FLOYD ARNOLD IMBODEN v. SUSAN PHELPS and TROVER CLINIC
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RENDERED: AUGUST 8, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001052-MR
FLOYD ARNOLD IMBODEN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00845
v.
SUSAN PHELPS and
TROVER CLINIC
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BAKER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE.
two minor children.
Floyd Arnold Imboden is the father of
He filed this action after Susan Phelps, a
psychologist, concluded that Imboden sexually abused the
children.
Her signed affidavit containing her expert opinion
regarding the abuse and her testimony were subsequently used in
a custody proceeding between Imboden and his ex-wife.
After the
custody dispute was resolved, Imboden filed this action against
Phelps alleging negligence, defamation, and slander.
He also
named as a defendant Phelps’ employer, Trover Clinic.
The trial
court ultimately held that the negligence action was barred by
the one-year time period set out in KRS1 413.245 and that Phelps
was entitled to absolute immunity on the libel and slander
claims.
This appeal followed.
Imboden and Karen Heady were divorced and Karen was
awarded custody of their two sons, Jesse and John.
given visitation.
Imboden was
Imboden’s two sons.
In October 1995, Phelps began seeing
At that time, Phelps noted that although
Jesse appeared to be functioning normally, John was showing
signs of anger and difficulty sleeping.
In April 1996, Jesse
began to exhibit similar problems.
On April 23, 1997, Phelps had a session with Jesse and
asked him to draw a picture of a person.
The picture, in which
there was a tree without leaves, a house, and a person with
large hands, led Phelps and her supervisor to conclude that the
drawing contained phallic symbols and indicated defensiveness.
In early May 1997, Phelps contacted the Kentucky State Police
and the Cabinet for Human Resources.
On May 9, 1997, Phelps and
Karen executed affidavits stating that Imboden had abused the
children and Karen filed a motion requesting that visitation be
denied.
A hearing on the motion was held on March 10, 1998, at
which Phelps testified concerning her opinion regarding
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Imboden’s abuse of the children.
However, based on a report by
Dr. Linda Flynn, the court continued visitation.
Imboden filed the present action on December 23, 1998.
On May 5, 2000, Phelps and Trover Clinic moved for summary
judgment on the basis that Phelps had a duty to report the
suspected abuse under KRS 620.030, that she has civil immunity
under KRS 620.050, and had a common law privilege from civil
suit for statements made in the custody proceeding.
The court
denied the motion holding that Phelps’ immunity depended on her
good faith, which was a jury question.
On December 18, 2000,
the appellees filed a second motion arguing that the action was
not timely filed pursuant to KRS 413.140 and 413.245, and again
that Phelps’ testimony in a judicial proceeding is absolutely
privilege.
On May 18, 2001, the court held the libel and
slander claim in abeyance pending the finality of this court’s
opinion in Reed v. Isaacs.2
It granted summary judgment on the
negligence claim finding that it was not filed within the oneyear time period set out in KRS 413.245.
After Reed became
final, on February 18, 2002, Phelps and Trover Clinic renewed
their motion for summary judgment on the libel and slander
claims to which Imboden did not file a response.
On April 18,
2002, the circuit court granted summary judgment finding that
2
Ky. App., 62 S.W.3d 398 (2000).
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the affidavit and the testimony at the hearing are privileged
and not subject to a civil suit for libel or slander.
Imboden’s notice of appeal identifies only the April
18, 2002, order as that appealed.
The only issue addressed in
that order is whether Phelps is entitled to immunity on the
libel and slander claims.
Imboden’s negligence claims against
Phelps and Trover Clinic were not addressed and were resolved in
earlier orders of the court.
CR3 73.03 specifically requires
that the notice of appeal designate the order appealed from and
strict compliance with the rule is required.4
We will not,
therefore, consider whether the trial court’s ruling that the
negligence claim is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations is correct.
Following Reed, there is no dispute that testimony
given in the course of a judicial proceeding is absolutely
privileged against claims for libel and slander:
Where a witness willfully and maliciously
gives false testimony, he is liable to
prosecution for perjury or false swearing.
[However] [n]o civil action will lie against
him, because it is a well-settled rule in
practically all jurisdictions that the
testimony of a witness given in the course
of a judicial proceeding is privileged and
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
4
Hopkins v. Hilliard, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 130 (1969).
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will not support a cause of action against
him.5
Phelps’ testimony and her affidavit given during the course of
the custody proceedings falls within the protection afforded.
Imboden argues that while Phelps’ testimony and
affidavit given during the custody proceeding are privileged,
her statements to social services and the police are not
shielded.
Although Imboden raised this issue in his initial
response to Phelps’ and Trover Clinic’s motion for summary
judgment, there is no distinction made in the circuit court’s
order between Phelps’ statements during the custody proceeding
and those prior to the proceeding.
However, even if this court
were to find that in reporting the suspected abuse, under KRS
520.050 she is entitled to a privilege from civil suit only if
her actions were in good faith, the action would have had to be
commenced within one year from the date of the alleged libel or
slander.
The reports to the police and the Cabinet for Human
Resources were made in May 1997 and the action was not commenced
until December 1998, well beyond the one-year time period.
The order of the Hopkins Circuit Court is affirmed.
BAKER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
5
Reed, supra, at 398 (quoting from McClarty v. Bickel, 155 Ky. 254, 159 S.W.
783, 784-85 (1913).
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JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING:
I concur with the
Majority Opinion on all issues except its misapplication of CR
73.03.
The order entered on May 18, 2001, which granted a
partial summary judgment on the issue of negligence was
interlocutory and was not made final until the trial court
entered its final order on April 18, 2002.6
However, I would
still affirm the trial court’s ruling on the merits.
The
tolling of the statute of limitations by the discovery rule does
not save Imboden’s negligence claim since he was aware of his
claim prior to December 23, 1997.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Tod D. Megibow
MEGIBOW & EDWARDS, PSC
Paducah, Kentucky
Charles G. Franklin
FRANKLIN, GORDON & HOBGOOD
Madisonville, Kentucky
6
Tile House v. Cumberland Federal Savings Bank, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 904, 907
(1997); Patrick v. Hiner, Ky.App., 867 S.W.2d 211, 212 (1993).
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