances.
The Court
has also stated that “the proper function of summary judgment is
to terminate litigation when, as a matter of law, it appears
that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce
evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.”16
There is no requirement that the appellate court defer to the
trial court since factual findings are not at issue.17
“The
record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to
13
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
14
CR 56.03.
15
Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255, 256 (1985).
16
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480
(1991).
17
Goldsmith v. Allied Building Components, Inc., Ky., 833 S.W.2d 378, 381
(1992).
-10-
be resolved in his favor.”18
Furthermore, “a party opposing a
properly supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat it
without presenting at least some affirmative evidence showing
that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.”19
With this standard in mind, we now turn to the merits of the
Commission’s argument.
Although there apparently is no Kentucky case law
setting forth the prima facie elements of a housing
discrimination claim, the federal courts have addressed the
issue on numerous occasions.
Since the relevant language of
Kentucky’s housing discrimination statute20 is virtually
identical to its federal counterpart,21 the interpretation given
by the federal courts is persuasive.22
Thus, “we are guided by
federal case law in the course of our review.”23
18
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480.
19
Id. at 482. See also Philipps, Kentucky Practice, Civil Rule 56.03, Vol. 7,
p. 321 (5th ed. 1995).
20
KRS 344.360.
21
42 U.S.C. § 3604.
22
See White v. Rainbo Baking Co., Ky.App., 765 S.W.2d 26, 28 (1988); and
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 586 S.W.2d 270,
271 (1979). See also KRS 344.020(1)(a), which states in relevant part,
“[t]he general purposes of this chapter are . . . [t]o provide for execution
within the state of the policies embodied in . . . the Fair Housing Act as
amended (42 U.S.C. § 360).”
23
Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Handley, Ky.App., 827 S.W.2d 697, 699
(1991). See also McNeal v. Armour & Co., Ky.App., 660 S.W.2d 957, 959 (1983).
-11-
In Mencer v. Princeton Square Apartments,24 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adapted the threepart evidentiary standard first articulated in McDonnell-Douglas
Corp. v. Green,25 to a fair housing claim brought under the FHAA.
The Court listed the elements of a prima facie case of housing
discrimination as follows:
A prima facie housing discrimination case is
shown when the plaintiff provides: (1) that
he or she is a member of a racial minority,
(2) that he or she applied for and was
qualified to rent or purchase certain
property or housing, (3) that he or she was
rejected, and (4) that the housing or rental
property remained available thereafter.26
We see no reason not to apply the same standard to housing
discrimination claims brought under KRS 344.360.27
The Commission claims that it has established facts
that would allow a jury to infer that the Wilkersons were
discriminated against based upon their race.
24
228 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2000).
25
The crux of the
411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
26
Mencer, 228 F.3d at 634-35 (citing Selden v. United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 785 F.2d 152, 160 (6th Cir. 1986).
27
We note in passing that several other circuits have also adapted the
McDonnell-Douglas framework to housing discrimination claims. Radecki v.
Joura, 114 F.3d 115, 116 (8th Cir. 1997); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104
F.3d 300, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1997); Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic
Association, Inc., 3 F.3d 1472, 1476 (11th Cir. 1993); and Soules v. United
States Department of Housing & Urban Devolvement, 967 F.2d 817, 822 (2nd Cir.
1992). See also 15 Am.Jur.2d, Civil Rights, § 472 (2000). Furthermore, we
also take pause to note that the McDonnell-Douglas framework is generally
inapplicable where there is direct evidence of discrimination. Jefferson
County v. Zaring, Ky., 91 S.W.3d 583, 591 (2002) (citing Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 621-22, 83
L.Ed.2d 523, 534 (1985)).
-12-
Commission’s argument appears to rest upon the statements
contained in Maupin’s affidavit.
As previously discussed,
Maupin stated that when he and his girlfriend, Stamper, applied
at Pickway, Maldonado told Stamper to sign on the line marked
“spouse” even though the couple was not married.
The Commission
claims that this is evidence of disparate treatment upon which
the jury could infer discrimination.
We disagree.
As an interracial couple, the Wilkersons are clearly
members of a protected class.28
Moreover, the appellees concede
that the Wilkersons’ joint application, which was filed in 1995,
and Stacy’s individual application, which was filed in 1997,
were both rejected.
The record also appears to indicate that
the apartment remained available.
Thus, there is no dispute
that the Commission is able to satisfy the first, second, and
fourth prongs of its prima facie case of housing discrimination.
We take issue, however, with the Commission’s ability to meet
the second prong of the standard set forth above.
When Stacy applied in 1997, she was not qualified to
rent an apartment at Pickway as she was unemployed and unable to
satisfy Pickway’s minimum income requirement.
28
In fact, in its
One of the stated purposes of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KRCA) is “[t]o
safeguard all individuals within the state from discrimination because of
familial status, race, color, religion, national origin, sex . . . [and to]
to protect their interest in personal dignity and freedom from humiliation .
. .” KRS 344.020(1)(b). Discrimination against a person because of his or
her choice to be a part of an interracial relationship would clearly
constitute discrimination because of race.
-13-
response to the appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the
Commission conceded that Stacy’s application was denied because
her income level did not meet Pickway’s threshold requirement.29
Although the Commission has admitted in no uncertain
terms that Stacy was unable to meet Pickway’s income
requirements, it nevertheless claims that the Wilkersons would
have been eligible for an apartment had Maldonado considered
Paul’s income.
The Commission insists that Maldonado applied a
different standard to the Wilkersons than she did to Maupin and
his girlfriend.
As noted above, this argument appears to rest
upon the Commission’s contention that Maupin’s girlfriend,
Stamper, was allowed to sign on the line marked “spouse” even
though the couple was not married.
This argument must fail.
First, Maldonado explained in her deposition that
Pickway has a policy of renting to unmarried couples if they are
in the process of getting married.
Maldonado specifically asked
the Wilkersons if they were getting married, to which Stacy
responded, “No.”
Maupin and Stamper, on the other hand, clearly
informed Maldonado that they were getting married as the word
“fiancée” appears next to Stamper’s name on the couple’s
application.
As previously discussed, Stacy did not include
29
In its response to the appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the
Commission stated that “Stacy’s application was denied for two reasons, one
that she and Paul were not married and two, Stacy did not have any income.
The fact that Stacy did not have any income was justifiable, the fact that
they were not married was not.”
-14-
Paul’s name on the application she filed in 1997.
Thus, there
is no evidence that Maupin and Stamper were treated any
differently than the Wilkersons.30
In summary, we hold that the
Commission has failed to demonstrate that Stacy was qualified to
rent an apartment at Pickway as the record clearly reveals that
Stacy was unable to meet Pickway’s income requirement,31 and
thus, the Commission has failed to establish a prima facie case
of housing discrimination.
Assuming arguendo, that the Commission had made out a
prima facie case of housing discrimination, the appellees claim
they had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for denying the
30
The Commission claims that a second unmarried white couple, Jerry Blocker
and Elizabeth Lynkins, also applied for an apartment at Pickway, however,
nothing contained in the record indicates that Blocker and Lynkins were
treated any differently than the Wilkersons. That is to say, the Commission
has failed to introduce any evidence suggesting that Blocker and Lynkins were
offered an apartment or that Pickway even considered their application.
31
See, e.g., Schanz v. Village Apartments, 998 F.Supp 784, 789-90 (E.D. Mich.
1998). The appellees also claim that the Commission’s housing discrimination
claim is barred by KRS 344.600(1)(a). As previously discussed, the appellees
insist that the Wilkersons’ discrimination claim was premised upon their 1995
application, as opposed to Stacy’s 1997 application. The Commission responds
to this contention by claiming that the appellees’ argument ignores the
discovery rule, i.e., that the limitations period does not begin to run until
an aggrieved party discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she was a
victim of discrimination. Because we believe the Commission’s housing
discrimination claim fails on the merits, we need not address the statute of
limitations question. As an aside, we comment only that there appears to be a
current split of authority among the United States Courts of Appeals on the
issue. Compare Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86, 87-88 (4th Cir.
1990) (holding that the statute of limitations contained in Section 626 of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621-34, begins
to run from the time of the alleged discriminatory act, not the time of
discovery of the same), with Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446,
450-51 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the accrual date in a ADEA claim is not
the date on which the wrong that injures the plaintiff occurs, but the date-often the same, but sometimes later--on which the plaintiff discovers that he
has been injured).
-15-
Wilkersons’ housing application.32
As previously discussed, the
Wilkersons insist that they applied jointly in 1995, that Stacy
applied solely on behalf of herself and Marcus in 1997, and that
they were informed on both occasions that Pickway did not rent
to unmarried couples.
However, unlike Maupin and Stamper, the
Wilkersons never indicated that they were engaged or that they
planned to get married.
Thus, since there is no evidence to
support the Commission’s claim that the appellees’ reason for
denying Stacy’s housing application was pretextual, the reason
must be held to be legitimate and non-discriminatory.
Based upon the forgoing reasons, the opinion and order
of the Fayette Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor
of the appellees is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
Edward E. Dove
Lexington, Kentucky
Johann F. Herklotz
Lexington, Kentucky
32
Once a plaintiff establishes the elements of a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant, who must articulate
a “legitimate non-discriminatory” reason for the alleged discriminatory
action. Handley, 827 S.W.2d at 699 (applying the McDonnell-Douglas framework
in an employment discrimination context). Once such a reason is given, it is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that the stated reason is merely
a pretext to cover the actual discrimination. Id.
-16-
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