LOREN NICHOLS, M.D. v. PIKEVILLE UNITED METHODIST HOSPITAL OF KENTUCKY, INC.
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 26, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001117-MR
LOREN NICHOLS, M.D.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00794
v.
PIKEVILLE UNITED METHODIST HOSPITAL
OF KENTUCKY, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, SCHRODER AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Loren Nichols, M.D. has appealed from an order
of the Pike Circuit Court entered on April 24, 2002, which
granted Pikeville United Methodist Hospital’s (PMH) motion for
summary judgment.
Having concluded that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that PMH was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, we affirm.
On February 26, 1996, Dr. Nichols and PMH entered into
an agreement whereby Dr. Nichols would begin practicing
orthopedic surgery in the Pikeville, Kentucky, area, including
the service area of PMH.
According to the contract, there was
an insufficient number of orthopedic surgeons in the Pikeville
area to meet the needs of the community.
In exchange for Dr.
Nichols agreeing to practice in the Pikeville area for three
years, PMH agreed to, inter alia, loan Dr. Nichols $57,000.00,
which would be forgiven if Dr. Nichols fulfilled his three-year
obligation.1
In late July 1997, Dr. Nichols moved to Pikeville
and began his practice at PMH.
During the fall of 1998, Dr. Nichols developed a boil
or pimple on his forearm that was slow in healing.
Tests on the
boil revealed that it was a bacterial infection known as
Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA).
As a
result, Dr. Nichols immediately ceased performing surgeries
until the infection had been given time to heal.
According to
Dr. Nichols’s deposition testimony, he refrained from performing
surgeries for approximately six days until the boil had healed
and he was cleared by Dr. Tamara Musgrave2 to resume performing
surgical procedures.
1
PMH also agreed to pay Dr. Nichols $25,000.00 as compensation under the
agreement.
2
Dr. Musgrave was an Infectious Disease Specialist at PMH during this time
period.
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At some point prior to June 1999, several of Dr.
Nichols’s former patients complained that he had infected them
during treatment.3
At around the same time, three other doctors
at PMH, Dr. Lela Maynard, Dr. Debbie Bailey, and Dr. Glenn
Irwin, also complained to hospital administrators regarding Dr.
Nichols’s response time to emergency room calls and his decision
to transfer patients that may have been properly treated
locally.
In June 1999 the Office of Inspector General for the
Kentucky Cabinet for Health Services investigated MRSA
infections in Dr. Nichols’s patients at PMH.
The Investigation
Report “substantiated” the allegations that PMH and Dr. Nichols
had “failed to protect patients from infections.”4
The report
concluded by recommending that Dr. Nichols be reported to the
Medical Licensure Board.5
On June 18, 1999, after reviewing information
contained in the Investigative Report, the Executive Committee
3
Dr. Nichols testified in his deposition that eight people had brought suit
against him alleging that he had infected them when they received treatment
as his patients.
4
Specifically, the report found that PMH “permitted a surgeon [Dr. Nichols]
with a positive culture for MRSA to return to the practice of surgery, prior
to obtaining a negative culture as recommended by the Infectious Disease
Specialist.”
5
Dr. Nichols stated in his deposition that he was reported to the Medical
Licensure Board, but that he never received any kind of official complaint or
notification from the Board. Dr. Nichols also stated that he believed one of
his former patient’s attorneys reported him to the Board.
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of the Medical Staff of PMH notified Dr. Nichols by letter that
“[his] surgical infection rate [was] significantly higher than
[his] peers at this hospital,” and that “[his] past activities
[had] raised questions regarding [his] judgment.”
The Executive
Committee further stated in this letter that Dr. Nichols would
be required to receive additional training from the hospital’s
Infection Control Officer, and that there would be “close
monitoring” during his surgical cases.
Following receipt of
this letter, Dr. Nichols immediately resigned from his staff
privileges at PMH.6
During this same time period, Dr. Nichols began
applying for surgical privileges at two other hospitals, Three
Rivers Medical Center and Paul B. Hall Regional Medical Center.
On July 7, 1999, Dr. Nichols signed a release form authorizing
Three Rivers to consult with other hospitals or institutions
regarding his professional competence as an orthopedic surgeon.
This release form also authorized PMH to release documents to
Three Rivers that might be relevant to its investigation of Dr.
Nichols’s credentials.
On July 8, 1999, Dr. Nichols signed a
similar written release form with Paul B. Hall.
As part of the investigative process, copies of the
letter sent by the Executive Committee to Dr. Nichols, wherein
he was notified of the results of the Investigative Report, were
6
Dr. Nichols’s resignation letter was dated June 21, 1999.
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sent by PMH to both Three Rivers and Paul B. Hall.
Prior to
this however, Dr. Nichols testified that he personally gave both
hospitals a copy of the letter.
According to Dr. Nichols’s
testimony, he did not want either hospital to be surprised by
the contents of the letter, and he wanted a chance to explain
the situation.
Three Rivers eventually granted surgical
privileges to Dr. Nichols, but Paul B. Hall did not.
On November 3, 1999, PMH filed suit in Pike Circuit
Court, seeking to collect the amount owed under its loan
agreement with Dr. Nichols.
PMH claimed that Dr. Nichols had
failed to fulfill the last two years of his three-year
obligation.7
On June 16, 2000, Dr. Nichols filed a separate suit
in Pike Circuit Court, asserting a wrongful termination of
employment claim and a defamation claim against PMH.
In an
order dated August 12, 2000, the trial court consolidated the
two cases.8
On September 10, 2001, PMH filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Dr. Nichols was not an employee of PMH,
and hence, could not have been “wrongfully terminated.”
PMH
further argued that the release forms signed by Dr. Nichols
barred his defamation claim against PMH.
7
After a hearing was
PMH sought $79,078.43, plus applicable interest charges in damages.
8
According to PMH’s brief, its claims against Dr. Nichols are still pending
before the trial court.
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held on the matter, the trial court granted PMH’s motion for
summary judgment on April 24, 2002.
This appeal followed.
Dr. Nichols argues that summary judgment was improper
on the grounds that a genuine issue of material fact existed as
to whether PMH released copies of the letter in question to
Three Rivers and Paul B. Hall “in good faith.”
Specifically,
Dr. Nichols argues:
Certainly, the dispute between PMH and Dr.
Nichols as to the truth or falsity of the
matters asserted in its letter of June 18,
1999, and its subsequent publication to
prospective employers, is such a dispute as
to [preclude summary judgment].
We disagree and hold that there was no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that PMH was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
Summary judgment is only proper “where the movant
shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any
circumstances.”9
The trial court must view the record “in a
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for
summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his
favor.”10
This Court has previously stated that “[t]he standard
of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether the trial
9
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480
(1991) (citing Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985)).
10
Steelvest, supra, (citing Dossett v. New York Mining & Manufacturing Co.,
Ky., 451 S.W.2d 843 (1970)).
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court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to
any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
There is no requirement that the
appellate court defer to the trial court since factual findings
are not at issue” [citations omitted].11
Section 583 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
states in part that “the consent of another to the publication
of defamatory matter concerning him is a complete defense to his
action for defamation.”12
Comment d to Section 583 explains what
is necessary for a consent to be valid:
It is not necessary that the other know
that the matter to the publication of which
he consents is defamatory in character. It
is enough that he knows the exact language
of the publication or that he has reason to
know that it may be defamatory. In such a
case, by consent to its publication, he
takes the risk that it may be defamatory.13
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that Dr.
Nichols knew the exact contents of the letter which he now
claims contained defamatory statements.
It is also not disputed
that Dr. Nichols expressly signed written release forms
authorizing PMH to release, among other things, copies of the
letter in question to Three Rivers and Paul B. Hall.
11
By signing
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
12
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 583 (1977). See also William S. Haynes,
Kentucky Jurisprudence, Torts § 8-7, p. 184 (1987) (stating that “[i]t is
also generally recognized that an absolute privilege exists where the
plaintiff has given his consent to the defamation”).
13
Id. at comment d.
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these release forms, Dr. Nichols knew that Three Rivers and Paul
B. Hall would have access to this letter.
Indeed, Dr. Nichols
admitted in his own testimony that he personally delivered
copies of the letter to both hospitals so that neither would be
surprised by the contents of the letter and so he would have a
chance to explain the situation.
Thus, since Dr. Nichols
consented to the publication of this alleged defamatory letter,
PMH is afforded a complete defense against Dr. Nichols’s
defamation action.
In his brief to this Court, Dr. Nichols has devoted
much of his time attempting to point out facts which he contends
indicate “bad faith” conduct on the part of PMH in releasing
copies of the letter to Three Rivers and Paul B. Hall.
However,
where the person alleging defamation has consented to the
publication of the statements in question, the presence or
absence of good faith is immaterial in determining whether the
defense of consent is available.
We return once again to
Section 583, where comment f states:
The privilege conferred by the consent
of the person about whom the defamatory
matter is published is absolute. The
protection given by it is complete, and it
is not affected by the ill will or personal
hostility of the publisher or by any
improper purpose for which he may make the
publication, unless the consent is to its
publication for a particular purpose, in
which case the publication for any other
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purpose is not within the scope of the
consent.14
Dr. Nichols does not argue that the publication of the
letter in question was for a purpose that was not intended by
the release.
Dr. Nichols intended for PMH to provide Three
Rivers and Paul B. Hall with documents concerning his employment
at PMH and the letter in question constituted such a document.
Hence, PMH was absolutely privileged in releasing copies of the
letter to Three Rivers and Paul B. Hall, regardless of any
alleged “bad faith” conduct on the part of PMH.
Accordingly,
since there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, PMH was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Dr. Nichols’s
defamation claim.15
Finally, we note that Dr. Nichols has made no argument
on this appeal that the trial court erred by granting PMH’s
motion for summary judgment on his wrongful termination claim.
Therefore, we will not discuss this issue on appeal.
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Pike Circuit
Court is affirmed.
14
Id. at comment f.
For similar cases from other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Baker v. Lafayette
College, 504 A.2d 247 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1986)(holding that a college was
absolutely privileged in publishing a professor’s evaluation where that
professor had consented to such publication); Litman v. Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 739 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1984)(holding that the defendant
was entitled to a complete defense where the plaintiff consented to the
release of statements regarding his financial situation); and Cox v. Nasche,
70 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1995)(holding that a former employer was absolutely
privileged in releasing a former employee’s work history to a prospective
employer where the employee had signed written release form authorizing such
a release).
15
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael de Bourbon
Pikeville, Kentucky
Pamela May
Pikeville, Kentucky
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