PERDUE FARMS, INC. v. FRED M. MAYES; HON. RICHARD CAMPBELL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; HON. SHEILA LOWTHER, CHIEF ADMINISTRAIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: JULY 3, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001169-WC
PERDUE FARMS, INC.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-01-00174
v.
FRED M. MAYES; HON. RICHARD CAMPBELL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; HON. SHEILA
LOWTHER, CHIEF ADMINISTRAIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Perdue Farms, Inc. has petitioned for review of
an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board entered on May 1,
2002, which affirmed the opinion, award and order of the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which awarded occupationallyrelated hearing loss benefits to the appellee, Fred M. Mayes.
Having concluded that the Board did not overlook or misconstrue
controlling statutes or precedent, or commit an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice,
we affirm.1
Mayes began working for Perdue on October 31, 1995.2
He was employed as an “area supervisor” at Perdue’s poultry
processing plant in Cromwell, Kentucky.
By the time Mayes
started working for Perdue he was already experiencing problems
with his hearing.3
Mayes, however, was never informed that his
hearing loss might be associated with his exposure to loud
noises.4
On March 6, 2000, Mayes went to see Dr. Uday Dave, an
otolaryngologist.
Dr. Dave informed Mayes that he had a severe
hearing impairment and that his hearing loss was work-related.
Although Dr. Dave was not the first physician to evaluate Mayes,
he was the first doctor to advise him that his hearing loss was
work-related.5
with Perdue.
1
On June 30, 2000, Mayes terminated his employment
Approximately two weeks later he sent a letter
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (1992).
2
Prior to his employment with Perdue, Mayes worked as a general mine
superintendent for Peabody Coal Company for approximately 18 years.
3
Mayes met with a Dr. Logan in 1990 concerning his hearing loss. Dr. Logan
advised Mayes that he had a high pitched hearing loss, but he failed to make
any diagnosis as to the cause of the hearing loss.
4
Throughout his employment with Perdue, Mayes was exposed to loud noises on a
regular basis. Although not as frequent, Mayes was also exposed to loud
noises while employed with Peabody.
5
In addition to the evaluation conducted by Dr. Logan, Perdue also conducted
audiological testing on Mayes in 1996 and informed him that he had a severe
hearing impairment. Perdue, however, never informed Mayes that his hearing
loss was work-related.
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notifying Perdue of his intent to file a hearing loss claim.
The claim was filed on February 5, 2001.
In an opinion, award and order dated December 7, 2001,
the ALJ ruled that Mayes was entitled to an award for permanent
partial disability as provided for in KRS6 342.7305.
The ALJ
determined the claim was not barred by the statute of
limitations as Mayes could not be charged with his knowledge of
having suffered a work-related injury prior to his March 6,
2000, evaluation with Dr. Dave.7
The ALJ also found the hearing
loss and impairment disclosed by the May 15, 1996, audiological
testing to be “part and parcel” of the present claim.
Perdue
filed a petition for reconsideration, and on February 5, 2002,
the Chief ALJ overruled the petition.
Perdue subsequently
appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board, and on May 1, 2002,
the Board affirmed the ALJ’s ruling.
This petition for review
followed.
Perdue contends the ALJ erred by finding that the
6
Kentucky Revised Statutes. KRS 342.7305 governs the compensability of
claims for occupational hearing loss. We note at the outset that this claim
has been treated as a cumulative trauma injury, as opposed to an occupational
disease.
7
Pursuant to KRS 342.185, a claim for benefits must be filed within two years
after the date of the accident. When a cumulative trauma injury is alleged,
the claim must be filed within two years of the date the disability becomes
manifest. A disability becomes manifest once the claimant is made aware that
he has sustained a work-related injury. See infra Hill v. Sextet Mining
Corp., Ky., 65 S.W.3d 503, 507 (2001). The ALJ found that there was
insufficient evidence that Mayes was aware that his hearing loss arose from
noise exposure within the workplace prior to his March 6, 2000, evaluation by
Dr. Dave.
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claim was timely filed.
Perdue claims the ALJ misconstrued the
applicable law and failed to consider relevant evidence.
Perdue
argues that the ALJ applied the wrong standard in determining
that Mayes was not aware that his hearing loss was work-related
prior to March 2000. Perdue maintains that the correct standard
is not whether Mayes was aware that his hearing loss was workrelated, but rather, whether he should have been aware.
Perdue
also alleges the ALJ erred by finding the impairment established
in 1996 was “part and parcel” of the current claim.8
Perdue’s first argument is premised upon the ALJ’s
determination that the record lacked “proof” that Mayes was
aware prior to March 6, 2000, that his hearing loss arose from
noise exposure within the workplace.
Perdue argues that there
was circumstantial evidence in the record suggesting that in
1996 Mayes was made aware that his hearing loss problems were
the result of noise exposure.9
Perdue argues that this case does
not involve a question of whether the ALJ’s findings in favor of
Mayes’s claim were supported by substantial evidence, but
rather, that the ALJ completely failed to consider the
8
Dr. Dave testified that the audiological testing performed in 1996 revealed
a functional impairment rating of 9%. Mayes’s current level of impairment
has been set at 13.6%.
9
Perdue claims the audiological testing conducted in 1996 should have made
Mayes aware of the fact his hearing loss was work-related.
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circumstantial evidence.10
Perdue fails to acknowledge the distinction between
evidence and proof.
When the ALJ determined the record lacked
proof that Mayes was aware prior to March 6, 2000, that his
hearing loss was related to noise exposure within the workplace,
he was merely arriving at the conclusion that the evidence
presented was sufficient to prove Mayes’s alleged disability
onset date of March 6, 2000.
Proof is not evidence, but rather, the result or
effect of evidence.11
Thus, a case may include some evidence in
support of a particular claim or defense, but insufficient
evidence to establish or prove the claim or defense.
In the
case sub judice, the ALJ did consider any and all evidence
pertaining to whether Mayes was aware in 1996 that his hearing
problems were work-related, and he determined that the evidence
was sufficient to prove that Perdue’s claim manifested in March
2000.12
We agree with the Board’s determination that the ALJ’s
finding is supported by sufficient evidence in the record.
10
Perdue violates CR 76.28(4)(c), which prohibits citation to unpublished
cases as authority, by citing Freedom Energy Mining Co. v. Adams, 2001-CA001231-WC, rendered December 7, 2001, and Tichenor v. St. Joseph Healthcare,
Inc., Claim No. 00-00575, rendered June 13, 2001.
11
See Black’s Law Dictionary 1215 (6th ed. 1990).
12
See Holman Enterprise Tobacco Warehouse v. Carter, Ky., 536 S.W.2d 461
(1976)(citing International Harvester Co. v. Poff, Ky., 331 S.W.2d 712
(1959)).
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Perdue further argues that the ALJ misconstrued the
applicable law when determining that Mayes was not aware in 1996
that his hearing loss was work-related.
According to Perdue,
the correct standard is not whether Mayes was aware that his
condition was work-related, but rather, whether he should have
known his hearing loss was work-related.
Perdue cites Alcan
Foil Products v. Huff,13 in support of this proposition.
In Alcan Foil, one of the appellees testified that he
was unaware that his hearing loss was work-related until August
1995.
The ALJ, however, determined that the injured worker was
aware that his condition was work-related as early as 1992.14
a result, the ALJ concluded the claim was untimely filed.
As
Thus,
Perdue argues that under Alcan Foil, the mere denial by a
claimant as to knowledge of an injury does not preclude a
finding that the claimant was aware his condition was workrelated.
Perdue fails to acknowledge, however, that Alcan Foil
does not mandate such a finding by the ALJ.
Furthermore, we
find nothing in the Alcan Foil opinion which suggests the
correct standard is whether a claimant should have been aware
that his injury was work-related as opposed to whether he was
actually aware of the fact.
Alcan Foil holds that in work-
related cumulative trauma claims, the clocking of the statute of
13
Ky., 2 S.W.3d 96 (1999).
14
Id. at 98.
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limitations and the requirement that a claimant provide due and
timely notice, begin once a worker (1) discovers that a
physically disabling injury has been sustained, and (2) becomes
aware that his injury is caused by work.15
This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hill, supra, where the injured worker suffered from
back problems which had gradually developed over time.
He had
been treated by several physicians over the years, none of whom,
however, attributed his injury to work-related activities.
Finally, the injured worker was evaluated by a Dr. Gaw who
informed him that his symptoms were in fact, work-related.16
The
Supreme Court held that although the claimant was aware of
symptoms long before this evaluation, his claim was nonetheless
timely filed because he was not aware that his injury was workrelated until he was diagnosed by Dr. Gaw.17
The following
language is helpful to the present analysis:
Medical causation is a matter for the
medical experts and, therefore, the claimant
cannot be expected to have self-diagnosed
the cause of the harmful change to his
cervical spine as being a gradual injury
versus a specific traumatic event. He was
not required to give notice that he had
sustained a work-related gradual injury to
15
Id. at 99-101.
16
Hill, 65 S.W.3d at 507.
17
Id.
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his spine until he was informed of that
fact.18
Thus, a claimant is not obligated to give notice, nor does the
statute of limitations in his case begin to run until he is
informed by a physician that his condition is work-related.
The
ALJ found that Mayes was first informed his hearing loss was
work-related when he met with Dr. Dave on March 6, 2000.
Once
again, we agree with the Board that the record contains
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding.
Perdue argues in the alternative that even if the ALJ
applied the correct standard in deciding this claim, the award
of benefits should still be overturned.
This argument is
premised upon the testimony of Mayes that prior to March 6,
2000, he was not aware his hearing condition was work-related.
According to Perdue, this testimony is not competent and,
therefore, could not be relied upon by the ALJ in awarding
benefits.
Perdue cites Couch v. Holland,19 in support of this
argument.
Couch, however, is factually distinguishable from the
present case.
Couch involved a negligence action in which the
former Court of Appeals overturned a jury verdict because the
appellee’s testimony did not support the finding that she was
18
Id. at 507 (citing Alcan Foil, supra and Special Fund v. Clark, Ky., 998
S.W.2d 487 (1999)).
19
Ky., 385 S.W.2d 204 (1964).
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entitled to a jury award.
The appellee in Couch testified that
she looked both ways before crossing a busy highway and that she
did not see the automobile that struck her.
She also testified
that her vision was unobstructed for approximately 600 feet in
the direction of the appellant’s car.
The Court was troubled by
this testimony and posed the question: “[w]hy did she not see?”
The Court went on to conclude that it would have been impossible
for her to have looked and not to have seen the automobile
approaching.20
Perdue would have this Court apply the same
reasoning to the present analysis.
In fact, it even paraphrases
the former Court of Appeals, “[h]ow could [Mayes] not have known
that his condition was work-related?”
Perdue’s argument, however, lacks merit and is easily
rejected.
Mayes did not know his condition was work-related
because he was never informed of such.
Had he been informed by
a physician that his condition was work-related, then Couch
would apply as it would have been impossible for him not to have
known.
The ALJ, however, determined that Mayes had not been
informed that his condition was work-related until March 6,
2000.
Moreover, his testimony on the issue was competent and of
sufficient probative value to justify the ALJ’s determination.21
20
Id. at 207.
21
See Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15, 16 (1977);
and Johnson v. Skilton Construction Co., Ky., 467 S.W.2d 785, 788 (1971).
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Once again, we cannot disturb any factual findings made by the
ALJ so long as there is sufficient evidence of probative value
justifying the decision.22
Perdue’s second claim of error is premised upon the
ALJ’s finding that the impairment established in 1996 was “part
and parcel” of the current claim.
As noted above, Perdue
conducted audiological testing on Mayes in 1996.
Dr. Dave
subsequently reviewed the result of the audiogram performed on
May 15, 1996.
Dr. Dave testified that the audiogram revealed a
hearing loss consistent with an impairment rating of 9%.23
Thus,
Perdue claims it is not liable for the 9% impairment rating that
existed in 1996.
According to Perdue, the proper method for
assessing the level of functional impairment is to consider the
current level of impairment and to carve out or subtract the
preexisting level of impairment.
As a result, Perdue argues
that Mayes is only entitled to compensation based upon a 4.6%
impairment rating.
Our analysis turns upon an interpretation of KRS
342.7305(4), which reads as follows:
When audiograms and other testing
reveal a pattern of hearing loss compatible
with that caused by hazardous noise exposure
22
Holman, 536 S.W.2d at 465.
23
Dr. Dave did not review the results of the May 1996 audiogram until May 14,
2001. Thus, the 9% impairment rating was not actually established until
several years after the 1996 tests were conducted.
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and the employee demonstrates repetitive
exposure to hazardous noise in the
workplace, there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that the hearing impairment in
an injury covered by this chapter, and the
employer with whom the employee was last
injuriously exposed to hazardous noise shall
be exclusively liable for benefits.
We begin by noting the interpretation to be given a
statute is a matter of law, and we are not required to give
deference to the decision of the Board.24
We must, however,
adhere to the general rule that the workers’ compensation
statutes will be liberally construed to affect their humane and
beneficent purposes.25
When read in conjunction with the rest of
the statute, the term “exclusively” suggests that it does not
matter whether Mayes developed his hearing condition while
working for other employers prior to being hired by Perdue.
Since Perdue is the last employer with whom Mayes was
injuriously exposed, it is exclusively liable for all benefits
due and payable as a result of his work-related hearing loss.
As previously discussed, Mayes was not aware that his hearing
loss was work-related until March 2000.
Thus, none of Mayes’s
hearing impairment leading up to the work-relatedness
determination made in March 2000 can be excluded from his
24
Wilson v. SKW Alloys, Ky.App., 893 S.W.2d 800, 801-02 (1995)(citing Newberg
v. Thomas Industries, Ky.App., 852 S.W.2d 339, 340 (1993)).
25
Id. at 802 (citing Oaks v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., Ky., 438 S.W.2d 482, 484
(1969)).
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overall disability.
If we were to accept Perdue’s argument,
then utilizing the date the injury began to manifest itself
would nonetheless result in many cumulative trauma disability
claims having little value, since all pre-existing disability
would be carved out of the total amount of disability, leaving
as compensable only that part of the disability which occurred
within the two-year statute of limitations.
Accordingly, the opinion of the Workers’ Compensation
Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John C. Morton
Samuel J. Bach
Henderson, Kentucky
Ronald K. Bruce
Greenville, Kentucky
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