ROBERT LOUDEN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and JEREMIE J. SULLIVAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 12, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-001050-MR
ROBERT LOUDEN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00740-002
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
and
NO.
2002-CA-001120-MR
JEREMIE J. SULLIVAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00740-003
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, COMBS, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Shortly after midnight on August 20, 2001,
Jeremie Sullivan, Robert Louden, and Richard Arlinghaus
assaulted Jeff McManama in the parking lot of Jillian’s, a
restaurant and bar in Covington.
The three men were soon
arrested, and because a satchel of compact discs had been taken
from McManama, they were charged with second-degree robbery.1
Arlinghaus eventually pled guilty to fourth-degree assault.
Louden and Sullivan, however, jointly stood trial and were
convicted, respectively, of second-degree robbery and complicity
to second-degree robbery, both class C felonies.
By judgment
entered May 8, 2002, the Kenton Circuit Court sentenced Louden
to eight years’ imprisonment.
By judgment entered May 15, 2002,
the court sentenced Sullivan to five years’ imprisonment and
probated that sentence for five years.
both appealed.
review.
Louden and Sullivan have
This Court consolidated their appeals for
The appellants maintain that their attack upon McManama
was a misdemeanor assault, not a robbery, and that the trial
court erred by failing to direct a verdict to that effect.
In
addition, Louden maintains that the trial court arbitrarily
rejected his guilty plea, and Sullivan complains that one of the
Commonwealth’s exhibits and certain remarks by the prosecutor
undermined the fairness of the trial.
We affirm.
McManama and three companions went to Jillian’s on a
Sunday night to bowl and to drink a few beers.
One of the
companions brought in a small satchel of compact discs, and the
bartender played the discs on Jillian’s stereo system.
Late in
the evening another group of young men, including Louden and
Sullivan, came into the bowling alley.
1
KRS 515.030.
2
Apparently there was
some cordial interaction between the groups.
McManama’s group
bought all a round or two of beers and gave the other group some
food.
When Jillian’s closed, at midnight, one of McManama’s
companions had already gone to the car and the two others
stopped in the restroom on the way outside.
McManama, with the
satchel of compact discs in his hand, left the building and was
confronted in the parking lot by Louden, Sullivan, and
Arlinghaus.
What passed between them is not clear.
No one called
Arlinghaus as a witness, Louden and Sullivan declined to
testify, and McManama, who was beaten unconscious, testified
that he could not recall what preceded the attack.
McManama’s
companion who had left early was asleep in the car.
The two
companions who had stopped in the restroom testified that as
soon as they left the building and came into the parking lot
they heard McManama trying to pacify the other three.
the problem?” he said.
food.”
“What is
“We bought you drinks, we gave you
They then saw Louden and Sullivan punch McManama in the
face, knock him down, and kick him several times in the head and
ribs.
One of companions went inside for help, the other
intervened.
Apparently there was a brief standoff.
McManama
may have attempted to get up, but Arlinghaus felled him again
with another kick to the head.
Louden, according to one of the
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companions, picked up the satchel of compact discs and fled
together with Sullivan.
Within a few minutes several policemen had arrived.
One attended McManama and saw him into an ambulance.
arrested Arlinghaus not far from the parking lot.
One
Another
followed a tip to a residence on Lewis Street where he found the
satchel of compact discs and, in the residence’s parking area,
arrested Louden and Sullivan.
KRS 515.030 provides that
[a] person is guilty of robbery in the
second degree when, in the course of
committing theft, he uses or threatens the
immediate use of physical force upon another
person with intent to accomplish the theft.
KRS 502.020(1) provides in part that
[a] person is guilty of an offense committed
by another person when, with the intention
of promoting or facilitating the commission
of the offense, he : . . . [a]ids, counsels,
or attempts to aid such person in planning
or committing the offense.
Louden and Sullivan contend that the Commonwealth
failed to prove that they attacked McManama intending to take
the cds.
Louden argues that the jury could have inferred that
the attack was sparked by something else and that the theft of
the cds was an afterthought.
Sullivan argues that even if
Louden intended to take the cds there was no evidence that he,
Sullivan, knew of or shared that intent.
4
This court, of course, may not order a directed
verdict unless the jury’s finding of guilt was clearly
unreasonable.2
The jury is permitted to make reasonable
inferences, including inferences about the defendant’s state of
mind from proof about his acts and the circumstances surrounding
those acts.3
The jury’s inferences need only be reasonable in
light of that proof, they need not be the only possible
inferences.
The robbery statute, moreover, requires only that
theft be a purpose of the assault, not the only purpose.4
The evidence that Sullivan and Louden attacked in
unison and apparently in concert, that Louden made a point of
picking up the satchel of cds, that he and Sullivan fled
together immediately after he picked it up, and that together
they attempted to secret the cds in the Lewis Street residence
are all facts permitting a reasonable inference that the theft
of the cds was a motive for the attack upon McManama and that
Sullivan shared that motive.
Although this is not the only
possible interpretation of the evidence, it is a likely
interpretation and one that a reasonable juror could believe
beyond a reasonable doubt.
2
The trial court did not err,
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991).
3
Commonwealth v. Suttles, Ky., 80 S.W.3d 424 (2002); Mills v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473 (1999).
4
Morgan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 730 S.W.2d 935 (1987).
5
therefore, when it denied the defendants’ motions for directed
verdicts.
Louden also contends that the trial court abused its
discretion when it rejected his offer to plead guilty.
The day
before trial Louden’s attorney represented to the court that
Louden desired to plead guilty to an amended charge of seconddegree assault under extreme emotional disturbance, a class D
felony.5
A discussion ensued during which the parties conceded
that the amended charge bore little relation to the alleged
facts, but struck a compromise between second-degree robbery, a
class C felony, and fourth-degree assault, a class A
misdemeanor.
The court expressed distaste for such fictional
guilty pleas and indicated that it probably would not accept
Louden’s plea.
Several times during the discussion Louden
indicated by shaking his head that the proposed plea was his
attorney’s idea, not his, and at the conclusion of the hearing,
when counsel asked him if he still wished to tender the plea,
Louden emphatically said that he did not.
Although it would seem to be well within the trial
court’s broad discretion under RCr 8.08 to reject a plea for
which there is no factual predicate, we need not reach that
question because Louden’s plea was never tendered and so could
not be rejected.
5
Louden’s claim that the trial court somehow
KRS 508.020, KRS 508.040.
6
improperly influenced his decision not to tender the plea is
meritless.
His decision was clearly based not on anything the
trial court said, but on his desire to avoid a felony
conviction, even at the risk of a trial for robbery.
Turning to Sullivan’s contentions, the officer who
arrested Louden and Sullivan seized the shoes they were wearing
because he suspected the presence on them of fresh human blood.
The Commonwealth introduced the shoes into evidence along with
lab results confirming the officer’s suspicions.
Sullivan
contends that the Commonwealth failed to establish an adequate
foundation for the introduction of his shoes and further
contends that the lab result, which confirmed that human blood
was on the shoes but did not identify the individual source of
the blood, was unduly prejudicial.
KRE 901(a) provides that
the requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent
claims.
To authenticate the allegedly bloody shoes, the Commonwealth
offered testimony by the officer who seized the shoes and by two
forensic lab technicians who inspected the shoes.
The officer
testified that the shoes offered at trial were the same shoes he
had seized from Sullivan the night of the attack.
The shoes are
black, and at trial the officer conceded that he could not then
7
see the alleged spatter marks.
He testified, however, that at
the time he seized the shoes the spatter marks were visible to
the unaided eye.
One of the technicians testified that the
shoes offered at trial were the ones he had tested.
He
described his removal of samples from both shoes and the tests
he performed to determine that the samples were human blood.
Someone had drawn on the shoes, apparently to indicate
areas that may have been spattered or areas to be tested.
The
drawer did not testify, and Sullivan contends that absent that
testimony KRE 901 was not satisfied and the shoes should not
have been admitted.
Not only does the drawer represent a
missing link in the chain of custody, but the markings, may,
Sullivan insists, have created a false impression about the
amount of blood on the shoes.
We disagree.
As our Supreme Court has explained,
a party seeking to introduce an item of
tangible evidence need not satisfy an
“absolute” identification requirement, and
evidence is admissible if the offering
party’s evidence reasonably identifies the
item. . . . [I]f the offered evidence is of
such a nature as not to be readily
identifiable, or to be susceptible to
alteration by tampering or contamination,
sound exercise of the trial court’s
discretion may require a substantially more
elaborate foundation. A foundation of the
latter sort will commonly entail
testimonially tracing the “chain of custody”
of the item with sufficient completeness to
render it improbable that the original item
8
has either been exchanged with another or
been contaminated or tampered with.6
We agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth’s
proof in this case satisfied this standard.
Enough of the chain
of custody was presented to establish the probability that
Sullivan’s shoes were tested and that they had not been
contaminated or tampered with.
The drawings, of course, did not
alter the presence of blood, and they corresponded closely
enough with the areas where blood samples were found as not to
require a separate explanation.
There is no indication that
they were intended to be misleading, nor is it at all likely
that they were given the jury’s opportunity to examine the shoes
and the testimony by several witnesses that McManama had bled
noticeably but not profusely.
Because the Commonwealth did not determine whose blood
was on the shoes, Sullivan contends that they amounted to
sensational and prejudicial evidence that was not sufficiently
probative to be admitted.
We disagree.
Evidence is probative,
of course, if it has any tendency to make a material fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
The
fact that Sullivan’s shoes bore spatters of human blood
increases the probability that he participated in the attack
upon McManama.
6
Evidence is unduly prejudicial if the jury is
Grundy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 25 S.W.3d 76, 80 (2000).
9
apt to give it substantially more weight than it deserves.
As
evidence of Sullivan’s participation in the assault, the jury is
not apt to have exaggerated the import of the shoes.
There was
ample evidence in addition to the shoes that Sullivan
participated in the assault.
Sullivan’s concern, as we understand it, is that the
jury may have been sufficiently outraged by evidence that the
attack was brutal to have found the attack a robbery instead of
an assault.
As noted above, however, there was sufficient
evidence of Sullivan’s intent to further Louden’s theft of the
cds to justify his robbery conviction.
Proof that the assault
was brutal enough to draw blood was not unduly prejudicial.
Finally, Sullivan contends that during his closing
argument the prosecutor told the jury that Sullivan could be
found complicit in the robbery regardless of his intent.
prosecutor did no such thing.
The
He did argue, legitimately, that
the intent of the robbers could be inferred from the fact that
the theft occurred in close temporal proximity to the assault.
He then suggested that such an inference was required.
Both
defendants immediately objected, and the trial court admonished
the jury to follow the law as expressed in the instructions.
In
their closings, of course, the defendants had emphasized
robbery’s intent element and the weakness of the Commonwealth’s
proof on that point.
We are confident that the jury appreciated
10
the issue.
Notwithstanding the unsuccessful attempt by the
prosecutor to overstate his case, Sullivan’s trial was
fundamentally fair.7
In sum, the General Assembly has declared its
intolerance of robbery, no matter how petty the theft involved.
In this case, the jury was convinced that to further a very
petty theft Louden and Sullivan perpetrated a violent assault.
The evidence does not compel, but it supports this conclusion.
Louden was not deprived of a right to plead guilty, and the
trial for both defendants was fundamentally fair.
Accordingly,
we affirm the May 8, 2002, and May 15, 2002, judgments of the
Kenton Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT LOUDEN:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
John M. Schultz
Benson & Schultz, P.S.C.
Walton, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT SULLIVAN:
Carlton S. Shier, IV
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Dennis A. Repenning
Erlanger, Kentucky
7
Slaughter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 744 S.W.2d 407 (1987).
11
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